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Abstract 
 
The global business environment is defined by its compete-or-perish nature. To 
survive, businesses must continually undertake both organic and inorganic corporate 
restructuring activities. Amongst the inorganic options, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
are a very attractive strategy for managers. When implemented successfully, M&As may 
enable rapid forays into new territories, the benefits of diversification, economies of scale, 
operating and financial synergies, better efficiencies, industrial supremacy, tax advantages 
and several more rewards. However, when they fail, M&As destroy the value of the 
participating firms. This failure can be caused by diseconomies of scale, lack of synergy, 
cultural conflicts, negotiation disputes, integration issues, agency issues, the hubris effect, 
and so on. Given the numerous advantages of M&As, it is not surprising that managers show 
an urge to merge. However, a wrong venture can wipe out millions of dollars of shareholders 
wealth. Nonetheless, global business history is replete with M&As debacles. Thus, the 
implementation of M&As is a debatable strategy that needs careful evaluation.  
The finance literature about M&As in the developed world is abundant. However, the 
emerging markets are not so well understood. While the emerging markets are relatively 
newer players, they are continuously gaining prominence on the global business landscape. 
The finance literature argues that Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs) are 
fundamentally different, in terms of their characteristics, from their counterparts in developed 
countries. In terms of globalization, as late comers, EMNEs have lagged behind, making their 
inspirations, intentions and implementation techniques quite unique. Further, emerging 
markets are typically characterized by weaker legal systems, with the legal firms controlled 
and managed by large business groups that own majority stakes in the firms. As a 
consequence, outside shareholders are minority shareholders, and in the context of classical 
agency theory, the principal and the agents are same identities. This implies a convergence 
of ownership and control. Thus, minority shareholders face the risk of expropriation of wealth 
at the hands of majority shareholders (horizontal agency issue), and the weaker legal systems 
constrain them in controlling the errant managers. Conceivably, announcing M&As in such 
a setting is poised to yield unique share market responses. Thus, our current understanding of 
M&As in the developed world has limited relevance to emerging markets.  
India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and a member of the  
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, which are projected to be 
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the most dominant economies by 2050. In the last 25 years, India has undergone a series of 
economic reforms which has catapulted its status from a dormant state to one of the key 
players shaping up the new globalized economy. The current Indian Prime Minister, Mr 
Narendra Modi, is one of the most influential statesmen worldwide and is known for carrying 
out bold policies in a democracy that accounts for a sixth of the world’s population. In fact, 
the press is already debating about the long-term potential that India has to become a new 
economic superpower.  
This thesis highlights several conflicting and intriguingly perplexing attributes about 
India that make it a unique country amongst other emerging markets, thus necessitating 
research focussed on India. This thesis develops a comprehensive framework which projects 
India as a common-law country with business structures and corporate governance models 
resembling civil-law countries, yet is distant from either of the two with respect to its socio-
cultural anthropological attributes. By defying existing principle theories in finance 
literature on various dimensions characteristically, India thus portrays a contradictory and 
captivatingly puzzling image. Therefore, to gain deeper insights, this thesis tests a set of 
hypotheses focusing on the impact of the factors like ownership stake, cultural proximity, 
related institutional frameworks, comparable corporate governance models, and economic 
distances on the returns obtained by the Indian shareholders.  
In essence, this thesis mainly focuses on the following set of questions:  
(i) How do the Indian target and acquirer shareholders fare on the announcement 
of M&As, both domestic and cross-border?  
(ii) Is there a difference in return from domestic and cross-border M&As for the 
shareholders?  
(iii) Is there any ownership effect on the returns to the shareholders in domestic 
M&As?  
(iv) Is there any cultural effect on the returns to the shareholders in cross-border 
M&As?  
(v) Is there any institutional effect on the returns to the shareholders in cross-
border M&As?  
(vi) Is there any corporate governance effect on the returns to the shareholders in 
cross-border M&As?  
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(vii) Is there any economic distance effect on the returns to the shareholders in 
cross-border M&As? 
The methodology employed is a two-stage analysis. The first stage includes an event 
study, which aims to determine abnormal returns associated with announcements of M&As 
to the Indian shareholders affected by the deal.  
The second stage is a cross-sectional analysis, which aims to identify the factors that 
may explain the sources of abnormal returns obtained by these shareholders. The two 
financial models—Market and three factor Fama-French—are used to calculate the abnormal 
returns for the event study. These abnormal returns are determined by using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and robust regression techniques. The robust regression method in the 
event study is the methodological contribution of this thesis to the literature. The 
contemporary discussions about event study methodology in statistical papers suggest that 
the robust regression method is more reliable in capturing announcement effects. For the 
cross-sectional analysis, the key factors identified in the literature are regressed with the 
cumulative average abnormal returns to identify those that determine the source of the returns.  
The data for the analysis covers the M&A deals from 1989 to 2013. In total, 407 deals 
are shortlisted, with the analysis based on 308 target firms and 355 acquirer firms. The 
emerging market literature often sights data limitations, and thus the analysis is confined to 
the scope of the data. The methodologically induced filtering process of excluding deals with 
the confounding effects and insufficient trading data, along with the missing firms, narrowed 
the sample size for some sub-sets. For example, of the original 50 cross-border deals by Indian 
acquirers, there are 38 left in the clean sample. The phenomenon of missing firms is a known 
issue in the Indian markets and is well documented. Likewise, even the relevant accounting 
data to perform a pair-wise relative analysis of the target and acquiring firms is missing for a 
significant proportion of the dataset. Finally, this thesis focuses on the successful deals 
between the listed firms. The unsuccessful, pending, rumoured, withdrawn deals along with 
the deals involving private firms on either side are not incorporated. 
The results indicate that:  
(i) Both the target and acquiring shareholders make positive abnormal returns on 
the announcement of M&As.  
(ii) Domestic deals produce higher returns for the shareholders than cross-border 
deals.  
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(iii) The deals in which acquirers take a significant stake (>50%) are favoured 
more by the sharemarket. There is also an indication that the large business 
groups do not indulge in tunnelling of wealth, and intra-group M&As yield 
higher returns to the acquirers and lower to the targets.  
(iv) Cultural proximity has no effect in determining the returns to the 
shareholders. Instead, distant cultures produce economically larger returns.  
(v) Similarity in institutions does not dictate the outcomes of M&As.  
(vi) The corporate governance model seems to be the most important source of 
returns to the shareholders in cross-border deals. It appears there is a 
preference for a corporate governance model that encourages the owners to 
take a majority stake in the firm. Given the weaker legal environment, the 
minority shareholders perceive majority stake as a commitment from the 
management to perform well and thus align managers with their interest.  
(vii) The economic distance is an important factor when selecting the target firm 
in the cross-border deals. The higher the economic distance, more advance is 
the target nation, and thus the higher returns to the Indian acquirers. 
Overall, as both the target and acquiring shareholders yield positive announcement 
returns, M&As appear to be a wealth enhancement strategy in the Indian markets. Also, there 
is a distinct preference for corporate practices that encourage concentrated ownership by the 
acquirers, as this enhances investor protection in a weaker legal environment by reducing 
horizontal agency issues between minority and majority shareholders. 
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 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The global business environment is defined by its compete-or-perish nature. The 
ongoing dynamism of this environment engenders continual reshaping of the businesses 
within to counter the ever-evolving competitive environment. As a response, corporations 
often seek organic growth internally by enhancing their core competencies. They undertake 
extensive Research and Development (R&D) which allows early access to productive 
technology or innovative new products. Or, they might devise a better marketing strategy for 
their products, implement competitive pricing or effective advertising policies, or even 
restructure their operations to attain cost efficiencies. Alternatively, corporations can 
restructure inorganically through external methods (various corporate strategies that chiefly 
deal with the overall scope of the business) which may alter their organizational structure and 
entire management. Here, decisions focus on the type and the form of the business, as well 
as its contraction or expansion. Firms may expand through joint ventures or mergers and 
acquisitions (takeovers), or may contract through divestitures, equity carve-outs or spin-offs.  
The ultimate objective for the managers of these firms is to create value for the firm. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As hereafter) are widely used to restructure corporate 
activities. A merger is a fusion of two entities into one new legal entity. An acquisition (or 
takeover) is where one firm takes a stake in another firm, either in part or in full. The modern 
corporations and capital markets made M&As attractive around the turn of the 20th century 
(Stigler, 1950), and since then they have occurred periodically in waves with rising numbers. 
Jensen (1987) favours such inorganic corporate restructuring by asserting that, on average, 
takeovers increase the total market value of the participating firms by nearly 50%.  
In M&As, acquiring companies expand their business horizons by tapping into a new 
set of resources— the capabilities and competencies of the merging or target firms1. They can 
enter new markets without investing in the necessary infrastructure and swiftly expand their 
market share locally and internationally. Alternatively, they can take advantage of the benefits 
of diversification, economies of scale, operating and financial synergies, tax advantages, a 
                                                 
1 M&As are traditionally classified as: (i) Horizontal M&As between competitors in the same industry, (ii) 
Vertical M&As occur between the firms in client – supplier relationships or value chain linkages and (iii) 
Conglomerate M&As occur between the firms from different industries. 
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superior position within the industry, or they may extract a comparative advantage from 
different economies or better efficiencies. The enormous list of the advantages makes M&As 
one of the favourite strategies for managers seeking inorganic corporate growth.  
However, the harsh reality is that the M&A landscape is plagued with deals that have 
destroyed colossal amounts of shareholders wealth, most famously AOL Time Warner and 
Daimler Chrysler (Bartlett, 2007). In fact, there is an equally extensive list of factors that may 
destroy the value of firms involved in M&As. For example, diseconomies of scale, lack of 
synergies, cultural conflicts, negotiation disputes, integration issues, agency issues, the hubris 
effect, and so on. As a result, there is a potential to lose a huge amount of shareholders’ wealth 
in the transaction. Corporate restructuring also entails dramatic changes in the working 
environment and the roles and responsibilities of related people and communities, thus 
creating controversies. The parties that are negatively impacted due to restructuring activities 
protest vehemently and claim that such actions destroy efficiencies, diverting energy from 
productive endeavours. They contend that gains if any are actually from renegotiated 
contracts, capital market inefficiencies in valuing assets, or lower tax payments, rather than 
from real synergies, as always argued. Since the gains are illusory and the costs are real, they 
opine that takeovers should be restricted (Jensen, 1987). Indeed, the evidence of positive 
returns to the acquiring firms is mixed, at least as a result of M&As in the developed world. 
In fact, MergerStat Review (2002) suggests that the mergers between 1995 and 2001 were 
five times greater than any other merger wave ever, and that 25% to 35% of the total mergers 
later resulted in divestitures. Corporate restructuring through divestitures implies disposing 
of some of business units by a firm. Alternatively put, divestitures may be understood as the 
reverse of M&As. Interestingly, M&As are quite often followed by divestitures as divesting 
can enhance firm value2. 
                                                 
2 Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) cite a case study of Thorn EMI which transformed itself from a stressed 
conglomerate merger to a very successful focused music company through divestitures in 1990s. Brealey 
et al. (2001) observe the number of divestitures has been about half of the number of mergers. Grimm’s 
Merger Review for 1987 report 35% of the M&A transactions involved divestitures. Prior to this in 1980s, 
M&A activities represented 35% to 45% of the total mergers as divestitures from other firms (Copeland 
et al., 2005). Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find 44% of the target companies were divested within 7 years 
of their acquisitions in the period from 1971 to 1982. In mergers of 1960 to 1970, Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987) find that 33% of the acquisitions later divested. They also find that the divestitures are almost four 
times likely when targets are not in businesses highly related to those of the acquirers. Porter (1987) 
studies a sample of 33 large conglomerate mergers in the period from 1950 to 1986 and finds 60% of the 
acquisitions in ‘new’ fields, and 74% in unrelated industries, later divested.  
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Empirically, the finance literature converges upon the positive gains made by target 
firms (Asquith et al., 1983), and the zero (Eckbo, 1983) or negative (Dodd, 1980) gains made 
by the acquiring firms as a result of takeover announcements. This initiates a debate about 
the efficacy of M&As overall. Though, Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that the varied 
evidence about acquiring firms is due to the difficulty in measuring returns to them.  
Amidst the mixed arguments and evidence of value creation from M&As and the 
positive impact of divestitures, Porter (1987) takes a different standpoint, arguing that in both 
the process of merging and divesting, the majority of companies have dissipated, instead of 
creating shareholders value. To further confuse our understanding of M&As, there is 
overwhelming evidence suggesting that they may follow (or lead to) each other (Porter, 1987; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) Thus, Porter’s (1987) view of 
the negative impact of corporate restructuring contrasts with Jensen’s (1987) view of the 
positive impact.  
Further, while M&A literature is abundant, the bulk of this literature is based on 
findings from the developed world, particularly in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, and other westernized countries (Franks and Harris, 1989; Erickson, 1998; Fuller 
et al., 2002; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Moeller et al., 2005; Otchere and Ip, 2006). However, 
the understanding of emerging markets characterized by high levels of business activity is 
relatively shallow - this in itself presents an opportunity for research that enhances the 
existing knowledgebase of the nature of M&As worldwide.  
The emerging markets are important because they have grown exponentially and are 
now a favourite destination of international capital inflows through hedge funds, index funds, 
indexes, Exchange Traded Funds, M&As and others. They have higher growth when 
compared to the rest of the world, encouraging corporations worldwide to enter into these 
markets. However, Fan et al. (2011) caution that in emerging markets, business organizations 
and managerial behaviours are fundamentally different to those in the developed world. 
Further, in the context of the prevailing corporate governance systems in the developing 
world, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) argue that due to their institutional specifics, mechanically 
extrapolating the experiences of corporate governance from the developed world may not 
yield necessary explanations. Hence, it is conceivable that in M&As, these markets present a 
different set of challenges all together, thus demanding specific attention by researchers.  
 Jensen (1984) asserts that the shareholders are the most important constituents of the 
modern corporations as they bear the residual risk of every corporate transaction. Thus, this 
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research focuses on the impact on shareholders’ wealth of the target and the acquirer company 
in the external restructuring method – M&As involving India.  
1.2 Research Contribution  
This thesis contributes contextually and methodologically. Not only does it develop 
a  unique framework describing India and test it empirically, it also implements the analysis 
differently. 
1.2.1 Contextual Contribution 
The landscape of M&As literature is vast and well explored but is dominated by 
findings from mature and developed economies such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and other westernized countries. By comparison, the literature from 
emerging markets is relatively sparse, partly because of the limitations posed by data 
availability from these countries. Despite these limitations, researching emerging markets is 
equally important, particularly given their growing importance to the global economy. In 
addition, emerging markets differ extensively from the developed world on various 
dimensions, making existing wisdom about M&As much less applicable.  
Drawn from prominent literature, the following discussion presents a snapshot of the 
major diversions of emerging markets, and thus, India in the context of M&As. These markets 
are typically characterized by (a) weaker legal systems and institutional voids, (b) pyramidal 
business structures, (c) agency issues, and (d) different motives. The arguments presented 
here are discussed at length in the literature review chapter.  
(a) Weaker Legal Systems and Institutional Void 
The shareholders bear the residual risk of every corporate transaction, making 
shareholders the most important constituency of the modern corporate world (Jensen, 1984). 
In that context, the emerging markets are characterized by weaker legal systems, which 
directly affect the level of investor protection. Their capital, labour and product markets 
suffer a variety of market failures. The financial markets are characterized by inadequate 
disclosures, and weak corporate governance and control. Further, securities regulations are 
generally weak, and their enforcement is erratic (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Given the 
institutional void, the threat of takeover markets - a potent tool in developed markets in terms 
of disciplining errant managers and protecting shareholders, does not exist in emerging 
markets. As a result, investors’ in emerging markets prefer concentrated ownership; it is 
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perceived as a means by which to align managerial interests and thus serves as a natural hedge 
against expropriation. That leads to the convergence of ownership and control which makes 
emerging markets behave significantly differently from developed markets. Firstly, the 
M&As tend to be mostly negotitated and friendly; they’re seldom hostile. Secondly, as 
proposed by the Transaction Cost Economies (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979), that 
firms are structured in accord with the institutional context, large business groups with 
concentrated ownerships are typical.  
(b) Pyramidal Business Structures 
La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that in economies with poor shareholder protection, 
firms are typically controlled by families or States. In emerging markets, business is generally 
structured as a pyramid wherein, through an intricate network of cross-holdings, owners can 
control a large number of diversified independent firms called affiliates without commiting 
commensurate cashflow investment.  
For example, the Tata Group, one of the largest business groups in India with 
interestes in everything from salt to software, manages a complex network of hundreds of 
public and private subsidiaries through its holding company, Tata Sons Limited.  
On the brighter side, these groups create their own internal factor markets and thus 
substitute the institutional void prevalent in the emerging markets. The affiliates then are not 
affected by the external market failures. However, at the same time, such complicated 
structures render external market discipline mechanisms ineffective and errant managers are 
able to ply their trade with impunity, often at the cost of minority shareholders3. 
It is conceivable that the participation of such large groups in M&As can change the 
dynamics significantly when compared with other stand-alone firms. 
Further, quite frequently, M&As occur within the affiliate firms of these groups. That 
could be the part of the restructuring within the group itself. However, such M&A 
                                                 
3 Currently, Tata Sons is embroiled in a bitter dispute between ousted Chairman, Mr. Cyrus Mystry and his 
predecessor, Mr. Ratan Tata. Amongst several allegations, there is one which suggests that the former 
chairman pursued a loss making project as it provided critical inventory for another firm in which Mr. 
Tata is a stakeholder. If true, this is a clear example of the adverse effect of cross-holdings. The Tata 
listed companies have already lost $13 billion in combined market capitalization thus far, and the 
controversy continues: https://www.ft.com/content/4e6cfa64-bdef-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 accessed 
on 09/02/2017. 
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transactions alter the subtleties completely as the risk and uncertainty of the event reduce 
significantly for the acquiring affiliate.  
(c) Agency Issues 
As there is a convergence of ownership and control, the higher levels of insider 
control and ownership, and relatively weaker external disciplining mechanisms, perfectly set 
a scene for expropriation by insiders (as alluded to above). The classic principal - agent 
vertical agency conflict due to the separation of ownership and control in the developed world 
betwen the owners and executives, is non-existent. Instead, horizontal agency conflict arises 
between the majority insider shareholders and minority outsider shareholders. The majority 
shareholders, by virtue of their control, can divert valuable resources away from other 
shareholders. However, at the same time, from the TCE  (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979)  
view point, the concentrated insider ownership can generate significant benefits where 
implicit trust-based contracting is widespread (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).  
(d) Motives  
The well-established theoritical frameworks explaining the motives for the cross-
border forays by developed nations such as TCE and OLI (Ownership, Location and 
Internalization - the eclectic paradigm from Dunning (1980)), do not adequately explain the 
motives of M&As in the emerging markets. Neither do they seek cheap resources (they 
already have them), nor do they lead in technology or brand to capitalize. In fact, these nations 
seek better quality management, technology, resources and skills and hence are buying 
corporations in developed, more expensive nations.  
Thus, the overall environment and the sentiments for M&As in emerging markets are 
significantly different to those of the developed world. A notion that the well-established 
verdicts from the rest of the world about M&As can explain the phenomenon in the emerging 
markets adequately would be grossly misleading. Further, the literature from emerging 
markets is continuously evolving, with this thesis contributing directly to that body of 
research. 
Why India? 
Apart from being an emerging market nation, India is an important country in the 
current global scenario. India belongs to a group of the fastest growing economies in the 
world commonly acronymed as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
countries. Since 1991, India has undergone a series of economic reforms that has catapulted 
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its status from a relatively dormant nation to one of the key players shaping up the new 
globalized economy. There is a steep rise in investment activities both inwards and outwards.  
The following chart depicts the flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in India in 
last sixteen years, and reflects the growing attractivenes of the Indian market for the rest of 
the world. 
 
Figure 1.2.1 FDI – Inflows into India  
Data from Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Government of India Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Likewise, Indian business houses are leaving their footprints on the global landscape, 
holding ambitions of becoming global leaders. For example, the Tata Group is the 
manufacturer of the world’s cheapest car, Nano, in the domestic Indian market. Yet, Tata 
Group acquired some of the most expensive international luxury cars brands - Jaguar and 
Land Rover - in a remarkable deal in 2008. Similarly, the Vedanta Group took over Asarco 
in 2008, transforming itself into one of the world’s largest copper miners, and the Aditya 
Birla Group acquired Novelis in 2007 to become the world’s largest rolled-aluminium 
producer.  
The M&A market in India has grown enormously in recent times. In the trend analysis 
of M&As in India in the post-liberalisation period, Kar and Soni (2008) recognize 1996 to 
2001 as the period of a first merger wave in India, with the focus of Indian M&As during this 
period purely strategic in nature and defined by a major emphasis on horizontal and vertical 
mergers. Further, Saboo and Gopi (2009) report a rise in the value of M&As in India from 
$2.2 billion in 1998 to $62 billion in 2007. 
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Clearly, this thesis highlights a number of contradictory and intriguingly puzzling 
attributes about India which make it a unique country amongst other emerging markets, thus 
necessitating research purely focussed on India. Drawing from the literature from various 
disciplines, India is uniquely placed. While India shares distinct tenets with some countries, 
holistically it has no exact match. India is truly multifaceted. Figure 1.2.2 highlights the 
inherent contradictions that India possess. 
 
Figure 1.2.2 Multidimensional Characteristics of India 
This thesis identifies India as a common law country with the business structures 
resembling civil law countries and with unique socio-cultural anthropological attributes.  
The common law system in India is a direct inheritance of British colonialism, and 
thus India’s institutional framework is fundamentally Anglo in nature. Even new reforms in 
business regulations, such as corporate governance, are evolving more towards the Anglo-
American system. In line with these Anglo-American systems, corporate governance 
institutions in India are well defined, with respect to the range and depth of existing statutes 
and legal frameworks. However, like other emerging economies, India suffers from a weak 
enforcement regime (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000), domestic institutional investors are passive, 
and external market monitoring mechanisms are ineffective. Sarkar et al. (2013) argue that 
good quality enforcement is as important as good quality laws to reduce agency costs. 
Consequently, in implementation and practices, the Indian corporate governance model, with 
respect to market mechanisms and ownership characteristics, more closely resembles that of 
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the German-Japanese model (Machold and Vasudevan, 2004). Finally, with respect to its 
culture and its impact on organizational processes, India is clustered with South Asian 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and so on (House et al., 2004).  
In the words of Nisha Kohli, “Indian society is diverse and multifaceted. Its social 
structure is quite complex because of ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic differences. 
Access to wealth and power also varies considerably” (Zattoni and Judge, 2012, p. 167). In 
fact, Chhokar (2002) in a GLOBE study, espouses that the best way to deal with India is “…to 
expect differences, to accept differences and also to respect differences”. 
This unique mix of institutional, corporate and social systems merits studies specific 
to the Indian market. The country context is critical in management issues. As Hofstede 
(1980) argues, all the popular American managerial theories (Anglo) may not be applicable 
universally - what works in America may not work in other countries. Clearly, while the 
findings from the Anglo world are inadequate in terms of explaining Indian M&As, even the 
understanding gained from other emerging countries cannot be mechanically extrapolated to 
explain M&As in India, given its unique features. A comprehensive study of M&As in the 
Indian market is thus warranted. 
Apart from testing the overall outcomes of M&As, this thesis also analyzes the 
specific impact of deals made by firms that pursue different corporate governance models, 
originate from other institutional environments, and with dissimilar cultures. This approach 
gives a unique element to this work.  
In perspective, this thesis attempts to systematically explore the answers to the 
following questions: 
 How do the Indian shareholders fare in M&As overall, and particularly in relation to 
domestic and cross-border deals? Are there any differences in returns between the 
two types of the shareholders?  
 How do the Indian Business Group acquirers affect the M&As outcomes? Do the 
returns vary in intra-group deals?  
 Does the variation in the corporate governance structures of the participating firms 
matter at all? 
 Is cultural proximity an important factor in cross-border M&As? 
 Do the returns vary with the countries? 
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 Is there any impact of similarities in the Institutional environment on returns for cross-
border M&As?  
1.2.2 Methodological Contribution 
Apart from testing the hypotheses surrounding M&As in the Indian context discussed 
above, this thesis also examines the implication of using (i) various financial models and their 
variants and (ii) robust regressions techniques in estimating the abnormal returns associated 
with Indian M&As.  
The primary analytical tool used in this thesis is the event study methodology, which 
is based on daily stock price returns by Brown and Warner (1985). The event study 
methodolgy is commonly implemented using OLS estimations of abnormal returns. Brown 
and Warner (1985) argue that non-normality is prominent issue in the daily stock price data 
and if so,  Huber (1973) and Yohai (1987) claim that the OLS estimates are sensitive to the 
presence of outliers and high leverage points. As a solution, Sorokina et al. (2013) suggest 
that using robust regressions (M and MM methods) captures event effects more accurately in 
the event studies. Thus, this thesis incorporates robust regression methods and compares and 
contrasts the returns from the OLS estimations, and finds significant differences between the 
two methods.  
Further, in the Indian context, Bahl (2006), Tripathi (2008) and Taneja (2010) test 
variants of asset pricing models and propose that the three-factor model as a better estimator 
of stock returns. Thus, apart from using well established Market model, this thesis also 
employs the three factor Fama-French model and compares the results. 
Further, Brown and Warner (1980) suggest that the use of Equally Weighted Index 
in asset pricing models is more likely to capture ARs. Thus, this thesis also compares the 
impact of Equally Weighted Index alongside the Value Weighted Index in the analysis.  
Finally, as Rao et al. (1999) and Agarwalla et al. (2013) allude towards a problem of 
thin trading in Indian markets, this thesis employs Scholes and Williams (1977) adjusted beta 
and its variants (Fowler and Rorke, 1983; Davidson and Josev, 2005) to estimate the abnormal 
returns in the analysis. 
Thus, this thesis employs different regression techniques, financial models, indices 
and their variants which, to the best of the author’s knowledge, have never been previously 
used in estimating M&A returns in Indian markets.  
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
The organization of this thesis is as follows:  
 Chapter 1 is an introduction about the need for this research, given the 
specifics unique to Indian corporate envirnonment.  
 Chapter 2 summarizes the M&A theories and develops various hypotheses 
in the context of Indian market, which are later tested in the analysis.  
 Chapter 3 details the methodology adopted for empirical analysis of the 
hypotheses.  
 Chapter 4 discusses the dataset properties and limitations used in the 
analysis.  
 Chapter 5 presents the results for the aggregate dataset which provides the 
overall reflection of the Indian M&As.  
 Chapter 6 focuses on the domestic M&As specifically, and tests the role of 
various attributes unique to the domestic Indian markets.  
 Chapter 7 focuses on cross-border M&As in India and examines several 
attributes that may have bearings on the outcomes of cross-border M&As.  
 Chapter 8 summarizes the results, discusses various limitations in the 
research and suggests possibile extensions.  
 
 
 
  
  2-16 
 
 Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate restructuring is one of the most prevalent strategies that firms employ to 
attain a competitive advantage and survive in the dynamic business world. 
 Amongst the various restructuring schemes, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have 
been very attractive for strategic development, mainly because M&As afford more rapid 
expansion than in-house organic growth. This research focuses on the worth of M&As as an 
effective corporate restructuring strategy for firms in India.  
Most of the primary literature on M&As emanates from the developed world, such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and other developed European countries. 
However, for the emerging markets, the literature is still in its nascent stage. These markets 
have a significant presence in the global business landscape and, as the firms in emerging 
markets are known to be fundamentally different from those in developed nations, the existing 
wisdom from the developed world may provide only a limited understanding. Thus, it is 
imperative to study emerging markets specifically. This chapter takes the lead from the key 
existing findings, and reviews these key findings from the perspective of emerging markets. 
Jensen (1984) argues that, as the shareholders bear the residual risk, they are the most 
important constituency of modern corporations. Following that notion, the primary focus of 
this thesis is on wealth effects to the target and acquiring companies’ shareholders in such 
restructuring strategies. This chapter summarizes the prominent findings of M&As from both 
the domestic and the cross-border perspective. It starts with a general background about 
M&As, including their origin and motivation. It then delves into studying the specific 
determinants governing these outcomes.   
2.2 Origin, Motives and Incentives for M&As 
Since the evolution of the industrial economy in the latter part of the 19th century, 
mergers have typically occurred in cyclical patterns. There have been periods of intense 
merger movements followed by intervening periods of fewer mergers. This wave-like pattern 
in the density of merger activities gave rise to the term ‘merger waves’. We have experienced 
six major waves thus far (Chang and Moore, 2011).  
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A brief discussion about these merger waves is warranted as they provide an 
evolutionary understanding and subsequent developments in M&As.  The most intriguing 
part is that each merger wave had its own set of unique characteristics and outcomes. In the 
wake of continuously evolving business regulations, financial innovations, technological 
developments and other dynamics, the corporate strategies, motives and responses differed 
with time. 
The first merger wave appeared around the conclusion of 19th century and the onset 
of the 20th century. Mergers, before 1904, were characterized by horizontal mergers. 
‘Monopolization’ or market power was the dominant business motive then (Heflebower, 
1963; Stigler, 1964). Another compelling argument put forth was that companies were 
seeking scale-efficiencies, achieved by lowering their per-unit costs (Jensen, 1986; Dutz, 
1989). Further, Capron et al. (1998) propose resource deployment between target and 
acquirer firms as another possible explanation for horizontal mergers.  
Approximately two thirds of all merger activities during the first merger wave were 
concentrated in a handful of industries: petroleum products, mining, metals, food products, 
and transportation, transforming the firms involved into industry giants. For example, the 
merger of Carnegie Steel and Federal Steel to form U.S. Steel which controlled 50% of the 
U.S. steel industry. The development of the modern corporations and the modern capital 
markets contributed immensely towards the rise of M&A activities. The aggregate market 
values of the securities of the new consolidation substantially exceeded the sum of the values 
of the securities just before the merger (Lintner, 1971). Hence, the mergers in this period 
were generally profitable for the shareholders of both firms involved. However, the stock 
market crash of 1904, the closure of many banks (Gaughan, 2010, p. 35), the enactment of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) in the US against horizontal mergers in 1904, and then the 
first world war, are regarded as the causes of the end of this wave (Lipton, 2006).  
The merger wave in the 1920s was characterized by vertical mergers and also 
occasionally by conglomerate mergers (M&As within firms from the same industry but not 
with the same product). The Clayton Act (1914) deterred monopolies, and instead led to what 
Stigler (1950) describes as “the mergers for Oligopoly”. The post World War I market boom 
provided the necessary impetus. Major automobile manufacturers emerged in this period. The 
expected gain from oligopoly was probably somewhat smaller than it was at the turn of the 
century (Lintner, 1971). Another prominent factor prompting M&As then was cost synergies 
(Chang and Moore, 2011), such as economies of scale in procurement, manufacturing, 
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marketing and distribution, and administration. Vertical mergers also provided better control 
of input resources, production process and distribution. The 1929 crash and the Great 
Depression ended this wave.  
Mergers exploded within the booming market of 1966 to 1968. In the third merger 
wave, strict enforcement of antitrust laws made vertical and horizontal mergers impossible. 
Yet, M&As continued to occur. Gorton et al. (2005) suggest that expanding empire through 
mergers served as a defensive mechanism for the managers who preferred to stay independent 
rather than being acquired. Hence, the companies seeking expansion were left with no 
alternative other than to move into other industries. When companies merged with firms 
outside their core capacities, in ‘pure conglomerate mergers’, M&As within firms from 
different industries emerged. And soon they gained prominence. These mergers were the most 
distinctive outcomes in this era. Product extension, market extension and diversification were 
the primary goals for the companies. Another stark difference in mergers from earlier waves 
was that smaller firms were targeting larger firms (Gaughan, 2010, p. 40). The mergers were 
motivated by the fact that many companies were selling below their break-up value4 or book 
value. The fact that the targets were selling, even below their reproduction costs, made such 
deals more attractive. It was therefore cheaper and quicker to acquire the entire 
infrastructure. They were seeking revenue synergies from cross-selling of products, 
increased market share and reduced competition. Purchasing a running business provided a 
competitive advantage as the merged companies had a direct entry in the market (Lintner, 
1971). Further, the upsurge in the market in the 1960s provided another rationale for rampant 
M&As. Investors preferred shares with a high P/E ratio and bidding firms realised stock 
financing could lead to a rise in P/E ratio5 without attracting tax liabilities, which would 
otherwise occur in the case of cash compensation. The bidding firms exploited this strategy 
and participated in several M&As (Gaughan, 2010, p. 40). Further, gaining leverage capacity 
by acquiring less leveraged firms and tax advantage by merging with companies with 
                                                 
4 Break-up value is a sum total of price obtained by selling each asset of a company separately. 
5 Example (adopted from (Gaughan, 2010, p. 43): Let us assume the bidding firm’s share price is $25 with 
$1 million earnings and 1 million shares outstanding. That implies the firm has a P/E ratio of 25:1. Let us 
also assume that the target firm’s earnings are $100,000 and has 100,000 shares outstanding and the 
current price is $10. That implies target’s P/E is 10:1. Further, let us assume that in stock-to-stock 
transaction, bidding firm offers 50,000 shares of $25 each for every 2 shares worth $20 in Target firm 
and cancels all of their shares. That implies bidding firm now has total earnings of $1,100,000 and total 
shares 1,050,000. The new EPS for the bidding firm is $1.05. If we assume that the P/E ratio of the new 
firm will stay the same, then the new price would be $26.25. So, even after providing premiums to Target 
firms, bidding firms could increase their own Price and EPS. 
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substantial losses, or just an investment to divest in future were other possible motives for 
mergers and acquisitions. The wave concluded in 1969 to 1970 (Lipton, 2006).  
The fourth wave spanned 1981 to 1989 and the typical feature was the spate of hostile 
takeovers. The fourth wave was also the wave of megamergers - dollar amounts in these 
mergers were significantly higher than in earlier mergers. Further, though not as 
overwhelming as in fifth merger wave, the fourth merger wave had a significant percentage 
of international activity in the United States. Various foreign corporates seeking more stable 
markets started moving towards the US and a dropping dollar value drove the process further 
(Gaughan, 2010, p. 59). The deregulation of the industries was another major contributor 
towards M&As. The development of the capital and money markets further fuelled M&A 
activities. The rising stock prices and falling interest rates, resulting in an upsurge in high-
yield bond markets, led to the higher usage of leverage. Leveraged Buyouts (LBO) were 
standard in this phase. Easy access to finance also resulted in rising in corporate raiding6 
(Chang and Moore, 2011), which was perceived as a highly profitable speculative activity in 
a very short time (Gaughan, 2010, p. 57). The overall sluggishness of the economy in general 
and the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989 which predominantly financed LBOs, led 
to the end of this wave. 
With an advent of the 1990s, globalization created international opportunities, as well 
as competition and pressure on corporates to compete and survive. Consequently, regulatory 
bodies stopped frowning at mergers and were friendlier towards horizontal and vertical 
mergers than ever before. Corporate raiding tactics or short-term profit strategies were 
shunned, and strategic alliances were pursued. Also, leverage buyouts had lost their charm. 
Instead, stock-swap mergers7 gained predominance due to high equity valuations as a result 
of the long sustained bull market. The most significant outcome of globalization was a 
tremendous increase in cross-border M&A activities. Even the corporates from emerging 
markets started participating in M&As worldwide (Gaughan, 2010, p. 66). Apparently, 
M&As were not restricted to the US or other developed nations. The deregulation of various 
economies, access to new resources and markets, and technological advancement further 
                                                 
6 A corporate raider is an entity seeking profit by acquiring and reselling companies. They frequently engage 
in takeover of undervalued firms. Post-acquisition, they typically strip off target companies of their assets, 
carry the proceeds and leave target shareholders poorer. 
7 An arrangement where the target shareholders relinquish their shares in exchange of the acquiring 
company’s shares in a predefined ratio. 
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stimulated such activities (Chang and Moore, 2011). This wave concluded with the market 
crash in the late 1990s and the ensuing recession. 
Finally, in the early 2000s, lower interest rates, as a response to the 9/11 crisis, 
stimulated the sixth wave. Prolonged lower interest rates helped the real estate industry to 
thrive. Also, it gave a significant boost to the private equity business. While leveraged 
acquisitions were already cheaper, the growing economy helped to raise equity finance. 
Consequently, numerous IPOs appeared on the landscape. Corporates used the combination 
of cheap debt and equity financing to acquire assets and simply waited for the rising market 
to push up the prices of their acquisitions before selling them off. As the cost of funds was 
cheap, demand for M&A targets was high. With the subprime market crash, access to keen 
equity investors and cheap debt became limited and the wave culminated (Chang and Moore, 
2011). 
The extant literature cites abundant justifications and various outcomes for M&As. 
However, to summarize, these motives can be clustered into three broad categories: the 
synergy, the agency, and the hubris hypotheses.  
The synergy motive aims to achieve value enhancement by integrating the resources 
of the firms. The hypothesis suggests that through various mechanisms, companies seek 
M&As to acquire specific competencies, resources, intellectual properties or unique talents 
which otherwise may not be viable to develop in-house. As such, mergers should result in an 
increase of overall combined value for the two firms.  
On the contrary, the agency hypothesis implies that managers need to maximize their 
own utility at the cost of shareholders. Here, M&A decisions may emanate purely from issues 
wherein status, power and compensation of the managers are proportionate to the size of the 
empire they control (Murphy, 1985), and also there are psychic rewards associated with 
running large firms. Thus, they have incentives to keep building empires at the cost of 
shareholders. Bhaumik and Selarka (2012) argue that agency conflict is a well-known 
dominant explanation for the inability of the average M&A to add to the performance of the 
acquiring firm. 
 Finally, the hubris hypothesis from Roll (1986) suggests that the positive returns to 
the target shareholders are merely because of the transfer of wealth from acquiring firm’s 
shareholders. This implies that managers err in estimating potential gains from targets and 
yet engage in M&As (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993).  
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The literature distinguishes the three motives by studying the total effects on the 
shareholders’ wealth from both the sides, as outlined in Table 2.2.1 (below). 
Table 2.2.1 Patterns of Gains Related to Takeover Theories 
Effect 
Total  
Gains 
Target 
Gains 
Acquirer 
Gains 
Synergy /Efficiency + + + 
Hubris  
(Winner's Curse /Overvaluation) 
0 + - 
Agency issues or errors - +/- - 
If synergies exist, markets react favourably to such announcements. However, as the 
M&As may also be driven by hubris or agency motives, the main hypothesis discussed here 
collectively tests for all the three possible motives.  
H1:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As to the 
shareholders of the participating Indian firms.  
In the analysis presented in subsequent chapters, this hypothesis is tested for the 
targets, as well as the acquiring Indian firms.  
2.3 Do M&As Have Synergies? 
As discussed above, corporates have myriad justifications for seeking M&As and 
‘synergistic gains’ is the dominant of all justifications. Any such activity entails an immense 
amount of both tangible and intangible resource expenditure, and the entire process may take 
months, or even years, to conclude. The entire exercise is worthwhile only when M&As 
deliver the envisioned outcomes. As huge amount of shareholders’ wealth is involved and 
they are the parties burdened with the residual risk, it is imperative to understand the financial 
and operational consequences on investors’ wealth. That is, if M&As really contribute to 
enhancing a firm’s value. The market perception about the scope of the possibile synergistic 
gains can be observed by analysing the returns generated to the targets and the acquirers 
during M&As. 
2.3.1 Returns to Target or Selling Firms’ Shareholders  
The literature consistently reports gains for the target shareholders (Bradley et al., 
1988; Lang et al., 1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Mulherin and Boone, 2000). These 
gains are  significantly and materially positive (Bruner, 2002).  
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One of the commonly cited arguments about why target shareholders may gain is due 
to premiums. A premium can be defined as the difference between the price offered for each 
share and the price of the share in the recent past, to say, a month before the offer. Jarrell et 
al. (1988) report that premiums for target firms in the 1960s to the 1980s averaged around 
30%, and were around 50% in the mid-1980s. Depending on the M&A chracteristics, 
premiums may vary. To illustrate, a premium will be higher when the consideration paid is 
in cash (Wansley et al., 1987), it is a tender offer (Jensen, 1984), or there is a competition 
within bidding firms (Jensen, 1987; Bradley et al., 1988). 
Interestingly, even when the deal fails, target shareholders may still enjoy higher 
valuation in the market. This is because, on the failure, target share prices do not immediately 
loose the entire price surge that they gained at the time of the announcement. This could also 
be because of the expectation of future bids. Jensen (1984)  reports a 20% gain for the firms 
which receive bids in at least two years’ time and a complete fall in initial rise for those firms 
that did not. Bradley et al. (1983) explain the same phenomenon through an information 
hypothesis which suggests that one of the rationales behind tender offers is the discovery of 
undervalued or underutilised assets owned by the target firms. This new information then 
becomes public and target share prices adjust accordingly, remaining the same for at least 
two years.  However, for permanency, the target firm should be subsequently acquired. 
At the other end of the scale,  Roll (1986), through the hubris hypothesis, argues that 
gains to target shareholders may not necessarily be due to the synergies, but simply because 
of the wealth transfer from acquiring shareholders. 
In sum, for numerous reasons, with respect to short-term price reactions around the 
announcements of M&As, the evidence of positive returns is well-established for the targets. 
2.3.2 Returns to Acquirer or Buying Firms Shareholders 
While vast literature supports positive returns for target shareholders, there is a lack 
of consensus about the returns for bidder shareholders. Evidence includes positive, nil and 
even negative returns. If there is support for synergistic gains, loss from the hubris hypothesis 
seems to exist as well. Evidence in favour of synergistic gains is found in several studies. 
Jensen (1987) estimates $50 billion in gains for the buying-firms’ shareholders. While, 
Bradley et al. (1988) report 50% of the acquiring firms in their sample set had negative 
returns, yet overall combined results were positive after M&As. Francis et al. (2008) find that 
both cross-border and domestic acquisitions enhance wealth for US acquirers. However, 
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Mulherin and Boone (2000) observe no gains for domestic acquirers and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) find lower returns for Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
(CBMAs). 
For Indian M&As,  Saboo and Gopi (2009) found positive returns for the companies 
acquiring domestic firms and negative impacts on those involved in CBMAs whereas,  Gubbi 
et al. (2010) and Rani et al. (2014) suggest positive and higher gains in CBMAs respectively. 
However, Bhaumik and Selarka (2008) report that M&As led to deterioration in firm 
performance.  
Clearly, the Indian evidence is mixed and further research is thus justified. And given 
the possible differences in returns in domestic and CBMAs, the first hypothesis (H1) is tested 
for the overall aggregate database and also for the sub-sets - domestic and cross-border deals. 
2.4 Factors Affecting Takeover Premiums 
This section focuses on the factors that may have a bearing on the outcomes of Indian 
M&As. The M&A outcomes may differ because of the puzzling attributes of Indian 
corporates—they are known to operate in significantly different institutional contexts and 
thus have different organizational structures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). It is largely because 
of the attributes (i) particular to the emerging markets, and (ii) peculiar to the Indian markets 
and firms. The discussion draws on the implications from the developed and emerging world, 
and analyzes these implications from an Indian perspective. Thus, it develops various 
hypotheses for the analysis of domestic and cross-border deals. 
2.4.1 Emerging Market Effects – Indian Business Houses 
Emerging countries are characterized by numerous market failures due to information 
and agency problems. Weaker corporate governance, control and law enforcement (and thus 
the weaker property rights), flawed regulatory structures and inadequate disclosures are 
typical of emerging markets. The well-functioning institutional infrastruture of developed 
countries is absent and these institutional voids make it more onerous for individual firms to 
engage in product, labour and capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Coase (1937) 
argues that the optimal structure of a firm is defined by the institutional framework in which 
it operates. Thus, given the institutional voids and market imperfections, the emerging 
markets’ firms respond differently, and are typically structured as large conglomerate 
business groups with concentrated ownership and significant operational and financial 
linkages with their affiliates (Gopalan et al., 2007). The large scale and scope of the groups 
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allow them to create internal factor markets. By efficiently allocating the critical resources 
internally, they replicate the functions of the institutions in advanced economies and mitigate 
the issues from the external market failures. Their affiliates derive significant benefits from 
relying on these internal sources. Besides that, concentrated ownership also provides internal 
monitoring mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
Right at the core of these large business groups is the principle that allows corporates 
to own shares in other corporates. This leads to the creation of pyramidal organisational 
structures, with a top-down chain of control, and successive layers of subsidiary or affiliate 
independent firms with the ultimate owners right at the apex. By virtue of its structure, a 
typical implementation entails that these owners take ultimate control of the resources of the 
entire group with just majority control at each level. Thus, they weild enormous control rights 
which are quite often disproportionate to their cashflow rights. Figure 2.4.1 illustrates how a 
pyramid structure provides 50% control to owners in firm D, while investing only 6.25% of 
total capital in firm D.  
 
Figure 2.4.1 Pyramid Structure 
By owning 50% of Firm A, which in turn owns 50% of Firm B, a family can achieve control rights of Firm B 
with a cashflow stake of only 25%. Further, for every $100 dividend in Firm D, owners are entitled to $6.25. 
Similarly, a typical Indian corporate structure is a ‘business house’. Indian business 
groups are the collection of publicly traded firms operating in several industries. The founding 
family members dominate shareholdings and control through direct and indirect participation 
via intra-family cross-ownership and passive support of domestic public financial institutions, 
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as they are perceived to be inactive in their governance roles in India (Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2000; Machold and Vasudevan, 2004) 
With respect to capital financing, one of the important functions of business groups 
is the formation of an ‘internal capital market’ wherein cashflows may be diverted from one 
affiliate to another for  numerous motives such as (i) further investments in profitable projects 
- investments, (2) risk sharing by proping up ailing units - support and (3) tunneling profitable 
resources out from the firms with low insider ownership to higher ones – tunneling8 (Gopalan 
et al., 2007). Depending on the motive, such functions may be advantageous or destructive 
for the affiliates—the outcome varies according to the institutional context (Marisetty and 
Subrahmanyam, 2010). For example, the businesses affiliated with US conglomerates 
underperform (Berger and Ofek, 1995), but Japanese keiretsu are known to benefit from 
internal capital market activities (Hoshi et al., 1991). However, the institutional context of 
India differs significantly from these advanced economies9. As the affiliates in Indian markets 
are independent public companies with distinct shareholders who, due to regulatory controls, 
are unable to own banks like in keiretsu in Japan, such opportunities are limited (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000). Thus, the functions of the internal capital markets are more significant in the 
Indian context. Business group affiliation provides greater access to external funds in the 
countries with underdeveloped capital markets and low levels of investor protections (Ghatak 
and Kali, 2001). Typically, the funds are chanellized through intra-group lending wherein the 
larger, more profitable firms borrow funds externally and then extend these funds to the other 
affiliates (Gopalan et al., 2007). Khanna and Yafeh (2007) suggest that the groups thrive on 
their reputation, which is particularly beneficial in emerging economies where minority 
investors are more vulnerable to expropriation due to the weak regulatory and legal environment. 
Thus, of the three motives outlined above, Gopalan et al. (2007) find support as the 
primary motive of capital transfers within Indian business groups, particularly as these loans 
are extended to assist troubled affiliates on heavily discounted or zero costs. They do so 
primarily to avoid negative spillovers within the rest of the group firms, particularly as 
business houses rely on their reputation as credible, high quality borrowers - the bankruptcy 
                                                 
8 Discussed ahead in more detail. 
9 The United States is characterized by well-functioning factor markets, low corruption and strong 
contractual enforcement mechanisms. The Japanese groups have a main bank as their affiliate which 
provides capital and performs monitoring tasks. Thus, they have an efficient internal capital markets. 
Besides, these financial markets are comparatively more developed and the groups are not family 
controlled (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
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of their affiliates can hamper future capital flows for the rest of the group. Indian business 
groups see propping up as their primary motive. 
Indian business groups enjoy a range of other advantages. Diversified business groups 
are able to generate large economic benefits because of their preferential access to bureaucrats 
in an economy where government regulation plays an important role, particularly in the event 
of a bail out when in distress. Further, group affiliates enjoy superior access to foreign capital 
and technology as the providers value their reputation and political connections and are 
concerned about information problems and weaker property rights of their investments 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Siegel and Choudhury (2012) suggest that a group firm can 
control vast knowledge-creating resources with little capital and can ‘create complex 
recombination of inputs’ to generate added value in their products. They invest heavily in 
marketing and technology, and thrive on product differentiation strategies that thwart the 
competition. Thus, they respond better to market shocks. 
Clearly, the functioning of internal capital markets benefits group affiliates in several 
ways. 
However, when the performance effect of these business houses is considered, 
Khanna (2000) argues that while the positive effect of the group affiliation is generally large, 
this is partly due to the value enhancing function evident in their exceptional response to 
various market failures, and also partly because of the welfare-reducing minority shareholder 
exploitation. As the group owners command a much larger quantum of the equity of the 
companies than is directly owned by them, the diversion in the cashflow and control rights 
leaves ample scope for opportunistic earnings management by the controlling owners, at the 
cost of minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (2002) argues that cashflow ownership by an 
entrepreneur is seen as commitment against expropriation. In similar spirits, (Claessens et al., 
1999) find higher value for corporate assets with greater insider cashflow ownership.  
With reference to the example in Figure 2.4.1, Firm A is entitled to receive only $6.25 
out of $100 dividend paid out by Firm D. This obvisouly creates incentives for controlling 
shareholders (owners) to divert productive and profitable resources from low cashflow rights 
companies (Firm D) to those with higher cashflow rights (Firm A). The process is called 
tunnelling. It may be executed in several ways, including through the transfer of assets, the 
syphoning of profits, transfer pricing, diverting corporate opportunities, related transactions 
between firms at below or above market prices, and so on.  
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In reference to the classical agency theory, the separation of ownership and controls 
leads to incongruency in principal and agent interests (vertical agency problem). However, in 
the Indian context, convergence of ownership and control leads to conflicts between inside 
and outside shareholders (horizontal agency problem). Thus, the groups are often analysed 
for their benefits and costs under alignment and entrenchment hypotheses. Sarkar et al. (2013) 
argue, the entrenchment by the owners-managers trumps the positive effects of reduction in 
vertical agency problem. Claessens et al. (1999) suggest that East Asian pyramids reduce 
Tobin’s q. Entrenchment is further facilitated by poor investor protection, which allows 
higher diversion of cashflows, rendering pyramidal structures more attractive as they generate 
higher private benefits of control (Heitor and Daniel, 2006).  
There are several reasons for tunneling to persist in such markets. While the groups 
provide monitoring functions internally, the external monitoring and disciplining of the 
group’s affiliates is a challenge for numerous reasons (i) domestic financial institutions are 
ineffective monitors, (ii) political affiliations insulate them from external interference and 
monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 1999), (iii) inadequate disclosures and reporting and 
accounting practices are known to be influenced by ownership and control structures (Fan 
and Wong, 2002), and (iv) concentration in the hands of promoter families, along with the 
passive support of domestic public institutional investors reduce takeover risks (Morck et al., 
1988). Instead, they argue that insider-dominated systems takeovers are generally negotiated, 
rather than contested. Likewise, even (Long and Walkling, 1984) find that insider ownership 
implies less resistance (hostility) to takeover bids. Consequently, takeover threat market 
mechanism10 is ineffective in disciplining errant management.  
Further, the internal monitoring itself may be ineffective as insiders serve on boards. 
The extent is apparent via board-interlocks. Balasubramanian et al. (2011) report that 6% of 
the total directors on the boards of National Stock Exchange (NSE) listed companies 
controlled 66% of the total NSE market capitalization in 2010. Most of the directors were 
from the concentrated ownership structures. 
Thus, the pyramidal structure makes it harder for the external market mechanism to 
discipline errant managers, and as internal monitoring may not be an adequate deterrent, the 
                                                 
10 The developed world is market oriented where in external markets perform monitoring and controlling 
role. In such an environment, a takeover threat by other companies acts as a disciplining mechanism for 
poorly performing corporates and incumbent management. 
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groups can continue to ply their trades with impunity.  
On another and significantly important cultural dimension, Sharma and Rao (2000) 
argue that the group firms value blood and family ties more than entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills. Hence, management and strategic decision-making at these firms may not 
be of the highest quality.  Further, Chacar and Vissa (2005) argue that in emerging economies, 
groups show higher persistence in the face of poor performance.  
Clearly, while groups are beneficial, they can also be detrimental. The evidence of 
tunnelling in Indian Business groups is mixed. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) do not find empirical 
evidence of expropriation by insiders. Likewise, Gopalan et al. (2007) argue that the primary 
motive of intra-group transfers is to support, and not to tunnel. Siegel and Choudhury (2012) 
find no evidence of tunneling. However, Bertrand et al. (2002) argue that Indian group 
affiliated firms engage in higher earnings management relative to non-affiliated firms. With 
respect to M&As, Bhaumik and Selarka (2012) report that concentrated ownership may 
precipate horizontal agency problems, and may not necessarily improve post M&A 
performance.  
The pervasiveness of pyramidal structure, ownership concentration, nepotism in the 
domestic setting creates a unique atmosphere for domestic M&As. The following hypothesis 
is thus developed to understand the announcement effect of domestic M&As and is tested on 
domestic deals.  
H2:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As to the 
shareholders of the participating Indian firms in domestic M&As. 
The hypothesis is tested for both targets and acquirers in domestic deals and also 
allows the testing of synergy, hubris and agency motives. 
Further, given the ambiguity around the effects of group affiliation, this thesis splits 
the domestic deals according to group orientation and tests the group impact on M&As using 
the following hypothesis: 
H3:  There is no difference in abnormal returns at the announcement of takeovers when 
acquirers belong to Indian Business Groups (IBG).  
The negative abnormal returns support entrenchment hypothesis, and allude towards 
the detrimental effects of being a group affiliate.  
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2.4.2 Information Asymmetry – Relatedness Effect 
While the ‘normal’ degree of information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed traders is pervasive, it may be larger before the release of significant firm specific 
events such as M&As (Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986). One way finance literature studies the 
role of information asymmetry and its impact on the distribution of total premium around 
M&A announcements is by splitting the premium into pre-bid run-up and post-bid mark-up. 
The cumulative abnormal returns to the targets prior to announcement day are called pre-bid 
run-up, and those after the announcement are called post-bid mark-up. Interestingly, it is well 
documented that takeover bids are typically preceded by substantial target share price run-
ups (Bris, 2002). Schwert (1996), in a well-regarded study based on 1,814 exchange-listed 
target takeovers, reports that this run-up starts 42 days before the announcement of M&As, 
with the largest pre-bid increments ocurring during days [-21, -1]. Schwert estimates an 
average run-up of 13%, and a mark-up of 10.5% in the main sample. The chief finding being 
that these run-ups and mark-ups are generally uncorrelated, which implies that the run-up is 
an additional cost to the acquirers. Schwert labels the phenomenon as mark-up pricing 
hypothesis. Every $1 in the last week of run-up increases the mark-up by $0.80 on the 
announcement day (initial offer).  Recently, Betton et al. (2008) performed a more exhaustive 
study, with 7,522 takeover bids of exchange-listed targets to arrive at similar conclusions. 
Thus, the larger the run-up, the larger the takeover premium. Even the most conservative 
estimate in Schwert’s analysis suggests that at least two-thirds of the run-up is added to the 
total premium paid in successful deals.  
For acquirers, Schwert did not find statistically reliable positive impact of acquirers’ 
run-up on the takeover premium (except when there is competition for targets). When 
compared with the target run-ups, acquirer run-ups are small, and their mark-ups are generally 
negative. 
Discussing its sources, pre-bid run-ups reflect takeover rumours emerging from the 
regulatory filings11, media speculations, street talks (Betton et al., 2008), informed trading by 
insiders and arbitrageurs or block trading by toehold12 investors (Choi, 1991). 
                                                 
11 For example, toehold acquisitions are generally required to be reported to the regulatory authorities if 
they exceed certain threshold. For India, the first 5% stake and then every 2% stake acquired thereafter 
in the target firm needs to be reported. 
12 Toehold is an ownership stake already held in the target firm at the announcement of M&As. Its impact 
on M&As are discussed in detail in the next section. 
  2-30 
 
2.4.2.1 Insider Trading 
Widely cited, Meulbroek (1992) explains pre-bid run-up by recognizing insider 
trading13 as an important contributor. Meulbroek estimates that nearly half of the run-up is 
accounted for on the insider trading days. The average abnormal return is around 3% with a 
mean CAAR of 7% for insider trading days. Interestingly, insider trading occurs only on a 
small sub-set of days in the run-up period, yet insider-induced price movement is statistically 
larger relative to the announcement effect of the same information. Though the entire price 
movement on insider trading days may not happen just due to insider trading, pre-bid run-ups 
reflect widespread insider trading and that it is rewarding. When it comes to information 
leakage, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) claim that imminent merger announcement is 
inefficiently managed secret and trading on this non-public information abounds. They 
estimate that nearly half of the target firms’ takeover gains occur before the actual public 
announcements. Several other researchers report similar estimates of pre-bid run-ups (Bris, 
2002). Klein (1978) describes the process of information leakage during M&As as, “You start 
with a handful of people, but when you get close to doing something the circle expands pretty 
quickly. You have to bring in directors, two or three firms of lawyers, investment bankers, 
public relations people, and financial printers, and everybody's got a secretary. If the deal is 
a big one, you might need a syndicate of banks to finance it. Every time you let in another 
person, the chance of a leak increases geometrically”14.  
Unusual trading patterns in the market about a security often attract attention from 
security traders. The efficient stock market may deduce informed trading through various 
legitimate sources, such as trade-specific characteristics (volume, size, frequency, direction, 
and so on) and incorporate a significant proportion of that information in the stock price 
instantaneously, and much before the formal announcements (Meulbroek, 1992). In similar 
spirits, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) argue that outside investors can update their beliefs 
about participating firms by observing them. They may also anticipate timing and terms of 
the takeover to some extent. This leads to the incorporation of takeover surplus in the stock 
prices of the participating firms, and more of it in rising probabilities of takeover, thus 
inducing pre-bid run-ups. 
                                                 
13 The definition of insiders varies according to jurisdictions but fundamentally it implies whoever is in 
possession of material non-public information that leads to significant abnormal price reactions on 
release. Apart from more obvious corporate insiders such as executives or staff members, brokers, dealers, 
arbitragers, investments bankers, and so on are just few other categories of insider traders. 
14 Quoted by Keown and Pinkerton (1981, p. 857) 
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Hence, the leakage of insider information and informed trading is quite prevalent and 
thus the pre-bid run-up. 
2.4.2.2 Toehold Theories 
Another explanation of run-ups comes from the toehold theories. A toehold is an 
ownership stake already held in the target at the time of the announcement. It is well 
documented that acquirers benefit from purchasing initial stakes (Bris, 2002). Intuitively, 
while a toehold reduces the number of shares that must be purchased at a higher premium if 
the deal is successful, it also creates capital gain if the toehold had to be sold to a rival bidder. 
Toehold interest bestows more bargaining power on the acquirers. Firstly, if a toehold exists, 
acquirers require less shares to buyout minority shareholders and gain control. They can even 
exert more influence on the target’s management. Secondly, if facing competition for targets, 
a toehold increases the probability of winning for the initial acquirer, lowers the offer 
premiums, and greater toeholds even deter competition or provide competitive advantage. 
Thirdly, a toehold effectively manages target free-rider problems15. Fourthly, if a toehold 
exceeds 9%, it reduces target management resistance to takeover attempts (Betton et al., 
2008, 2009). Finally, toeholds afford acquirers a partial insurance in case of overpayments, 
as the consideration paid is shared between the two sides. Depending on the extent of the 
toeholding, it can mitigate the issue of Winner’s curse (Strickland et al., 2010). Thus, the 
acquirers have an absolute advantage over both the target firm, as well as any rival acquirers. 
Strategically, acquirers may bid aggressively in either of the situations and gain nonetheless. 
Overall, a toehold gives acquirers an advantage and is generally considered to be a profitable 
approach.  
However, toehold acquisitions prior to the announcement16 while beneficial, may also 
be detrimental for the acquirers. While being a profitable strategy (acquirers can buy a stake 
beforehand the annoucenemnt, avoiding expensive premiums and deriving benefits 
associated with higher negotiating powers), toeholds also carry a certain amount of risk—
they reveal valuable private information to the market before the announcement is made, 
particularly as toehold purchases can signal initiation of the acquisition process (Mikkelson 
                                                 
15 Minority shareholders may not tender their shares and hold out for a higher premium. Consequently, 
acquirers are forced to provide substantial premium and surrender their takeover gains. 
16 There is a debate about the timing of these acquisitions. Long-term toeholds refer to acquisition made 
long before the announcement, whereas short-term toeholds acquisitions occur during the run-up period. 
While short-term toeholds are known to have more impact, the overall total toeholds have a significantly 
negative impact on mark-ups (Betton et al., 2008). 
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and Ruback, 1985). Unfortunately, acquirers can hide their trades only partially, even when 
the target stock is liquid. A part of the value gained at toehold acquisition announcements is 
in anticipation of value-enhancing control transfers either through takeovers or internal 
mechanisms, and the subsequent premiums to be earned (Choi, 1991). With such 
announcements, market participants infer imminent takeover probability and potential 
takeover synergistic gains thereupon, and revise stock prices upwards. Therefore, toeholds 
may initiate price movements before the M&A announcements in run-up period and affect 
the overall cost of acquisitions.  
Despite the several positive effects of toeholds for acquirers, interestingly there is 
little empirical evidence of significantly positive direct takeover gains for acquirers due to 
toeholds (Betton and Eckbo, 2000). Betton et al. (2009) find toehold size to be statistically 
insignificant in explaining abnormal returns to the acquirers. Choi (1991) explains that 
acquirers receive only partial benefits from their toehold investments. However, they are are 
still beneficial indirectly as they reduce the offer premium and acquirers’ returns are less 
negative with positive toehold (Betton et al., 2008).  
For target firms, toeholds may directly reduce private benefits of control (Betton et 
al., 2009). They have lesser negotiating power and thus toeholds imply lower bid premiums. 
Toehold purchase is positively related to price run-ups when detected by the market and there 
is a negative correlation between toehold size and offer premiums (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; 
Bris, 2002), which is well recognized in finance literature. 
2.4.2.3 Firm Level Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry may exist between the participating firms in the deal, which 
can have a bearing on takeover premiums. Firstly, it may be difficult for the firms to value 
the growth opportunities beyond the assets in place. Imperfect information about the possible 
synergistic gains leads to negative takeover returns for acquirers (Morellec and Zhdanov, 
2005). 
Secondly, if the run-up reflects the information already held by the participating 
firms, the takeover premium remains unaffected and both the parties may choose to ignore 
the run-up. However, in the case where either of the participating firms is uncertain about the 
sources of the run-ups, then they are likely to revise their valuations of the target’s stock.  For 
instance, if there is any suspicion about the presence of a rival bidder gradually acquiring 
target shares in the open market, then both the parties will revise their valuations upwards 
  2-33 
 
leading to a higher mark-up price (Schwert, 1996). Such competition decays the acquirers’ 
bargaining powers and gives targets an advantage, which increases the takeover premium. 
Target shareholders receive higher returns when the acquirers have to compete (Servaes, 
1991). Bradley et al. (1988) found acquirer firms’ returns to be significantly positive when 
single and almost zero in multiple-acquirer contest. Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) concluded 
that competition produces probabilities of negative returns for acquiring firms. 
The presence of competition may also be falsely alluded to by shills. Shills are the 
third party insider traders in possession of proprietory information about the target and bidder, 
who act on that information without the knowledge of the negotiating parties. Their trades 
generate unusual price movements in the market and may falsely lead participating firms to 
conclude the presence of some legitimate competing acquirer, thus instigating an upward 
revision of the takeover premium. They have incentives in upward price revisions and thus 
prefer to remain disguised (Schwert, 1996).  
Figure 2.4.2 demonstrates the sources of information asymmetry and how they affect 
the takeover premium. In essence, the insider trading and toehold acquisitions may signal 
imminent takeover activities to market participants, and thus their actions create run-ups. 
Whereas, uncertainty about synergistic gains and the presence of rival bidders and shills may 
lead to upward price revisions by the participating firms, thus increasing the mark-up. 
Together, they both affect the total takeover premiums. 
 
Figure 2.4.2 Role of Information Asymmetry in Takeover Premiums 
However, these run-ups may not necessarily always be costly to the acquirers. Betton 
et al. (2008, 2009) found that run-ups are significantly positively related to acquirer returns 
and explained that the takeovers with greater run-ups are indeed associated with larger total 
synergies (target plus acquirer). Hence, they increase the acquirers takeover gains. Instead, it 
is the mark-up which reduces the acquirers’ gains. Further, run-up and mark-up may not 
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always be exogenous. Instead run-ups may partially substitute mark-ups in the presence of a 
toehold (Betton et al., 2008) and insider trading (Schwert, 1996). This phenomenon is known 
as substitution hypothesis. In such scenarios, as the mark-up is low, informed investors get 
the larger share of the premium in the pre-bid run-up period.  
Apart from the aspects of information asymmetry in M&A outcomes discussed 
above, in emerging markets such as India there is another dimension to this theory – related 
acquisitions. Related acquisitions refer to intra-group acquisitions. As discussed earlier, 
businesses are typically structured as a network of independent yet affiliated firms – pyramid 
structures. Interestingly, a plethora of M&As occur between the firms within the same 
business group with common parent company. One way to explain such M&As is corporate 
restructuring. However, M&As with or between affiliates changes the dynamics of M&As 
dramatically. As acquirers takeover an affiliate within the same group, the risk of valuation 
and uncertainty about the outcomes are reduced significantly. Even the level of information 
asymmetry about the target firm may be non-existent for the acquirers. There may not be any 
threat of competitive bidding. Given these possibilities, it is conceivable that acquiring firms 
enjoy the upper-hand in the deal right from the beginning, particularly given that they have 
even more bargaining power. The advantage enjoyed by the acquiring firm may dampen the 
positive announcement effect and larger takeover premiums generally argued in favour of the 
target firms. Even in this thesis, one third of the domestic acquisitions are intra-group in 
nature. Given their frequency and atypical characteristics, the following hypothesis is tested 
to evaluate if related M&As are different to unrelated M&As. 
H4: There is no difference in abnormal returns at the announcement of takeovers when the 
targets and the acquirers are already affiliated. 
2.4.3 Cross-Border M&As – Multidimensional Effects 
One of the most significant outcomes of globalization in the late 20th  century is the 
tremendous increase in Cross-Border M&A (CBMA) activities. The shift in the political and 
economic systems prompted liberalisation of economies. In turn, increased economic 
opportunities, technological advancements (such as reduced transaction costs which 
enhanced international participation and facilitated exchange of information, knowledge and 
skills), the convergence of accounting standards, and the reduction in cumbersome industry 
regulations and bureaucracy provided the requisite stimulus (Dunning, 2006b; Chang and 
Moore, 2011). Edith (1959) defines firms as a collection of productive resources (physical 
and human) in constant quest of rewarding opportunities (new products and markets) to 
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ensure their long-term profitability - all this is the source of synergies in CBMAs (Seth et al., 
2000, 2002). In spirit, Jensen (1987) justifies CBMAs by reasoning that the most publicly 
traded companies cannot meet their targets without foreign acquisitions. Under the purview 
of these explanations, globalization has heightened the opportunities, as well as the pressure 
of engaging in CBMAs. Firms now have to work together to be either more inventive or more 
expansive. Just some of the opportunities that globalization provides are: (i) cost and revenue 
synergies by exploiting market imperfections wherein the same resource (factor or product) 
is priced differently in other countries, (ii) companies may seek acquisitions to transfer their 
technology to other nations and increase market share, (iii) acquisition of new knowledge and 
superior technology and capabilities which bolsters business both abroad and domestically. 
Many times, companies undertake CBMAs simply to follow or support existing clientele 
internationally, thereby avoiding the possibility of competition from potential suppliers 
abroad (Chang and Moore, 2011). Hofstede (1984) expects culturally different firms to grow 
with the exchange of a new set of strengths, capabilities, resources, and knowledge.  
Given the range of plausible explanations, it appears that CBMAs may improve the 
overall efficiency of firms and increase shareholders’ value. Indeed, that is the case in many 
studies. For Indian acquirers, Gubbi et al. (2010) report positive returns and Rani et al. (2014) 
indicate higher returns in CBMAs than in domestic acquisitions. Yet there is ample evidence 
of negative returns (Barkema et al., 1996). Aybar and Ficici (2009) report that acquirers from 
emerging markets lose in CBMAs. In fact, 50% of the deals lost value in their sample. Holl 
and Kyriaziz (1996) report that 25% of CBMAs deals were abandoned after the 
announcement. Seth et al. (2000, 2002) find neutral, as well negative, returns for the acquiring 
firms in different sub-sets in their analysis and rationalize that these returns have occurred 
due to hubris and managerialism hypothesis respectively.  
The path of CBMAs is far from being frictionless. Though the dynamics of CBMAs 
are similar to those of domestic ones, they also face several other unique hurdles due to their 
international characteristics. When compared with domestic M&As, Seth et al. (2000, 2002) 
argue that the CBMAs present different sources of costs and benefits, and may therefore lead 
to different magnitudes of synergies overall. In particular, the CBMAs face serious challenges 
at the post-acquisition stage. The impact of various country, industry, and firm-level variables 
is vital and poses a serious threat to successful post M&A integration. The country-level 
factors refer to cultural, institutional, economic, and political differences. The industry and 
firm-level attributes include factors such as technology, sales potential, brands, 
complimentary or strategic assets, multinational and local experience, product differentiation, 
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size, and age. The impact of the country and industry-level factors on cross-border ventures 
is clear and robust, but the impact of firm-level factors is ambiguous (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
There are numerous theoretical frameworks that can be used to explicate the role of 
these variables in cross-border ventures. Arguably, the most dominant frameworks, based on 
economic perspective, in the finance literature are TCE (Transaction Cost Economies)  
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979) and the OLI framework (Eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 
1980, 1985). The fundamental tenet of TCE is establishing governance structures that 
minimize transaction costs (searching, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing) and 
inefficiencies (coordination and cooperation) while enforcing implicit and explicit contracts 
associated with the foreign markets operations. Likewise, the OLI framework refers to 
exploiting Ownership (proprietory assets), Locational (factor costs) and Internationalization 
(scale and scope) advantages as a source of minimizing the transaction and coordination costs. 
Another relatively recent model, RBV (Resource Based View) (Barney, 1991), advocates 
investing in resources to create sustained competitive advantages that are valuable, rare and 
inimitable  barriers to diffusion (exclusivity or non-transferability).  
While each of these accounts is primarily focussed on exploring the appropriate 
channels to penetrate foreign markets (and since CBMA is one of the ways to foray into 
foreign markets), they provide a rich background of the challenges encountered by the firms 
engaged in cross-border alliances. As such, these accounts are a good starting point to discuss 
risks and rewards associated with any CBMA transactions. 
One important limiting aspect of each of these theoretical frameworks is that they are 
based on the analysis of developed markets. However, in present times, CBMAs are not 
confined to developed nations - Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs) are 
increasingly participating in M&As worldwide. EMNEs are corporates headquartered in an 
emerging market, which engage in outward FDIs. In 2011, they accounted for 29% of global 
cross-border acqusition by value, according to the World Investment Report (2011) 
UNCTAD. And for these firms, Fan et al. (2011) argue that their business organizations and 
managerial behaviours are fundamentally different. That prompts Hennart (2012) to question 
the validity of Dunning’s OLI framework in this context. In fact, even Dunning himself 
(Dunning, 2006b) suggests that the country and firm-specific competitive advantages might 
be different for EMNEs. And instead of exploiting their ownership advantages (O), they 
might be seeking ways to access or augment their existing capabilities. Likewise, in sharp 
contrast to the existing frameworks explicating internationalization, Mathews (2006) argues 
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that the well-established TCE, OLI or RBV views are inadequate for EMNEs. In fact, these 
markets expose the limitations and weaknesses of these existing accounts. They do not seek 
cheap resources (TCE) as they already have them, nor do they own any proprietary asset to 
exploit in foreign markets (OLI). Also, unlike RBV, which argues for non-duplicity and non-
transferability, they assess resources for imitability and transferability. These firms usually 
start small. They lack critical resources, proprietary technology, brands, skills, experience, 
and knowledge, and they are distant from major markets. In reality, these firms are either 
newcomers or latecomers in the global scenario, and to make up for the lost time, they seek 
inorganic growth by directly acquiring corporations with better technology, resources, and 
managerial skills in developed and more wealthy nations. They grow through organizational 
innovations, rather than through product or technological inventions. In fact, Mathews argues 
that these firms have lessons to teach about the strategies they have adopted and proposes a 
new framework, Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL), which governs firms’ behaviour in these 
markets. They establish links through joint ventures and partnerships overseas, and leverage 
their existing cost advantage. Repeated application of this strategy gives them valuable 
learnings about new sources of competitive advantage. Their view of the world as a set of 
available resources, and the modus operandi of M&A, is truly unique. In a similar vein, 
Kumar (2009) argues that emerging markets have different motivations. They already have a 
cost advantage, so what they seek is complementary competencies, as well as new business 
models, distribution networks, innovations, and talent. They aim to acquire and augment their 
existing strategic assets. Nicholson and Salaber (2013) take the argument even further, 
suggesting that motives for EMNEs are even country specific.  
To further discuss their limitations, in their native form, these traditional theories fail 
to acknowledge the impact of institutional and cultural disparities which have emerged as 
prominent challenges within CBMAs. Olie (1994) explains that this is because the wealth of 
research has focussed primarily on M&As derived from the same national background. 
Today, these factors are vital in foreign forays, particularly in terms of their potential to 
impede the success of post-merger integration (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000) and  hinder the realization of strategic objectives by foreign ventures. 
Consequently, these theories had to be revamped. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) and  
Brouthers (2002) extend the TCE model to incorporate the institutional and cultural context. 
Dunning (2006b) also incorporated the institutional context into the OLI framework. He 
acknowledged that the respect for culture and tradition is of particular importance for the 
success of these strategic alliances. For the LLL framework, Dunning (2006a) credits it as a 
complement that adds to the richness of OLI framework, but disagrees about it being a 
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replacement and instead recommends that institutional context should be integrated into the 
LLL framework. Another argument incongruent with the LLL comes from Narula (2006) 
who asserts that EMNEs are not different from any traditional MNEs as they both exploit 
firm specific advantages and seek resources that they lack. Further research on Indian 
markets’ EMNEs (Buckley et al., 2015) finds support for both the asset exploitation (OLI) 
and augmentation (LLL) by Indian firms.  
An alternate, but relatively expansive, model explaining CBMAs is proposed by 
Ghemawat (2001). He argues that managers are myopic in selecting cross-borders associates, 
basing their decisions on the sales potential in a new territory and relying on tools such as 
country portfolio analysis (CPA) centred on national wealth and people’s propensity to 
consume. In doing so, these managers grossly underestimate the costs and risks of doing 
business internationally. These costs and risks are from the impact of distance. The author 
proposes the unique CAGE (Cultural, Administrative, Geographical, and Economic) 
Distance Framework, which proposes that cultural, administrative, geographical, and 
economic distances between the participating firms are factors that affect CBMA outcomes. 
The higher the variance of these paradigms, the riskier the target market will be, the higher 
the degree of convergence, and the greater the potential will be. Of the four, cultural and 
administrative (institutional) distances have a larger impact. Ghemawat argues  that these 
distances can make the foreign market considerably more or less attractive, citing some 
literature findings for substantiation. For instance, the chances of trade between firms from 
countries with past colonial relationships are ten times more likley, than between firms with 
no such historical connection. Likewise, trade between the countries with a common business 
language is three times greater than it would be otherwise. Common memberships of the 
countries can raise the trade possibilities by 330% and so on. What this implies is that socio-
political linkages, charter memberships, and historical relationships are vital for foreign 
ventures. The idea that these business relationships must emerge from some cultural or 
institutional commonalities, and not just out of pure coincidence, is deep seated. 
However, these distances are not always strenuous. Other theories such as RBV and 
Organizational Learning Theory suggest that the cultural and institutional differences present 
opportunities to acquire unique skill sets. The greater the divergence, the higher the 
possibilities of new learning (Barkema et al., 1996; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These 
dissimilarities provide new knowledge, talent and experience which adds to managerial 
proficiency. Towards wealth creation, CBMAs generate synergies through asset sharing and 
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risk diversification and hence positive returns to both target and acquiring shareholders (Seth 
et al., 2002).  
Further, a common business language, geographical proximity, religion, membership 
of various international organizations and many more factors are touted as other possible 
determinants. Identifying real factors from ephemeral factors is particularly difficult under 
the circumstances where underlying notions are shifting radically. While carefully sifting 
through these frameworks (along with their stated limitations and suggested reforms), a 
common theme emanates. This theme is that the dominant source of risks in CBMAs is the 
exposure to incongruent economic, regulatory and cultural structures (Hofstede, 1980; House 
et al., 2002). In the same vein, Brouthers (2002) states that foreign market ventures are 
dictated by transaction costs (economic risks), as well as institutional (legal and regulatory 
environment risks) and cultural variables (investment risks). Technology may indeed be 
making the world a smaller place, but it is not eliminating the very real and often very high 
costs of distance (Ghemawat, 2001). 
Figure 2.4.3 summarizes the extract of the discussion in a simple layout. In essence, 
the various frameworks explaining the cross-border activities argue that the economic, 
cultural and institutional incongruities matter. However, while RBV and Organizational 
Learning Theory frameworks see them as mutual learning opportunities, other frameworks 
like TCE, OLI, CAGE and LLL perceive them as challenges. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.3 Distance Factors in CBMAs 
Incongruities (distance) in Economic, Institutional and Cultural structures of the participating firms are the 
sources of inefficiency in CBMAs. While the TCE, OLI, CAGE, and LLL frameworks see them as 
challenges, RBV and Organizational Learning Theory dub them ‘learning opportunities’. 
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The fragmented literature on M&As in emerging markets is already pointing towards 
some unprecedented outcomes. Chari et al. (2009) distinguish between returns to the 
acquirers in deals between developed-country acquirers and emerging or developed country 
targets, and suggests that the results are economically large and statistically significant in 
former deals, as long as the majority control is acquired. Likewise, deals between emerging 
markets acquirers and targets also yield positive returns to the acquirers. Bhagat et al. (2011) 
show positive returns to the EMNEs acquirers. This positive gain to the acquirers is one 
unique finding in emerging markets M&As thus far. But not always. Aybar and Ficici (2009) 
report no value addition for EMNEs. Instead, 50% of the firms destroyed value in their sample 
set. When it comes to Indian markets, studies find positive returns to the acquirers (Gubbi et 
al., 2010; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013) and (Chhibber and Majumdar (1999, 2005)) 
determine that foreign association has a positive impact on Indian targets for higher levels of 
ownership.  
The evidence is mixed, and clearly, there is a pressing need to understand further the 
effects of CBMAs in general, and in emerging markets in particular.  
In summary, while CBMAs have immense potential, this potential is coupled with 
greater obstacles to realizing opportunities. Depending on the theoretical framework, CBMAs 
may be seen as a challenge or an opportunity. They can be a source of positive synergies and 
can also act as value destroyers. While the return for target firms is clearly positive, the 
evidence in relation to CBMAs for EMNEs acquirers is mixed. To test the impact of the 
announcement of CBMAs on Indian firms, the following hypothesis is developed and tested 
on cross-border deals:  
H5:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of CBMAs to the 
participating Indian firms. 
The hypothesis is tested for both targets and acquirers in cross-border deals and also 
allows the testing of synergy, hubris and agency motives. 
 Figure 2.4.3 above summarizes the prominent frameworks explaining foreign forays 
into three main sources of incongruities, which are vital for the success of CBMAs leaving a 
scope for better understanding of these factors. 
2.4.3.1 Economic Costs - Corporate Governance  
Pivotal to understanding the costs summated in the TCE framework is the fact that 
the underlying arguments are identical to the issues pertaining to the agency costs theories in 
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finance. They both refer to the costs incurred by tolerating or restricting the commitment 
problem or opportunist behaviour on the part of one party to the contract. Jones (1995) argues 
that the macro-level impact of opportunism can be pervasive and that attempts to restrain it 
can be expensive. As a way to address these issues, Williamson (1996, p. 5) emphasizes the 
role of governance. The study of governance is concerned with the identification, explication, 
and mitigation of all forms of contractual hazards, and an essential function of governance is 
the harmonisation of interests that would otherwise spawn the pursuance of antagonistic sub-
goals (Williamson, 1979). Likewise, in reference to CBMAs, Canabal and White (2008) 
propose that there is a need to establish governance structures that minimize costs and 
inefficiencies that are likely to incur while enforcing implicit and explicit contracts associated 
with the operations of foreign markets. As measuring transaction costs is a formidable task, 
focusing on comparative governance structures can alleviate the issues significantly.  
In summary, the underlying argument for economic costs is that the divergence in 
corporate governance (CG) systems across nations can be detrimental to CBMAs. 
Why is the  corporate governance structure of a country such an important factor?  
Corporate governance is core to any economic system. It outlines authority and 
accountability. It establishes the claims on cashflows and answerability for strategic disasters. 
It prescribes market structures, resource allocation, wealth creation and dividend distribution. 
For employees, it determines the opportunities and job security; for suppliers, it dictates 
contractual continuity; for investors, it assures growth, return, and security; and for society at 
large, corporate governance is closely intertwined with general prosperity. It determines the 
response of firms to economic shocks, takeover threats, disputes and trade unions. Thus, both 
the affluent and the deprived are equally concerned, and every entity holds a stake in the 
prevailing corporate governance system and cares for its structure (Gourevitch and Shinn, 
2005, p. 3). As a result, every nation has its own corporate governance system - one that is 
best suited to its own local economic environment. 
Anything that determines the division of wealth and power is bound to create 
conflicts. The impact of such conflicts is often more pronounced in the case of CBMAs 
because the target firms import the corporate governance systems of the acquiring companies 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004). This has the potential to alter the target firm’s investor protection 
(Bris and Cabolis, 2002). To add to these complexities, Aguilera and Jackson (2010) argue 
that there is no definitive theoretical explanation that enables the comparison of corporate 
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governance models across countries - scholars must rely on legal origins, political systems or 
others to unravel the mysteries.  
The two main economic models of corporate governance that dominate the traditional 
finance literature are based on Shareholder and Stakeholder perspective.  
The Shareholder view finds its origin in classical Agency theory, first propounded by 
Berle and Means (1932) and popularised by Jensen (1986). It posits that there is a separation 
of ownership and control that leads to the divergence of agents’ and shareholders’ interests. 
Investors rely on market-based penalty and reward systems to control errant managers and 
recognize good performance; the monitoring system is external. Such economies are 
characterized by active markets for capital control, equity financing, diffused ownership and 
high investor protection right.  
Stakeholder theory (Coase, 1937; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Jones, 1995) recognizes  
owners, managers and employees as the primary stakeholders, with the performance of a 
company dependent on the relationships of these stakeholders. As there is generally no 
separation of ownership and control, the monitoring system is internal. These economies are 
characterized by dormant markets for capital control, debt-financing, concentrated ownership 
and lower investor protection rights. 
One of the ways to operationalize these theories in research is by employing ‘a legal 
approach’, as proposed by the iconic (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998, 2002) (LLSV 
from now) (García‐Castro et al., 2008). LLSV literature divides the world into four legal 
regimes: English, French, German and Scandinavian. It is suggested that the legal context is 
the best way to understand  corporate governance and its reforms. They particularly focus on 
the laws for investor protection and their effective enforcements. When these laws are weak, 
block ownership shows a commitment against expropriation, and is a way to persuade 
investor confidence.  
In LLSV literature, English origin countries possess conditions that are propitious for  
Shareholder view based corporate governance models. The model thus developed is 
commonly referred to as the Anglo-Saxon model (García‐Castro et al., 2008). Likewise, Civil 
law regimes reflect attributes conducive to a Stakeholder view based corporate governance 
model, and the resultant corporate governance model is thus referred to as the 
German/Japanese model.  
  2-43 
 
In the wake of the recent findings, Armour et al. (2009) question the validity of the 
legal origin hypothesis and find the dichotomy of the world in Common and Civil law regimes 
vague, particularly in trying to understand investor protection and ownership patterns. Their 
belief is that Civil law regimes are increasingly converging with Common law systems with 
regards to shareholder protection. However, Licht et al. (2005) argue that regardless of its 
limitations, the LLSV dataset provides a unique snapshot of certain legal rules in the context 
of corporate governance. 
Another dimension to understanding corporate governance is proposed by Roe (1996) 
who brings in political paradigm for cross-national comparisons of corporate governance. 
The perspective has been further extended by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) in recent times. 
In contrast to the theory propounded by LLSV, they opine that countries have various 
corporate governance systems and that they change over time. This notion opposes the LLSV 
argument that the corporate governance practices are hard-wired into country-specific legal 
families. Instead, they propose ‘Domestic Politics’ as a critical factor responsible for the 
adoption of various corporate governance models. The corporate governance systems reflect 
public policy choices based on laws and regulations. However, eventually, the extent of 
enactment and the degree of enforcement of these rules, laws and regulations are the functions 
of the prevailing political systems. In particular, it is the interaction of the economic 
preferences of the interests groups and the institutional framework that matters. This means 
that the relations between the principal actors within the firms (specifically managers, owners, 
and workers) have to be considered just as much as their relationships with actors outside the 
firm, particularly the state as key actors can form coalitions and influence the character of the  
corporate governance system. Consequently, multiple corporate governance models may 
exist, but they all eventually translate into Diffused or Blockholding ownership that can be 
abusive or protective for the investors.  
In their seminal work, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) detail Shareholder and 
Blockholder models. The Blockholder model tightly links ownership and control, and 
monitoring is performed by an influential ‘insider’ with concentrated blockholding of shares. 
These blockholders could be individuals, family, financial institutions and banks, other 
corporates or even the state itself. With such a range of possible blockholders, this model 
exists in several variants.  
In this model, Owners (O), Managers (M) and Workers (W) are the interest groups 
(Stakeholders). Corporate governance confers benefits and each entity works through politics 
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to achieve the corporate governance policies which suit that entity the most. Depending on 
the varying corporate governance preferences they have, these stakeholders combine in 
different coalitions. The outcomes depend not only on what coalitions emerge, but also on 
who wins. There is an element of a power struggle here.  The power comes from the 
institutional framework characterized by the extent of minority shareholder protection and 
the degree of coordination. The degree of coordination implies various laws and regulations 
governing several economic elements relevant to corporate governance, such as labour, anti-
trust, price determinants and more. However, these economic policies are a function of the 
prevailing political system. Political systems can be Majoritarian or Consensual. Majoritarian 
systems have the potential for large policy swings which affect long-term investments and 
impair committed ownership. Consequently, Majoritarian systems are most likely to produce 
Diffused ownership. Whereas, Consensual systems generate concentrated Blockholding. 
Figure 2.4.4 summarizes their proposition. 
 
Figure 2.4.4 Political View of CG Models 
Adopted from Gourevitch & Shinn (2005, pp.16) 
To summarize,  corporate governance is a function of the interplay of various 
coalitions of stakeholders and political institutions. The winning coalition forms the  
corporate governance system that they prefer. With three stakeholders and two political 
systems, there are six corporate governance models which might result in either Blockholding 
or Diffused ownership. Based on this theory, in their comprehensive study on comparative 
international corporate governance systems, Aguilera and Jackson (2010) produced the 
following table. 
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Table 2.4.1 Adopted from Aguilera & Jackson (2010 p. 515)  
 
* X > Y: X’s preferences prevail in the political struggle over CG issues. O=Owners, 
M=Managers, W = Workers. 
In this political perspective, Germany, Japan and Sweden are identified as having 
Blockholding ownership just like LLSV or Stakeholder theory suggests. France is particularly 
interesting as Aguilera & Jackson categorize it alongside countries with Diffused ownership; 
this is in contrast to previous classifications where France was identified as having 
concentrated ownership. 
Interestingly, regardless of the differences in their origin, all the theories - the 
classical view of Shareholder/Stakeholder dichotomy, the legal view from LLSV, and the 
political framework of corporate governance systems, converge eventually, with ‘ownership 
patterns’ the ultimate outcome. Concentrated ownership emerges as a natural hedge against 
the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders in the countries with weaker legal systems, 
such as India. Thus, they are all concerned with investor protection eventually. 
Following the literature discussion presented above, corporate governance systems 
are eventually concerned with investor protection and property rights. Further, target firms 
are known to import corporate governance systems of the acquiring companies (Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004), which has the potential to alter its investor protection (Bris and Cabolis, 2002). 
Aybar and Ficici (2009) however, find no evidence of this transfer from emerging market 
economies. Further, there is a lack of any definitive theoretical explanation to match corporate 
governance systems across countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). Collectively, all these 
findings inspire the testing of the impact of corporate governance systems on CBMAs in this 
thesis. The Indian corporate governance system is Anglo-Saxon or Shareholder formally, and 
it will be interesting to evaluate how they measure up against alternative corporate 
governance models. Statistically, the hypothesis constructed is as follows: 
H6:  There is no difference in abnormal returns from the announcement of CBMAs in deals 
where the firms have identical corporate governance models. 
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The hypothesis is tested for both Legal Origin of corporate governance systems from 
LLSV and political origin (Roe, 1996; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). 
2.4.3.2 Cultural Distance – National Administrative Heritage 
“Culture is the glue that holds an organization together. It helps guide all the decisions, how you 
behave and act. You can pick whatever strategy you want but how you go about doing it is the 
difference between, oftentimes, success and failure.”  
-  Lori Fouché, CEO, Fireman’s Fund 
 
Cultural disparity is generally blamed for ruining CBMAs (Chakrabarti et al., 2009). 
Smith (2015) explains cultural distance as the measure of similarity or difference between 
two cultural groups or nations.  Kogut and Singh (1988) measure cultural distance by using 
different scores on various cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980). To fully 
comprehend why cultural distance matters, it is imperative to distinguish between national 
and organizational cultural disparities. Organisational cultural differences refer to the 
dissimilarities between the two firms such as different organizational routines and repertoires, 
or managerial practices and styles. They manifest formal control mechanism of an 
organization. National cultural disparities relate to the differences between the two countries 
in which the firms operate, and include attributes such as communication, coordination, 
socialization, individuals’ values and risk propensities, the degree of uncertainty avoidance. 
They are the informal control systems of an organization, which emanate from the respective 
national culture (Shimizu et al., 2004). Hofstede (1994) provides a formative study that 
distinguishes between the two cultures. Literature suggests that of the several elements in the 
relationship between acquirer and target firms, the prevailing formal and informal control 
mechanisms are critical. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1999) refer to these formal control 
mechanisms as the ‘anatomy’ of an organization and the informal mechanisms as its 
‘physiology’ and ‘psychology’. Put together, they represent national administrative heritage. 
Administrative heritage is a tangible representation of an organizational culture—its 
practices, beliefs and control structures. Over time, these routines and shared logic become 
institutionalized or ‘hard-wired’ for the members of the firm  (Lubatkin et al., 1998). In fact,  
Edith (1959) believes that firms are ‘administrative organizations’. Olie (1994) argues that 
the appropriate organizational structure and leadership are important. However, prevalent 
managerial practices and values vary between nations. Hofstede (1980) explains that 
worldwide dissimilarities in management styles, organizational structures, and employee 
motivations emerge from the differences in the collective mental programing of people 
embedded in different national cultures. Common culture produces common beliefs, and they 
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shape common practices. Hence, in the international arena, firms have diverse administrative 
heritages that are culturally influenced and nationally bound. Thus, the national 
administrative heritage partially reflects the national culture and the institutional routines in 
which it develops (Lubatkin et al., 1998). 
With respect to CBMAs, the acquirers are known to transfer their home practices and 
values to their subsidiaries or targets across nations (Bris and Cabolis, 2002; Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004). They tend to do so either because of ethnocentricity or due to comfort in their 
own national administrative heritage itself. However, in doing so, the divergence in the 
national administrative heritages of the participating firms can create conflicts and frustrate 
the successful integration of the merger.  A poor administrative fit lowers the commitment 
and cooperation of the target members and enhances transaction and administrative costs 
(Lubatkin et al., 1998). In the case studies from Olie (1994), the subject managers identify 
cultural conflicts as a potent source that prevented their firms from forging into cohesive 
entities. Likewise, Dikova et al. (2010) argue that national cultural differences may lead to 
standstills in acquisition deals, and its impact should not be underestimated. Furthermore, 
Calori et al. (1994) report national biases in the ways that buyers exert formal and informal 
controls over foreign targets. Their study found that informal systems are positively linked 
with the attitudinal and economic performance of target firms, and opposite with the levels 
of operational controls. So, the rigidity of the administrative heritage also matters.  
Researchers such as Calori et al. (1994) and Hofstede (1993) argue that the cultural 
contingencies must be considered in management theories. Hofstede (1994) suggests that 
managing international businesses implies accommodating both national and organizational 
cultures simultaneously. Barkema et al. (1996) claim that the integration process is more 
complex now as it requires double-layered acculturation (organizational and national). While 
differentiating the impact of the two, Weber et al. (1996) suggest that the incongruity in the 
corporate cultures engenders non-cooperation and negativity between the two sets of 
managers. However, the stress is not as high as in the case of national cultural disparity. 
Hofstede (1994) rationalizes that by arguing that organizational cultures are derived from 
(superficial) practices, they are somewhat manageable. However, national cultures are based 
on values and are hardwired. Relating the two, (Schneider, 1988; Calori et al., 1994) argue 
that organizational cultures are, in fact, heavily influenced by their national culture. And these 
national characteristics are difficult to adjust as, over time, they are crystallized through 
institutions such as family and educational structures; religious and work organizations; 
government and law; literature and others. Thus, leadership style should emanate from the 
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cultural conditioning of a leader’s subordinates (Hofstede, 1980). Mahatma Gandhi says, “A 
nation's culture resides in the hearts and in the soul of its people.” In fact, Lubatkin et al. 
(1998) suggest that the distance in the administrative heritage of the two firms is 
commensurate to the variations in the respective national cultures. Thus, the culture of a 
nation is a puzzling and unyielding factor in CBMAs. 
Not only do investors need to consider the strategic and financial fit of firms, but they 
must also evaluate the impact of organizational and human resources in estimating future 
consolidation costs and the economic repercussions. The stock market announcement returns 
reflect the expectations of investors about the future performance of a firm involved in 
culturally different transactions (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Datta and Puia (1995) report the 
detrimental effect that acquirer-target cultural distance has on acquiring shareholders in their 
short run analysis on the ‘announcement effect’. But Chakrabarti et al. (2009) find 
significantly positive returns for the cross-border acquirers, and fail to see integration as an 
issue in the long term— CBMAs can equip acquirers with higher synergies and organizational 
strengths, making them successful global players. Likewise, Goulet and Schweiger in Stahl 
et al. (2012, p. 410) comment that congruity of national cultures is not necessarily a harbinger 
of successful integration as participating firms are already predisposed to manage these 
differences. There could be a possibility of attraction, rather than resistance, depending on 
the entities involved (Very et al., 1996). Another popular argument emphasizes the required 
extent of integration, which can range from total autonomy to complete absorption of the 
target firm. If the degree of required integration is low, then there is no issue (Stahl and Voigt, 
2008). However, Aybar and Ficici (2009) report that half of the transactions in their sample 
of CBMAs from EMNEs destroyed value, and the acquirers earned negative returns overall. 
Interestingly, cultural proximity, rather than distance, was an issue in their findings. On the 
contrary, Nicholson and Salaber (2013) argue that the Indian acquirers earn higher returns 
from culturally close countries and that cultural distance for Chinese acquirers does not matter 
at all. To summarize, the impact of national cultural distance in CBMAs from EMNEs is still 
murky. 
 Hofstede (1980) pioneered monumental studies of cultural variations and 
management theories on motivation, leadership styles, and organization across countries. His 
work was based on forty countries and four basic cultural dimensions. He suggested that these 
theories reflect the cultural environment in which they were written and hence they are not 
universally pervasive. Further, Schwartz (1994) proposed three alternative dimensions to 
study culture. These studies inspired House et al. (2004) to conduct a comprehensive analysis 
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of 62 societies on nine cultural dimensions and their impact on six types of leadership styles. 
On the basis of their analysis, they divide these 62 societies into ten cultural clusters as 
outlined in Figure 2.4.5.  
 
Figure 2.4.5 Cultural Clusters Adopted from the GLOBE Study 
Adopted from House et al., (2004, p 190) 
According to the findings of the previous literature, including the GLOBE study, 
people from same cultures develop shared schemas – common patterns of perceptions and 
reactions. That implies that organizations emerge with structures and cultures that mirror 
those schemas. They further find support for the cultural congruence proposition for 
leadership which implies that the style that is consistent with the shared values is acceptable 
and effective otherwise it engenders resistance, conflicts and dissatisfaction. Weiss and 
Bloom (1990) find that a clash of collective norms and foreign values are related to lower 
productivity and discontentment. 
To summarize, the structure and conduct of an organization (organizational culture) 
are reflected in the national administrative heritage of a firm, which is derived from its 
national culture and institutional routines. Any divergence in these heritages ultimately leads 
to conflict and inefficiencies in the system. Hofstede (1994) argues that both the cultures need 
to be managed concurrently when conducting international businesses. And in fact, original 
policies should be adapted to fit local cultures and lead to the desired effect. Comparing the 
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impact of the two, Stahl and Voigt (2008) argue that the national cultural differences create 
relatively greater barriers to integration than the organizational cultural differences. 
The finance literature is rich with evidence for both sides of the cultural context 
argument in realtion to CBMAs and consequently, amongst all these explanations and 
evidence, the impact of cultural distance is ambiguous. As cited earlier, results from (Aybar 
and Ficici, 2009; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013) provide 
contradictory conclusions. Past research has relied upon Hofstede’s dimensions, religion and 
legal origin, (Chakrabarti et al., 2009), as well as language and geographical proximity (Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004) as measures to capture cultural distances. Dikova et al. (2010) argue that 
the constructs and scales in the GLOBE study are developed cross-culturally and are more 
comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically verified. Accordingly, this thesis uses the 
cultural clusters created by the GLOBE study to test whether there are any variations in the 
returns of the participating firms in CBMAs, based on the cultural distances of these firms.  
Intuitively, cultural proximity should produce higher returns, but the literature is 
divided. Thus, statistically, the hypothesis created is as follows: 
H7:  There is no difference in the abnormal returns obtained from the announcement of 
CBMAs when the counterparty to the deal originates from other cultures.  
2.4.3.3 Institutional Distance –Legitimacy and Isomorphism 
Institutional context is important. It can undermine property rights and escalate risks 
in exchange in CBMAs (Brouthers, 2002). Institutions provide the structure in which 
transactions occur. They set out the ‘rules of the game in a society’ and construct the 
constraints that shape human interactions (North, 1990, pp. 3-4). For semantics, formal 
constraints refer to constitutions, rules, laws and regulations and are collectively referred to 
as institutions. In comparison, informal constraints such as values and beliefs; customs, 
conventions, and traditions; and codes of conduct are manifestations of the national culture 
of a country. Scott (1995) classifies these constraints in three domains: regulatory, cognitive 
and normative. Institutional distance is defined as the differences in these institutions 
between the host and the home country. It affects the interpretation of local institutional 
requirements, as well as the extent of adjustments required. In practice, it may create barriers, 
such as quotas and tariffs, incentives for entry-exit and performance conditions, ownership 
restrictions, and many more. It implies dissimilarities in accounting standards, legal systems, 
political setups and others. Of the three domains, the regulatory domain is relatively easier to 
comprehend and adapt, as its constituents are formalized and well codified. However, 
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complexities increase in the other domains as they are more tacit, and embedded deep into 
the structures of a country (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The latter two are captured more in 
administrative heritage, which was discussed earlier.  
The institutional environment exerts forces on organizations ‘to legitimize’ and hence 
institutional theory can best be explained as a theory of ‘legitimacy-seeking’  (House et al., 
2004, p. 81). Organizational legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the organization by its 
environment and the adoption of legitimate elements, which increases the probability of the 
organization’s survival and success (Zucker, 1987; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Kostova and 
Zaheer (1999) cite a case study of the uprooting of Cargill Inc from India. This was met with 
vociferous resistance from local competitors, politicians, intellectuals and environmentalists. 
Despite several moderating measures, Cargill Inc failed to obtain local legitimacy. Thus, by 
incorporating the institutionalized elements in its formal structure, functionaries, and 
procedures, an organization insulates itself against public outrcry against its conduct. It is 
then referred to as ‘legitimized’, which ensures external support, less turbulence and more 
stability (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, the prevailing institutional environment dictates 
the shape of firms’ structures and behaviours (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). 
Suchman (1995) adds that institutionalization and legitimacy empower organizations by 
making them seem natural and meaningful.  
Firms can legitimize themselves through isomorphism, which is the process of 
adopting the structures and practices that are already institutionalized in the given 
environment and are successful. The implementation of institutional isomorphism by an 
organization maximizes its legitimacy and ensures its support, success and survival (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). In terms of CBMAs, institutional distance has been linked with two 
aspects: firstly, the transfer of strategic orientations and organizational practices from the 
parent firm to the acquiring foreign subsidiary (Kostova, 1999), and secondly, the 
establishment of legitimacy in the host country (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Davis et al. 
(2000) refer to them as internal and external institutional environment respectively. They 
explain that the acquiring subsidiaries face twofold isomorphic pressures: being isomorphic 
to the internal institutional environment requires the need for conformity with the parent 
firm’s structure, policies, and practices. It is critical to share resources internally. Whereas, 
adapting to local markets (target) and their unique characteristics implies isomorphism with 
respect to the external institutional environment. This is important for outside support and 
survival in the host country. While discussing the relative importance of the two forms of 
isomorphisms, Davis et al. (2000) conclude that the internal isomorphism exerts more 
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pressure. This implies that the institutional features of the acquiring parent company are 
critical to the success of CBMAs. The firms are exposed to all the three domains to varying 
degrees as their structures and legitimacy requirements vary across national environments. 
Hence, the more identical the institutional profiles of the countries are, the easier it is to 
comply with legitimacy requirements (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
For businesses operating in emerging markets, the legal framework and institutions 
are of prime importance, particularly when they are unacquainted with the local environment 
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). The purpose of the formal constraints is to facilitate the process 
of decrypting the environmental complexities and to promote value enhancing transactions. 
However, these elements are country-specific and more importantly, they differ between 
countries even for the same transactions (North, 1990, pp. 3-4). Hence, the home grown 
wisdom about legal institutions has limited validity in international transactions. Given the 
fact that the acquirers acclimatize more easily to identical legal environments (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999), divergence in the regulatory environment of the target and acquirer countries 
increases the environmental complexities. In fact, in a unique study about deals abandoned 
after announcements, Dikova et al. (2010) found that differences in the formal institutional 
environments of the home and host countries play havoc.  
Given the possible range of impact of institutional differences, the success of CBMAs 
depends on the choice of the integration process and control systems, which are contingent 
on the acquirers’ nationality (Brouthers, 2002). Hitt et al. (1997) argue that the cultural and 
institutional environment construct the strategic orientation of the managers. Thus, the 
divergence in institutional frameworks can lead to distinct managerial practices and thus 
severe conflicts (Shimizu et al., 2004) during the process of isomorphism within the local 
institutional environment of the host country.  
Thus, an identical institutional environment is a key to reducing this friction. 
Referring to the classic distinction between common and civil law systems, Dikova et al. 
(2010) argue that the fundamental legal institutional differences can heighten the 
environmental complexities of CBMAs. The laws of most nations were transplanted through 
either voluntary adoption, or conquests or colonization by one of the European powers, and 
then tailored to suit local needs. Legal rules reflect legal family concisely (Licht et al., 2005). 
Thus, contract laws and commercial laws in India find their origin in the common law adopted 
during British imperialism, with Indian formal institutions reflecting this legacy. However, 
‘legal family classification’ is just one dimension of identifying near-identical legal 
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institutional environment. The administrative distance in the CAGE framework (Ghemawat, 
2001) also refers to home-host country linkages and suggests that other socio-political and 
economic ties between countries can also help bridge institutional distances. For instance, 
bilateral treaties and membership of international organizations can moderate distance 
problem. Indian membership of international groups such as G15 (developing countries), G20 
(developed and emerging countries) and the Commonwealth (former British colonies) is 
relevant in this context. Coordinated macro-economic policies implemented by member 
countries to achieve common economic goals promote networking and linkages between the 
member countries, engendering institutional uniformity for the firms intending cross-border 
transactions (Buckley et al., 2012). In their analysis, they find membership of the G20 and 
Commonwealth nations to have a significantly positive impact on CBMAs.  
Following CAGE theory and in the spirit of Buckley et al. (2012) who found that 
membership of the Commonwealth was a significant variable in Indian CBMAs, this thesis 
uses Commonwealth membership as a measure of institutional distance to evaluate whether 
there are any differences in abnormal returns for participating Indian firms in a deal. India is 
a Commonwealth nation, so for statistical analysis the following hypothesis is constructed: 
H8:  There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the deals with the firms with the 
identical Institutional framework. 
2.4.3.4 Distance Factors Relationship 
The finance literature suggests that cultural, institutional and economic incongruities 
are not always truly exogenous, but instead have an implicit hierarchy of influence. It explains 
how cultures affect institutions (Licht et al., 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) and, in turn, 
how institutions determine the economic cost of exchange (North, 1990, p. 34).  
Drawn from the various arguments presented in the finance literature, Figure 2.4.6 is 
constructed to demonstrate the purported flow of influence in this hierarchy. Right at the top 
sits the culture. And that is the reason, Brouthers (2002) suggests, that the cultural context 
disparity, in its larger connotation, summates ‘investments risks’ generated from the 
difference in the target country’s economic, legal, political, and cultural systems, along with 
its market attractiveness. 
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Figure 2.4.6 Relationship between Various Distance Factors 
The cultural values may motivate and constrain law-makers’ preferences for certain 
legal arrangements (Licht et al., 2005). Thus, countries differ in institutional contexts, and 
that directs their  corporate governance relationships (Inkpen et al., 2000). 
However, this direction of relationship may not always be that clear or unidirectional. 
Culture and institutions are not always exogenous—they interact and co-evolve in a 
complementary way with mutual feedback effects. As a result, culture may evolve differently, 
depending on the type of institutions. And, institutions may function differently depending 
on the culture (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013). Even, Lubatkin et al. (1998) suggest that national 
culture can shape, and be shaped by, social and political institutions.  
Nonetheless, what is evident is that these elements strongly relate, both to each other 
and to national culture (Licht et al., 2005), and institutional setup can help determine and 
predict the governance structure, and thus the extent of challenge in any CBMA deal. 
2.4.3.5 The Indian Conundrum 
If culture and statutory laws are related with respect to corporate governance rules 
(Licht et al., 2005), then this should generate a stable equilibria with certain specific sets of 
attributes for each country in line with the existing literature. However, when India as a 
country, is evaluated on all the three relevant dimensions of incongruities simultaneously, it 
defies all existing tenets of finance theories. It presents a unique confluence of these variables, 
which is only partly chartered in the literature, making it difficult to predict the directions of 
the outcomes in Indian CBMAs. In fact, Licht et al. (2005) treated Asian countries with a 
common law heritage (including India) as an outlier, concluding that formal laws play only a 
minor role in protecting shareholders in these countries.  
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a) Appropriateness of Indian Corporate Governance Model 
As discussed earlier, the two classic corporate governance models are the Anglo-
Saxon (outsider dominated) and German/Japanese (insider dominated) models. Owing to its 
British heritage, the Indian legal system finds its origin in the common law system. And 
consequently, the corporate governance model adopted by India is formally Anglo-Saxon. 
Not only that, it even continues to evolve on the similar lines. But the debate is about the 
fitness of such a model in the Indian context—in practice is the Indian corporate governance 
model Anglo-Saxon? 
Machold and Vasudevan (2004) suggest that corporate governance models can be 
evaluated on three primary continuums: (a) ownership and control distance, (b) role of 
external or internal control mechanism, and (c) the social versus the economic view of the 
firm. They argue that with respect to these dimensions, the Indian corporate governance 
model is more German/Japanese (than Anglo-Saxon) in practice. 
With regards to ownership in India, some strategic sectors are dominated by the state, 
while others are dominated by various business groups or promoters. These business groups 
or promoters (through direct ownership, family ownership or People Acting in Concerts 
(PAC)) exercise direct control in firms. Through crossholdings and pyramidal structures, they 
gain more influence. Further, like in Germany and Japan, domestic financial and institutional 
investors hold both equity and debt with significant voting rights, and can potentially 
influence corporate decisions. However, as in many similar countries, in India, these investors 
are perceived to be inactive in their governance roles (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000). In reality 
though, they are even known to block hostile takeovers. So, the effective powers of the 
owners’ increase further due to the inertness of the investors. This ‘business house culture’, 
where significant control of a firm is in hands of a promoter or family due to the confluence 
of various sources and significant funding from institutional investors resembles the 
German/Japanese model of dominant shareholders (Machold and Vasudevan, 2004). 
Literature acknowledges the stock markets’ role in corporate control through mergers 
and takeovers mechanisms. Takeover threats acts as a disciplining mechanism for poorly 
performing corporates and management. Anglo-Saxon models are market-oriented wherein 
external markets perform a monitoring and controlling role. However, such takeover threats 
rarely exist in insider-dominated systems. Instead, they are generally negotiated and not 
contested (Davis and Stout, 1992). The lack of hostile takeovers in India reflects the 
characteristics of the German/Japanese model. 
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Finally, the active participation of Indian corporate houses in local community 
development highlights the social orientations of Indian firms, rather than the narrow 
economic or financial orientation in the Anglo-Saxon model. In the German/Japanese model, 
corporations are social institutions, with a distinct public role and responsibility (Machold 
and Vasudevan, 2004). 
Thus, the Indian corporate governance model is intricate. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) 
suggest that the Indian corporate governance system shares attributes of both the systems and 
thus they call it ‘hybrid system’ whereas (Machold and Vasudevan, 2004) suggest that despite 
adopting Anglo-American model, in India the ‘business house model’ persists.  
b) Formal Institutional Environment  
The iconic LLSV literature provides an excellent discussion of laws and finance 
theories.  The literature argues that investor protection rights are essential for investors to 
extract a return on their investments from managers. However, these rights derive value only 
from the legal system of the jurisdiction in which these securities were issued. Outside 
investors’ rights can be protected only through the enforcement of regulations and laws. Some 
of the crucial regulations are disclosure and accounting rules, which provide investors with 
the information they need to exercise other rights. However, legal systems (laws and 
enforcement) differ markedly around the globe due to the different legal families from which 
they originate: common and civil. The common law tradition tends to protect investors, 
including both shareholders and creditors, considerably better than the civil law tradition. 
Legal families also determine the quality of accounting standards and, here again, common 
law countries are ranked higher than German and French civil law countries. To 
counterbalance, countries with poor legal systems and accounting standards adopt remedial 
laws (referred to as ‘bright line’ rules), which provide some mandatory controls against 
managerial expropriation. Further, in countries with higher anti-director rights, a better rule 
of law and better accounting standards, ownership tends to be dispersed. The legal systems 
also affect the size and the extent of a country’s capital markets. 
Alternatively stated, weak legal systems engender ineffective  corporate governance, 
which implies poor investor protection and consequently inferior opportunities of external 
financing, as well as smaller financial markets. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that poor 
investor protection engenders economic inefficiencies as financial markets can no longer 
allocate resources efficiently (La Porta et al., 2002). Poor investors’ protection also 
necessitates heavily concentrated ownership as a way to monitor and control errant managers. 
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Indian commercial law originated from the common law family as a legacy of British 
imperialism. Thus, ideally, Indian laws should be similar to the laws of other common law 
countries. However, a careful analysis of the data from LLSV literature specifically about 
India, suggests that it rarely complies with the aggregate findings of common law countries. 
Even, Licht et al. (2005) report that Asian countries with a common law heritage are an outlier 
sub-group with respect to investor rights. 
Firstly, for investor protection, the aggregate common law index for anti-director 
rights stood at 3.39 on scale of 5. In that same group, India scored 2. This score is not only 
the minimum for all the countries in the group, but it is also closer to the aggregate of various 
other civil law families, such as French (1.76), German (2), and Scandinavian (2.5).  
Secondly, for accounting standards, India scored 57. This was far away from the 
average score of 70 recorded by common law countries. In fact, it was closer to French (51.17) 
and German (62.67) civil law countries.  
In the law enforcement category, out of five variables, India was in the lowest quartile 
with respect to ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘Corruption’, and was below the median for ‘Efficiency of 
Judicial System’, ‘Risk of Expropriation’ and ‘Contract Repudiation’. It has been argued that 
richer countries enforce laws more effectively than poorer countries. 
Further, despite the weaker legal system and poor accounting standards, India did not 
have any remedial (or bright line rules) to protect investors, as LLSV literature suggested of 
most civil law countries. 
Inefficient corporate governance leads to under-developed financial markets and 
limited external financing resources. However in the seven-pillar analysis of Financial 
Development Report of 2012 from WEF17, Indian financial markets were relatively well 
placed, at 28th out of 62 countries analysed.  
Finally, in terms of concentration of ownership, as per the rationales presented in the 
literature, Indian firms should have had higher outsider shareholdings so as to enable them to 
monitor and control management and thus save their interests from expropriation. However, 
the Indian corporate landscape, like many other emerging nations, is dominated by large 
business groups wherein the owners are also the managers, which gives them significant 
control over company affairs, with investors relegated to the status of minority shareholders. 
                                                 
17 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FinancialDevelopmentReport_2012.pdf accessed on 7/12/2014 
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Selarka (2005) finds no support for the monitoring hypothesis (in which there are minority 
block holders) in Indian firms. 
To conclude, despite being classified as a member of the common law family, India 
rarely exhibits the attributes argued for such countries. In several dimensions, it is more 
aligned with civil law countries but not always. Thus, legal systems in India do not project 
picture consistent with the finance literature. This challenges the fundamental tenet of the 
institutional theory that institutional proximities can reduce risks and facilitate isomorphism.  
c) Socio-Cultural Anthropological Attributes 
India’s corporate governance model reflects the properties of the German/Japanese 
model more so than those of the Anglo-Saxon model. Furthermore, the relevant laws of 
economics and finance in India deviate from the established wisdom about other common 
law regimes. Finally, what adds more to the puzzle is the findings of GLOBE study about 
India, in which India is clustered with countries like the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Iran, rather than grouped with nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany or Japan from where it’s institutional and corporate governance features are 
derived. In fact, the social values and practices of Germanic, Nordic, Latin European and 
Anglo-Saxon cultures are noticeably different to the South Asian cluster. Hofstede (1980) 
argues that Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions of culture are more 
important for structuring organizations operating in different countries. However, he had 
difficulties in identifying an ‘implicit model’ for India on those grounds. Mainly because 
Indian organizations are formalized as far as relationships between people are concerned 
(Power Distance), but not as far as the workflow is concerned (Uncertainty Avoidance). 
Likewise, other mutually exclusive cultural attributes such as Collectivism and Individualism 
coexist in Indian systems. Thus, India presents ambiguity in its cultural orientation. In the 
GLOBE study, Chhokar (2002) explains that the diversity and complexity of society and 
culture in India results in a lack of one common nation-wide theme that could be termed as 
‘Indian Culture’. Simultaneously, it also lacks any unique country-specific cultural model 
that is different to others countries. He states that the best way to deal with India is “…to 
expect differences, to accept differences and also to respect differences”. 
2.4.3.6 Multidimensional India 
Thus, when India is analysed from the frame of incongruities relevant in CBMAs, a 
multifaceted picture of India emerges as follows:  
  2-59 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.7 The Multidimensional Aspects of India 
 
The findings within India make it a unique territory for CBMAs—one that 
necessitates more research, particularly as India contradicts existing beliefs about how these 
three associate with each other and shape the structures and procedures of firms in any 
country. 
Further, undoubtedly, there is a wealth of literature that explains the motives, tools 
and risks for outward orientation in CBMAs. However, the literature that describes 
determinants of returns to target firms is equally scarce. Though, unambiguously, literature 
documents extraordinary positive returns for target firms but rarely are there any studies 
which explore the factors that may be driving those returns. This is imperative to explore 
especially in the environment where the deals are mostly negotiated and even targets have 
bargaining powers. Occasionally, there are some explanations, such as that of Chhibber and 
Majumdar (2005) who argue that for Indian target firms, CBMAs can provide them with 
global orientation with reduced transaction costs as foreign firms generally have superior 
international marketing capabilities or knowledge of other institutional, legal and cultural 
domains. Likewise, acquirers can become global suppliers at the behest of their low cost 
subsidiary in India. Indeed, in their sample set, the authors find superior exporting 
performance for Indian target firms which have major ownership in hands of foreign 
associates. In another finding, Rossi and Volpin (2004) argue that in CBMAs, targets are 
generally based in poor investor protection countries, and they subsequently adopt the 
enhanced  corporate governance of the acquiring firms. However, Aybar and Ficici (2009) 
find no evidence for this in emerging market economies.  
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With an exception of a handful of publications, the territory is largely uncharted and 
needs further research. As a starting point, this thesis takes a different approach, evaluating 
whether the factors that are so profound for CBMA acquirers, hold any importance for targets. 
Do the returns to target firms vary depending on the cultural, institutional and economic 
distance from the acquiring firm? And if the answer is yes, of all the factors, which one affects 
the returns the most? 
Other Factors 
2.4.4 Methods of Payment – Consideration Effect 
In terms of acquisition currency, bidder firms may opt for cash, stocks or a 
combination of both, in order to pay the consideration in M&A deals. Martin (1996) classifies 
the possibilities in three categories: cash financing (including cash, debt or assumption of 
liabilities), common stock (with or without differing voting rights), and the combination of 
cash, stock or other convertible security. The choice of payment method is crucial as there is 
always a trade-off for acquiring firms: cash impacts liquidity and stocks provide tax benefits.  
Acquirers with higher cash balances or free cashflows18 prefer cash financing (Jensen, 
1986). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) argue that large cash offers increase the possibility 
of initial bid acceptance, and can avoid both delays and the possibility of another competing 
bid. In a similar vein, if the bidder firm places a higher value on the target firm, perhaps due 
to perceived synergistic gains or other favourable private information, then they may also opt 
for cash in order to deter competing bids (Fishman, 1989) Under the ‘control hypothesis’ 
managers prefer to retain control and are reluctant to use shares (Stulz, 1988). In the case of 
information asymmetry, where the valuation of the firm is questionable, stock financing is 
often the preferred option as it contains ‘contingency pricing effect’, which makes target firm 
shareholders bear the burden in post-acquisition revaluations effect if any  (Hansen, 1987). 
Further, if the acquirer perceives growth opportunities from acquisitions, the chances of 
raising stock for financing increases, as it gives management (Myers and Majluf, 1984) 
greater descretion over funds. 
The enormous amount of literature documents negative price reactions to the 
acquiring firms in stock/equity swap/financed deals. Servaes (1991) reports that cash 
takeovers increase bidder’s abnormal returns by 11%.  Travlos (1987) documents significant 
                                                 
18 Jensen (1988, p.28) defines Free Cashflow as “cashflow in excess of that required to fund all of a firm’s 
projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. 
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losses in stock deals, but normal reaction for cash offers. Wansley et al. (1987) report 
significantly higher returns on the cash offers than that of security offers. Agrawal et al. 
(1992) also find lower post-acquisition returns in stock-financed acquisitions. Linn and 
Switzer (2001) substantiate the same findings and propose that post-acquisition stock return 
performance of merged firms is significantly larger for cash offers as compared to stock 
offers. The important outcome of their research is that the share of synergistic gains captured 
by the acquiring firm seems to increase with the proportion of cash in the offer. Thus, bidders 
with very favourable private information about future excess operating returns tend to use 
larger amounts of cash in their offers, both to deter competition and to ensure that they capture 
a large share of the synergistic gains. Similarly, Eckbo et al. (1990) also support a higher 
proportion of cash in mixed financing for higher valued acquirers. 
2.4.5 Industry – Diversification Effect  
Berger and Ofek (1996) find that diversified firms destroyed an average of 15% of 
their possible value, had they not diversified. Morck et al. (1990) record statistically 
significant declines in the returns of unrelated acquisitions. Bruner (2002) concludes that 
there is a positive association in the returns and the degree of relatedness between merging 
firms and that conglomerate deals lead to poor returns. Literature suggests that shareholders 
lose wealth as managers lack necessary skills to manage diversified portfolios. Almost 60% 
of the mergers in the third merger wave, which was dominated by conglomerate mergers, 
were later divested (Gaughan, 2010, p. 46).  
However, in the context of emerging markets and particulary in India, Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) find that the affiliates of the most diversified groups have higher Tobin’s q. As 
such, diversification across industries is key for large business houses when it comes to 
minimizing risks and creating internal factor markets. 
2.5 Overall Summary 
This chapters reviews the M&A literature from both emerging markets and the Indian 
perspective. It highlights the main findings, and develops the following set of hypothses that 
are tested in the subsequent chapters. 
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Aggregate Analysis 
Effect Hypothesis 
Motive 
H1: 
There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of 
M&As. 
  H1a: Synergy 
  H1b: Hubris 
  H1c: Agency 
Domestic Analysis (DMA) 
Effect Hypotheses 
Motive 
H2:  
There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of 
domestic M&As.  
  H2a: Synergy 
  H2b: Hubris 
  H2c: Agency 
Indian Business  
Group 
H3: 
There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers by the 
large Indian Business Groups. 
Relatedness H4: 
There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers when 
the participating firms are already affiliated.   
Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions (CBMA) Analysis 
Effect Hypotheses 
Motive 
H5: 
There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of Cross-
Border M&As (CBMA). 
 H5a: Synergy 
 H5b: Hubris 
 H5c: Agency 
Corporate  
Governance 
H6: 
There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers of the 
firms with the identical corporate governance models. 
Cultural 
Proximity 
H7: 
There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers of the 
firms with the cultural proximity. 
Institutional 
Framework 
H8: 
There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers of the 
firms with the identical institutional framework. 
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 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The impact of M&As on the value of a firm is determined by measuring its accounting 
or share price performance. However, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) argue that accounting 
variables are susceptible to manipulation due to managerial choices of accounting processes. 
Stock prices, on the contrary, are relatively exogenous in nature, reflecting the true value of 
firms as they incorporate all relevant current and future information. In the same vein, even 
Bromiley et al. (1988) propose that share price based studies can measure economic 
performance of any corporate event more efficiently than any study of accounting returns.  
Event study methodology is one such model that relies on security price behaviour 
and focuses on measuring the impact of any ‘new or unexpected information’, termed as an 
‘event’, on a firm’s value. A plethora of extant corporate finance literature focussing on 
effects of M&As is indeed based on this technique (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 
2004; Chari et al., 2009). 
The origins of the event study method can be traced back to the early 1930s (Dolley, 
1933) and was popularized by Fama et al. (1969). Since then, it has become one of the 
prominent techniques in corporate finance. Interestingly, the primary structure and the focus 
of the method has not changed over time. Hence, the formative literature about the 
methodology is still relevant, which is why it is discussed here. Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985), while advocating that the methodology is a powerful tool, also argue that the 
usefulness of this methodology largely relies on the set of strong assumptions (like market 
efficiency, unexpected events, and so on) associated with it, and the fact that any violation 
renders empirical results biased and imprecise (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Further, 
researchers have also highlighted other critical issues and suggested various measures to 
ensure compliance with these assumptions Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and  Binder 
(1998).  Consequently, over the last few decades, any statistical imperfections have been 
identified, critiqued and reformed, making the methodology even more sophisticated (Kothari 
and Warner, 2006, p. 8).  
The first half of this chapter discusses the fundamentals of an event study. The second 
half describes the steps for implementing an event study. The discussion summarizes the 
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seminal work, highlights various concerns and explains available measures. The state-of-the-
art event study adopted in this thesis incorporates the latest developments in the literature. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the cross-sectional analysis used as an extention to 
event study analysis in this thesis. 
3.2 Fundamentals 
Central to any event study is the measurement of ‘Abnormal Returns’ (AR) or ‘excess 
returns’ around the event date. Abnormal returns are the difference between expected returns 
and actual (realized) returns during the event period. The expected returns are the ‘normal 
returns’ of a given security in the absence of any event. Any deviation of realized returns 
from the expected returns during the event period is attributed to the event and defined as an 
AR. ARs are further analysed statistically for their significance.  
ARit =  Rit Actual − Rit Expected 
However, as with any analytical tool, this methodology has some key aspects that 
determine the efficacy of the model and reliability of the results. This section outlines all the 
relevant issues that have a bearing on the methodology.  
3.2.1 Event Study Assumptions 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) provide the following partial, yet nonetheless critical, 
list of assumptions present in event study methodology: 
a. Existence of Market Efficiency  
This assumption is inarguably a founding pillar of the methodology. Market 
efficiency suggests that stock prices incorporate all relevant information. The underlying 
notion behind event study is that when the markets are efficient, future expected earnings are 
reflected in the current market price of securities. This implies that the advent of any news 
that may have a potential impact on future payoffs should lead to an instantaneous repricing 
of securities. Thus, by observing price disturbances around event dates, the impact of the 
event can be accurately measured.  
The bonding of the two is highlighted in the fact that the tests for Efficiency Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) and event study methodology are interrelated. In fact, they tend to 
presume each other to an extent. To study information content, the event study assumes quick 
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absorption of new information in share prices (EMH) wherein the tests for EMH assume the 
existence of information in the event (Bowman, 1983).  
However, as a matter of fact, there exists sufficient evidence that the random walk 
model—the test for EMH—does not sufficiently describe stock behaviours in Indian markets 
(Poshakwale, 1996; Pandey, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2006). This violation of the efficiency 
hypothesis implies imperfect price reaction around the event time, and the spill over effect in 
the surrounding days. Therefore, as a remedy, the share price of a firm should be observed 
for few days surrounding the event date, in a period that is known as an event window19. 
However, the size of an event window is a subjective matter as the researchers lack consensus 
about the optimum size (Seiler, 2004, pp. 218-9).  
b. Events are Unexpected 
This methodology presupposes that markets strictly do not have any a priori 
information about the event and that the market participants obtain information through 
formal announcements. Brown et al. (1988) argue that any dramatic financial event increases 
both the risk and the expected return of the securities systematically. Thus, in conjunction 
with market efficiency assumption, the advent of any news should naturally produce 
disturbances or ARs in the event window. Nonetheless, Brown et al. (1988) argue that while 
market reaction to uncertain information may not be instantaneous, it is still efficient. 
However, in practice, there is the strong possibility that the market has either 
anticipated the formal annoucement, or that information has been leaked prior to the formal 
announcement. Dodd (1980) reports evidence of such leakage. Consequently, the exact event 
time becomes elusive, and the published date might not capture the impact of an event 
adequately and efficiently. For this, Brown et al. (1988) suggest accumulating residuals over 
a period to capture event effect adequately. Hence, the event study invariably always tests 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) in order to understand the full impact of 
any given event. CAARs refer to the accumulation of average abnormal returns over various 
days in the event window.  
c. Absence of Confounding Effects 
The ultimate aim of the method is to attribute ARs to the given event. However, the 
presence of confounding effects reduces the efficacy of the model. Confounding effects occur 
                                                 
19 The concept of event window is discussed in detail further in the chapter. 
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when a firm experiences multiple corporate events in quick successions. Since each event has 
some bearing on stock returns, it becomes impossible to isolate the impact of each of these 
events distinctly on share prices. Hence, an event study cannot be performed on either of 
these events. As a prerequisite, it is imperative that the defined event window is clear of every 
other major event20.  
This assumption once again brings forth the discussion about the event-period 
windows. The companies in M&As tend to be large, well-diversified and multinational, 
which means they regularly engage in major corporate activities. The longer the period of 
event window in the analysis, the higher the chances of confounding effects in the sample 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), and the higher the chances of inconsequential results. Thus, 
it is critical that the sample firms and windows are selected cautiously, and that they are free 
of any confounding effects. 
3.2.2 Event and Event Date 
Any corporate decision that has financial and economic implications for a given firm 
can be defined as an ‘event’. The share price performance is evaluated in the days surrounding 
the event date. It is referred to as Day–0 in the event study methodology.  
There is a dichotomy surrounding the event date in the finance literature. On one side, 
Dodd (1980); Asquith et al. (1983) and numerous others, have used the ‘Announcement date’ 
as Day-0. The announcement date is the date when the target company is first publicly 
disclosed as a possible takeover candidate. On the other side, Mandelker (1974); Ellert 
(1976); Langetieg (1978) frequently refer to findings that used the ‘Effective date’ as Day-0. 
This is the date when the entire transaction is completed and is effective, and when final 
approval for the merger is received from the shareholders. They report systematic ARs to the 
firms in the estimation period21 but nothing significant around the event period. Dodd (1980) 
probes these results and purports that pre-event gains could be the result of information 
                                                 
20 Confounding Effect Example: In a completed deal wherein Company A acquired Company B, if the same 
deal was withdrawn two months ago and has been renegotiated, it is said to have confounding effect. As 
the share prices must have fluctuated then, the deal does not have a clean event or estimation period 
windows. Likewise, the deals where Company A was also involved in multiple acquisitions in recent past 
or Company B had also received bids from other vendors recently are also regarded as confounded deals. 
Similarly, there could be various scenarios which can lead to confounding effects and such deals are 
excluded from the sample. It is to be noted that literature refers to Confounding effects and ‘Contagion 
effects’ interchangeably. The treatment of confounding effects is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
21 Estimation-period is a pre-event period used to determine the normal returns of any security. It is 
explained in the next section in detail. 
  3-67 
 
released on the announcement date, as this date precedes the effective date. Alternatively, a 
new hypothesis could be that the firms actually perform well during the transition. This 
ambiguity suggests that the use of an effective date leads to inconclusive results.   
Brown and Warner (1980) emphasize that the uncertainty of specific timing of ARs 
leads to a significant fall in the power of tests. Henderson (1990) elaborates that it is not the 
exact event date which is critical. Instead, it is the timing of when the interested and informed 
segment of the market could have reasonably foreseen and acted upon the news. For M&As, 
the timing issue may be even more profound given that they take longer to be fully reflected 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). 
To conclude, the announcement date should be considered as the starting point. 
However, in reality, the impact may be observed for a number of days either side of the 
announcement date and, as such, the returns should be observed for a longer period, rather 
than just not on the event day itself. 
3.2.3 Estimation and Event Period Windows 
The process of event study entails recognizing an ‘estimation period’ and an ‘event 
period’ around the advent of the news. The two windows are designed specifically to ensure 
that there is no overlapping, which can contaminate the analysis. Figure 3.2.1 is a graphical 
representation of the two event period windows: 
 
Figure 3.2.1 Graphical Representation of Event Study Time Frame 
An estimation period is the period during which no other significant event must occur. 
The estimation period is used to establish how the returns of given stock behave ordinarily. 
The statistics thus obtained are used to estimate expected returns in the event period. The 
event period surrounds the event date and captures the actual returns of the firm. The 
difference between the actual and expected returns in the event period is termed as Abnormal 
Returns (AR). ARs are interpreted as an impact of the event and are the focus of event study. 
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The size of these estimation windows is another critical aspect as inappropriate sizes 
can violate the assumptions and make analysis redundant. Seiler (2004, pp. 218-9) suggests 
that there is generally a lack of consensus in scholars’ fraternity about an optimal number of 
days to include in these event windows. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) select 
window size arbitrarily. Dodd (1980) reports results for a 250 day estimation window 
analysis, and also used 100 and 300 days estimation windows, and found no difference in the 
results for the sample. Binder (1998) argues that studies based on daily data tend to take 250 
trading days (1–Year). For merger studies, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest using 
longer windows as M&As may take relatively longer to reflect information as this 
information is released slowly. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) suggest longer windows to 
ensure more stable estimates of model parameters.  
In Indian studies of cross border analysis, Gubbi et al. (2010) use an 11 day event 
window and a 240 day estimation window. In comparison, for similar studies, Mann and 
Kohli (2011) use a 101 day event window and a 150 day estimation period. 
In theory, an event window should be large enough to capture any significant impact, 
yet small enough that it does not violate any other assumptions. 
3.2.4 Choice of Models 
Prime issues in event study arise as result of the type of event, the statistical properties 
of the data, and the estimation model. As these issues were recognized and resolved, few 
variants of the methodology evolved. All the prominent offshoots of event study are 
categorized broadly into three categories: (a) Mean Adjusted model, (b) Market Adjusted 
Returns, and (c) Market and Risk Adjusted Returns (Brown and Warner, 1980). On the 
grounds of technical complexities, misspecifications possibilities, implementation cost and 
efficiency and performance of the tests, Market and Risk Adjusted Returns models have 
gained popularity. This category refers to various Asset Pricing models, which are used to 
calculate returns based on market and other factors, and use a regression model to generate 
estimates. 
a. Market Model 
While literature proposes various models to calculate expected returns (Masulis, 
1978; Latane and Jones, 1979; MacKinlay, 1997), the model that has gained prominence is 
the Market model. Its strength lies in its simplicity and efficacy (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
  3-69 
 
In this one-factor linear model, the expected return of a given security is determined by its 
covariance with the return on the market portfolio. 
b. Fama-French Three Factor Model 
After the use of the one factor model, researchers soon found numerous patterns in 
understanding average stock returns and, as such, a list of other possible fundamental factors 
was devised. To cite few,  (Stattman, 1980; Rosenberg et al., 1985) propose book to market 
value as a key element, while (Banz, 1981) finds that size–effect is vital and the relationship 
is not linear. Basu (1983) suggests an earnings to price ratio, and Bhandari (1988) finds 
leverage critical. They are termed as anomalies as they are aberrations from the market 
portfolio theory and are generally categorized as Size, Value, Leverage and Price earnings 
effect. Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) conclude that just general market conditions 
alone cannot explain returns, and instead derive a more comprehensive three factor model. 
They suggest that most of the anomalies disappear when size and value factors are included, 
along with the market factor in the original asset pricing model. However, for the event 
studies,  MacKinlay (1997) argues that gains from multifactor models are limited. 
In the Indian context, Bahl (2006), Tripathi (2008) and Taneja (2010) test variants of 
asset pricing models and conclude the three factor model is a better estimator of stock returns. 
Interestingly, Taneja (2010) in the analysis of 187 companies, reports a high correlation 
between size and value factors and instead proposes a two factor model with Market and Size 
or Value as the only factors. However, Tripathi (2008), in the analysis of 455 companies, 
finds low and insignificant correlation between the size and value factors, and finds both of 
them significant in explaining stock returns. Jain (2013) analyses stock returns on an industry 
basis and argues that there must be other factors apart from the three factor model to account 
for variation in performance sector-wise. 
Amidst the debate about the Market model’s sufficiency in explaining stock price 
returns, this thesis also employs the Fama-French Three Factor model to gain a better 
understanding of stock price returns22.  
                                                 
22 Agarwalla et al. (2013) provide a data library for the period 1993 to 2012 to implement Three Factor 
model. The relevant daily data for Rm, SMB and HML variables with Survivorship-Bias Adjusted is 
downloaded from the following link: http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~iffm/Indian-Fama-French-
Momentum/archive/archive-2013-06-30.html accessed on 15th April 2014. This data is being updated 
continually. 
  3-70 
 
3.2.5 Choice of Index 
As a proxy for market portfolio, asset pricing models specify the use of a Value 
Weighted Index because it is able to adequately reflect overall market performance. However, 
Brown and Warner (1980) suggest that use of an Equally Weighted Index in asset pricing 
models is more likely to capture ARs. They argue that there exists a higher degree of 
correlation between the latter index and the security returns, which gives more accurate 
parameter estimators of a model and thus more easily detectable abnormal returns. However, 
in most of the issues related to indices that they highlight, they exonerate the Market model 
and conclude that while other models suffer significantly, the Market model tends to perform 
reasonably well. 
Unfortunately, all the prominent indices in India are value weighted. Though some 
recently developed indices are equally weighted, they do not cover the sample period 
sufficiently to derive any meaningful analysis. However, the MSCI India Equally Weighted 
Index was launched in 2013 and is back-tested up until July 1999. As such, this thesis uses it 
for the deals that occurred in the study period. 
3.2.6  Data Frequency 
Share price performance is studied typically on an intraday, daily or monthly basis. 
However, in event studies, studying intraday fluctuations is highly dependent on accurate 
knowledge of the timing of the event. Such precision is rarely available. On the other hand, 
monthly values are quite distant from each other, making precise attribution of the impact of 
the event difficult. However, share price performance is still used to measure long-term post-
event performances of firms.  
This thesis is about measuring short-term share price reactions within few days (event 
window) around the event date. For such study, extended periods can violate basic 
assumptions, dilute statistical tests and change stock’s risk exposure, thus contaminating the 
results. Further in favour of daily data, Fama et al. (1969) find a full reflection of the 
information in the share price on monthly data. They also alluded that some adjustment lags 
for daily data provides an opportunity to study delay in absorption of information. Kothari 
and Warner (2006, p. 8) suggest that daily returns allow a more accurate measurement of 
abnormal returns and more informative studies of announcement effects. Even Campbell et 
al. (1997, p. 174) find a substantial increase in the power of testing daily intervals when 
compared to monthly testing. In case of any violations of assumptions by the data, Henderson 
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(1990) argues that the event study design is still robust as techniques have developed to 
address such concerns.  
3.2.7 Sample Size 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests that the power of the tests is directly proportional to the 
sample size, and a larger sample size is particularly critical when ARs are minuscule. Brown 
and Warner (1980) also support the same argument. Further, in Brown and Warner (1985), 
they suggest that the degree of misspecifications in the method is sensitive to sample sizes. 
3.2.8 Non-Synchronous Trading 
Non-synchronous trading is another prominent time series property of daily data, 
which leads to serial dependence in daily excess returns, even when the underlying return 
series are independent and the serial is uncorrelated (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Brown and 
Warner (1985) explain that the presence of non-synchronicity makes OLS estimates of 
Market model 𝛽 biased and inconsistent. Infrequently, traded shares have downward biased 
𝛽 estimates. The problem is more pronounced with target firms as they are relatively smaller 
when compared with acquiring firms. Consequently, regression estimates may be biased and 
inconsistent with higher variance.  
For non-synchronous or thinly traded shares,  (Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 
1979; Fowler and Rorke, 1983) have proposed the aggregation of lead, current and lagged 
estimators in models to estimate  ?̂?𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?𝑖  through regression models.  
However, Dyckman et al. (1984) found no significant improvement in the 
specification or power of the tests using either of these modified betas. Though they argue 
their conclusion is based heavily on the sample firms they used. Brown and Warner (1985), 
Jain (1986) and Davidson and Josev (2005) share a similar conclusion. 
3.2.9 Non-Normality of Daily Data 
Daily returns data has known issues of non-normality. Brown and Warner (1985) find 
the same for distribution of excess returns too. Dyckman et al. (1984) report leptokurtic 
residuals with a negative median in their analysis. Fama et al. (1969) report right skewness 
in Market model residuals. 
As a solution, Patell (1976) suggests using Scaled (standardized) Abnormal Returns 
(SAR) for statistical tests. In the process, the abnormal returns are divided by the standard 
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deviation of the residuals from estimation period, adjusted for forecasting errors. The 
advantages are two folds: (i) adjustment for out of sample forecast has a statistically higher 
variance, (ii) controlling hetroskedasticity lessens the impact of high volatility firms in the 
tests when averaging. Consequently, the resulting returns (SARs) are approximately unit 
normal (Boehmer et al., 1991). Similarly, Dyckman et al. (1984) use standardised residuals 
and conclude that non-normality of abnormal returns has little impact on the inferences and 
t-tests are valid. 
3.2.10 Hetroskedasticity – Event Induced Variance 
Stationarity of daily variances is also questionable in event study. Given that the 
market reacts to uncertain events, there is evidence that event period variance of returns 
increases significantly (Patell and Wolfson, 1984; Kalay and Loewenstein, 1985). To 
illustrate, the event period variance was more than 3.5 times the estimation period variance 
(Dann, 1981). This increase in variability is economically intuitive. Brown et al. (1988) argue 
that it is due to a temporary shift in firm’s systematic risk. Alternatively, either the event was 
triggered by the factors aggrandizing uncertainty, or the event itself prompts uncertainty in 
the economic circumstances of the firm (Kothari and Warner, 2006, p. 12). From a 
methodological perspective, this increased variance affects cross-sectional dispersion and 
reduces the power of tests. Boehmer et al. (1991) in their simulation study, demonstrate that 
even the slightest increase in variance increases the probability of Type I error in the analysis 
of zero mean returns.  
As a solution, researchers suggest ignoring estimation period variance, and instead 
employing contemporaneous cross-sectional variance of abnormal returns of the firms in the 
sample to generate test statistics (Charest, 1978; Penman, 1982). The underlying assumption 
is that these returns are independent and identically distributed. However, in the case of the 
violation of assumptions, the cross-sectional procedures may be misspecified. Also, ignoring 
estimation period variance can lower the power of the test if there was no induced variance 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). Boehmer et al. (1991) (referred to as BMP-91 hereafter) 
eliminate these concerns by introducing standardizing theory from Patell (1976) to ordinary 
cross-sectional technique. The resulting methodology is a standardized cross-sectional 
procedure that accounts for non-normality and hetroskedasticity issues. It also incorporates 
estimation period standard deviation that increases its efficiency and the power of the tests. 
However, it is still based on the assumption that the abnormal returns are cross-sectionally 
uncorrelated, or that the returns are independent.  
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3.2.11 Event Clustering - Cross-Sectional Dependence 
There can be two main types of clustering effects in the analysis. First, Calendar time 
Clustering, which is a possibility when firms simultaneously experience an event at or near 
the same calendar time. This can be further divided into two main types: (i) Event date 
clustering, which may happen if firms experience multiple events on the same date. Changes 
in accounting procedures, tax laws, regulations, government, or the legal framework may 
engender such a situation. (ii) Event-period clustering (partial clustering) may occur due to 
events such as mergers and share repurchases that exhibit waves (Kothari and Warner, 2006, 
p. 28). Second, Industrial clustering (risk clustering) refers to increased concentration of 
similar beta firms (industries) in the sample set. Calendar time clustering is known to weaken 
the power of the tests, while industrial clustering does weakens the power of the tests in the 
case of high beta firms (industries) as they increase the variance and make detection of 
abnormal returns complicated (Brown and Warner, 1980). There is also a possibility of these 
clusters reinforcing each other and further reducing the power of tests (Dyckman et al., 1984). 
Statistically, the issue that follows is that the firms in the sample set are no longer 
independent. Consequently, estimated ARs are correlated across securities, and that increases 
the variance and hence lowers the power of tests. It is termed as cross sectional dependence, 
and it leads to two issues: (i) Cross-sectional correlation and (ii) Cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity. 
One popular technique to address cross-sectional correlation is the portfolio approach 
(Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 1974). However, Salinger (1992) is sceptical of the approach and 
rationalizes that one portfolio for each period will only address contemporaneous correlation 
and, as such, intertemporal correlation (between portfolios) will still remain.  
Another alternative is to analyze abnormal returns without aggregation by running a 
multivariate regression with a dummy variable for event date security-by-security. However, 
the model has its own drawbacks and lacks power compared to other alternatives (Campbell 
et al., 1997, p. 167). 
The Market model, which explicitly accounts for market wide risks and systematic 
risks has no significant impact of clustering. However, that conclusion comes with a rider 
that the Equally Weighted Index is used (Brown and Warner, 1980). The standardized cross-
sectional approach from BMP-91 accommodates cross-sectional hetroskedasticity and is 
even found to be immune to event date clustering. However, it still needs cross-sectional 
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correlation of the ARs be zero. So, there exists a need to address the issue of clustering in the 
analysis explicitly. 
3.2.12 Cross-Sectional Correlation of Estimated Abnormal Returns 
Clustering may lead to cross-sectional correlation. Salinger (1992) stresses that even 
if true abnormal returns were uncorrelated, estimated abnormal returns are not, and failing to 
account for correlation results in significant underestimations of standard errors. In the same 
vein, Jaffe (1974) argues that test statistics should not assume independence of residuals. 
While Brown and Warner (1980) and Dyckman et al. (1984) suggest positive correlation 
leads to higher rejection rates of the null hypothesis, Kothari and Warner (2006, p. 28) argue 
that even the negligible size of cross-sectional correlation in the data will certainly lead to 
serious misspecifications of the models. Hence, the impact of clustering should not be 
overlooked in abnormal returns, particularly for longer duration studies (a year or more).  
As a solution, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) in their model, ADJ-BMP, adjust the 
standardised cross-sectional variance procedures proposed by BMP-91 to accommodate 
cross-correlation within securities. In the case of zero correlation, their adjustment factor is 1 
and the t-statistics is same as that of BMP-91. 
3.2.13 Autocorrelation 
Brown and Warner (1985) find significant autocorrelation in the residuals from 
Market model estimations, and when coupled with non-synchronous trading the issues could 
be more pronounced (Henderson, 1990). Due to nonsynchronous trading, security returns are 
not perfectly matched with market returns, which renders the OLS estimates biased and 
inconsistent. 
However, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) argue that in the single day analysis, the 
biasing effect is negligible and in cumulative returns analysis, ADJ-BMP handles this issue 
indirectly in the process. Firstly, SARs are calculated on a time series variance and are 
accumulated. Then, they are again rescaled with cross-sectional variance. Effectively, same-
order autocorrelation in numerator becomes the part of the denominator and cancels out the 
effect of autocorrelation. 
3.2.14 Impact of Outliers and Leveraged Data-Points 
The issue of non-normality in daily stock returns is indicative of the existence of 
outliers and leverage data points. OLS estimations and the inferences thereupon are reported 
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to be quite sensitive to such issues (Huber, 1973; Yohai, 1987). The literature suggests a few 
measures such as ignoring, trimming through some arbitrary cut-off threshold point or 
winsorizing them. None of the methods is foolproof as true outliers are from the size of the 
residuals from the model, and just not from the observations. Moreover, even if such 
measures improve accuracy, they come at the cost of vital information. Alternatively, if such 
observations are not treated properly, they immensely influence the benchmark statistics used 
to identify events (AR) (Sorokina et al., 2013).  
Cook’s distance (Cook, 1977) can be used to identify outliers and high leverage 
points. In case they are present, the robust regressions should be employed instead of the 
OLS. The robust regressions work with less restrictive assumptions than OLS. In the OLS 
estimations, outliers may exert more influence in the estimations and thus distort the 
coefficients and residuals to be smaller. However, the robust regressions down-weigh the 
influence of outliers and make their residuals larger and visible. The process minimizes the 
impact of outliers on the coeffcient estimates. The robust regressions like the M estimator 
(Huber, 1973) and the MM estimator (Yohai, 1987) significantly improve the recognition of 
event effects. While the M estimator is used to deal with outliers and is therefore useful in 
detecting changes in systematic risks, the MM estimator is used to simulataneously deal with 
outliers and leveraged data points both and is found to be better in identifying ARs in event 
studies (Sorokina et al., 2013).  
3.2.15 Analysing and Testing Models 
As a violation of assumptions needed for parametric tests is frequent in event study, 
other non-parametric tests have evolved over time. Brown and Warner (1980) argue that 
while non-parametric tests are employed to correct misspecifications of parametric tests such 
as t-statistics, they are misspecified themselves. Instead, they report that after transforming 
the data to approximate theoretical distributions, t-test based parametric tests perform better 
than any non-parametric tests. Even, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) argue that the ADJ-BMP 
parametric test was the most robust and dominates non-parametric tests in certain situations 
in event study. 
Table 3.2.1 summarizes the prominent issues in event study methodology, along with 
the proposed solutions discussed in the literature. This thesis takes these measures as 
guidelines and implements them in the analysis. 
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Table 3.2.1 Summary of Issues and Resolutions in Event Study Methodology 
Specifications Issue Resolution 
EMH Assumption Violation Large Windows 
Unexpected News Spill Over Effect Cumulative Studies 
Confounding Effects Inconsequential Analysis Weed them out of the sample set 
Event Date Inconclusive Analysis Announcement and surrounding dates 
Frequency of the  Data Detection of ARs Use Daily Data 
Non-synchronous trading Biased Estimates Scholes and Williams Beta 
Non-Normality of Data Violation of Regression Assumptions Standardisation of Residuals 
Event Induced Variance Incorrect Hypothesis Testing Cross-Sectional Procedures 
Clustering Cross-Sectional Correlation ADJ-BMP method accounts for that 
Autocorrelation Biased and Inconsistent Estimates ADJ-BMP method accounts for that 
Outliers and Leverage Incorrect estimates Robust Regressions 
Statistical Tests Misspecifications Parametric Tests are better 
3.3 Implementation  
Having discussed the model specifications, this section explains the process of event 
study adopted for this research, and how the required variables are determined. 
In this thesis, the announcement of M&As is the event. Following the argument 
proposed by Dodd (1980) and others cited earlier, the event date used for this research is the 
‘Announcement Date’ and the words ‘event day’, ‘announcement day’ and ‘Day-0’are used 
synonymously to indicate the event date. 
Using Day-0 as a reference point, this study uses a window of 51 trading days (-20 
to +30 days from Day-0) for the event period and a window of a year or 250 trading days (-
270 to -21 days from Day-0) for the estimation period. Clearly, there is no overlapping of the 
two windows that can otherwise contaminate the analysis. While there is a lack of consensus 
for window sizes (Seiler, 2004, pp. 218-9), some pointers do exist. The selection of days for 
the two windows and also the idea of an asymmetric event period are collectively inspired by 
the arguments presented by Ball and Brown (1968), Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dodd (1980), 
Asquith et al. (1983) and Binder (1998). Instead of just focusing on the specific date of an 
event, the event window is defined to fully capture any pre-event expectations or information 
leakages, as well as post-event slow reactions if applicable.  
3.3.1 Calculating Actual Returns 
Once the windows are determined, actual returns for any security i are calculated on 
a continuous compounding basis in the estimation period. Stock returns are assumed to be 
lognormal. Hence, stock return on day-t 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is calculated by taking the natural log (Ln) of the 
share price on day t divided by share price on day t-1 for a given security i.  
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Rit = Ln [
Pt
Pt−1
⁄ ] (3-1) 
Similarly, continuous returns on the market index value (𝑅𝑚𝑡) are also calculated for 
each day. It is worth noting that the Datastream database (used in this study for share price 
data) excludes weekends and holidays. Also, adjusted closing prices are used to control for 
capitalization changes and dividends. 
3.3.2 Regression Techniques 
Expected returns in the event window are generated by extrapolating the parameter 
estimators calculated in the estimation period window through regression analysis. However, 
the estimators themselves are calculated using the OLS and the robust regressions are 
calculated using the M and MM estimators for the market, and the Fama-French three factor 
model. 
3.3.3 Calculating Expected (Normal) Returns 
a. Market Model 
The model determines a linear ex-ante relationship between the return of a firm i and 
the return of the market portfolio. It assumes that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal 
and independently and identically distributed through time. Following is the mathematical 
representation of Market model: 
Rit =  αi + βiRmt + εit (3-2) 
where: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡   = the actual daily return of Target or Acquirer security i for day t 
𝑅𝑚𝑡   = the daily return on market index for day t 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  = error term 
𝛼𝑖  = intercept of the model  
 𝛽𝑖   = slope of the model  
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the parameters of the model which are estimated through parameter 
estimators ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂̂?𝑖  generated by the OLS, M and MM methods. The model assumes 
stationarity of the return values and that 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑖
2).  
The unbiased estimate of the variance of the residuals during estimation-period is 
given by: 
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2 =  
1
n − 2 
 ∑ êi
2
N
i=1
 
(3-3) 
(e) Fama and French Three Factor Model 
Fama et al. (1969) argue that the Market model is oversimplified, and general market 
conditions alone do not determine the returns on an individual security. Consequently, the 
actual and expected returns are also calculated using Fama-French three factor model: 
Rit =  αi + βiRmt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit (3-4) 
where: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡   = the actual daily return of Target or Bidder security i for day t 
𝑅𝑚𝑡   = the daily return on market index for day t 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡   = small market capitalization minus Big  
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡   = high book to market ratio minus Low  
𝛼𝑖  = intercept of the model  
 𝛽𝑖   = slope of the model with respect to market Index 
𝑠𝑖   = slope of the model with respect to SMB  
ℎ𝑖   = slope of the model with respect to HML 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  = prediction error for security i for day t 
αi, βi, si and hi are the parameters of the model which are estimated through the OLS, 
M and MM Methods of regression. Similar assumptions to those of the Market model apply 
here as well. The unbiased estimate of the variance of the residuals during estimation period 
is given by: 
sei
2 =  
1
n − 4 
 ∑ êi
2
N
i=1
 
(3-5) 
 
(f) Scholes and Williams - Non-Synchronous Trading 
This research uses daily data which is known for non-synchronous trading. Scholes 
and Williams (1977) technique is used to estimate the Market model parameters. As there is 
no existing precedent about the levels of leads and lags that shall fit the Indian market 
adequately, this thesis extends the basic SW-betas using the generalization provided by 
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Fowler and Rorke (1983) for two and three leads and lags in the market returns23. Davidson 
and Josev (2005) also test the two period lead / lag model. The revised Market model equation 
is as follows: 
Rit =  αi
sw +  bi
swRmt + εit (3-6) 
where: 
𝑏𝑖
𝑠𝑤 =
𝑏𝑖
−1 + 𝑏𝑖
0 + 𝑏𝑖
+1
1 + 2𝜌1
 
𝛼𝑖
𝑠𝑤 =
1
𝑇
 [∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑏𝑖
𝑠𝑤  ∑ 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑇
𝑡=0
] 
𝑏𝑖
−1 ∶  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖
−1𝑅𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑏𝑖
0   ∶  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖
0𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
𝑏𝑖
+1 ∶  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖
+1𝑅𝑚𝑡+1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
T = number of days employed to estimate the adjusted betas 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  = actual daily return of Target or Bidder security i for day t 
𝑅𝑚𝑡  = daily return on market index for day t 
 1= first order Serial correlation co-efficient for the market return. 
The unbiased estimate of the variance of the residuals during estimation-period is 
given by the equation (3-3). 
3.3.4 Calculating Abnormal Returns (AR) 
Stationarity assumption allows extrapolation of the model in and out of the sample 
period. By using the estimated coefficients for both the models and all regressions, expected 
or theoretical returns for a security i over the event period are calculated. After this, prediction 
errors 𝑒𝑖𝑡  are calculated as a difference between actual returns and theoretical returns from 
                                                 
23 When two - leads and lags model is used, first model is extended to obtain new 𝑏𝑖
𝑠𝑤 as: 
𝑏𝑖
𝑠𝑤 =
𝑏𝑖
−2 + 𝑏𝑖
−1 + 𝑏𝑖
0 + 𝑏𝑖
+1 + 𝑏𝑖
+2
1 + 2𝜌1 + 2𝜌2 
 
where: 
𝑏𝑖
−2 ∶  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖
−2𝑅𝑚𝑡−2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ;  
𝑏𝑖
+2 ∶  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖
+2𝑅𝑚𝑡+2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ;  
 1 and 2:  are first and second order serial correlation coefficient for the market return respectively. 
Likewise, it was further extended to obtain three – leads and lags model. 
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the models - (𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑).  The error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is referred to as Abnormal 
Returns (AR) or excess return in event study. For each model, they are calculated as follows: 
Market Model ARit = eit = Rit − (α̂i +  β̂i Rmt ) (3-7) 
Fama-French Model ARit = eit = Rit − (α̂i +  β̂i Rmt + ŝiSMBt + ĥiHMLt) (3-8) 
SW-adjusted Betas ARit = eit = Rit − (α̂i
sw +  β̂i
swRmt ) (3-9) 
The prediction error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is termed as an abnormal return because it captures the 
deviation from what would have been a normal return with respect to the various factors in 
case the event had not taken place. 
3.3.5 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns  
For meaningful inferences in the case of event date uncertainty, these AR values must 
be aggregated. This is done in two ways: 
 Aggregation across firms (Average AR) 
 Aggregation across time (Cumulative Average AR) 
After calculating the abnormal returns for all the firms in the sample for day t in the 
event window, a cross-sectional average of abnormal returns for the same day is then 
computed for the entire sample.  These values are called as Average Abnormal Returns ( AR). 
ARnt  =  
1
n 
 ∑ ARit
n
i=1
 (3-10) 
where, n is the total number of firms in the sample on day t. 
Following that, 𝐴𝐴𝑅s are summed across all the days in the event window to arrive 
at what is called as Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR). 
CAARi,T1,T2  = ∑ ARit
T2
t=T1
 
(3-11) 
where, 
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T1 is the first day in event-period before Day 0. 
T2 is the last day over which cumulative AR̅̅ ̅̅ it are being calculated in the event-period. 
Alternatively, 
CAARt =  CAARt−1 + ARt (3-12) 
In case of no abnormal price fluctuations around the event date,  AR and CAAR values 
should randomly fluctuate around zero. Any evidence of CAARs being systematically 
different from zero indicates the presence of information.  
The CAAR analysis is meaningful only when there is no clustering. The CAARs are 
also understood to be serially dependent. So, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) argue that raw 
returns should only be used to interpret economic information when any signals are detected. 
However, for statistical testing, they purpose use of scaled returns as signal detecting devices. 
3.3.6 Variance of Abnormal Returns (AR) – Scaling Factor 
Variance for the ARs is a two step process: First, it requires calculation of an unbiased 
estimate of variance from regression models explained in equation (3-3) and (3-5). Second, 
when estimated period coefficients are extrapolated to predict returns in the event period, 
which is essentially out of sample period, the variance of ARs must be adjusted to reflect the 
predictive nature of the excess returns (Patell, 1976; Peterson, 1989). The generic formula for 
adjustment factor24 (Af) is as follows:  
Af = 1 +
1
n
+
∑ (xj,t − xj)
2k
j=1
∑  ni ∑ (xj,i − xj)
2k
j=1
 
So, the variance of the abnormal returns from each of the models, for each day in the 
event-period is calculated as: 
sARit
2 =  seit
2 ∗  Af (3-13) 
As n increases, 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ≈  𝜎𝑖
2 
                                                 
24 For the market model it can be simplified as follows: 
Af =  1 +
1
n
+
[Rmt (event window) − R̅mt (est.period]
2
∑ [Rmt (est.period) − R̅mt (est.period)]
2n
t=1
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3.3.7 Standardised Abnormal Return (SAR) 
The effects of an event are determined by testing the statistical significance of ARs. 
Following the argument proposed by Patell (1976), these ARs are standardized by their 
respective variance to arrive at SARs. The standardization process normalizes each AR value 
to generate 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁𝐼𝐷. The distribution of SAR values comply with the assumptions of 
Normal Distribution and thus can be readily employed in various parametric tests. 
SARit =  
ARit
√sARit
2
 
(3-14) 
where, sARit
2  is the variance of ARs from equation (3-13) and SAR ~ 𝑁𝐼𝐷 
3.3.8 Cumulative Standardised Abnormal Returns (SCARs) 
These SAR values are aggregated across event time to generate SCARs as follows: 
 SCARi,T1,T2 =  
1
√T2 − T1 + 1
 ∑ SARit
T2
t=T1
 (3-15) 
where, T1 and T2 represent the length of the period over which SAR values are 
accumulated. 
3.3.9 Statistical Tests for Significance of ARs 
This thesis uses the ADJ-BMP method by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) to generate 
test statistics to confirm the significance of the results. For individual day analysis (AR), test 
statistics for SARs is developed using cross-sectional procedures and then it is adjusted for 
cross-correlation. 
Steps: 
Average SARs: SAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nt =  
1
n 
 ∑ SARit
n
i=1
 (3-16) 
Cross-sectional Standard 
Deviation of SARs: 
sc
2 =  
1
n − 1
 ∑(SARt − SAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nt)
2
n
i=1
 (3-17) 
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BMP-91 test statistics tBMP =
SAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅nt  √n
√sc
2
 (3-18) 
ADJ-BMP test statistics tAdj−BMP =  tBMP √
1 − r̅
1 + (n − 1)r̅
 (3-19) 
where,  
?̅? is calculated by averaging the sample correlations of the estimation-period residuals and 
𝑛 represents number of firms in the sample set. 
3.3.10 Statistical Tests for Significance of CAARs 
The same steps are followed for multiple day analysis (CAAR) by replacing SAR in 
the above set of equations by SCARs. 
This thesis also needs to compare the differences between CAARs for various sub-
sets of the firms. It is done by using a t-test proposed by Sicherman and Pettway (1987). 
t =  
[ CAARTi,1 Ti,1⁄ ] − [ CAARTi,2 Ti,2⁄ ]
Sp√ 1 Ti,1⁄ +  1 Ti,2⁄
  (3-20) 
where, 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖 is cumulative average abnormal return over interval i for each sub-set 
𝑇𝑖  is the specific number of days in interval i 
𝑠𝑝  is the pooled estimate of each group’s standard deviation25 
The differences in overall CAARs from the robust and OLS regressions are tested 
using paired t-test for two sample means.  
3.3.11 Cross Sectional Regression Analysis 
Typically, an event study is performed in conjunction with cross-sectional regression 
analysis. This allows the evaluation of the impact of various firm and deal specific factors on 
abnormal returns even if the ARs are zero (Kothari and Warner, 2006, p. 19). It can help in 
                                                 
25 sp =  
√[TBASE(i,1)−1]s1
2 − [ TBASE(i,2)−1]s2
2
[TBASE(i,1)  +  TBASE(i,2)−2]
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detecting multiple sources of ARs, if any. As each firm is studied individually, it can also be 
construed as an alternative to dealing with the issue of clustering and several other issues that 
are cited above.  
Given the possibilities of leakages, spill over effects, imperfect event dates, and so 
on, the cross-sectional analysis is performed on the CAARs at varying intervals. The 
univariate and multivariate OLS regressions analyses are conducted to analyse the cross-
sectional variation in these CAARs on selected explanatory variables classified under six 
categories. The general form of the equation is as follows: 
CAARi,T1,T2 =  α + ∑ γk,i
k=4
k=1
Deal attributes + βi Ownership stake
+ βi Information asymmetry + βi Instituitional distance
+ ∑ θj,i
j=6
j=1
 Cultural distance + βi Economic distance
+ βi Corporate Governance distance + ϵi 
(3-21) 
where, 
CAARi,T1,T2  is a cumulative average abnormal return of firm i over period T1 to T2. 
γk , βi , θj  are regression coefficients from OLS regression for each independent variable. 
ϵi is an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
Independent Variables Description 
 There is a range of variables under each category analysed in this thesis. The 
independent variables under each category are: 
a. Deal Attributes 
In the method of payment variable, Cash is given a value of one if it is a cash offer 
and zero for shares or any combinations. The cross-border variable CB is given a value of 
one if the acquirer is a foreigner and zero otherwise. The Conglomerate variable captures the 
industry effect and is assigned a value of one when the deal happens within firms not identical 
on SIC two digit codes basis. The BGroup variable is assigned a value of one if the acquirer 
in the deal is affiliated with some large Indian Business Group.  
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b. Ownership Stakes 
The variable Pct50 is assigned a value of one when the final ownership stake of the 
acquirer exceeds 50%. Such stakes grant majority control over target firms to the acquirer 
and are considered a turning point in M&As.  
c. Information Asymmetry  
The variable PctToe is a continuous variable that measures the size of pre-event 
ownership (Toehold), if any. The variable Related also captures the relationship between the 
target and the acquiring firm and is assigned a value of one if the two are connected either 
through parent-subsidiary relationship or if they both are sister firms within the same 
corporate group or have a common parent company. 
d.  Corporate Governance Models 
The variable GJ is assigned a value of one when the acquirer company is believed to 
follow the German/Japanese corporate governance model and is used to test CBMA targets. 
Likewise, the variable AS is assigned one if the target country is pursuing Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance model. It is used to test returns to the Indian acquirers in CBMAs. The 
variable Blockhold is another way to test the effect of the corporate governance model. Here, 
one is assigned when the acquirer is pursuing a model that promotes Blockholding of shares 
in the system, and zero describes Diffused ownership pattern. 
e. Institutional Distances 
CWA and CWT variables capture the institutional framework of the participating 
firms. CWA is assigned a value of one when the acquirer is one of the Commonwealth nation. 
Likewise, CWT is assigned one when the target is from one of the Commonwealth nations. 
f. Cultural Distances 
There is a range of cultures involved in the sample deals in this thesis. Following the 
GLOBE study, these foreign firms are classified into several cultures and are assigned one 
for belonging to their respective cultural category and zero otherwise. The variables Anglo, 
Germanic, Nordic, Confucian, SE, LE and Others are assigned a value of one when the 
acquirer or target belongs to that culture.  
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g. Economic Distances 
The role of economic distance between the Indian acquirer and the participating target 
firms is analysed. A variable Ed is constructed as a ratio of (
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛
). The lower 
the ratio, the larger the economic distance between the two countries. Alternatively put, this 
variable captures the role of targets from the developed nations to the Indian acquirers in the 
Indian CBMAs. 
Finally, this thesis studies the impact of M&A announcements on Indian firms over 
three scopes: Aggregate, Domestic and Cross-Border Deals. It is to be noted that not all the 
variables under each category are relevant for every scope analysed. While some are tested 
for each scope, others are selected on the basis of literature findings for each scope. Even 
after that, in multivariate analysis, the variables have to be paired cautiously to achieve 
statistical robustness and stability. The cross-sectional results presented in the main body are 
those which are optimized according to the model and/or variable(s) significance. Others are 
reported in the appendix to that chapter. 
3.4 Overall Summary 
This chapter highlights the key aspects of the event study methodology. It discusses 
the framework of the methodology, possible concerns cited in the literature and the ways to 
resolve them. Based on the findings, this thesis implements the Adjusted BMP framework 
(ADJ-BMP) which attempts to addresses all the main concerns surrounding event study and 
makes it a state-of-the-art methodology. 
Further, the Market model has always been the most popular model for its simplicity 
and efficacy. Yet, there are some limitations cited in the literature about it. Consequently, this 
thesis also uses the Fama-French three factor model to capture the share price returns around 
the event. For thin trading, the Market model coefficients are estimated using Scholes and 
Williams adjusted beta with its variants up to three lead and lag periods. 
The analysis uses a long event window of 250 days [-270, -21] for the estimation 
period and 51 days [-20, +30] in the event period. The tests of significance are applied to 
ensure the robustness of the results. 
Apart from the OLS methodology, this thesis also uses robust regressions (M and 
MM) to generate the abnormal returns around the event. These robust regressions are deemed 
better in terms of handling the presence of outliers and influential leverage points, which are 
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known to occur around the event. The robust regressions down-weigh the influence of outliers 
and make their residuals larger and more visible, while minimizing their impact on the 
regressions coefficients. 
The univariate and multivariate regression is performed to analyse the cross-sectional 
variation in cumulative average abnormal returns over several intervals on selected 
independent variables categorized under six categories: deal attributes, ownership stakes, 
corporate governance models, institutional distances, cultural distances, and economical 
distances. 
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 Sample Data 
4.1 Introduction 
While the methodology adopted in this thesis is quite intuitive, it has its own 
implementation challenges. Chapter three highlights the range of possible issues that event 
study may encounter. It also details how the methodology adopted in this thesis addresses 
those issues. A substantial part of this methodology relates to the type and treatment of the 
data. This chapter aims to describe the attributes of the data, and outlines the treatment 
adopted to make the data suitable for analysis. 
This chapter also provides a description of the databases and the variables used, along 
with the descriptive analysis of the sample data.  
4.2 Data Section 
The sample for this research is comprised of domestic and cross-border merger and 
acquisition deals involving Indian companies. In the sample set, either the target or the 
acquirer nation was India. The sample covers deals from 1988 to 2013. 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
a. Deals and Stock Exchange Data 
Information about various M&A deals is gathered from Thomson Reuters’ Thomson 
ONE (T1) Database. T1 provides extensive coverage of around 25 years of Indian M&A 
markets, though the data for the initial years is understandably sparse. 
The relevant Share – Price and Indices Values needed for the study also come from 
another Thomson Reuters product named Datastream.  
b. Indices 
BSE Sensex, which is a yardstick index, is used as a proxy for market returns for firms 
listed in India. Also, the Fama-French variables used in this analysis are based on companies 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).  
BSE-Sensex is a Value Weighted Index. However, as literature argues for Equally 
Weighted Index to detect abnormal returns, the MSCI India Equally Weighted Index is also 
used for the analysis. The MSCI Index was launched in 2013 and is back-tested up until July 
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1999. As it does not cover the entire sample period, it is used for a sub-set of the dataset to 
draw inferences, if any.  
While the prime focus of this thesis is to evaluate returns to Indian shareholders, a 
brief analysis of participating foreign firms is also conducted. For the foreign firms, the 
leading indices in the respective countries are used based on their primary stock exchanges 
as follows: 
Table 4.2.1 Detail of Indices Used for Each Country 
Country Market Index 
 
 
  Australia 
Australia 
All Ordinaries Australia 
stria Austrian Traded Index 
Bahrain Bahrain Bourse All Share Index 
Belgium BEL20 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index 
China SSE Composite 
Finland OMX Helsinki 25 
France CAC 40 
Germany DAX 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index 
Indonesia Jakarta Composite 
Italy FTSE MIB 
Japan Nikkei 225 
Malaysia FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 
Netherlands AEX-INDEX 
Oman MSM 30 
Singapore STI 
South Africa FTSE/JSE All Share Index  
South Korea KOSPI 
Sri Lanka ASPI 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 
Switzerland Swiss Market Index 
Taiwan Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Thailand SET Index 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 
United States of America S&P 500  
c. Fama-French Model Data 
Agarwalla et al. (2013) 26 provide the necessary data for the period January 1993 to 
June 2012. To gain an understanding of the return behaviour, Figure 4.2.1 graphs the three 
                                                 
26 Agarwalla et al. (2013) provide data library for the period 1993-2012 to implement Three-Factor Model. 
The relevant daily data for Rm, SMB and HML variables with Survivorship-Bias Adjusted is downloaded 
from the following link: http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~iffm/Indian-Fama-French-
Momentum/archive/archive-2013-06-30.html accessed on 15th April 2014. This data is being updated 
continually. 
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factors. The returns graphed are annualized by compounding daily returns and are readily 
available from the same source.  
 
Figure 4.2.1 Fama-French Factor Annualized Daily Returns Over a 20 Year 
Period 
While there is certainly a difference in scales in the three factors, they seem to follow 
a similar trend overall, with a few exceptions. The correlation matrix of the factors is as 
follows: 
Table 4.2.2 Correlation Matrix of Fama-French Factors 
  Rm %   SMB %   
SMB % -0.4051 ***  
HML % 0.0106  0.0802 *** 
p-values: *** p <.01 
Though the variable SMB is significantly negatively (positively) correlated with Rm 
(HML) variable, it is not in high enough order to affect the analysis.  
4.2.2 Dataset Structures 
For the purpose of the analysis, data is grouped into three sets as outlined in Figure 
4.4.2. On the top of the hierarchy is the aggregate sample, which comprises of all the deals 
shortlisted after data screening. The aggregate sample is then split into two more sub-sets: 
domestic and cross-border. The domestic sub-set focuses on the deals wherein both the 
participating firms (target and acquirer) originate in India as per their primary listing. In the 
cross-border sub-set, only one of the participating firms originates in India. The nationality 
of a firm is based on the primary exchange listing, and the location of the primary business 
or division at the time of the transaction.  
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Figure 4.2.2 Data Structures 
 
Further, data from the MSCI Equally Weighted Index and the Fama-French model 
does not cover the entire sample period. They are implemented on sub-sets based on their 
availability. 
4.2.3 Data Screening 
i. Public Companies 
This thesis focuses on the deals between listed companies and the immediate share 
price reaction around the announcement. Hence, the primary filter applied to the database is 
for the ‘Public’ status of the target and acquiring companies at the time of the deal. This 
results in a total of 932 deals.   
ii. Confounding Effects 
Bowman (1983) suggests that the success of any event study heavily relies on the 
treatment of confounding effects. The confounding effect is said to appear when any firm 
experiences multiple events either during the estimation  or event period window. As a result, 
it becomes difficult to measure the magnitude of the effects and attribute them to each of the 
events distinctly. Consequently, such observations have to be excluded from the sample set.  
One of the variables of the T1 database is Deal Status, which describes deals as  
completed, withdrawn, rumoured, pending, related, intended or unknown. While the focus is 
on the successfully completed deals, information of other deals is also vital to identify 
contagion effects in completed deals, if any. Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) 
argue that even on cancellation of tender offers, the share price for target firms does not return 
to pre-offer level. Thus, the impact of any event engenders some price reaction, and it stays, 
at least in the short-term. Hence, all types of deals were downloaded and are part of the sample 
above of 932 observations. 
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There are numerous scenarios which trigger the contagion effect and result in removal 
of the deal(s) from the sample. As the contagion effect is based directly on the event study 
design, a brief note about it is warranted beforehand. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2.3, this 
study uses the estimation window of 250 days, and the event window covers 51 days. This 
event study goes up to 30 days after the event. Thus, it covers 301 trading days for a given 
firm overall. 
 
Figure 4.2.3 Event Study Window Sizes 
The comprehensive list of all the scenarios prompting confounding effects found in 
this dataset is as follows: 
 Multiple bids27 from the same bidder within 30 days: This refers to the situation where 
in the target firm receives multiple bids from the same bidder within 30 days of the 
original bid. These bids have dual contagion effect - they influence event period of 
the original bid, and the original bid influences the estimation period of the latter bid. 
Hence both the deals, former and latter, disqualify from the sample.  
 Multiple bids from the same bidder within 270 days but not in 30 days: This refers to 
the situation where the bidder firm makes another bid for the same target firm within 
270 days28 but after 30 days of the original bid. The target and the bidder companies 
are same. Such a deal does not affect the original bid as it is out of the event period 
of the former deal. Hence, the original bid is included in the dataset. However, this 
deal itself has contagion effect due to the existence of former bid effect in its 
estimation period and thus is removed from the dataset.  
                                                 
27 Multiple bids are said to occur when any target firm receives more than one bid within 270 day period 
from either the same bidder or from different bidder(s). They also describe a situation wherein bidders 
make multiple bids either for the same target or different targets within 270 days. It is observed that targets 
did receive subsequent bids either on the same day, or within few months of the initial bids quite 
frequently. Likewise, it also happens regularly that even bidders bid for same or different target(s) in short 
span of time. However, any bid that occurs after 270 days of the last deal of the target or the bidder is 
treated separately and not considered as a multiple-bid. 
28 The calculation of 270 days comes from 20 days of event period window and 250 days of estimation 
period. 
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 Multiple bids from new bidder(s) within 30 days: This refers to the situation where 
the target firm receives multiple bids from one or more different bidders within 30 
days of the original bid. These bids have a dual contagion effect. While they influence 
event period of the original bid, even the original bid influences their estimation 
period. Hence, all deals, former and latter, disqualify from the sample.  
 Multiple bids from new bidder(s) within 270 days but not in 30 days: This refers to 
the situation where the target firm receives another bid from one or more different 
bidders within 270 days, but after 30 days of the original bid. Such deals do not affect 
the original bid as they are out of event period of the former deal. Hence, the original 
bid is included in the dataset. However, these deals themselves have contagion effect 
due to the existence of former bid effect in their estimation period and thus are 
removed from the dataset. 
 Multiple bids from parents and its subsidiary companies: This scenario describes 
situations in which target firm receives multiple bids from a parent company and its 
subsidiary company simultaneously. Herein, a parent company tries to raise its stake 
directly and also indirectly through its subsidiary. However, since all the companies 
are listed companies and are independent in the Indian context, it is difficult to isolate 
the impact of each bid on respective share prices and hence is removed from the 
dataset. Though, such occasions are very rare. 
 Multiple acquisitions by the bidder on the same date: This refers to the situation 
where the bidding firm acquires multiple targets on the same day. This phenomenon 
occurred quite frequently, and these deals were removed from the sample set.  
 Multiple acquisitions by the bidder within 30 days: This describes a scenario in which 
any bidder engages in multiple acquisitions within 30 days of the first bid. 
Consequently, the event window of each bid has a contagion effect and is 
subsequently removed from the dataset. 
 Multiple bids from multiple bidders on the same date: Occasionally, some target firms 
receive bids from multiple bidders on the same date. Such cases can be classified as 
competing bids. Cleary, such bids affect estimation and event period windows of the 
companies involved and thus are taken out of sample.  
 Withdrawal of the same bid in the recent past: This occurs when an acquirer 
withdraws the same deal and bids again within 270 days. This typically happens in 
cases of renegotiations. However, such deals are taken out of dataset as their 
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estimation period has contagion effects. Also, the original deal is taken out as it was 
withdrawn. 
 Withdrawal of a bid by another bidder in the recent past: This refers to the situation 
when a target firm is subjected to a new bid from a different bidder within 270 days 
of the last bid from another bidder, which was subsequently withdrawn. Such deals 
are taken out of dataset as their estimation period has contagion effects.  
 Withdrawal of a bid by the bidder for another deal in recent past: This accounts for 
a situation wherein the bidder of the current deal has recently withdrawn from other 
deal(s) for another target firm(s) within 270 days. The last withdrawal(s) renders the 
estimation period of the current deal contagious and thus disqualifies it from the 
sample dataset. 
 Discontinued rumours: The T1 database also captures the dates when bidder firms 
officially put down rumours about potential bids. While these rumoured bids do not 
qualify for selection in the dataset, they create a confounding effect for other deals 
involving the target or the bidder if they happen within 270 days. 
 Spinoff and bidding simultaneously: In one of the occasions, the target firm spun off 
one of its units just to acquire another target somewhere else. This generated 
ambiguity about the status of the firm as target or acquirer and, as such, is left out of 
sample dataset. 
 ‘Related deals’ 29 is another variable that captures any other transaction related to the 
companies in the original bid. It is also used to detect confounding effects. Out of 176 
completed related transactions, 111 were contaminated transactions due to the reasons 
outlined above. In 27 instances, the same bidder and the target had two or more deals 
on the same date. It happened when the merger and the tender offers occur 
simultaneously. For the purpose of share price reaction, the two deals were treated as 
one deal and for variables such as toehold size, shares acquired, and so on, the values 
were added carefully while ensuring no double counting happens. This led to the 
further rejection of 27 more deals (double counting). Finally, 38 pure deals are 
identified from this category and are included in the analysis. 
                                                 
29 Related deals: When two or more deals exist which cause or effect each other including, but not limited 
to, competing bids, divestitures or seeking buyers connected with a merger, defensive transactions, stakes 
before acquisitions and two or more deals having a combined total value.  
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To summarize, every deal is carefully evaluated for a clear window of 250 + 51 = 301 
days. All the deals with overlapping windows are removed from the dataset. And deals 
between the same targets and acquirers on the same date are treated as one.  
In all, the instances of competing bids are scarce, but those of multiple bids by the 
acquirers in rapid sucession are quite numerous. Given that the mergers occur in waves, using 
large estimation and event windows presents the challenge of qualifying them for the analysis. 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest that longer event windows result in a higher number 
of confounding effects in the sample, which leads to more rejections.  
Also, quite frequently, these deals are affected by multiple contagion effects and 
classifying each deal under exactly one contagion category is grossly misleading. However, 
Table 4.2.3 below provides a detailed breakdown of all the types of deals accepted and 
rejected for the analysis. In total, 283 completed deals (172 + 111) are contaminated and are 
excluded from the sample.  
Table 4.2.3 Deals Count Breakdown 
Deal Status Downloaded Rejected Accepted 
Completed 623 172 451 
Related Deals 149 111 38 
Combined Deals 27 0 0 
Rumours 48 48 0 
Intended 6 6 0 
Pending 19 19 0 
Unknown 1 1 0 
Withdrawn 59 59 0 
Total 932 416 489* 
*489 includes 27 related firms 
In the first round of screening, 489 deals were shortlisted for the event study analysis. 
In Table 4.2.2, 176 Related Deals are divided into two headings: Related Deals (149) and 
Combined Deals (27). These 27 valid deals are included in 489 accepted deals. 
iii. Missing companies  
The phenomenon of ‘vanishing public companies’ in the Indian market is well 
documented in the literature (Rao et al., 1999). Agarwalla et al. (2013) report that 3,184 
companies stopped trading in their sample period from 1993 to 2012, and out of these 
companies, 439 ceased operations purely due to ‘merger activities’. They also indicate that 
the Datastream database may not have sufficient coverage of medium to small firms in the 
Indian market. Given that their sample period heavily overlaps the period covered in this 
study, and also that the data is extracted from Datastream, missing companies is a major issue 
  4-96 
 
in the sample set. While some of these companies are traced as dead and delisted, others did 
not exist even on stock exchange websites.  
iv. Insufficient data – Illiquidity, Unavailable or Missing data 
The Indian stock market is characterized by concentrated trading. Rao et al. (1999) 
report that only 1.2% (Top 50) of all companies accounted for 91% of all turnover in 1998, 
and that almost 50% of the companies transacted less than 100 times in that year.  Similarly, 
Agarwalla et al. (2013) removed more than 50% of the firms with 50 trading days’ filter from 
1998 to 2001. They report it is only after 2004 that the liquidity improved significantly in the 
Indian markets.  
Consequently, thin trading is another significant issue in the sample set. This thesis 
deals with the issue in two ways. Firstly, it excludes firms which do not have sufficient trading 
days for reliable estimation of parameters or ARs. Some studies suggest using a minimum of 
30 days trading data as a filter for estimation period data. This choice still results in a fairly 
large dataset and yet removes truly illiquid firms. For the event period window, Marisetty et 
al. (2008) suggest that a firm should have traded at least once in the days [0, +2] relative to 
the announcement day or at least for 50% of the days (26 days in this analysis) in the event 
window to qualify for a sample. They use the same market and comparable event period (61 
days) in their analysis. This thesis uses Day -1 to Day +2 or the 50% criteria. 
Secondly, Scholes and Williams betas along with its variants are also employed to 
estimate the Market model parameters. However, Brown and Warner (1985) find even failing 
to account for non-synchronocity in Market model OLS estimates does not lead to 
misspecification of event study methodology.  
 
Figure 4.2.4 Breakdown: Vanishing Companies and Insufficient Data 
Out of 489 deals shortlisted so far, acquirers and targets of five deals vanished, and 
nineteen deals had insufficient data. Another thirteen deals suffered both the issues 
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simultaneously for either side. Subsequently, all these deals had to be excluded, resulting in 
the further loss of 37 deals30.  
Further, of the remaining 452 (489-37) deals, 48 deals are share repurchase or 
buybacks, which do not fit strictly into the definition of M&As. So, the final count for 
shortlisted deals is 404. After applying all the filters, out of 404 deals, 234 are domestic, and 
remaining 170 are cross-border deals. Of these 404 deals, 25 acquirers and 52 targets were 
missing, and another 34 acquirers and 44 targets lacked sufficient data. Since their 
counterparts in the deals were valid, only these companies in the analysis are dropped but not 
the entire deal. Table 4.2.4 provides a final breakdown of Indian acquirers and targets for 
each sample sub-set.  
Table 4.2.4 Breakdown of Targets and Acquirers Firms 
Sample 
Aggregate Domestic Cross-Border 
Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets Acquirers Targets 
Shortlisted 404 404 234 234 170 170 
Vanished -25 -52 -16 -38 -9 -14 
Insufficient Data -34 -44 -23 -26 -11 -18 
Total Sample  345 308 195 170 150 138 
Foreign firms -112 -34 - - -112 -34 
Indian firms 233 274 195 170 38 104 
 
4.3 Data Description 
i. Yearly Distribution of All the Deals for All the Samples 
Table 4.3.1 provides a summary of the distribution of domestic, cross-border (CB) 
and aggregate M&A deals by year. The deals in the initial years are quite sparse, particularly 
the cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms. Each side in the table is split by a median 
number of deals, suggesting 50% of the deals occur after 2004-2005, implying that half of 
the deals occurred in one third of the sample period, which suggests the possibility of calendar 
time clustering.  
                                                 
30 In these 13 deals, seven acquirers and six targets vanished while their counterparts in the deals - seven 
targets and six acquirers are excluded because of insufficient data.  
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Table 4.3.1 Yearly Distribution of Indian M&A Deals 
Year 
Acquirers Targets 
Domestic CB Aggregate Domestic CB Aggregate 
1990   1 1  1 1 
1991 1  1  1 1 
1992 1  1 1 1 2 
1993 2  2 1 3 4 
1994 1  1 1 3 4 
1995 5  5 3 2 5 
1996 2  2 2 4 6 
1997 8  8 5 6 11 
1998 6  6 3 7 10 
1999 9  9 5 4 9 
2000 13 4 17 13 4 17 
2001 5  5 6 7 13 
2002 6  6 7 2 9 
2003 7  7 13 3 16 
2004 12 2 14 7 6 13 
2005 14 3 17 16 4 20 
2006 20 4 24 15 10 25 
2007 20 4 24 15 8 23 
2008 12 8 20 10 10 20 
2009 14 3 17 13 2 15 
2010 15 2 17 15 2 17 
2011 9 3 12 6 8 14 
2012 11 2 13 11 1 12 
2013 2 2 4 2 5 7 
Total 195 38 233 170 104 274 
 
Further, while both domestic and cross-border mergers show a relative drop in the 
period around Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, cross-borders mergers seem to have 
taken the major brunt here. Given the fact that nearly 40% of the cross–border mergers are 
from Anglo countries (refer Table 4.3.2), which suffered heavily during GFC, such a drop is 
understandable. 
ii. Breakdown as per the Country and Culture of the Acquiring Countries 
Using the GLOBE Study (House et al., 2004), the cross-border deals are clustered 
according to the acquirers’ ultimate parent’s culture. Table 4.3.2 (below) provides a 
breakdown of deals by acquiring cultures and their countries. Clearly, the landscape of Indian 
CBMAs is dominated by the United Kingdom and United States, which collectively account 
for nearly 40% of the deals. Culturally, Anglo countries dominate the M&As landscape in 
Indian markets. Since these countries suffered heavily in GFC, there is a noticeable drop in 
cross-border mergers in Table 4.3.1 in the years after GFC.  
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Table 4.3.2 Breakdown of CBMAs by Country and Culture of the Foreign Acquirers 
Culture/Country Count % of Deals 
Anglo 39 38% 
Australia 1 1% 
United Kingdom 12 12% 
United States 26 25% 
Confucian 24 23% 
China 1 1% 
Hong Kong 2 2% 
Japan 18 17% 
Singapore 2 2% 
Taiwan 1 1% 
Germanic 15 14% 
Austria 1 1% 
Germany 7 7% 
Switzerland 7 7% 
Latin Europe 9 9% 
France 6 6% 
Italy 2 2% 
Switzerland 1 1% 
Nordic 11 11% 
Finland 1 1% 
Sweden 10 10% 
Others 3 3% 
Bahrain 1 1% 
Oman 2 2% 
SA 3 3% 
Malaysia 1 1% 
Thailand 2 2% 
Total 104 100% 
 
iii. Conglomerate Mergers 
Conglomerate mergers are identified by matching all the product lines of the target 
company with that of the acquiring company or that of the ultimate parent company of the 
acquirer. The product lines are matched with two digit SIC code. In total, 132 deals are  
conglomerate. 
iv. Absence of Hostile Takeovers in the Data 
Emerging economies are typically characterized by higher insider control and 
ownership and relatively weaker external disciplining mechanisms (La Porta et al., 1999). 
There is a convergence of ownership and control in Indian firms. The concentration stays in 
the hands of promoter families and institutional investors, both of which reduce takeover 
risks. Morck et al. (1988) argue that in insider-dominated systems, the takeover is generally 
negotiated, rather than contested. In similar spirits, even Long and Walkling (1984) suggest 
that insider ownership implies less resistance (hostility) to takeover bids. Consequently, the 
takeover threat market mechanism is ineffective in disciplining errant management. Instead, 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) find a positive correlation between concentrated ownership and firm 
value. This supports ‘convergence of interests’, and discards the classical agency theory of 
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‘conflict of interests’. Consequently, one of the most effective agency conflict resolutions—
the ‘hostile takeover’—is practically non-existent in the Indian market.  
4.3.1 Data Issues 
i. Non-Normalcy - Outliers and Leverage Observations 
As discussed earlier, daily returns data is characterized by non-normalcy. Hence, the 
returns are thoroughly inspected for the presence of outliers. Firstly, a more stringent four 
standard deviation filter is applied to the return data in the estimation period, and still there 
are occasions where extreme values exist.  Following that, Q-Q Plots are drawn for each firm 
to inspect these outliers visually. There are instances of deviation from the normal 
distribution. Further, Cook’s Distance is used with 4/(n-k-1) as the cut off mark to verify if 
these outliers have any impact on the analysis, where n is the number of observations and k 
is the number of independent variables. As accounted by Sorokina et al. (2013), the data of 
the sample firms has outliers with high leverage points. Consequently, robust regression 
techniques, including the M and MM methods, are applied in addition to the OLS method to 
estimate the returns in this analysis. 
ii. Missing Values and Regressions 
The data for the Equally Weighted Index and the Fama-French model used in the 
analysis does not cover the sample period entirely. As the information is merged from 
different sources into the main dataset, for some firms it was not a perfect match, and they 
had missing values for the control variable. For such cases, the 50 day trading rule is applied 
and, if qualified, missing values for control variables were ignored pairwise in calculating 
regression estimators. 
Ideally, this thesis would control for accounting attributes. However, as discussed 
earlier, vanishing companies (Rao et al., 1999), and missing data (Agarwalla et al., 2013) are 
known issues with Indian firms, particularly in the Datastream database. The sparse coverage 
of accounting data makes evaluating attributes like relative size, profitability, leverage and 
other such factors of the participating firms difficult. This would have led to a substantial loss 
of sample observations and limited the analysis. 
Further, the robust regressions have an inbuilt threshold for the level of data 
contamination, and in a few specific cases robust regressions do not generate coefficients. 
This happens with the firms with insufficient values to run the algorithm of the models. All 
the robust regressions are first estimated in Eviews-8 and then again verified by SAS 9.3. 
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However, the issue persists. Consequently, while the OLS regressions generate estimations 
for the entire dataset, robust regressions exclude some firms.  
iii. Clustering  
As discussed in Methodology in chapter three, clustering can be of two types: calendar 
time and industry. Table 4.3.1 shows that 50% of the deals happened in the last eight years 
of the sample data, and 25% of the deals occured in just three years from 2006 to 2008. As 
such, there is a strong indication of the presence of calendar time clustering. Further, the 
industry analysis for the targets in Figure 4.3.1 reveals that just five industries account for 
nearly three-quarters of the deals.  
 
Figure 4.3.1 Breakdown of All the Targets for All the Deals 
It appears that the sample may have clustering issues and that cross-sectional 
procedures with adjustment for cross-sectional correlation must be adopted and the Adjusted 
BMP-91 methodology accounts for that. 
4.4 Overall Summary 
This thesis investigates M&As in India for the period 1989 to 2013. The M&A and 
Stock Exchange data is collected from Thomson Reuters’ T1 and Datastream Databases.  
After filtering for confounding effects, missing firms and insufficient data issues, the 
clean sample is comprised of 404 deals. These 404 acquirers and targets are further filtered 
for missing firms, insufficient data and foreign participants, to arrive at a clean sample of 234 
acquirers and 274 targets. They are analysed through three sample sets: aggregate, domestic 
and cross-border deals. 
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It appears that the data suffers from some statistical issues like non-normalcy due to 
outliers and high leverage observations, clustering, missing values, and thin trading. 
As a recourse, for high leverage values, robust regressions are used to generate 
estimates. For clustering, cross-sectional procedures are adopted, and for thin trading, Scholes 
and Williams's adjusted betas and its variants are calculated. 
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 Aggregate Deals 
5.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate the overall returns to the 
shareholders of Indian target and acquiring firms in the aggregate dataset. The synergy motive 
views M&As as a value enhancing scheme by integrating strategic resources of the 
participating firms. If synergies exist, markets react favourably to such announcements. 
However, M&As may also be driven by hubris or agency motives. Thus, the main hypothesis 
discussed here collectively tests for all the three possible motives. It states that: There are no 
abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As to the shareholders of the 
participating Indian firms. The literature distinguishes the three motives by studying the total 
effects on the shareholders’ wealth from both the sides as outlined in Table 5.1.1. 
Table 5.1.1 Patterns of Gains Related to Takeover Theories 
Effect 
Total  
Gains 
Target 
Gains 
Acquirer 
Gains 
Synergy /Efficiency + + + 
Hubris  
(Winner's Curse /Overvaluation) 
0 + - 
Agency issues or errors - +/- - 
The second objective of the chapter is to critically analyse the impact of various 
financial models, regression techniques and types of indices in evaluating the announcement 
effects. The focus here is to understand whether the outcomes vary with changes in analytical 
tools. 
This study uses two types of financial models to calculate the abnormal returns 
associated with the announcement of M&As. The Market model is based on ‘market risk’ as 
the sole source of security risk and has a well-established precedent in such research. Its 
strength lies in its simplicity and its efficacy Brown and Warner (1985). The second model, 
the Fama-French three factor model (FF), incorporates additional sources of risks such as 
‘size and value effect’, as well as market risk. Bahl (2006), Tripathi (2008) and Taneja (2010) 
argue that three factor model is more comprehensive in capturing security returns in India. 
Further, as it is typical of emerging economies that share price data is non-synchronous, the 
variants of the Market model based on the Scholes and Williams (SW) adjusted betas are also 
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employed here. The SW betas are calculated by leading and lagging returns by two and three 
periods. 
The market indices used here as benchmarks are both Value Weighted (VWI) and 
Equally Weighted Index (EWI). 
Finally, the analysis is based on two regression techniques: Ordinary Least-Square 
(OLS) and robust regressions. Of the available robust regressions, the M and the MM 
regression estimates are applied here.  
Table 5.1.2 summarizes the variants of event study analysis used. 
Table 5.1.2 Event Study Models and its Variants 
Regression 
Techniques 
 
Financial Models 
Market Model 
Fama-French 
(FF) 
Unadjusted Beta 
Scholes –Williams 
(SW) Betas 
OLS  VWI       EWI  
VWI       EWI VWI 
Robust 
Regressions 
M  VWI       EWI - VWI 
MM  VWI       EWI - VWI 
* VWI refers to a Value Weighted Index and EWI refers to Equally Weighted Index 
One particular challenge here is that all the likely combinations of the two financial 
models, regression techniques and indices mentioned above, are neither relevant nor possible. 
To elaborate, the EWI data does not extend earlier than the year 2000 and, for the FF model, 
it is not available at all. Hence, the analysis of the Market model based on EWI is not all-
inclusive, and the analysis of the FF models is based only on VWI returns. Further, even the 
FF data does not cover the entire sample period. Hence, the FF model analysis is also not all-
inclusive. Finally, while the returns from the native Market model are calculated using all the 
regression techniques, the SW variants of the Market model are based on the OLS method.  
Another challenge that arises is the various regression techniques. As discussed in 
chapter three, the M and the MM estimators are sensitive to influential outliers, and when 
executed on their default parameters, they have their own inbuilt threshold for the level of 
contamination (influence) due to the outliers in the dataset. Consequently, even after using 
both - SAS and Eviews software, they both eliminated some sample firms from the 
estimations. On an average, both the M and the MM estimations excluded 10% and 5% of 
the sample firms from the analysis respectively. That is advantageous in the sense that they 
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make analysis more accurate and more robust by deliberately excluding potentially 
problematic firms. However, this also implies that the results may not be comparable with 
other regressions directly due to the possibility of sample variation bias. Consequently, 
parallel to the analysis of ‘all firms’ for each regression method, another analysis is also run 
for the common set of firms – ‘same firms’ in the MM and the M sample sets, in order to 
compare and ensure that the results are actually regression driven and not sample driven. 
These sub-sets are referred to as: M firms and MM firms. Further, various graphs are merged 
here to facilitate meaningful comparisons. The MM and the OLS combination (All & Same 
firms) are presented in one graph, and the MM, the M and the OLS (All & Same firms) 
combination in another for each phenomenon when appropriate.  
Further, even the data for both the Fama-French variables and the Equally Weighted 
Index cover the sample period partially. Hence, to compare these returns with those from the 
Market model and VWI outcomes respectively, the ‘same firm’ analysis is also carried out 
and the sub-sets are referred to as FF firms and EWI firms. 
The final and equally important objective of this chapter is to identify the decisive 
factors that govern these outcomes. The univariate and multivariate OLS regressions analyses 
are conducted to evaluate the cross-sectional variation in these CAARs for the selected 
explanatory variables. 
The chapter begins with a discussion about Indian target firms, which leads to the 
analysis of Indian acquirer firms. In the process, the impact of various financial models, 
regression techniques, and indices on abnormal returns around the announcement day are 
discussed. Finally, the cross-sectional results for the two sides are reported.  
For brevity and relevance, only the primary outcomes are graphed, compared, 
contrasted and summarized in the main body of the chapter. Other subsidiary outcomes are 
provided in Appendix Chapter 5 31.  
                                                 
31 All the statistical results of the analysis are tabulated in the appendix for Chapter 5. These tables are 
labelled to provide the name of the financial model; the type of sample firms; the type of sample set; the 
regression technique and the number of observations (in parenthesis) and the index used. For each day in 
the entire event window - Days [-20, +30], these tables provide average abnormal returns - AAR, median 
AARs, cumulative average abnormal returns - CAARs, averaged Standardized Abnormal Returns (SARa) 
along with their standard deviations and t-statistics, and averaged Standardized CAARs (SCARa) along 
with the respective standard deviations and the t-statistics. Finally, the tables also earmark the t-statistics 
significant at the 5% and 10% level for SARa and SCARa. While, the t-statistics, significant at the 10% 
level, is provided in bold and italic numbers, that at 5% is further highlighted. Also, 3 day analysis for the 
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5.2 Market Model Analysis – Targets 
In the aggregate dataset, subsequent to the filtering process discussed in chapter four, 
of the 308 target firms, 274 firms are identified as Indian targets. While the regression 
estimates based on the OLS method are available for the entire dataset, those from the M and 
the MM regressions are available only for 241 and 264 firms respectively.  
Figure 5.2.1 compares the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) obtained 
from the MM and the OLS regressions for all the available firms over the 51 day event 
window [-20, +30] relative to the announcement day for the target firms in India.  
Also, as the MM estimator includes slightly fewer firms, the solid blue line labelled 
as ‘OLS-Same’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms 
(MM firms – 264 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions 
by controlling the sample selection bias. 
 
Figure 5.2.1 Market Model Returns; MM vs. OLS;  All & Same-firms; VWI 
The CAARs derived from the MM estimator are represented by the solid black line 
and are reported in Table-A 5.1. With some intermittent days as an exception, the AARs are 
mostly significantly positive even in the pre-event period and around the event day for the 
days [-3, +1]. The CAARs are also significantly greater than zero throughout the event 
window, with an exception of Day -20. Also, with the t-statistics of 7.95, even the 3 day 
                                                 
days [-1, +1] is provided at the bottom of these tables. 
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CAAR [-1, +1] of 5.93% is significantly positive. Finally, the CAARs tend to drift upwards 
in later weeks.  
The OLS results are tabulated in Table-A 5.2. The CAARs are statistically 
significantly greater than zero from Day -12 onwards. The AAR and CAAR on Day-0 and 
the three day CAAR [-1, +1] of 5.24% are all significantly positive at the 5% level. Though 
there is evidence of a slight decline in daily returns in the days after the event (hence the 
negative slope for the CAARs in later weeks), overall there is a positive impact not just on 
the announcement day itself, but also on the surrounding days [-3, +1]. 
The blue line, OLS-Same, based on the MM firms sub-set follows the same trajectory 
as of the OLS-All and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample 
variation does not change the overall properties of the results. The results are presented in the 
table Table-A 5.3. 
Table 5.2.1 provides a statistical snapshot of the three CAAR graphs discussed above. 
Table 5.2.1 Market Returns to Targets; All & Same Firms; OLS vs MM; VWI 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
AARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0  
CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0  
n 
Market 
MM 2.54% *** 5.93% *** 13.21% *** 18.45% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 264 
OLS-All 2.33% *** 5.24% *** 9.52% *** 8.05% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
OLS-Same 2.35% *** 5.36% *** 8.92% *** 7.93% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 264 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The hypothesis tested here is that there are no abnormal returns associated with the 
announcements of M&As to the shareholders of the participating Indian firms and the 
evidence presented here rejects the null hypothesis. In conformity with the findings from 
other countries, there is sufficient evidence that the Indian target firms do gain positive 
abnormal returns at the announcements of M&As. These gains occur on the event day, as 
well as on the surrounding days.  
Further, being consistent with the efficiency market hypothesis, there is no evidence 
of systematic average abnormal returns (AARs) to the new investors immediately after the 
public announcement of the event. However, the returns before the announcements are 
significantly positive and worthy of further discussion. 
The significantly positive CAARs since Day -19 (MM) or Day -12 (OLS) before the 
event indicate pre-bid run-up. In Schwert (1996) analysis, the pre-bid CAARs start rising 
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from the Day -42 but the largest activities are recorded during days [-21, -1]. While the 
announcement effect returns hover around 2.5% (Day-0), the pre-bid run-up is already in 
excess of 10.5% (MM) and 7% (OLS). This suggests that the market participants can partially 
anticipate the takeover premiums and have already incorporated that information into the 
price of the target shares. For the lower announcement effect, Cai et al. (2011) suggest that 
the abnormal returns based on announcements are largest when the takeovers are largely 
unanticipated. This is not entirely true here. Further, as the Day-0 AARs dominate the other 
AARs in the run-up period, it suggests that the information leakage may not be a universal 
phenomenon for all the deals, but for just a few of them and that most of the new information 
is made available only on the event day. In similar spirits, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) 
suggest that some level of uncertainty is resolved only at the announcement. 
Though it is a crude measure, Table 5.2.2 (below) provides some insight into the 
differences between run-up and mark-up CAARs.  
Table 5.2.2 Run-up vs. Mark-up; Target Shareholders; Market Model 
Regression 
Run-up  
[-20, -1] 
Mark-up  
[0, +30] 
Difference 
MM 10.67% 7.78% 2.89% * 
OLS 7.19% 0.86% 6.34% ** 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
The CAARs in the run-up period indicate anticipation of synergies by some market 
participants. The CAARs in the post-event days capture the general market expectations of 
the synergies once the news enters the market formally. Interestingly, more than half of the 
total price adjustments occur prior to the event day. The difference in run-up and mark-up 
CAARs is significantly greater than zero (it is nearly significant at 5% level from the MM 
estimates). Evidently, the higher proportion of the takeover premium is credited to the 
informed participants trading in the run-up period. This may be a market response to an 
increase in takeover probabilities inferred either through insider trading (Meulbroek, 1992) 
or through the toehold effect (Betton et al., 2008).  
The significantly positive AARs on a number of days prior to the announcement may 
be consistent with the notion of insider trading days proposed by Meulbroek (1992). Though, 
she also suggested that the entire price movement on those days should not be attributed 
purely to the insider trading. While she estimated half of the run-up is accounted for on insider 
trading days, in this analysis, nearly 80% of the total run-up occurs on select days when AARs 
are significantly positive. However, given the data limitation, unfortunately there is no way 
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to ascertain if insiders actually traded on those days. Thus, at best, it is purely a deduction. 
With respect to toehold theory arguments, the average toehold held by the acquirers in these 
targets at the announcement is around 17%, and toeholds are known to increase the run-ups 
and reduce the mark-ups (Betton et al., 2008). 
The analysis thus provides insights into the extent of trading in the pre-event period 
and its impact on the distribution of the takeover premium. It highlights that proportionately 
larger takeover returns are attributed to a select group of investors before the announcement. 
It is evident that apart from the synergistic gains, asymmetric information plays a dominant 
role in determining the outcomes of takeovers32.  
Another important finding is the fact that there are striking differences in the results 
from the OLS and the MM regression. While both the regressions indicate significantly 
positive abnormal returns on both the announcement day and the surrounding days, the 
magnitudes differ—those from the OLS regressions are lower. Even the window of 
significantly positive CAARs [-19, +30] is larger for the MM estimates. Not only that, in the 
post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM regression continue to rise, and are 
significantly greater than zero, those from the OLS estimates declined, which is also 
statistically significantly positive. 
Further, the t-statistics of the differences in the Day-0 AARs from the MM and the 
OLS regressions is not statistically significantly different from zero. This can be explained 
by the argument proposed by Cai et al. (2011) that the announcement effect is amplified only 
when it is largely unanticipated. Here, with large run-ups and mark-ups, the announcement 
effect (the tested variable) cascaded over several days in the event window and is actually 
diluted on that day. 
On the contrary, the t-statistics of the differences in the CAARs from the MM and the 
OLS regressions for the 3 days [-1, +1] and the entire event window [-20, +30] is statistically 
significantly different from zero, even at the 1% level. This is true with both the OLS-All and 
the OLS-Same. This confirms that the divergence in the outcomes is fundamental to the 
regression techniques and is not sample specific.  
                                                 
32 The findings here do not aim to validate or discard the theories of investor behaviour in markets with 
prevalent information asymmetry within market participants. Neither it attempts to determine the nature 
of information – public or private - used by them while trading in days prior to the announcement. 
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Clearly, the OLS and the MM returns differ, not only in their magnitudes, but also in 
the directions of the outcomes. This is because robust regressions down-weigh the influence 
of outliers and make their residuals larger and more visible, and also minimize their impact 
on the regressions coefficients. 
5.2.1 OLS MM M Comparison 
Figure 5.2.2 presents the Market model results from the M estimator. Since the M 
regression excluded a lot more firms from estimation, its results are compared here separately 
with the MM and the OLS results for the same set of firms (equivalent to M-firms - 241). 
 
Figure 5.2.2 Market Model Returns; M vs. Others (Same-firms); VWI 
These results are tabulated in Table-A 5.4, to 5.6 and the findings are summarized in 
Table 5.2.3 below.  
Table 5.2.3 Market Returns to Targets; All & Same-Firms; M, MM & OLS; VWI 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days  
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
AARs (**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 2.67% *** 6.12% *** 13.91% *** 19.68% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 241 
M 2.63% *** 6.00% *** 13.17% *** 17.90% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 241 
OLS 2.48% *** 5.55% *** 9.68% *** 9.29% *** -2 to +1 -12 to +30 241 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The results are still qualitatively identical to that of the MM and the OLS regressions 
presented in Table 5.2.1 with the full sample set. There is no change in the status of the 
statistical significance of the Day-0 AARs and CAARs or even for 3 day CAARs. The 
magnitudes of these values are also comparable to their respective counterparts.  
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The announcement day differences in the AARs from the three regressions are not 
statistically different from zero. However, the difference in the 3 day and 51 day  CAARs 
between the OLS and the other two robust regressions is significantly different from zero. 
The comparison of the two robust regression techniques suggests that the CAARs from the 
M method are slightly lower, but are similar with respect to the overall pattern and statistical 
significance of the results. This slight difference is not statistically different from zero. 
Clearly, the divergence in the outcomes from the OLS and the robust regressions is 
not sample specific but is fundamental to the regression techniques instead. The relevant 
finding here, however, is the fact that there is no unique value addition to the analysis from 
the M estimations.  
5.3 Fama-French (FF) Analysis – Targets 
The Fama-French variables cover the period from January 1993 to June 2012 and 
hence could be used only for a part of the sample period. The clean sample set for Fama-
French analysis has 256 Indian target firms. While the regression estimates based on the OLS 
regressions are available for the entire dataset, those from the M and the MM regressions are 
available only for 230 and 248 firms respectively. 
Figure 5.3.1 compares the CAARs obtained from the MM and the OLS regressions 
for all the available firms over the 51 day event window [-20, +30] relative to the 
announcement day for the target firms in India.  
Also, as the MM estimator has slightly lesser firms, the solid blue line labelled as 
‘OLS-Same’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms (MM-
firms – 248 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions by 
controlling the sample selection bias.  
The solid black line presents the CAARs from the MM estimates and those from the 
OLS estimates are in red dotted line.  
The CAARs obtained from the MM regression are reported in Table-A 5.7. The AARs 
and the CAARs remain positive throughout. With some intermittent days as an exception, the 
AARs are mostly significantly positive, even in the pre-event period and around the event 
day for the days [-3, +1]. The CAARs are also positive and statistically significantly different 
from zero for the entire event window. Also, with the t-statistics of 7.58, even the 3 day 
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CAAR [-1, +1] of 5.67% is significantly positive. Finally, the upward sloping CAAR curve 
is explained by the regular positive daily AARs in the days after the event. 
 
Figure 5.3.1 FF-Model Returns; MM vs. OLS;  All & Same-Firms; VWI 
The returns from the OLS regression for 256 firms are tabulated in Table-A 5.8. While 
the CAARs are positive throughout, they gain statistical significance from Day -15 and 
sustain it for the rest of the event window. The AAR and the CAAR on Day-0 and also the 3 
day CAAR [-1, +1] of 5.10% are all significantly different from zero at 5% level. Though 
there is an evidence of a slight decline in daily returns in the days after the event (hence the 
negative slope for CAARs), overall there is a positive impact on the announcement day  and 
the adjacent days [-3, +1]. 
The blue line, OLS-Same based on the MM firms sub-set, follows the same trajectory 
as the OLS-All, and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample variation 
does not change the overall properties of the results.  
The results are presented in Table-A 5.9 in the appendix and Table 5.3.1 provides a 
statistical snapshot of the three CAAR graphs discussed above. 
Table 5.3.1 Fama-French Returns to Targets (All-firms) 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs (**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Fama-
French 
MM 2.43% *** 5.67% *** 14.13% *** 19.29% *** -3 to +1 -20 to +30 248 
OLS-All 2.23% *** 5.10% *** 10.62% *** 8.16% *** -3 to +1 -15 to +30 256 
OLS-Same 2.24% *** 5.15% *** 9.82% *** 8.22% *** -3 to +1 -14 to +30 248 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
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Like Market model analysis, the evidence presented here also rejects the null 
hypothesis. In line with the findings from other countries, there is sufficient evidence that the 
Indian target firms gain positive abnormal returns at the announcements of M&As. These 
gains occur on the event day, as well as on the surrounding days.  
Further, similar to the findings from the Market model analysis, the efficiency market 
hypothesis holds true as there is no evidence of systematic average abnormal returns (AARs) 
to new investors immediately after the public announcement of the event.  
Table 5.3.2 provides the difference between the run-up and mark-up CAARs.  
Table 5.3.2 Run-Up vs. Mark-Up; Target Shareholders; FF Model 
Regression 
Run-up  
[-20, -1] 
Mark-up  
[0, +30] 
Difference 
MM 11.70% 7.59% 4.11% ** 
OLS 8.39% 0.22% 8.17% *** 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
The difference in run-up and mark-up CAARs is significantly greater than zero. 
Evidently, the higher proportion of the takeover premium is attributed to the informed 
participants due to their trading activities in the run-up period. This may be a market response 
to an increase in takeover probabilities inferred either through insider trading (Meulbroek, 
1992) or the toehold effect (Betton et al., 2008). Clearly, apart from the synergistic gains, 
asymmetric information also plays a dominant role in determining the outcomes of takeovers. 
Once again, the analysis exhibits striking differences in the returns from the OLS and 
the MM regressions. While both the methods produce significantly positive returns around 
the event for both the AARs and the CAARs, the returns based on the OLS are relatively 
lower, and the difference is particularly large for the CAARs. Even the window for 
significantly positive CAARs [-19/20, +30] is larger for the MM regressions. Not only that, 
in the post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM estimator continue to rise and are 
significantly positive, those from the OLS method—also statistically significantly different 
from zero—declined. This explains the divergence in the post-event slopes of the respective 
graphs. 
Like the Market model analysis, the test of differences in the returns on 
announcement day based on the respective AARs is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. But, the t-statistics of differences in the CAARs from the MM and the OLS 
regressions for the 3 days and the entire event window of 51 days is significantly different 
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from zero, even at the 1% level. That is true for both the OLS-All and the OLS-Same. That 
confirms that the divergence in the outcomes is fundamental to the regression techniques and 
is not sample specific.  
Clearly, the OLS and the MM returns differ, not only in magnitude, but also in the 
directions of the outcomes. This is because robust regressions down-weigh the influence of 
outliers and make their residuals larger and more visible, and also minimize their impact on 
the regressions coefficients. 
5.3.1 OLS MM M Comparison 
Figure A 5.1 in the appendix presents the Fama-French model results from the M 
estimator and compares it with those from the OLS and the MM regressions for the same set 
of firms (M-firms - 230). The results are summarized in Table 5.3.3. 
Table 5.3.3 Fama-French Returns to Targets (Same-Firms) 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR 
 Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Fama-
French 
MM 2.51% *** 5.82% *** 14.32% *** 19.91% *** -3 to +1 -20 to +30 230 
M 2.48% *** 5.70% *** 13.65% *** 18.20% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 230 
OLS 2.32% *** 5.31% *** 10.04% *** 8.78% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 230 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The results are still qualitatively identical to that of All-firm regressions presented in 
Table 5.3.1. There is no change in the statistical significance of Day-0 AARs, and CAARs or 
3 day CAARs. Even the magnitudes of these values are comparable to their respective 
counterparts.  
Once again, the announcement day differences in the AARs from the three 
regressions are not statistically different from zero. However, the difference in the 3 day and 
51 day CAARs between the OLS and the other two robust regressions is significantly 
different from zero.  The comparison of the two robust regression techniques suggests that 
the CAARs from the M method are slightly lower, but the difference is not statistically 
different. 
Clearly, the divergence in the outcomes from the OLS and the robust regressions is 
not sample specific but is fundamental to the regression techniques. The relevant finding here, 
however, is the fact that there is no unique value addition to the analysis from the M 
estimations as such.  
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5.3.2 Fama-French (FF) vs. Market Model 
Figure 5.3.2 compares the two financial models for the same set of firms and the two 
regression techniques. The OLS analysis is based on 256 common firms, and the MM CAARs 
are based on matching 248 firms. As the CAARs from the M regression are identical to those 
from the MM estimations, they are not included here.  
The graphs in red are for the CAARs from the OLS method and those in black are 
from the MM regression respectively. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market 
model, and the solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
The divergence in the black and the red graphs reflects the differences in the 
regression techniques. Clearly, the MM estimator produces higher returns. Also, while the 
MM CAARs continue to rise in the later part, those from the OLS method decline. 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the Market and the FF models for the respective regression technique. The solid lines (FF 
model) in both the regressions lie above the dotted lines (Market model) and run parallel 
throughout. That indicates that the returns from the FF model are consistently marginally 
higher.  
Table 5.3.4 (below) provides a statistical summary of the various CAARs graphed in 
Figure 5.3.2. The relevant tables are Table-A 5.7, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.3.2 Market vs. FF Returns; OLS vs. MM Regressions (Same-Firms) 
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Table 5.3.4 Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM Comparison 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs (**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Market 2.47% *** 5.74% *** 13.29% *** 18.08% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 248 
FF 2.43% *** 5.67% *** 14.13% *** 19.29% *** -3 to +1 -20 to +30 248 
OLS 
Market 2.27% *** 5.06% *** 9.56% *** 7.39% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 256 
FF 2.23% *** 5.10% *** 10.62% *** 8.61% *** -3 to +1 -15 to +30 256 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Overall, qualitatively, the Fama-French model analysis reproduces the findings of the 
Market model. The magnitudes of the Day-0 AARs, CAARs and 3 day CAARs are all 
comparable to the given regression technique. So is the window size of the significantly 
positive AARs and the CAARs around the event day. Even the test of differences in abnormal 
returns for Day-0 AARs and 3 day CAARs for each regression technique is not significantly 
different from zero. However, the overall CAARs generated within 51 days are significant 
different and the FF Model returns are higher by 1% (rounded) on an average.  
Though in the Indian context, Bahl (2006), Tripathi (2008) and Taneja (2010) favour 
the three factor model as a better estimator of stock returns, this thesis reports no significant 
difference in the announcement returns from the two. The overall CAARs however, may be 
marginally higher, but there is no difference in the trend at all. This finding is in line with 
MacKinlay (1997) who argues that for event studies, gains from the multifactor models are 
limited. 
Once again, the analysis exhibits prominent differences in the returns from the OLS 
and MM regressions. While both the methods produce significantly positive returns around 
the event for both AARs and CAARs, the returns based on the OLS are relatively lower, and 
the difference is particularly large for the CAARs. Even the window for significantly different 
from zero CAARs [-19/20, +30] is larger for the MM regressions. Not only that, in the post-
event days, while the CAARs from the MM method continue to rise and are significantly 
positive, those from the OLS method, also statistically significant, declined. This explains the 
divergence in the post-event slopes of the red and the black graphs. 
The main finding are: (i) the target shareholders gain significantly positive returns on 
the announcement day, and in the surrounding days, and (ii) both the financial models capture 
identical announcement effects. However, the overall CAARs are marginally higher from the 
Fama-French model—by approximately 1% on average. In addition, it is important to note 
that the Fama-French model has a limitation due to its unavailability for the entire sample 
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period. (iii) The MM regressions returns are lot higher and they differ significantly from the 
OLS estimates in magnitudes as well in the direction. 
5.4 Scholes and Williams Analysis – Targets 
The Market model is recalculated using Scholes and Williams’ adjusted betas by 
lagging the index variable for one to three time periods. That generates three new variants of 
the Market model. The set of common firms used is also the entire sample set. 
 
Figure 5.4.1 Market vs. SW (1-3) Models Return; OLS (All-firms); VWI 
 Figure 5.4.1 is based on Table – A 5.20, 5.12 to 5.14. It serves two purposes. Firstly, 
it shows the abnormal returns from all three of the SW adjusted beta variants. Secondly, it 
also compares them with the unadjusted Market model for the same set of firms. Table 5.4.1 
(below) provides a statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed above. 
Table 5.4.1 Market and SW Variants Comparison (All-Firms) 
Model 
Regression 
Beta 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 2.33% *** 5.24% *** 9.52% *** 8.05% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
SW-1 2.31% *** 5.31% *** 9.43% *** 7.96% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
SW-2 2.34% *** 5.36% *** 9.25% *** 7.37% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
SW-3 2.37% *** 5.40% *** 9.37% *** 7.52% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The SW adjusted betas also replicate the findings of the unadjusted Market model. 
Qualitatively, all the relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically identical. The findings 
are in line with Dyckman et al. (1984) and Davidson and Josev (2005), which advocate no 
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significant improvement in the model specifications or the power of tests using either of these 
modified betas. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis over the Market model 
analysis from the SW adjusted beta Market models. 
5.5 Equally Weighted Index - Targets 
The Equally Weighted Index (EWI) data does not extend earlier than the year 2000 
and, hence, is used only for a sub-set of the sample data. In total, 226 target firms from the 
clean sample have EWI values available. 
 Figure 5.5.1 presents the comparison of Market model returns based on EWI and 
VWI indices, and also for both the OLS and the MM regressions. It is based on Table-A 5.15  
to 5.18.  
The OLS analysis is based on 226 common firms, and the MM estimations are based 
on 220 common firms. The CAARs from the M estimates are identical to those from the MM 
estimates, and have been left out in this comparison.  
The graphs in red are for the CAARs from the OLS method, and those in black are 
from the MM technique. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the EWI, and the solid 
lines denote those from the value weighted index.  
 
Figure 5.5.1 Returns to Targets; VWI vs. EWI; OLS vs. MM (Same-Firms) 
The divergence in the black and the red graphs reflects the differences in the 
regression techniques. As the robust regressions down-weigh the influence of outliers and 
make their residuals larger and more visible, and minimize their impact on the regressions 
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coefficients, the MM estimations generate larger returns. Not only that, in the post-event days, 
while the CAARs from the MM estimates show significant systematic increment, those from 
the OLS estimates, also statistically significantly different from zero, declined. 
Comparing any solid line (VWI) with the dotted line (EWI) in the same colour shows 
the impact of the index for that regression technique. There is hardly any discernible 
difference between any pair. The dotted lines (EWI) in both the regressions match the 
respective solid lines (VWI) precisely. As explained in the data chapter, EWI values have 
been developed retrospectively using BSE Sensex, which is the same market index used in 
the VWI models. The two datasets correlate highly (0.95), and that may explain this 
resemblance. The given set of CAARs is summarized in Table 5.5.1.  
Table 5.5.1 OLS vs. MM and VWI vs. EWI Comparison (Same-Firms) 
Regression Index     
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
VWI 2.87% *** 6.12% *** 14.34% *** 20.80% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 220 
EWI 2.94% *** 6.23% *** 14.51% *** 20.96% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 220 
OLS 
VWI 2.67% *** 5.34% *** 9.70% *** 8.36% *** -2 to 0 -12 to +30 226 
EWI 2.71% *** 5.38% *** 9.77% *** 8.15% *** -3 to 0 -11 to +30 226 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Qualitatively, there is no key difference in the returns from VWI and EWI. The only 
difference is due to the regression techniques where the robust regression returns are larger 
than that of the OLS, and they slope upwards in later weeks when OLS CAARs decline. 
Though EWI is argued to be better in asset pricing models to capture abnormal returns (AR), 
Brown and Warner (1980) argue that, of all the possible issues cited for not using EWI, the 
Market model particularly, tends to perform reasonably well regardless. 
5.5.1 SW vs. Market Model 
All the three versions of the Market model, based on Scholes and Williams adjusted 
betas from EWI, are compared with the VWI based Market model returns for the set of same 
firms. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it presents the abnormal returns from the SW 
adjusted beta Market models based on EWI and secondly, it compares them with a VWI based 
Market model for the same set of firms. 
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Figure 5.5.2 Market (VWI) vs. SW (1-3) (EWI) OLS (Same-Firms) 
Figure 5.5.2 is based on Table-A 5.15, 5.19 to 5.21. Table 5.5.2 (below) provides a 
statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed above. 
Table 5.5.2 Market vs. SW Variants; VWI vs. EWI Comparison Targets 
Beta Index 
AAR  
 Day-0 
CAAR  
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
Unadjusted VWI 2.67% *** 5.34% *** 9.70% *** 8.36% *** -2 to 0 -12 to +30 226 
SW-1 
EWI 
2.74% *** 5.50% *** 9.80% *** 8.39% *** -3 to 0 -11 to +30 226 
SW-2 2.76% *** 5.53% *** 9.53% *** 7.97% *** -3 to 0 -11 to +30 226 
SW-3 2.80% *** 5.60% *** 9.66% *** 8.26% *** -3 to 0 -11 to +30 226 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Interestingly, the SW adjusted beta Market models based on EWI replicate the VWI 
based Market model returns. The magnitudes of Day-0 AARs, CAARs and  3 day CAARs 
are all comparable. So is the window size of the AARs and CAARs significantly different 
from zero around the event day.  
Qualitatively, there is no fundamental difference in the outcomes from the two indices 
and the model variants.Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis from the SW 
adjusted betas or the EWI. 
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5.6 Summary - Targets 
Table 5.6.1 summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of the abnormal returns to 
the Indian target firms, based on the value weighted index. 
Table 5.6.1 Summary Results; Indian Targets; All-Firms - VWI 
Model 
Regression 
Betas 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 2.54% *** 5.93% *** 13.21% *** 18.45% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 264 
OLS 2.33% *** 5.24% *** 9.52% *** 8.05% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
M 2.63% *** 6.00% *** 13.17% *** 17.90% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 241 
SW-1 2.31% *** 5.31% *** 9.43% *** 7.96% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
SW-2 2.34% *** 5.36% *** 9.25% *** 7.37% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
SW-3 2.37% *** 5.40% *** 9.37% *** 7.52% *** -3 to +1 -12 to +30 274 
Fama-
French 
MM 2.43% *** 5.67% *** 14.13% *** 19.29% *** -3 to +1 -20 to +30 248 
OLS 2.23% *** 5.10% *** 10.62% *** 8.16% *** -3 to +1 -15 to +30 256 
M 2.48% *** 5.70% *** 13.65% *** 18.20% *** -3 to +1 -19 to +30 230 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The announcement day effect (AAR Day-0) and that in the surrounding days 
(CAARs) are statistically significantly positive. Depending on the financial model and the 
regression technique, the AAR on Day-0 can range from 2.23% to 2.63%, and the CAAR up 
until the announcement day can vary between 9.25% and 14.13%. Even the overall 51 day 
CAAR can be as high as 19.29%, which is also statistically significantly positive.  
The positive abnormal returns to the target firms are a well-established phenomenon 
in the finance literature for both developed and emerging markets. Clearly, there is sufficient 
evidence that the Indian target shareholders make huge positive abnormal returns both at the 
announcement and in its surrounding days. The statistically significant post-event CAARs 
suggest small incremental continuous returns to the shareholders. 
Further, the target run-up is lot higher than its mark-up, suggesting that a major share 
of the takeover premium is taken away by the informed traders. A role of information 
asymmetry within the market participants is a large determining factor for outcomes and 
allocations. 
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5.7 Market Model Analysis – Acquirers 
In the aggregate dataset, subsequent to the filtering process discussed in chapter four, 
of the 345 acquirer firms, 233 firms are identified as Indian acquirers. While the regression 
estimates based on the OLS are available for the entire dataset, those from the M and the MM 
regressions are available only for 214 and 229 firms respectively.  
Figure 5.7.1 compares the CAARs obtained from the MM and the OLS regressions 
for all the available firms over the 51 day event window. The solid black line presents the 
CAARs from the MM estimates, while those from the OLS estimates are in red dotted line. 
Also, as the MM estimator includes slightly fewer firms, the solid blue line labelled 
as ‘OLS-Same’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms 
(MM firms – 229 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions 
by controlling the sample selection bias. 
 
Figure 5.7.1 Market Model Returns; MM vs. OLS;  All & Same-Firms; VWI 
The CAARs from the MM regression are reported in Table-A 5.22. The AARs are 
mostly positive around Day-0 but are not statistically significantly different from zero except 
for Day -1. The CAARs are significantly positive from Day -7 onwards for the rest of the 
event window. Also, with the t-statistics of 3.23, even the 3 day CAAR of 1.49% is 
significantly greater than zero. The upward sloping CAAR curve suggests continuous 
positive share price reactions in several days after the event. 
The returns from the OLS method are tabulated in Table-A 5.23. The CAARs are 
positive for a brief period of the days [0, +16] but are not statistically different from zero for 
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the entire event window. So is the AAR on Day-0. However, the 3 Day CAAR [-1, +1] of 
1.11% is significantly positive, at the 5% level.  
The blue line, OLS-Same, based on the MM firms sub-set follows the same trajectory 
as of the OLS-All and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample 
variation does not change the overall properties of the results. These returns are presented in  
Table-A 5.24. 
Table 5.7.1 provides a statistical summary of the three regressions discussed above. 
Table 5.7.1 Market Returns to Acquirers -VWI - All-Firms 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days  
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days  
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 0.39%   1.49% *** 3.13% *** 6.33% *** -1 -7 t0 +30 229 
OLS-All 0.26%  1.11% ** 0.17%  -1.40%  -1   233 
OLS-Same 0.25%   1.04% ** -0.17%   -1.60%   -1   229 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
There are significantly positive abnormal returns to the Indian acquirers at the 
announcement of M&As. However, they occur cumulatively over the adjacent days [-1, +1] 
and not on the announcement day (AAR Day-0) itself. These CAARs are significantly 
positive to both the regression techniques. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the Indian acquirers do observe positive gains at the 
announcement of M&A deals. This conforms with other findings from the emerging markets 
(Bhagat et al., 2011).  
Further, consistent with the efficiency market hypothesis, there is no evidence of 
systematic significant Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) for new investors after the public 
announcement of the event in the event window.  
Discussions concerning bidders’ run-ups and mark-ups are quite rare in the existing 
finance literature. Schwert (1996) finds that acquirer mark-ups are generally negative and 
acquirer run-ups are much smaller, particularly when compared with the target run-ups. 
Further, there is no significant impact on acquirers’ run-up as a result of the takeover 
premium. It is possible that some investors may infer the probability of takeovers for the 
targets (hence the target run-up), but may still remain unaware of the identity of the acquirers. 
In this analysis, although MM regression shows some significantly positive CAARs in days 
just before the announcement in the pre-event period (implying the possibility of insider 
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trading), unlike target firms, there is no discernible pattern of significantly positive average 
abnormal daily returns to the acquirers before the announcement. One possibility is that the 
trades were proportionately so small that insider trading, if any, may have gone unnoticed.  
Particularly of interest, is the fact that there are striking differences in the results from 
the OLS and the MM regressions. The CAARs are higher and are also statistically 
significantly different from zero from the MM method on Day-0, as well as in the pre and 
post-event days, which is not the case for the OLS CAARs. Not only that, in the post-event 
days, while the CAARs from the MM method continue to rise and are significantly positive, 
those from the OLS declined and lacked any statistical significance. 
The test of differences in the returns on the announcement day based on the respective 
AARs is not statistically significantly different from zero, but the t-statistics of differences in 
the CAARs from the MM and the OLS regressions for the 3 day window and the entire event 
window of 51 days is statistically significantly different from zero, even at the 1% level. This 
is true with both - the OLS (All) and the OLS (Same-firms). This confirms that the divergence 
in the outcomes is fundamental to the regression techniques and is not sample specific.  
Clearly, the OLS and the MM returns differ, not only in the magnitudes, but also in 
the directions of the outcomes. This occurs because robust regressions down-weigh the 
influence of outliers and make their residuals larger and  more visible, and minimize their 
impact on the regressions coefficients. 
5.7.1 OLS MM M Comparison 
Figure 5.7.2 presents the Market model results from the M estimator. Since the M 
regression left out many more firms in its estimation, its results are compared here separately 
with the MM and the OLS results for the same set of firms (equivalent to M-firms - 214). 
When compared with the results presented in Table 5.7.1 for All-firm regressions, the 
MM outcomes have changed. Even the announcement day abnormal return (AAR Day-0) is 
now statistically significantly different from zero. 
Further, the announcement day differences in the AARs from the three regressions 
are not significantly different from zero. However, the difference in the 3 day and 51 day 
CAARs between the OLS and the other two robust regressions is significantly different. By 
comparison, the two robust regression techniques produce statistically identical returns.  
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Figure 5.7.2 Market Model Returns; M vs. Others (Same-Firms); VWI 
These results are tabulated in the Table-A 5.25 to 5.27 and the findings are 
summarized in Table 5.7.2 (below).  
Table 5.7.2 Market Returns to Acquirers (Same-Firms); All Regressions 
Model Regression 
AAR  
Day-0 
  
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR 
Day-0 
  
51-Days 
CAAR  
 AARs (**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 0.51% ** 1.69% *** 3.39% *** 6.26% *** -1 to 0 -7 to +30 214 
M 0.47% * 1.58% *** 2.72% *** 4.64% *** -1 -1 to +30 214 
OLS 0.35%  1.21% ** 0.00%   -1.83%   -1   214 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size .   
The Day-0 AARs are significantly positive from the MM and nearly significantly 
positve from the OLS regressions, which is not the case with the full sample. Apparently, 
dropping the sample to the M-firms sub-set can modify the results. Whereas, the analysis in 
Table 5.7.1 confirms that modifying a sample set to the MM firms sub-set does not affect the 
outcomes qualitatively, and can be readily compared with OLS (All). So, there is no sample 
selection bias in the MM regression outcomes, but the M regression results may not be 
consistent as there is a potential for distortion in results obtained from the M-firms sub-set.   
5.8 Fama-French Analysis - Acquirers 
The Fama-French variables cover the period from 1993 to June 2012. As such, they 
can only be used for a sub-set of the sample period. The clean sample set for Fama-French 
analysis includes 209 Indian acquirer firms. All of these acquirer firms are used in the OLS, 
whereas the M and the MM regressions are available only for 191 and 205 firms respectively. 
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Figure 5.8.1 compares the CAARs obtained from the MM and the OLS regressions 
for all the available firms over the 51 day  event window. The solid black line presents the 
CAARs from the MM estimates, while those from the OLS estimates are shown as a red 
dotted line. 
Also, as the MM estimator has slightly lesser firms, the solid blue line labelled as 
‘OLS-Same’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms (MM 
firms - 205). This facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions by 
controlling the sample selection bias. 
 
Figure 5.8.1 Returns from FF Model; MM vs. OLS;  All & Same-Firms; VWI 
The CAARs derived from the MM method are reported in the Table-A 5.28. They are 
positive throughout the event window and are also statistically significantly positive for the 
days [-7, +30]. Even, the 3 day CAAR of 1.53% is significantly positive. However, while the 
AARs are mostly positive around Day-0, they are not different from zero, except for just one 
day - Day -1. Finally, the upward sloping CAAR curve in the subsequent weeks suggests 
positive share price reactions in several days after the event. These CAAR values are also 
significantly positive. 
The CAARs obtained from the OLS estimations of the 209 firms are tabulated in  
Table-A 5.29. The CAARs are positive for the days [-1, +17], and yet are never statistically 
different from zero for the entire event window. The same results are true of the AARs, except 
for Day -1. There is evidence of a decline in the AARs in subsequent weeks, which explains 
the downward drift of the post-event CAAR graph. Finally, the 3 day CAAR [-1,+1] of 1.12% 
is significantly positive at the 5% level. 
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The blue line, OLS-Same  based on the MM firms sub-set, follows the same trajectory 
as the OLS-All and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample variation 
does not change the overall properties of the results. The results are presented in Table-A 
5.30. Table 5.8.1 provides a summary of the three regressions discussed above. 
Table 5.8.1 FF Returns to Acquirers; All & Same-Firms; MM vs. OLS; VWI 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
 (**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
 (**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Fama-
French 
MM 0.56%  1.53% *** 3.78% *** 6.37% *** -1 -7 to +30 205 
OLS-All 0.39% ** 1.12% ** 0.86%  -1.40%  -1  209 
OLS-Same 0.37% * 1.04% ** 0.54%   -1.61%   -1   205 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The evidence presented here rejects the null hypothesis. In line with the findings from 
the other emerging countries, Indian acquirer firms do observe positive abnormal returns with 
the announcement of M&A deals. However, these gains may not occur on the event day, as 
the evidence suggests that the AAR Day-0 is statistically weak. Instead, consistent 
statistically significantly positive 3 day CAARs imply positive abnormal returns to the 
acquirers in the cumulative form.  
Similar to the findings from the Market model analysis, the efficiency market 
hypothesis holds true because there is no evidence of systematic average abnormal returns 
(AARs) for the investors after the public announcement of the event. Although, the returns 
are marginally higher. Also, while the MM regression shows some significant CAARs in the 
pre-event period, there are rarely any significant average abnormal daily returns to the 
acquirers before the announcement.   
Once again, the results from the OLS and the MM regressions differ. The CAARs are 
higher and are also statistically significantly different from zero even in both the pre and the 
post-event periods from the MM estimations. This is not the case with the OLS CAARs. Not 
only that, in the post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM method are upward sloping 
and significantly positive, those from the OLS regression decline and are not different from 
zero statistically. 
Like the Market model analysis, the test of differences in the returns on the 
announcement day based on the respective AARs is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. However, the t-statistics of differences in the CAARs from the MM and the OLS 
regressions for the 3 day and the entire event window of 51 days is statistically significantly 
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different from zero, even at the 1% level. This confirms that the divergence in the outcomes 
is fundamental to the regression techniques and is not sample specific.  
Clearly, the OLS and the MM returns differ, not only in the magnitudes but also in 
the directions of the outcomes. This is so because robust regressions down-weigh the 
influence of outliers and make their residuals larger and more visible, and also minimize their 
impact on the regressions coefficients. 
5.8.1 OLS MM M Comparison 
Figure A 5.2 presents the Fama-French Model results from the M estimator and 
compares it with those from the OLS and the MM regressions for the same set of firms (M-
firms - 191). The results are summarized in Table 5.8.2 (below). 
 Table 5.8.2 Fama-French Returns to Acquirers; (Same-Firms); All-Regressions 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
 around 
Day-0 
n 
FF 
MM 0.74% *** 4.17% *** 1.85% *** 6.56% *** -1 to 0 -7 to +30 191 
M 0.70% *** 3.43% *** 1.75% *** 4.78% *** -1 to 0 -4 to +30 191 
OLS 0.53% ** 0.59%   1.33% ** -2.01% * -1 to 0   191 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
When compared with the results presented in Table 5.8.1 for All-firm regressions, 
there is a noticeable disparity. Even the announcement day abnormal return (AAR Day-0) is 
now statistically significantly different from zero. 
The announcement day differences in the AARs from the three regressions are 
statistically not different from zero. However, the difference in the 51 day CAARs between 
the OLS and the other two robust regressions is significant. The two robust regression 
techniques produce identical returns statistically.  
Clearly, dropping the sample to the M-firms sub-set can alter the results. Whereas, 
the analysis in Table 5.8.1 confirms that modifying a sample to MM firms sub-set does not 
affect the outcomes qualitatively and can be readily compared to the OLS (All). So, there is 
no sample selection bias in the MM regression outcomes, but the M regression results may 
not be consistent as there is a potential for distortion in results obtained from the M-firms 
sub-set.   
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5.8.2 Fama-French (FF) vs. Market Model 
Figure 5.8.2 compares the two financial models for the same set of firms and the two 
regression techniques. The OLS analysis is based on 209 common firms, and MM CAARs 
are based on same 205 firms. Following the results of the previous sub-section, the CAARs 
from the M estimates are left out of this comparison. 
The graphs in red are the CAARs from the OLS method, while those in black are 
from the MM regression. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market model, and 
the solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
 
Figure 5.8.2 FF vs. Market; OLS vs. MM Regressions (Same-Firms) 
The divergence in the black and the red graphs reflects the differences in regression 
techniques. Clearly, the MM estimator produces higher returns. Also, while the MM CAARs 
are statistically significantly positive in the later part, those from the OLS are negative. 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the Market and the FF models for that regression technique. The solid line (FF model) has 
the same trajectory as the dotted lines (Market model) but it mostly lies above the dotted line. 
This indicates that the returns from the FF model are consistently marginally higher.  
Table 5.8.3 (below) provides a statistical summary of the various CAAR graphs 
presented in Figure 5.8.2. The relevant tables are Table-A 5.28, 5.29, 5.31 and 5.32.  
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Table 5.8.3 Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM Comparison 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days  
CAAR 
CAAR 
Day-0 
51-Days  
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Market 0.50%   1.43% *** 3.43% *** 6.55% *** -1 -6 to +30 205 
FF 0.56%   1.53% *** 3.78% *** 6.37% *** -1 -7 to +30 205 
OLS 
Market 0.37% * 1.06% ** 0.49%  -1.28%   -1   209 
FF 0.39% ** 1.12% ** 0.86%   -1.40%   -1   209 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
The magnitudes of Day-0 AAR, CAAR and 3 day CAAR are all comparable to the 
given regression technique. So is the window size of the significantly positive AARs and 
CAARs around the event day. Further, the test of differences in the Day-0 AARs, 3 day, and 
51 day CAARs for each regression technique is not significantly different from zero. Thus, 
the results from the Fama-French and Market model are identical. This is consistent with 
MacKinlay (1997) who argues that for event studies, the gains from multifactor models are 
limited.  
Once again, the OLS and the robust regressions differ. They both produce 
significantly positive returns for the AARs and CAARs. However, the OLS returns are 
relatively lower. The MM regression even has long windows for significantly positive 
CAARs. Not only that, in the post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM method 
continue to rise and are significantly positive, those from the OLS method declined. This 
explains the divergence in the slopes of the red versus the black graphs. 
Overall, qualitatively, the Fama-French model analysis reproduces the findings that 
of the Market model. Thus,  there is no additional value to the analysis over the Market model 
from the Fama-French model. In addition, it is important to note that the Fama-French model 
has a limitation due to its unavailability for the entire sample period. 
5.9 Scholes and Williams Analysis – Acquirers 
The Market model is recalculated using Scholes and Williams adjusted betas by 
lagging the index variable for one to three time periods. Doing so generates three new variants 
of the Market model. All three of the new models, along with the original Market model, are 
compared in this section. 
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Figure 5.9.1 Returns from Market and SW (1-3) Models OLS (All-Firms) 
Figure 5.9.1 is based on  Table-A 5.23, 5.33 to 5.35. It serves two purposes. Firstly, 
it shows the abnormal returns from all of the three SW adjusted betas. Secondly, it compares 
SW models with the Market model for the same set of firms.  
Table 5.9.2 provides a statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed above. 
Figure 5.9.2 Market and SW model variants comparison (All-firms) 
Model Beta 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days  
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days  
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around  
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 0.26%   1.11% **  0.17%   -1.40%   -1   233 
SW-1 0.29%  1.14% ** 0.15%  -1.54%  -1   233 
SW-2 0.32%  1.16% ** 0.02%  -1.66%  -1   233 
SW-3 0.29%   1.14% ** 0.19%   -1.35%   -1   233 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
The SW adjusted betas also replicate the findings of the unadjusted Market model. 
Qualitatively, all the relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically identical. The findings 
are in line with (Dyckman et al. (1984) and Davidson and Josev (2005) which advocate no 
significant improvement in the model specifications or the power of tests using either of these 
modified betas. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis over the unadjusted 
Market model analysis from the SW adjusted beta Market models. 
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5.10   Equally Weighted Index – Acquirers 
The Equally Weighted Index (EWI) data does not extend earlier than the year 2000. 
As such, it is used only for a sub-set of the sample data. In total, 194 acquirer firms from the 
clean sample have EWI values available.  
Figure 5.10.1 is based on Table-A 5.36 to 5.39. It presents the comparison of Market 
model returns constructed using the EWI and the value weighted index (VWI) indices, as 
well as for the OLS and MM regressions. 
The OLS analysis is based on 194 common firms, and the MM estimations are based 
on the same 193 firms. The CAARs from the M estimates are excluded from this comparison. 
 
Figure 5.10.1 Returns to Acquirers; VWI vs. EWI; OLS vs. MM (Same-Firms) 
The graphs in red are the CAARs from the OLS estimates, while those in black are 
from the MM estimates. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the EWI, while the solid 
lines denote those from the VWI.  
The divergence in the black and red graphs reflects the differences in regression 
techniques. Clearly, the MM estimations produce larger returns. Not only that, in the post-
event days, while the CAARs from the MM method continue to rise and are significantly 
positive, those from the OLS method decline. That explains the divergence in the slopes of 
the red and the black graphs. 
Comparing any solid line (VWI) with the dotted line (EWI) in the same colour shows 
the impact of the index for that regression technique. There is hardly any discernible 
difference between any pair. The dotted lines (EWI) in both the regressions follow the solid 
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lines (VWI). As discussed earlier, the high degree of correlation (0.95) between the two sets 
of indices may explain this resemblance. 
The given set of CAARs is summarized in Table 5.10.1 (below).  
Table 5.10.1 Market Models; OLS vs. MM and VWI vs. EWI (Same-Firms) 
Regression Index 
AAR  
Day-0 
  
3-Days  
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
  
51-Days  
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
VWI 0.58%  1.68% *** 3.28% *** 6.89% *** -1 -1 to +30 193 
EWI 0.69%   1.83% *** 3.30% *** 7.05% *** -1 -1 to +30 193 
OLS 
VWI 0.45% ** 1.23% ** -0.27%   -1.59%   -1 to 0   194 
EWI 0.54% ** 1.34% ** -0.44%   -1.83%   -1 to 0   194 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Qualitatively, there is no key difference in the returns from the VWI and the EWI. The 
only difference is due to the regression techniques where the robust regression returns are 
larger than the OLS, and they slope upwards in later weeks, whereas the OLS CAARs decline. 
Though EWI is argued to be better in capturing abnormal returns (ARs) in asset pricing 
models, Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the Market model tends to perform reasonably 
well, even when the EWI is not used. 
5.10.1 SW vs. Market Model 
All the three versions of the Market model (based on Scholes and Williams adjusted 
betas from EWI) are compared with the VWI based Market model returns for the set of same 
firms. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it presents the abnormal returns from the SW 
adjusted beta Market models based on EWI. Secondly, it compares them with a VWI based 
Market model for the same set of firms. 
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Figure 5.10.2 Market (VWI) vs. SW (1-3) (EWI); OLS (Same-Firms) 
Figure 5.10.2 is based on Table-A 5.37, 5.40 to 5.42 and Table 5.10.2 provides a 
relevant statistical summary.  
Table 5.10.2 Market vs. SW Variants; VWI vs. EWI Comparison - Acquirers 
Beta Index 
AAR   
Day-0 
CAAR  
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs  
(**)  
around 
Day-0 
n 
Unadjusted VWI 0.45% ** 1.23% ** -0.27%   -1.59%   -1 to 0   194 
SW-1 
EWI 
0.58% ** 1.39% *** -0.31%  -1.64%  -1 to 0   194 
SW-2 0.61% ** 1.42% *** -0.40%  -1.77%  -1 to 0   194 
SW-3 0.60% ** 1.40% *** -0.20%   -1.56%   -1 to 0   194 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Interestingly, the SW adjusted betas Market models based on EWI match the VWI 
based Market model returns. The magnitudes of Day-0 AARs, CAARs and 3 day CAARs are 
all comparable, as is the window size of the significantly different from zero AARs and 
CAARs around the event day.  
Thus, qualitatively, there is no fundamental difference in the outcomes from the two 
indices and the two financial models. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis 
from the  SW adjusted betas or the EWI. 
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5.11   Summary – Acquirers 
Table 5.11.1 summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of abnormal returns to the 
Indian acquirer firms. 
Table 5.11.1 Summary Results; Indian Acquirers; All-Firms - VWI 
Model 
Regression 
Betas 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 0.39%   1.49% *** 3.13% *** 6.33% *** -1 -7 t0 +30 229 
OLS 0.26%  1.11% ** 0.17%  -1.40%  -1   233 
M 0.47% * 1.58% *** 2.72% *** 4.64% *** -1 -1 to +30 214 
SW-1 0.29%  1.14% ** 0.15%  -1.54%  -1   233 
SW-2 0.32%  1.16% ** 0.02%  -1.66%  -1   233 
SW-3 0.29%   1.14% ** 0.19%   -1.35%   -1   233 
Fama-
French 
MM 0.56%  1.53% *** 3.78% *** 6.37% *** -1 -7 to +30 205 
OLS 0.39% ** 1.12% ** 0.86%  -1.40%  -1  209 
M 0.70% *** 3.43% *** 1.75% *** 4.78% *** -1 to 0 -4 to +30 191 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
When compared with the target firms, the abnormal returns to the acquirers are not 
as high. In fact, they are very small. However, this could be because of the size effect—
acquirers are generally larger companies, and the returns are calculated in terms of 
percentages (Jensen, 1984). Depending on the financial model and the regression technique, 
the AAR on Day-0 can range from 0.26% to 0.70%, and the CAAR up until the announcement 
day can vary from 1.12% to 1.75%. The 51 day CAAR can be as high as 6.37%, which is also 
statistically significantly different from zero.  
While the positive returns to the acquiring firms are a rare phenomenon in the 
developed world, the findings are in line with the existing literature on the emerging markets 
(Bhagat et al., 2011). However, instead of occurring on the event day itself, these abnormal 
returns accumulate over adjacent days and are captured in the significantly positive 
surrounding CAARs.  
To summarize, there is sufficient evidence that the shareholders of Indian acquirer 
firms make positive abnormal returns. Further, there is no significant difference in abnormal 
returns from the two financial models and indices. However, the two regression methods 
produce significantly different estimates. 
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5.12   Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This section takes the analysis further, investigating the cross-sectional determinants 
of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) obtained by the participating Indian 
firms in the aggregate dataset. As a dependent variable, this analysis uses several CAAR 
windows of various time lengths, ranging from the days [-1,+1] to [-20,+20] with respect to 
the announcement day. While the smaller event windows capture only the returns in the days 
adjacent to the event day, larger event windows ensure that pre and post-event market 
reactions are also fully captured. The larger windows are particularly important in this 
analysis. As evidenced by the event study analysis, the announcement effect is not 
concentrated solely around the event day, but is also present throughout the surrounding 
weeks.  
Both the target and the acquirer firms’ CAARs are regressed on a series of 
independent variables comprising Cash, Pct50, PctToe, CB and Conglomerate33. The 
equation takes the following form: 
CAARt1,t2  =  α0  +  β1 Cash +  β2 Pct50 + β3 PctToe + β4 CB + β5 Conglomerate
+ εi 
(5-1) 
where Cash and CB variables are expected to be positive for both the sides; Pct50 
should be positive for the targets and unclear for the acquirers; PctToe is expected to be 
negative for the targets and positive for the acquirers, and Conglomerate should be negative 
for both the sides.  
Further, the Market model CAARs (based on both the OLS and MM estimation 
techniques from the event study analysis) are examined using the OLS regression with White-
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors adjustments.  
This thesis confines the cross-sectional analysis to the OLS technique. Maronna and 
Yohai (2000) argue that the presence of multiple independent explanatory dummy variables 
                                                 
33 Recall from the methodology chapter, Cash is a dummy variable wherein the value of one is assigned for 
a cash offer and zero for shares or a combination of cash and share; Pct50 is a dummy variable that reflects 
acquisition of majority stake - one is assigned when either the acquired stake is 50% or more or when the 
existing stake is increased to 50% or more; PctToe is a continuous variable that represents the percentage 
shareholding already held by the acquirer prior to the announcement of the deal; CB variable is assigned 
one when the given deal is Cross-border and zero when it is Domestic; and Conglomerate is a dummy 
variable and is assigned one when the participating firms belong to a different industry on the basis of 2 
digit SIC codes. 
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can easily yield to collinear sub-samples created while executing various algorithms inherent 
to robust regressions procedures.  
5.12.1 Indian Target Firms 
Table 5.12.1 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the independent 
variables used in the analysis of the target firms. While some of the variables are significantly 
correlated, none of them is of high enough order to make any impact on the analysis. Further, 
these variables have a mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 1.08, with none exceeding 
1.12 individually. Collectively, they both rule out the possibility of the existence of any 
multicollinearity issues in the analysis. 
Table 5.12.1 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables-Targets  
 
Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe   CB   
 
Pct50 0.0174        
   (0.7748) 
 PctToe 0.1689 *** -0.0024      
   (0.0056) 
 
(0.9686) 
 CB 0.2659 *** 0.0900  0.0818    
   (0.0000) 
 
(0.1372) (0.1821) 
 Conglomerate -0.1280 ** -0.1780 *** -0.1839 *** -0.1102 * 
   (0.0341) 
 
(0.0031) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0686) 
 
 
  p-values in parentheses; *p <.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Table 5.12.2 presents the multivariate regression results for the various CAAR 
windows for the Indian target firms. The CAARs referred to here come from the OLS 
estimation of the abnormal returns in the event study analysis. The univariate results for each 
of these regressions are presented separately in Table-A 5.43 to 5.52. The discussion below 
refers to both the multivariate and the univariate results. 
The equation (5) in Table 5.12.2 below for the days adjacent to the announcement 
day [-1,+1]  has weak F-statistics with regressions coefficients not differing from zero 
statistically. As Cai et al. (2011) explain, the announcement based abnormal returns are 
largest when they are largely unanticipated. The large number of significant CAARs in the 
run-up and mark-up period in the event study analysis reveals that the returns are scattered 
around the announcement day.  
The larger CAAR windows provide a more comprehensive picture of the analysis. 
The statistical significance for the model and the constituting variables fluctuate as the 
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window size grows. The variables which are significantly different from zero at least at the 
5% level are indicated in bold in Table 5.12.2. 
Table 5.12.2 Regression Analysis OLS CAARs – Indian Target Firms 
 CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
 [-20, +20]   [-15, +15]   [-10, +10]   [-5, +5]   [-1, +1]   
 
Cash 0.1173 ** 0.0972 ** 0.0986 *** 0.0529 ** 0.0066  
 
 
(2.5686) 
 
(2.4890) 
 
(2.9638) 
 
(2.2559) 
 
(0.4261) 
 Pct50 0.1067 ** 0.0997 ** 0.0597 * 0.0690 *** 0.0188  
 
 
(2.4173) 
 
(2.3613) 
 
(1.8261) 
 
(2.6660) 
 
(1.1266) 
 PctToe -0.1679 * -0.1322 * -0.0999  0.0382  0.0310  
 
 
(-1.9422) 
 
(-1.7392) 
 
(-1.6208) (0.8276) (1.0397) 
 CB -0.0681 * -0.0432  -0.0242  0.0127  0.0228  
 
 
(-1.7269) 
 
(-1.2053) (-0.8131) (0.5692) (1.5065) 
 Conglomerate -0.0813 * -0.0513  -0.0276  -0.0146  -0.0123  
 
 
(-1.8867) 
 
(-1.3137) (-0.8732) (-0.6492) (-0.8398) 
 Intercept 0.1263 *** 0.1066 *** 0.0750 ** 0.0276  0.0368 *** 
 
 
(3.0172) 
 
(2.7923) 
 
(2.1882) 
 
(1.3367) (2.9283) 
 
 Observations 268   268   268   268   268   
 F-Statistics 3.8333  3.2942  2.8614  3.3407  1.7434  
 p-value 0.0023 *** 0.0067 *** 0.0155 ** 0.0061 *** 0.1250  
 Adj. R-Squared 0.0547   0.0406   0.0335   0.0462   0.0153   
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
Of all, Cash (the consideration paid in cash) and Pct50 (the acquisition of majority 
stake) are the two most prominent variables to explain the CAARs. These findings are 
consistent with the existing literature. Even in the univariate analysis, these two variables are 
generally significantly positive for these CAAR windows. Cash and Pct50 both produce 
higher returns in the range of 5% to 12% and 7% to 11% (approximately) respectively when 
compared with their base dummy counterparts.  
For targets, Cash compensation reflects managers confidence about the target 
valuation and also reduces the risk of the ‘contingency pricing effect’ in the post-acquisition 
revaluation effect (Hansen, 1987). Linn and Switzer (2001) find that cash offers produce 
significantly larger post-acquisition stock return performance for the merged firms. Under 
synergy hypothesis, cash offers reflect acquirers’ perception of synergistic gains and their 
need to capture them (Stulz, 1988; Fishman, 1989) particularly for acquirers who place a 
higher value on the target firms. Cash consideration then is a way to deter other competitors. 
Taking the majority stake in an Indian company reflects managements’ confidence 
and their long-term commitment to the venture. Also, as explained by LLSV, majority stakes 
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are preferred by minority shareholders in countries with weaker legal systems to defend their 
own interests. Chari et al. (2009) observe significantly positive returns from the acquisition 
of majority control to the participating firms in the emerging markets. 
The coefficients of PctToe (existing toeholds) are mostly negative and are 
occasionally significant but at 10% level in both the univariate and in the multivariate 
analyses. This negative relationship is in line with existing literature. Toeholds are known to 
be advantageous for acquirers on several dimensions, particularly with respect to asymmetric 
information about the targets and competition from rival acquirers. They increase the 
bargaining power of the acquirers significantly, while reducing the offer price for the target 
firms (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Bris, 2002; Betton et al., 2009). 
In multivariate analysis, while the CB coefficients are insignificantly positive for 
smaller windows and significantly negative (at the 10% level) for larger windows [-20,+20], 
are actually significantly positive for smaller windows [-1,+1] and insignificantly negative 
for the larger ones in univariate analysis. This ambiguity between short-term and long-term 
CAAR windows implies that the immediate positive announcement effect is relatively higher 
in cross-border deals, but overall, it is the domestic deals that offer greater cumulative returns 
for the target firms’ shareholders. 
Finally, the Conglomerate variable is generally not different from zero in multivariate 
analysis. However, it is frequently significantly negative at the 10% level in univariate 
analysis. The significantly positive intercept terms in each of these univariate cases imply 
that conglomerate deals produce lower returns when compared with the congeneric deals. 
Bruner (2002) concludes that conglomerate deals lead to poor returns.  
The next analysis (Table 5.12.3) also applies to target firms, but the CAARs here are 
based on the MM estimations of the Market model in the event study analysis.  
Once again, depending on the window size, the model and the constituting variables 
alter their statistical significance. The results are still identical to the analysis of OLS based 
CAARs with slight variations. The two variables—Cash and Pct50—are still the most 
prominent independent variable to explain the CAARs. They are statistically significantly 
positive in both multivariate and univariate analysis for most of the CAAR windows. Even 
their coefficients are economically large enough to affect the size of returns obtained on the 
announcement of deals. 
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Table 5.12.3 Regression Analysis MM CAARs - Indian Target Firms 
 CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
 [-20, +20]   [-15, +15]   [-10, +10]   [-5, +5]   [-1, +1]   
 
Cash 0.0851 ** 0.0743 ** 0.0783 *** 0.0507 ** 0.0040  
 
 
(2.0446) 
 
(2.0908) 
 
(2.6124) 
 
(2.1514) 
 
(0.2503) 
 Pct50 0.0912 ** 0.0937 ** 0.0574 * 0.0543 ** 0.0162  
 
 
(2.0121) 
 
(2.2255) 
 
(1.7810) 
 
(2.1346) 
 
(0.9781) 
 PctToe -0.1662 ** -0.1292 * -0.0965 * 0.0305  0.0228  
 
 
(-2.0675) 
 
(-1.8221) 
 
(-1.6791) 
 
(0.6728) (0.7500) 
 CB -0.0423  -0.0160  -0.0060  0.0153  0.0261 * 
 
 
(-1.1015) 
 
(-0.4645) (-0.2139) (0.6892) (1.6925) 
 
 Conglomerate -0.0597  -0.0289  -0.0152  -0.0119  -0.0152  
 
 
(-1.4102) 
 
(-0.7714) (-0.5160) (-0.5316) (-1.0575) 
 Intercept 0.2011 *** 0.1534 *** 0.1087 *** 0.0529 ** 0.0466 *** 
 
 
(5.1691) 
 
(4.3439) 
 
(3.5703) 
 
(2.5474) 
 
(3.7258) 
 
 Observations 258   258   258   258   258   
 F-Statistics 2.6307  2.4828  2.4113  2.5121  1.7091  
 p-value 0.0244 ** 0.0323 ** 0.0370 ** 0.0305 ** 0.1329  
 Adj. R-Squared 0.0325   0.0281   0.0251   0.0327   0.0155   
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
The coefficients of PctToe become significantly negative for larger CAAR windows 
in the multivariate analysis, but they are not significantly different from zero in the univariate 
analysis for all the windows. PctToe in window [-20, +20] implies that the existing toehold 
interest of an acquirer can reduce the overall takeover returns to the targets by 17%. The CB 
variable is significantly positive for smaller windows in both univariate and multivariate 
analysis [-1, +1]. However, it is negative but not different from zero for the larger ones. This 
suggests that target shareholders may receive higher than domestic returns around the 
announcements from cross-border deals, but may not receive higher returns overall. 
Overall, the consideration received in cash and the acquisitions of the majority stake 
emerge as the main driving forces for the returns to the Indian target firms. Cash payments 
mitigate several risks for the target shareholders. And a majority stake safeguards the interests 
of minority shareholders. Further, toehold interests impact returns negatively. Another 
interesting finding is the distinction between smaller and larger CAAR windows in the cross-
border deals. Cross-border deals yield lesser returns to the targets when compared with those 
from the domestic returns in aggregate but not so at the time of the announcement.  
Interestingly, despite big differences in the magnitudes of the CAARs obtained from 
the OLS and the MM methods, the regression results from both are essentially identical. They 
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both identify the same factors as critical, and produce similar inferences about the analyses. 
However, their magnitude of coefficients may differ slightly. 
5.12.2 Indian Acquirer Firms 
Table 5.12.4 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the independent 
variables used in this analysis for the acquirer firms. While some of the variables are 
significantly correlated, none of them is of a high enough order to make any impact on the 
analysis. Further, these variables have a mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 1.07, with 
none exceeding 1.12 individually. Collectively, they both rule out the possibility of the 
existence of any multicollinearity issues in the analysis. 
Table 5.12.4 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables - Acquirers  
 
Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe   CB   
 
Pct50 0.0537        
   (0.4144) 
 PctToe -0.0231  0.0068      
   (0.7288) (0.9192) 
 CB 0.2392 *** -0.0166  -0.1063    
   (0.0002) 
 
(0.8007) (0.1102) 
 Conglomerate -0.1027  -0.1331 ** -0.1083  -0.1695 *** 
   (0.1181)   (0.0424)   (0.1038)   (0.0095)   
 p-values in parentheses; ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
    
The multivariate regression results for the various CAAR windows for the Indian 
acquirer firms are presented in Table 5.12.5. The CAARs used here are from the OLS 
estimation of the abnormal returns in the event study analysis. The univariate results for each 
of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 6.53 to 6.57. The 
discussion below refers to both the multivariate and the univariate results. 
With the changing CAAR windows, the model and the constituting variables alter 
their statistical significance. The most important variable that governs the returns obtained by 
the acquiring firms is CB. Unlike the ambiguity presented in the analysis of the target firms, 
this variable is unequivocally negative and mostly significant in both univariate and 
multivariate analyses. Further, the positive intercept coefficients in the univariate analyses 
suggest that the acquirers lose 2% to 8% (approximately) in cross-border takeovers relative 
to domestic deals. Another variable, Pct50, is generally not different from zero except for the 
CAAR window of [-15, +15], where it is significantly positive in both the analyses.  
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Table 5.12.5 Regression Analysis OLS CAARs – Indian Acquirer Firms 
 CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
 [-20, +20]   [-15, +15]   [-10, +10]   [-5, +5]   [-1, +1]   
 
Cash 0.0376  0.0245  0.0112  0.0122  0.0032  
 
 
(1.0731) (0.7688) (0.4278) (0.5155) (0.2716) 
 Pct50 0.0629  0.0848 ** 0.0417  0.0073  0.0038  
 
 
(1.5664) (2.1855) 
 
(1.3933) (0.3872) (0.3274) 
 PctToe 0.0812  0.0631  -0.0009  0.0111  0.0125  
 
 
(1.4289) (1.1990) (-0.0194) (0.2841) (0.6450) 
 CB -0.0804 ** -0.0672 ** -0.0521 ** -0.0227  -0.0040  
 
 
(-2.1990) 
 
(-2.2117) 
 
(-2.2799) 
 
(-1.5299) (-0.3944) 
 Conglomerate 0.0457  0.0374  0.0216  0.0210  0.0079  
 
 
(1.1699) (1.0422) (0.7837) (1.2105) (0.7988) 
 Intercept -0.0425  -0.0299  0.0020  0.0028  0.0058  
 
 
(-1.4942) (-1.1701) (0.0885) (0.2186) (0.7154) 
 Observations 227   227   227   227   227   
 F-Statistics 2.5992  2.8403  1.9443  1.1019  0.3047  
 p-value 0.0262 ** 0.0165 ** 0.0881 * 0.3603  0.9098  
 Adj. R-Squared 0.0214   0.0307   0.0038   -0.0077   -0.0172   
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
In other variables, the variable PctToe for existing toeholds is steadily positive, as 
expected, but has weak t-statistics in both the analyses. This positive, yet insignificant impact, 
is consistent with Betton et al. (2009). Choi (1991) explains that the acquirers receive only 
partial benefits from the toehold investments. But, the toeholds are still indirectly beneficial 
as they reduce the offer premium and acquirers’ returns are less negative when there is a 
positive toehold in place  (Betton et al., 2008). Likewise, as expected, even the Cash variable 
is positive but never significantly different from zero in both the analyses. 
Interestingly, the Conglomerate coefficients, though not significantly different from 
zero throughout, show signs of positivity. This suggests that for acquirers, diversification is 
seen as a positive move, which is in complete contrast to the findings of the target firms. 
However, given the culture of large business houses in India, which are also large 
conglomerates, positive signs for the acquirers make sense.  
Table 5.12.6 below is based on the CAARs from the MM estimations of the Market 
model in the event study analysis. The univariate results for each of these regressions are 
presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 5.58 to 5.62. The results obtained here are 
qualitatively identical to the regression analysis from OLS CAARs presented in Table 5.12.5. 
The difference is that the intercept coefficients are significantly positive in all the univariate 
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analysis. Also, there are some sign reversals in smaller and larger CAAR windows when 
compared with respective multivariate equations, but none of these coefficients is 
significantly different from zero to explain CAARs. 
Table 5.12.6 Regression Analysis MM CAARs – Indian Acquirer Firms 
 CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
 [-20, +20]   [-15, +15]   [-10, +10]   [-5, +5]   [-1, +1]   
 
Cash 0.0252  0.0160  0.0056  0.0078  0.0032  
 
 
(0.7365) (0.5072) (0.2053) (0.3257) (0.2612) 
 Pct50 0.0493  0.0685 ** 0.0314  0.0024  0.0029  
 
 
(1.4704) (2.2487) 
 
(1.1696) (0.1337) (0.2496) 
 PctToe 0.0964 * 0.0809  0.0131  0.0144  0.0158  
 
 
(1.6654) 
 
(1.4968) (0.2639) (0.3614) (0.8043) 
 CB -0.0858 ** -0.0709 ** -0.0532 ** -0.0261  -0.0042  
 
 
(-2.2073) 
 
(-2.2215) 
 
(-2.2231) 
 
(-1.6339) (-0.4028) 
 Conglomerate 0.0382  0.0280  0.0171  0.0184  0.0076  
 
 
(1.0506) (0.8914) (0.6436) (1.0848) (0.7450) 
 Intercept 0.0235  0.0196  0.0347  0.0219  0.0098  
 
 
(0.7583) (0.7197) (1.4510) (1.6365) (1.1483) 
 Observations 223   223   223   223   223   
 F-Statistics 2.8006  3.4050  1.9713  1.2336  0.3295  
 p-value 0.0179 ** 0.0055 *** 0.0840 * 0.2944  0.8948  
 Adj. R-Squared 0.0198   0.0273   -0.0011   -0.0081   -0.0172   
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
An interesting finding is that the toehold variable has gained mild statistical 
significance for larger CAARs, which is not in line with existing finance literature. 
Overall, the cross-border (CB) deals and the acquisition of the majority stake (Pct50) 
emerge as the main driving forces for the returns to Indian acquirer firms. The CB variable is 
mostly significantly negative. This implies that the cross-border deals yield lesser returns to 
the acquiring shareholders. Pct50 is consistently positive and significantly different from zero 
for CAAR window [15, +15], thus acquiring a majority stake may yield positive results.  
Signs of Cash and PctToe are as expected, and a positive sign for Conglomerate suggests that 
for the acquirers, diversification strategies generate positive returns—just the opposite of 
target firm returns. However, the coefficients are never significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. 
Once again, despite a big difference in the magnitudes of the CAARs obtained from 
the OLS and the MM methods, the regression results from both are, in effect, identical. They 
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both point towards the same critical factors. However, their magnitude of coefficients may 
differ slightly. 
5.13  Overall Summary  
The chapter tests the first hypothesis (H1), which is focused on the possible motives 
of M&As: synergy, hubris or agency. The hypothesis tested is: 
H1:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As for the 
participating Indian firms.  
As both the target and the acquirer firms’ shareholders make abnormal positive 
returns at the announcement of M&As, the null hypothesis is rejected. And the positive 
returns to both the sides indicate synergy creation. However, the returns to the target 
shareholders are considerably higher than those to the acquirers’, at least in percentage form.  
Further, the targets’ takeover premium has a run-up that is significantly more than the 
post-bid mark-up. This implies that information asymmetry and informed trading play a 
substantial role in determining the distribution of the total takeover premium generated 
around announcements. It also implies that informed traders receive a larger proportion 
overall. 
The second, but equally important, objective of this chapter is to analyse the impact 
of various financial models, regression techniques and types of indices in evaluating the 
announcement effects.  
5.13.1 Impact of Various Financial Models 
The abnormal returns calculated using the SW adjusted beta Market models 
reproduce the returns obtained by the native Market model. There is hardly any discernible 
difference between the outcomes. This is true for both the targets and the acquirers, and also 
for the Value Weighted Index (VWI) and the Equally Weighted Index (EWI). Essentially, 
there is no unique contribution to the analysis from using SW adjusted betas. 
Likewise, qualitatively, Fama-French returns are mostly identical to those of the 
Market model returns. While the Fama-French returns are marginally higher with respect to 
the announcement effect, they are statistically alike overall. However, with respect to the 
overall CAARs [-20, +30], FF based returns exceed Market model returns statistically by 1% 
on average but for only the target shareholders. Apart from this slight variation, the outcomes 
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are comparable. Besides, the Fama-French variables do not cover the entire sample period 
and hence, is not an all-inclusive model.  
Thus, the Market model provides the most exhaustive and reasonably reliable and 
insightful analysis of this event study. 
5.13.2 Impact of Various Regression Techniques 
As expected, there are striking differences between the abnormal returns from the 
OLS and the robust regressions. These differences are multidimensional, including 
magnitudes, direction and statistically significant values. What is also evident is that the M 
estimations generally replicate the outcomes of the MM estimations.  
The abnormal returns based on the robust regressions are much larger in magnitude 
than those obtained from the OLS method. This is true for both the targets and the acquirers, 
for both the financial models, and for both types of indices.  
Generally, in the post-event period, the CAARs obtained by robust regressions are 
upward sloping, while those from the OLS regression, decline. There are also sign reversals 
in the outcomes in both the Market model and the Fama-French model.  
Finally, more of the CAARs and the AARs obtained by robust regressions are 
statistically significantly different from zero when compared with the ones from the OLS 
method. For the target firms, the CAARs based on robust regressions are statistically 
significantly positive generally for the entire event period. For the acquirer firms, they are 
significant for the entire post-event period. However, for OLS based estimations, the days 
with the returns that are statistically significantly different from zero are considerably less. 
One criticism of this argument could be the fact that the robust regressions did not 
use the entire sample set, and that this difference in results could be due to sample selection. 
To counter this problem, all the models were re-estimated for the same set of firms (based on 
the availability of the M and the MM estimations) for both the target and the acquirer firms, 
and the Market model and the Fama-French model. When all the results were re-estimated 
for the OLS and the MM comparison only, they were identical to the ‘all firms’ analysis, 
which indicates that the results from the MM method can be directly compared to those from 
the OLS regression, without being concerned about sample selection bias. With the M 
estimation sub-set, for the target firms, the ‘same-firms’ results are qualitatively identical to 
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those with ‘all-firms’ analysis for all the three regressions.  However, for the acquirers, the 
results change.  
To conclude, while the M estimations replicate the MM estimations qualitatively, 
they can still potentially distort the results due to the smaller sample set. Further, given the 
influencing leverage points in the data (as explained in chapter four), the MM estimations are 
the most reliable estimations in this analysis.  
5.13.3 Impact of Indices 
Equally Weighted Index (EWI) data does not cover the entire sample period and thus 
is not an all-inclusive model. Still, for the firms where EWI data is available, the Market 
model and the SW adjusted betas are evaluated for both the indices. When compared, 
qualitatively, there is no difference in the results obtained by using the VWI or the EWI for 
any of these regressions. Clearly, the type of index has no bearing on the results of event 
study as derived in this thesis.  
Table 5.13.1 (below) summarizes the methodological impact on the analysis. 
Table 5.13.1 Summary of Methodological Impact on the Analysis 
Regression 
Techniques 
Financial Models 
Notes  
(Regression 
Techniques)  
Market Model 
Fama-
French Unadjusted 
Beta 
Scholes –
Williams 
OLS  VWI       EWI  
VWI       EWI VWI 
All-inclusive and 
insightful results 
Robust 
Regressions 
M  VWI       EWI - VWI 
Potential to distort 
results 
MM  VWI       EWI - VWI 
Most reliable 
estimations 
Notes  
(Financial Models) 
All-inclusive 
(VWI). 
 
Insightful results. 
 
EWI is a sub-set. 
Results replicate 
the Market 
model. 
outcomes  
 
EWI is a sub-set. 
Results 
replicate the 
Market model 
outcomes with 
occasionally 
marginally 
higher returns. 
Most insightful 
results come 
from: 
 
Market model, 
OLS, MM and VWI 
The Market model based on the OLS and MM estimations using VWI provides the 
most insightful analysis. The two regression outcomes could be compared directly without 
any sample selection bias. Due to the contamination of the data, MM estimations are the most 
reliable estimations in this analysis. All the other financial models, their variants and M 
estimates are practically redundant for the purpose of this thesis.  
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5.13.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
In the cross-sectional analysis, target returns are governed by cash compensation 
(Cash) and the acquisition of the majority stake (Pct50). Toehold (PctToe) yield lower 
returns. Cross-border deals yield higher returns around announcement day but not overall, 
and diversification is discouraged. On the other hand, for acquirers, cross-border deals yield 
lesser returns always and there is also some evidence that majority stake (Pct50) may generate 
positive returns. As opposed to the target firms, diversification can be positive. 
Another important finding is that despite the differences in the magnitudes of the 
CAARs obtained from the OLS and the MM estimations, they yield coefficients that are 
qualitatively identical and comparable in a cross-sectional analysis. 
5.13.5 Snapshot – Hypothesis 
 
Table 5.13.2 Hypothesis Testing Outcome – Aggregate Dataset 
 
Effect Hypothesis Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
H1 : 
There are no 
abnormal returns 
associated with the 
announcements of 
M&As to the 
participating Indian 
firms. 
 
Significantly positive returns 
to both - the targets and 
acquiring shareholders at 
the announcement. 
  H1a: Synergy   As both targets and 
acquirers gain positive 
abnormal returns on 
average, the total effect is 
positive for the combined 
wealth. 
  H1b: Hubris  
  H1c: Agency  
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 Domestic Deals 
6.1 Introduction 
The aggregate dataset of M&A deals is further divided into two broad sub-sets: the 
domestic dataset and the cross-border dataset. The domestic dataset is comprised of M&A 
deals where both the target and the acquirer firms are based in India, evidenced by their 
primary listing on the Indian Stock Exchanges. This chapter focuses on the returns obtained 
by these companies. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to test the synergy hypothesis for domestic 
M&A (DMA) deals. If synergies exist, markets should react favourably to such 
announcements. Thus, the central hypothesis tested here is: There are no abnormal returns 
associated with the announcements of domestic M&As to the shareholders of the 
participating Indian firms.  
However, there is a gamut of related factors that can play a significant role in 
determining the outcomes of M&As in national settings. This makes the testing of a variety 
of sub-hypotheses imperative in terms of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the 
announcement effects of DMA deals. 
Large Indian Business Groups (IBGs) dominate the corporate Indian landscape. IBGs 
are family-based business groups which use both pyramidal structures and reciprocal cross-
holdings amongst group member companies. IBGs are typically characterized by the 
influential insider control in the affiliate companies they own, achieved either through 
substantial shareholdings or controlling rights disproportionately higher than their cashflow 
rights. This significant and concentrated control provides absolute discretion over the assets 
of the company they manage, creating a conducive environment for expropriation, often at 
the cost of minority shareholders. Given these circumstances, being taken over by an IBG 
may not be looked upon favourably by outside shareholders, who are reduced to the status of 
minority company owners. On the other extreme, IBG acquirer can have positive impact on 
the target returns. In an environment of subpar capital, product and labour markets, IBGs  
create ‘internal factor markets’ for their affiliates. To achieve that, they thrive on their 
reputation and will support ailing affiliates (often by diverting resources towards them) to 
protect their reputation. In turn, that increases the value of a group overall.  
  6-149 
 
The possible effects of pyramidal structures are commonly propositioned by the 
tunnelling and propping hypotheses. Delving deeper into the subject, the deals are analysed 
to determine that effect of IBG acquisition.  
Nayar (2014, pp. 207, 10) compiles lists of the top Indian Business Groups (IBGs) in 
the 1950s and 1990s. Understandably, there is a significant overlap between the two lists. 
Based on Nayar’s lists, a combined list of the top 60 IBGs was prepared. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the acquirer may be either the flagship company of an IBG, or one of its 
subsidiaries. Accordingly, all domestic M&A deals were reclassified as either Business 
Group or Non-Business Group deals. The hypothesis tested in this context is: There is no 
difference in abnormal returns generated from the takeovers by the large Indian Business 
Groups. 
Another important dimension of organizing business in groups is intra-group deals.  
Businesses are structured as a group with a network of firms in the Indian corporate system. 
However, despite belonging to a common parent company, these affiliates are independent 
companies with their own board of directors and are accountable to their own shareholders. 
Being a member of  a group enables access to the diverse resources of other sister companies. 
In fact, quite often, deals occur within the affiliates of the same business group. In the sample 
used, nearly a third of the deals are intra-group in nature. The existing relationship between 
the targets and acquirers may have substantial bearings on the takeover outcomes. In such 
takeovers, the information asymmetry about the target would be less, as will the probability 
of competing bids. As the attribute relatedness has different dynamics, such deals may 
produce different outcomes.  
Related deals are those where the two participating companies are the part of the same 
corporate group. Either they already have an existing parent-subsidiary relationship, or they 
are two distinct entities operating under the same parent company. Accordingly, all domestic 
deals were reclassified as either related or unrelated deals. The hypothesis tested in this 
context is: There is no difference in abnormal returns generated in the takeovers when the 
participating firms are already affiliated.   
The final, and equally important, objective of this chapter is to evaluate the various 
deal and firm-specific characteristics to determine the main driving forces for these returns. 
A thorough cross-sectional analysis is conducted to isolate the decisive factors that govern 
the outcomes in domestic deals. 
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The chapter begins with a discussion about domestic target firms and leads to the 
analysis of domestic acquirer firms. In the process, the impact of various financial models, 
and regression techniques on abnormal returns is discussed. Finally, the cross-sectional 
results for each side are reported. 
Chapter five provides a sound basis for all the relevant aspects of the methodology 
employed in this thesis. To restate, the announcement effect captured by the Fama-French 
model is identical to the Market model outcomes. However, the overall CAARs for the 51 
day event window are 1% higher for targets, and no difference for acquirers. The Scholes and 
Williams adjusted betas replicate results from the unadjusted Market model. The EWI 
produces returns that are comparable to VWI returns for the same set of firms, and thus 
provides no additional insights. However, for the two regressions techniques, there are 
significant differences in the results from the MM and the OLS regressions. The MM returns 
can be directly compared with the OLS outcomes, despite the marginal difference in the 
sample size. In terms of the two robust regressions, the M estimator follows the general trend 
of the MM regressions for the same set of firms. However, due to the smaller sample size, it 
has the potential to alter the overall properties of the analysis. Finally, given the properties of 
the dataset, the MM estimator is better suited.  
Following on from chapter five, this chapter focuses on the outcomes from the Market 
model based on the Value Weighted Index (VWI) and regressed with the OLS and the MM 
techniques. As discussed earlier, the MM regression does not estimate all the sample firms. 
The sub-set estimated by the MM regressions is referred to as ‘MM  firms’. Further, the results 
from the Fama-French model and the SW variants are compared for the primary hypothesis. 
For the other attributes, the Fama-French results are provided in Appendix Chapter 6 . The 
Fama-French sub-set is referred to as ‘FF firms’. 
For brevity and relevance, only the primary outcomes are compared, contrasted and 
reported in the main body of the chapter. Other subsidiary findings are provided in the 
appendix to this chapter. 
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6.2 Returns to Domestic Targets 
The aggregate dataset has 274 firms identified as Indian Targets. Of these, 170 firms 
are domestic targets. While the regression estimates based on the OLS method are available 
for each of these firms, only 165 firms are estimated by the MM regression.  
Figure 6.2.1 compares the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) obtained 
from the MM and the OLS regressions using the Market model for all the available firms 
over the 51 day  event window [-20, +30], relative to the announcement day for the target 
firms in India.  
Also, as the MM estimator includes slightly fewer firms, the solid blue line labelled 
as ‘OLS (Same)’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms 
(MM firms – 165 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions 
by controlling the sample selection bias. 
 
Figure 6.2.1 Market Returns; DMA - Targets – OLS vs. MM; (All & Same). 
The CAARs derived from the MM estimator are represented by the solid black line 
and are reported in Table-A 6.1. With some intermittent days as exceptions, the AARs are 
mostly significantly positive, including in the pre-event period and around the event day for 
the days [-3, 0]. The CAARs are also significantly positive throughout the event window, 
except for Day -20. Also, with the t-statistics of 4.74, even the 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] of 4.77% 
is significantly different from zero. Finally, the CAARs in the later weeks can be seen drifting 
upwards. 
11.33%
14.57%
10.14%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
16.0%
20.0%
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
C
A
A
R
s
Event Days
Market-Model
(All & Same)
OLS (All)
MM
OLS (Same)
  6-152 
 
The red dotted line charts the CAARs from the OLS regression based on 170 firms. 
The results are tabulated in Table-A 6.2. The CAARs are statistically significantly greater 
than zero from Day -12 onwards. The AAR and the CAAR on Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR [-
1, +1] of 4.15% are all significantly positive at the 5% level. Though there is evidence of a 
slight decline in daily returns in the days after the event (hence the negative slope for the 
CAARs in later weeks), overall there is a positive impact on the announcement day itself, as 
well as on the surrounding days [-3, 0]. 
The blue line, OLS (Same), based on the MM firms sub-set, follows the same 
trajectory as of the OLS (All) and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the 
sample variation captures similar effects and does not change the overall properties of the 
results. The results are presented in  Table-A 6.3.  
6.2.1 Market vs. Fama-French (FF) Model 
Figure 6.2.2  compares the two financial models and the two regression techniques 
for the same set of firms (FF firms). The OLS analysis is based on 163 common firms, and 
the MM CAARs are based on the same 158 firms. The results are documented in Table-A 6.4 
to 6.7 in the appendix. 
The graphs in red are the CAARs from the OLS regression, while those in black are 
the MM estimator. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market model, while the 
solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
 
Figure 6.2.2 Returns to Domestic Target; Market vs. FF; OLS vs. MM  (All & Same-Firms) 
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The divergence in the black and the red graphs in the post-event period reflects the 
differences in the regression techniques. Clearly, the MM estimators produce higher returns. 
Also, while the MM CAARs drift upwards in the later part, those from the OLS estimator 
gradually decline. This is so because robust regressions down-weigh the influence of outliers 
and make their residuals larger and more visible, while minimizing their impact on the 
regressions coefficients. 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the Market and the FF models for that regression technique. The solid line (FF model) has 
the same trajectory as the dotted lines (Market model), but it mostly lies above the dotted line. 
That indicates that the returns from the FF model are consistently marginally higher.  
Table 6.2.1 provides a statistical summary of all the CAAR graphs discussed above. 
The comparative results for the same set of firms, based on the M estimator, are graphed in 
Figure A 6.1 and 6.2 in the appendix for the Market and FF model respectively.  
Table 6.2.1 Market Returns to Targets; All & Same-Firms (OLS vs. MM) 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 1.99% *** 4.77% *** 14.57% *** 18.48% *** -3 to 0 -19 to +30 165 
OLS (All) 1.82% *** 4.15% *** 11.33% *** 8.48% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
OLS (Same) 1.80% *** 4.18% *** 10.14% *** 7.72% *** -2 to 0 -12 to +30 165 
FF 
MM 
1.95% *** 4.59% *** 15.43% *** 19.56% *** -6 to 0 -20 to +30 158 
Market 1.95% *** 4.53% *** 14.81% *** 18.49% *** -6 to 0 -19 to +30 158 
FF 
OLS 
1.77% *** 4.01% *** 12.27% *** 9.36% *** -3 to 0 -14 to +30 163 
Market 1.79% *** 3.90% *** 11.50% *** 8.20% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 163 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The hypothesis tested here is that there are no abnormal returns associated with the 
announcements of DMAs for Indian target shareholders. The evidence presented here rejects 
the null hypothesis. In line with findings from other countries, there is evidence that the Indian 
target firms do gain positive abnormal returns at the announcements of M&As. These gains 
occur on the event day ,as well as on surrounding days.  
Further, consistent with the efficiency market hypothesis, there is no evidence of 
systematic average abnormal returns (AARs) to the new investors immediately after the 
public announcement of the event. On the contrary, the period before the announcement is 
marked with significantly positive returns on numerous days and is worthy of closer 
inspection. 
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The significantly positive CAARs before the event day are part of pre-bid run-ups. 
While the announcement day returns are around 2% (Day-0), the pre-bid run-up is already in 
the range of 9% to 13 % (refer Table 6.2.2). This suggests that the market participants can 
somewhat anticipate the takeover premiums and incorporate that information into the price 
of the target shares before the event. Yet, since the AARs on Day-0 are the highest abnormal 
returns generated on a single day in the entire event window, it suggests that the significant 
information released only at the announcement resulting in positive returns for the 
shareholders. 
Though a crude measure, Table 6.2.2 highlights the distribution of the total premium 
generated between the run-ups and the mark-ups of DMAs. 
Table 6.2.2 Run-Up vs. Mark-Up Returns to Domestic Targets 
Model Regression 
Run-up 
 [-20, -1] 
Mark-up  
[0, +30] 
Difference 
Market 
MM 12.58% 5.90% 6.69% *** 
OLS 9.50% -1.02% 10.53% *** 
FF 
MM 13.48% 6.08% 7.40% *** 
OLS 10.50% -1.14% 11.64% *** 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.    
Both the models show a significant difference in the pre and post-event CAARs. 
While the CAARs in the run-up period indicate anticipation of synergies by some market 
participants, those in the post-event days capture the synergy realisation expectations of the 
traders in general when the news formally enters the market. However, the returns in the 
mark-up period after the announcement are much lower than the returns in the run-up period. 
In fact, they are negative when estimated from the OLS method. Notably, the higher 
proportion of the total takeover premium goes to the informed participants trading before the 
event. This may be a market response to an increase in takeover probabilities inferred through 
insider trading (Meulbroek, 1992) or the toehold effect (Betton et al., 2008). Clearly, apart 
from the synergistic gains, asymmetric information also plays a dominant role in determining 
the outcomes of takeovers.  
Further, there are striking differences in the results from the OLS and the MM 
regression for the Market and FF models. While both the regressions indicate significantly 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement and overall, their magnitudes differ. 
Those from the OLS regressions are lower. Even the window for significantly positive 
CAARs [-20/-19, +30] is larger from the MM regression. Not only that, in the post-event 
days, while the CAARs from the MM regression continue to rise and are significantly 
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positive, those from the OLS estimates, while also statistically significantly positive, decline. 
This explains the divergence in the post-event slopes of the respective graphs. 
When the returns from both the models are compared for the two regression methods, 
the t-statistics of the differences in the Day-0 AARs are not statistically significantly different 
from zero. The large run-up suggests that the announcement effect (the tested variable) is not 
fully unanticipated and is therefore diluted on that day. On the contrary, the t-statistics of the 
differences in the CAARs from the MM and the OLS regressions for 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] 
and the entire event window [-20, +30] is statistically different from zero at the conventional 
level of significance. Also, there is no significant difference between the returns from the 
OLS (All) and OLS (Same). That confirms that the divergence in the outcomes is fundamental 
to the regression techniques and is not just sample specific.  
Evidently, the OLS and the MM returns differ not only in the magnitudes but also in 
the directions of the outcomes.  
Further, while comparing the FF model with the Market model returns, the 
differences in the magnitude of the Day-0 AARs, CAARs and 3 day CAARs are not different 
from zero. However, 51 day CAAR from the FF model exceed Market model returns by 1% 
(rounded) on average at the 5% level. Finally, the FF model is limited by its unavailability 
for the entire sample period. 
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6.2.2 Market & Scholes and Williams (SW) Adjusted Betas 
All three SW adjusted beta variants, along with the unadjusted Market model, are 
compared in this section. There is no variation in the samples. 
 
Figure 6.2.3 Returns from the Market and SW (1-3) Models; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Figure 6.2.3 is based on Table-A 6.2, 6.8 to 6.10. It serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
shows the abnormal returns from all three SW adjusted beta variants. Secondly, it compares 
them with the unadjusted Market model for the same set of firms. Table 6.2.3 provides the 
statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed in Figure 6.2.3. 
Table 6.2.3 Market and SW Variants Comparison; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Model Beta 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 1.82% *** 4.15% *** 11.33% *** 8.48% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-1 1.77% *** 4.15% *** 11.13% *** 8.52% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-2 1.80% *** 4.19% *** 11.00% *** 7.82% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-3 1.85% *** 4.28% *** 11.11% *** 7.88% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The SW adjusted betas also replicate the findings of the unadjusted Market model. 
Qualitatively, all relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically identical. The findings are 
in line with Dyckman et al. (1984) and Davidson and Josev (2005) which advocate no 
significant improvement in the model specifications or the power of tests using either of these 
modified betas. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis as a result of 
implementing the SW adjusted beta variants of Market model. 
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6.3 Business Group Acquirers and Domestic Targets 
This section evaluates the abnormal returns obtained by the domestic targets when 
taken over by an acquirer affiliated with a large Indian Business Group (IBG).  
For the convenience of comparing the outcomes, the CAAR graphs for the two sub-
sets, Business Group and Non-Business Group, are presented alongside each type of 
regression technique.  
6.3.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
The MM regression based results are graphed here in Figure 6.3.1 and tabulated in 
Table-A 6.11  and 6.12 in appendix.  
 
Figure 6.3.1 Domestic Targets and Business Group Analysis (MM) 
* BGrp implies acquirers belongs to large Indian Business Group 
For the non-business group, Day-0 AAR, the CAARs from Day -19 onwards and 3 
day CAAR of 5.43% are all significantly positive. There is a positive reaction in the market 
on and around the announcement day. However, this is followed by an immediate negative 
reaction for a couple of weeks. 
For the business group sub-set, the announcement day return AAR Day-0 is not 
significantly different from zero but the CAARs from Day -14 onwards along with the 3 day 
CAAR of 3.75% are all significantly positive. Unlike the non-business group, the CAARs 
here have a constant positive slope for the remainder of the post-event days. Thus, there is a 
clear evidence of positive returns to the shareholders around and after the announcement. 
16.04%
12.30%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
16.0%
20.0%
24.0%
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
C
A
A
R
s
Event Days
Business Group Analysis
(MM - All-firms)
Non-BGrp BGrp
  6-158 
 
6.3.2 OLS Estimation Analysis 
In the OLS analysis, of a total of 170 domestic targets, the acquirers of 66 deals are 
associated with a large business group; the remaining 104 acquirers are not. Figure 6.3.2 
presents the CAARs for the two sub-sets. 
 
Figure 6.3.2 Domestic Targets and Business Group Analysis (OLS All-Firms) 
* BGrp implies these acquirers belong to a large Indian Business Group 
The red dotted line represents the CAARs from the non-business group acquirers. The 
results are tabulated in Table-A 6.13. The AAR and the CAAR on Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR  
[-1, +1] of 4.58% are all significantly positive at the 5% level. For other days, CAARs are 
significantly positive for the days [-7, +21]. However, due to the decline in the post-event 
daily returns, some of which are significantly negative, the CAAR graph slopes downwards 
in the subsequent weeks. There is an adverse market reaction immediately after the 
announcement. 
The CAARs derived from the Business Group acquirers are represented by the solid 
black line and are reported in Table-A 6.14. The Day-0 AAR is significantly positive at the 
10% level. The 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] of 3.48% and the CAARs from Day -12 onwards are 
significantly greater than zero at the 5% level. The CAARs in post-event weeks are upwards 
sloping. Table 6.3.1 (below) summarizes the statistical findings from the two regression 
methods discussed above34.  
                                                 
34 The comparative results for the same set of firms for each category are graphed in Figure A 6.3 and 
Figure A 6.4 in the appendix and there is no statistical variation in the results. Hence, the sample reduction 
does not alter the properties of the results obtained from the OLS  estimates. 
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Table 6.3.1 Summary of Business Group Analysis; Market Model; OLS & MM 
Market 
Model 
Sub-Group 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR 
 Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Non-BGrp 2.37% *** 5.43% *** 16.04% *** 18.08% *** -3 to 0 -19 to +30 100 
BGrp† 1.39% 
 
3.75% ** 12.30% ** 19.09% *** 
 -14 to +20 65 
OLS 
Non-BGrp 2.22% *** 4.58% *** 11.98% *** 5.34% * -3 to 0 -7 to +21 104 
BGrp 1.20% * 3.48% *** 10.30% *** 13.43% ***   -12 to +30 66 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. † BGrp - Indian Business Group 
Interestingly, both the sub-groups have significantly positive CAARs in the pre and 
post-event window with comparable magnitudes in the former period, but with growing 
divergence in the latter. The business group CAARs become larger and maintain positive 
slope in the weeks immediately after the event. Whereas those from the non-business group 
face a negative reaction. Such a pattern can be explained by numerous advantages of being 
affiliated with a business group, which are discussed ahead. 
Following Sicherman and Pettway (1987), the differences in the two sub-groups are 
compared over a various stratum of the event period. The differences in stratum-specific 
CAARs (BGrp – Non-BGrp) over selected intervals are presented in Table 6.3.2. 
Table 6.3.2 Comparison BGrp –Non-BGrp Targets 
CAAR Windows MM   OLS   
Pre-event 
-20 to -1 -2.76%   -0.66%   
-15 to -1 -3.29%   -2.40%   
-10 to -1 -4.00%   -3.24%   
Post-event 
+1 to +10 7.75% *** 10.07% *** 
+1 to 15 9.09% *** 11.42% *** 
+1 to +20 7.63% ** 10.56% *** 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
While the differences between the two sub-groups during the pre-bid run-up is not 
significantly different, business groups yield significantly higher returns post-event. Schwert 
(1996) explains that the variation in average run-ups across various deal types is much less. 
Instead, the reliable variation of takeover premiums is determined in the variation of mark-
ups as the deal specifics are learned by the market. It is plausible that some investors may 
deduce information about a target’s potential takeover, without actually learning about the 
acquirers. As such, some of this uncertainty is resolved only at the announcement (Morellec 
and Zhdanov, 2005). Thus, the post-event share price behaviour reflects the market reaction 
to those unknown deal specifics. According to this analysis, when the news of an IBG 
acquirer formally enters the market on the event day, and it drives the market sentiments 
bullish.  
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The higher returns from IBG acquisitions are consistent with the findings of (Siegel 
and Choudhury, 2012). They compare and contrast the IBGs with the standalone (others) 
firms and also comment on the ownership effect thereupon. They suggest that the affiliated 
group firms differ systematically in their business strategies. A group firm can control vast 
knowledge-creating resources with little capital and can ‘create complex recombinations of 
inputs’ to generate added value in their products. As the institutional environment develops, 
they become larger, more diversified and invest more in their marketing and technology. They 
might have relatively lesser profitability, but they thrive on product differentiation strategies 
that thwart the competition. Thus, they respond better to market shocks. In general, IBGs are 
able to create more value than standalone firms. Further, when it comes to ownership, control 
and their impact on minority shareholders within the affiliated group firms, their restrictive 
yet robust analysis finds no evidence for tunnelling possibilities.  
In an alternative explanation, of the 66 business group deals, 50 deals (76%) were 
settled through shares. While the compensation in the form of shares generally generates 
negative signals in the market, for the business groups, the phenomenon is the reverse. In 
finance literature, asymmetric information hypothesis explains negative share price reactions 
for stock offers for two reasons. Firstly, the preference for stock payment signals the 
management’s incompetence in assessing the true value of the target assets (Hansen, 1987). 
Secondly, it may also suggest acquiring managements’ belief about the possible 
overvaluation of their own shares, implying bleak long-term prospects (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). However, in the case of IBGs, cash offers could also be seen as a defence mechanism 
against ownership dilution in a potentially valuable asset. Shares offer the opportunity to 
partake in long-term synergies as a result of the takeover, and to be associated with an IBG 
that has a long-standing reputation for creating value over time. This is particularly true of 
the higher levels of ownerships, which are typical of IBGs. Thus, share offers may engender 
positive returns for the target firms when the acquirer is affiliated with an IBG.  
The t-statistics of the differences in the Day-0 AARs is not statistically significantly 
different from zero for both the types of regressions. The differences in CAARs for the entire 
51 day event window are nearly statistically significantly different from zero at 10% from the 
OLS and not at all from the MM regression. 
 However, the post-event returns are higher in the deals involving large IBG 
acquirers. From the shareholders’ perspective, these significantly positive returns from the 
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business group sub-set defy the tunnelling hypothesis, which proposes the possibility of 
expropriation from the minority shareholder.  
6.3.3 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
Here, the Fama-French results for all the available firms are presented and compared 
with those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two regression 
techniques. The comparative graphs are provided in the Figure A 6.5 and 6.6 and the findings 
are summarized in Table 6.3.3 below. 
Table 6.3.3 Summary of Business Group Analysis; Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM. 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Non-Business Groups 
MM 
Market 2.22% *** 5.25% *** 16.22% *** 18.26% *** -3 to 0 -19 to +30 99 
FF 2.18% *** 5.18% *** 16.95% *** 19.87% *** -6 to 0 -19 to +30 99 
OLS 
Market 2.05% *** 4.38% *** 12.05% *** 5.30% * -3 to 0 -7 to +21 103 
FF 2.00% *** 4.36% *** 13.64% *** 8.20% ** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 103 
Business Groups 
MM 
Market 1.50%   3.31%  12.45% *** 18.87% ***   -14 to +30 59 
FF 1.56% * 3.61% * 12.86% *** 19.00% ***   -19 to +30 59 
OLS 
Market 1.33%  3.07% ** 10.56% *** 13.18% **   -6 to +30 60 
FF 1.38% * 3.41% ** 9.93% *** 11.33% **   -6 to +30 60 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
The announcement effect from the Fama-French model is comparable to the Market 
model for each sub-set for the respective regression techniques. Plus, their level of 
significance is also mostly identical. Thus, qualitatively, both the financial models have 
similar outcomes. They both suggest positive abnormal returns around the announcement. 
However, the 51 day FF-CAARs exceed the Market CAARs for the non-business group sub-
set by 1.5% on an average. But for the business group sub-set, there is no significant 
difference.  
In summary, as the announcement effect difference from the two sub-groups is not 
different from zero in either of the financial models, there are comparably significantly 
positive returns for the targets from both the sub-sets, regardless of the choice of the financial 
model and regression technique. However, the IBG returns exceed the other and lead to stark 
differences in the post-event window when markets learn about the acquirer formally. 
Thus, the target shareholders receive higher abnormal returns when taken over by a 
large IBG, and the findings do not support the tunnelling hypothesis. 
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6.4 Related Firms and Domestic Targets 
This section evaluates the abnormal returns obtained by the domestic targets when 
taken over by a related acquirer. Related acquisitions refer to intra-group acquisitions where 
the two participating companies either already have an existing parent-subsidiary relationship 
or are two distinct entities under the same ultimate parent company.  
For the convenience of comparing the differences, the CAAR graphs for the two sub-
sets—related and unrelated—are presented alongside one another for each type of regression 
technique.  
6.4.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
The MM regression based results are graphed here in Figure 6.4.1 and tabulated in 
Table-A 6.15  and 6.16  in the appendix.  
 
Figure 6.4.1 Domestic Targets and Relatedness Analysis (MM All-Firms) 
The solid black line represents the CAARs derived from unrelated deals. The CAARs 
are statistically significantly positive from the Day -19. With the exception of few intermittent 
days, the AARs in the pre-event period are significantly positive for several days. The AAR 
Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR of 4.33% are also significantly greater than zero. Further, this 
positive impact on daily returns is just not on the announcement day, but also on the 
surrounding days [-3, 0]. The CAARs, while being significantly greater than zero, continue 
to drift upwards persistently.  
The CAARs for the related sub-set, displayed by the red dotted line, are statistically 
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significantly greater than zero from Day -5 onwards. While they are upward sloping in the 
pre-event weeks, they stabilise around 10% mark on an average in the post-event weeks. The 
Day-0 CAAR and the 3 day CAAR of 5.69% both are significantly greater than zero at the 
conventional level of significance along with the AAR on Day +1.  
6.4.2 OLS Estimation Analysis 
In the OLS analysis, out of total 170 domestic targets, 116 deals are between unrelated 
entities and 54 are related entities. Figure 6.4.2 presents the CAARs for the two sub-sets. 
  
Figure 6.4.2 Domestic Targets and Relatedness Analysis (OLS All-Firms) 
The CAARs derived from the unrelated deals are represented by the solid black line 
and are reported in the Table-A 6.17. The CAARs are statistically significantly positive from 
Day -15. The AAR Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR of 3.59% are also significantly greater than 
zero. Further, these positive daily returns are just not on the announcement day, but also on 
the surrounding days [-3, 0]. However, due to the gradual decline in the post-event daily 
returns from Day +3, the CAAR graph slopes downwards in the subsequent weeks.  
The red dotted line represents the CAARs from the related sub-set. The results are 
tabulated in Table-A 6.18. The CAARs are statistically significantly greater than zero for the 
days [0, +5]. However, due to the gradual decline in the post-event daily returns, the CAAR 
graph slopes downwards in the subsequent weeks. The Day-0 CAAR, 3 day CAAR of 5.37% 
and AAR on Day +1 are all significantly positive at 5% level of significance. 
13.65%
6.34%
-4.0%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
16.0%
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
C
A
A
R
s
Event Days
Relatedness Analysis
(OLS - All-firms)
Unrelated Related
  6-164 
 
Table 6.4.1 summarizes the statistical findings from the two regression methods 
discussed above. The comparative results for the same set of firms are graphed in Figure A 
6.7 and 6.8 in the appendix, and there is no statistical difference in the results. 
Table 6.4.1 Summary of Market Returns to Targets; All-Firms (OLS & MM) 
Market 
Model 
Sub-set 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR 
 Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Unrelated 2.12% *** 4.33% *** 17.56% *** 22.43% *** -3 to 0 -19 to 30 112 
Related 1.70%   5.69% *** 8.24% *** 10.14% *** +1 -3 to 30 53 
OLS 
Unrelated 1.98% *** 3.59% *** 13.65% *** 10.19% *** -3 to 0 -15 to 30 116 
Related 1.48%   5.37% *** 6.34% ** 4.82%   +1 0 to 5 54 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
Though the overall magnitudes of abnormal returns from the MM estimator are higher 
than the OLS returns, both the regression techniques capture announcement effects with 
similar levels of significance for the two sub-sets. Thus, qualitatively, both the regression 
techniques have similar outcomes. They both suggest positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement. Further, the post-event OLS CAARs slope downwards for both the sub-sets. 
In comparison, MM CAARs for the unrelated ones continue to rise, and the related MM 
CAARs stabilise around the 10% mark.  
To gain deeper insights, the stratum-specific differences in CAARs (unrelated – 
related) over selected intervals are presented in Table 6.4.2 (below).  
Table 6.4.2 Comparison Unrelated – Related Targets 
CAAR Windows MM OLS 
Pre-event 
-20 to -1 8.90% ** 6.80% * 
-15 to -1 5.79% * 4.80%   
-10 to -1 3.67%  2.90%   
Post-event 
+1 to +10 -1.05%   -3.48%   
+1 to 15 -0.22%  -2.65%   
+1 to +20 0.84%   -2.22%   
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
The interesting finding here is that significant differences occur in the run-up period 
before widespread public knowledge of the event. It is not in line with Schwert (1996) which 
observes little variation in average run-ups of various types of deals and the reliable variation 
in takeover premium is reflected in mark-up period when the deal specifics are revealed. This 
implies that the effect of information asymmetry on the target run-up is generally comparable 
across deals with varying attributes. However, in this case, since the run-up varies 
significantly, it highlights the variation in the degree of asymmetric information in the deals.  
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The pre-event AARs in the unrelated sub-set are mostly significantly positive for the 
MM estimations, and rarely for the related sub-set. Even the CAARs of the unrelated sub-set 
are significantly positive for the entire run-up period, whereas it happens only in the last week 
for the related sub-set.  
Similarly, from the OLS method, the AARs are rarely significantly positive in the 
run-up period for the related sub-set, and the CAARs are not significantly different from zero 
at all at 5% level. 
To summarize, the related sub-set rarely has any noticeable activities in the run-up 
period which suggests informed trading is nearly non-existent in such takeovers. From the 
acquirers’ perspective, the information asymmetry about the target valuation and the expected 
level of synergies is minimum. They can also effectively protect their intent of takeover by 
not engaging in the information gathering process externally. Thus, the run-up is low. And 
lower run-up implies lower mark-up (Schwert, 1996). Further, in the related sub-group, 60% 
of the firms have an average toehold interest of 45%, and toehold size and offer premiums 
are negatively correlated (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Bris, 2002). Even, the threat of 
competitive bidding is also non-existent for the related deals. Thus, the mark-up should also 
be low. The lower the run-up and the mark-up the lower the takeover premium overall for the 
related targets. 
For the unrelated acquirers, the level of information asymmetry about the target firms 
is high and hence the run-up. The acquirers face valuation risk and other uncertainties, and 
given them, they generally pay disproportionately higher premiums towards deal 
considerations. 
6.4.3 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
Here, the Fama-French results for all the available firms are presented and compared 
with those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two regression 
techniques. The comparative graphs are provided in Figure A 6.9 and 6.10 and the findings 
are summarized in Table 6.4.3 (below). 
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Table 6.4.3 Summary of Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM - Relatedness Analysis 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Unrelated 
MM 
Market 2.03% *** 4.18% *** 17.40% *** 22.19% *** -2 to 0 -19 to +30 108 
FF 2.03% *** 4.17% *** 18.07% *** 23.02% *** -2 to 0 -19 to +30 108 
OLS 
Market 1.90% *** 3.43% *** 13.51% *** 9.88% *** -3 to 0 -15 to +30 112 
FF 1.89% *** 3.47% *** 14.44% *** 11.12% *** -3 to 0 -15 to +30 112 
Related 
MM 
Market 1.77%   5.28% *** 9.22% *** 10.49% *** -1, +1 -3 to +30 50 
FF 1.77%   5.50% *** 9.71% *** 12.09% *** -1, +1 -6 to +30 50 
OLS 
Market 1.55%   4.93% *** 7.09% ** 4.51%   -1, +1 0 to +4 51 
FF 1.51%   5.20% *** 7.50% *** 5.48%   -1, +1 -1 to +7 51 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
The magnitudes of the Day-0 AAR and CAAR and the 3 day CAAR from the two 
models are comparable to the respective regression techniques, and their level of significance 
is also mostly identical. Further, there is no difference in returns from the two financial 
models from both the regressions at the conventional level.  
Further, the announcement effect in the two sub-groups is not significantly different 
from zero from either of the regression techniques for both the models. However, the overall 
MM CAARs for 51 day event window from the unrelated sub-set do exceed the related 
CAARs from both the models but only at the 10% level of significance, and that OLS CAARs 
do not differ at all. Possibily, the test of differences in CAARs is not significantly different 
from zero because of the large standard deviations in the two sub-sets, which statistically 
reduce the power of the test and may result in Type-II error. Thus, the impact of relatedness 
on the outcomes must be further evaluated in cross-sectional analysis. 
In summary, there are significantly positive returns to the targets from both of the 
sub-sets, regardless of the choice of financial model or regression technique. The positive 3 
day CAAR announcement effect is evident in both the groups. Though the overall returns 
from the unrelated sub-set appear to be much larger than the related ones, the difference is 
significant only at 10% and only with the MM regression.   
Hence, the analysis thus far fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there 
is no difference in returns to the target shareholders when taken over by the related acquirers. 
However, further verification of the impact is needed by cross-sectional analysis. 
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6.5 Summary - Returns to Targets 
Table 6.5.1 summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of the abnormal returns to 
the domestic Indian target firms based on the Value Weighted Index (VWI). 
Table 6.5.1 Summary Results; Domestic Indian Targets; All-Firms - VWI 
Model 
Regression 
Betas 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 1.99% *** 4.77% *** 14.57% *** 18.48% *** -3 to 0 -19 to +30 165 
OLS 1.82% *** 4.15% *** 11.33% *** 8.48% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-1 1.77% *** 4.15% *** 11.13% *** 8.52% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-2 1.80% *** 4.19% *** 11.00% *** 7.82% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
SW-3 1.85% *** 4.28% *** 11.11% *** 7.88% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
Fama-
French 
MM 1.95% *** 4.59% *** 15.43% *** 19.56% *** -6 to 0 -20 to +30 158 
OLS 1.77% *** 4.01% *** 12.27% *** 9.36% *** -3 to 0 -14 to +30 163 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The announcement effect and overall CAARs are statistically significantly positive. 
When rounded to the nearest integer, the announcement day return can be 2%, 3 day  returns 
average 4% and. depending on the financial model and regression techniques, the overall 
positive CAARs lie somewhere between 8% and 20%.  
Clearly, there is sufficient evidence that the domestic target shareholders make huge 
positive abnormal returns, both at the announcement and in the surrounding days.  
Further, there is evidence that target firms benefit more when taken over by IBGs and 
thus there is no evidence of  tunnelling. With respect to relatedness aspect of firms within the 
deal, there is no significant difference in target returns when taken over by a related acquirer 
which is subject to further verification in cross-sectional analysis. 
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6.6 Returns to Domestic Acquirers 
The aggregate dataset has 233 firms identified as Indian acquirers. Of these, 195 firms 
are domestic acquirers. While the regression estimates based on the OLS method are available 
for each of these firms, 191 firms are determined by the MM regression. 
Figure 6.6.1 compares the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) obtained 
from the MM and the OLS regressions using Market model for all the available firms over 
the 51 day event window [-20, +30], relative to the announcement day for the target firms in 
India.  
The solid black line presents the CAARs from the MM estimates, while those based 
on the OLS estimates are represented by a red dotted line. 
Also, as the MMestimator has slightly lesser firms, the solid blue line labelled as 
‘OLS (Same)’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms (MM 
firms – 191 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regressions by 
controlling the sample selection bias. 
 
Figure 6.6.1 Market Returns to Domestic Targets – OLS vs. MM 
The CAARs from the MM estimations are reported in Table-A 6.19. The AARs are 
mostly positive around Day-0 but are not statistically significantly different from zero except 
for Day -1. The CAARs are significantly positive from Day -7 onwards for the rest of the 
event window. Also, with the t-statistics of 2.94, even the 3 day CAAR of 1.58% is 
significantly greater than zero. The upward drift in the CAARs is due to continuous positive 
share price reactions in several days after the event. 
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The CAARs from the OLS estimations are tabulated in Table-A 6.20. The CAARs 
are positive for the days [-1, +21] but are never statistically different from zero for the entire 
event window. So are the Day-0 AAR and CAAR. However, the 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] of 
1.16% is significantly positive at the conventional level.  
The blue line, OLS (Same) which is based on the MM firms sub-set, follows the same 
trend as the OLS (All) and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample 
variation does not change the overall properties of the results. These results are provided in 
Table-A 6.21. 
6.6.1 Market vs. Fama-French (FF) Model 
Figure 6.6.2 presents the Fama-French results for all the available firms and compares 
these results with those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two 
regression techniques. The OLS analysis has 177 common firms, and the MM CAARs are 
based on the same 173 firms.  
 
Figure 6.6.2 Returns to Domestic Acquirers; Market vs. FF; OLS vs MM  (All & Same-Firms) 
The graphs in red are the CAARs from the OLS regression, while those in black are 
from the MM estimator. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market model, and 
the solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
The divergence in black and red graphs reflects the differences in the regression 
techniques. Clearly, the MM estimator produces higher returns. Also, while the MM CAARs 
continue to rise in the later part, those from the OLS method decline. This is because robust 
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regressions down-weigh the influence of outliers, making their residuals larger and more 
visible, while minimizing their impact on the regressions coefficients. 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the Market and the FF models for that regression technique. The solid line (FF model) has 
the same trajectory as the dotted lines (Market model) but it mostly lies above the dotted line. 
This indicates that the returns from the FF model are consistently marginally higher.  
Table 6.6.1 (below) provides the statistical summary of all the CAAR graphs 
discussed above. The comparative results for the same set of firms based on M estimator are 
graphed in Figure A 6.11 and 6.12 in the appendix for the market and FF Model respectively.  
Table 6.6.1 Market Returns to Acquirers; All & Same-Firms (OLS vs. MM) 
Model Regression  
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 0.24%   1.58% *** 3.46% *** 8.05% *** -1 -7 to +30 191 
OLS (All) 0.11%  1.16% ** 0.50%  -0.03%   -1   195 
OLS (Same) 0.09%   1.08% ** 0.09%   -0.23%   -1   191 
FF 
MM 
0.41%  1.57% *** 4.12% *** 7.86% *** -1 -7 to +30 173 
Market 0.34%   1.48% *** 3.72% *** 8.18% *** -1 -7 to +30 173 
FF 
OLS 
0.23%  1.15% ** 1.24%  0.00%   -1   177 
Market 0.21%   1.09% ** 0.81%   0.06%   -1   177 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The evidence presented here rejects the null hypothesis. The significantly positive 
abnormal returns from M&As captured over the adjacent 3 days [-1, +1] provide sufficient 
evidence that the Indian acquirers gain positive abnormal returns at the announcement of 
domestic M&As. These CAARs are significantly positive from both the financial models and 
the regression techniques. This conforms to existing literature on emerging markets (Bhagat 
et al., 2011).  
Further, as consistent with the efficiency market hypothesis, rarely are there 
systematic significant average abnormal returns (AARs) to new investors after the public 
announcement of the event in the event window. 
There is hardly any positive build-up in the run-up period from the OLS. Though the 
MM regression shows some significant CAARs in the pre-event period, unlike targets firms, 
there is no discernible pattern of significantly positive AARs to the acquirers. In theory, there 
is no significant impact of bidders’ run-up on the takeover premium. It is possible that some 
investors may infer the probability of takeovers for the targets, but remain unaware of the 
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identity of the acquirers (Schwert, 1996) till the last. Thus, the informed trading may be non-
existent and hence no strong run-up for the acquirers. 
The analysis exhibits stark differences in the abnormal returns from the OLS and the 
MM regressions. While both the regressions indicate significantly positive abnormal returns 
in the days surrounding the event, the magnitudes differ. The returns based on the OLS 
method are relatively lower, and the difference is particularly large for the CAARs. The 
CAARs are also statistically significantly different from zero from the robust regression even 
on Day-0, and in the pre and post-event days. This is not the case with the OLS estimations. 
Not only that, in the post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM method continue to rise 
and are significantly positive, those from the OLS method declined. This explains the 
divergence in the post-event slopes of the red and the black graphs. 
When the returns from both the models are compared for the MM and the OLS 
regressions, the t-statistics of the test of differences in the returns on the announcement day 
(AARs) is statistically not different from zero. However, the t-statistics of the differences in 
the CAARs from the two regression methods for the 3 days [-1, +1] and the entire event 
window of 51 days [-20, +30] are statistically significantly different from zero, even at the 
1% level. Also, there is no significant difference between the returns from the OLS (All) and 
OLS (Same). This confirms that the divergence in the outcomes is fundamental to the 
regression techniques and is not sample specific.  
Evidently, the OLS and the MM returns differ not only in the magnitudes but also in 
the directions of the outcomes. 
Further, while comparing the FF model with the Market model return, the test of 
differences in the Day-0 AARs, 3 day CAARs and the total CAARs from each of the 
regression techniques is not significantly different from zero. Besides, they capture all the 
effects on the same levels of significance. Thus, the returns from the Market and the Fama-
French models are qualitatively identical overall. They both suggest positive abnormal returns 
around the announcement. In addition, it is important to note that the Fama-French model has 
a limitation due to its unavailability for the entire sample period. 
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6.6.2 Market vs. Scholes and Williams 
All the three SW variants, along with the unadjusted Market model, are compared in 
this section. The set of common firms is also the entire sample here. 
 
Figure 6.6.3 Returns from the Market and SW (1-3) Models; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Figure 6.6.3 is based on Table-A 6.20, 6.26 to 6.28. It serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
shows the abnormal returns from all the three SW variants. Secondly, it also compares the 
abnormal returns with the unadjusted Market model for the same set of firms. 
Table 6.2.2 provides a statistical summary of all CAARs graphed in Figure 6.6.3. 
Table 6.6.2 Market and SW Variants Comparison; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Model Beta AAR  Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 0.11%   1.16% ** 0.50%   -0.03%   -1   195 
SW-1 0.14%  1.20% ** 0.50%  -0.06%  -1  195 
SW-2 0.16%  1.23% ** 0.35%  -0.17%  -1  195 
SW-3 0.12%   1.19% ** 0.43%   0.00%   -1   195 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Once again, the SW adjusted betas replicate the findings of the unadjusted Market 
model. Qualitatively, all the relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically identical. The 
findings are in line with Dyckman et al. (1984) and Davidson and Josev (2005), which 
advocate no significant improvement in the model specifications or the power of tests using 
either of these modified betas. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis over 
the unadjusted Market model analysis from the SW adjusted beta variants of Market model. 
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6.7 Business Group Acquirers 
This section compares the abnormal returns obtained by the acquirers affiliated with 
the top 60 Indian Business Groups (IBG) and the rest.  
For the convenience of comparing the differences, the CAAR graphs for the two sub-
sets, Business Group and Non-Business Group, are presented alongside one another for each 
type of regression technique.  
6.7.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
The MM regression based results are graphed in Figure 6.7.1 and tabulated in Table-
A 6.29 and 6.30 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 6.7.1 Domestic Acquirers and Business Group Analysis (MM) 
* BGrp implies Indian Business Group affiliated Acquirer. 
The solid black line represents the CAARs for the IBG acquirers, while the CAARs 
derived from the non-business group acquirers are represented by a red dotted line. 
For both the sub-sets, the post-event CAARs and the 3 day CAARs are significantly 
positive. The CAARs drift upwards with significantly positive returns from Day -1 to reach 
an average of 8%. 
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6.7.2 OLS Estimation Analysis 
In OLS analysis, of the total 195 domestic acquirers, 65 deals have IBG affiliated 
acquirers, while the remaining 130 do not. Figure 6.7.2 presents the CAARs for the two sub-
sets. 
 
Figure 6.7.2 Domestic Acquirers and Business Group Analysis (OLS All-Firms) 
The red dotted line represents the CAARs for the non-business group acquirers. The 
results are tabulated in Table-A 6.31. The CAARs are positive for the day [-1, +21] but 
otherwise are never significantly different from zero. This is also true of the Day-0 AAR, 
CAAR and the 3 day CAAR [-1, +1]. 
The CAARs derived from the Business Group acquirers are represented by the solid 
black line and are reported in Table-A 6.32.  Similar to the case of the target firms’ analysis, 
the business group impact is observed more in the post-event period. However, the CAARs, 
AARs and the 3 day CAARs [-1, +1] of 0.82% are not significantly different from zero. 
Table 6.7.1 summarizes the statistical findings from the two regression methods 
discussed above. The comparative results for the same set of firms are graphed in Figure A 
6.13 and 6.14  in the appendix, which confirms that there are no statistical differences in the 
results due to sample size variation.  
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Table 6.7.1 Summary of Market Returns to Acquirers; OLS & MM; Business Group Analysis 
Market 
Model 
Sub-set 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Non-BGrp 0.56%   1.75% ** 3.85% ** 8.02% ***   -1 to +30 127 
BGrp† -0.40%   1.23% ** 2.70% * 8.12% ***   -1 to +30 64 
OLS 
Non-BGrp 0.44%  1.33% * 0.96%  -0.24%      130 
BGrp -0.54%   0.82%   -0.43%   0.41%       65 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. † BGrp - Indian Business Group 
Interestingly, each of the regression methods produces a dramatically different picture 
about the returns to the acquirers. While they both suggest that there are no abnormal returns 
on the announcement day (AAR Day-0), the MM estimator captures significantly positive 
returns in CAARs. In comparison, those from the OLS are not different from zero for the 
entire period. The OLS CAARs gradually decline after the event, whereas those from the MM 
estimator continue to rise and are significantly positive.  
The stratum specific differences in the CAARs (BGrp – Non-BGrp) over selected 
intervals are presented in Table 6.7.2 (below). 
Table 6.7.2 Comparison BGrp –Non-BGrp Acquirer 
CAAR Windows MM OLS 
Pre-event 
-20 to -1 -0.20%   -0.42%   
-15 to -1 -0.43%   -0.70%   
-10 to -1 -0.68%   -0.95%   
Post-event 
+1 to +10 2.77% * 2.16%   
+1 to 15 3.04%   2.28%   
+1 to +20 2.34%   2.09%   
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
The differences between the CAARs over various stratum are not reliably different 
from zero at the conventional level. Also, the test of differences in returns of the Day-0 AARs, 
as well as of the 51 day CAARs are not different from zero in either of the regression 
techniques.  
Evidently, though takeovers have a positive impact on the acquirers, the involvement 
of a large IBG affiliate makes no difference to the overall outcome. Thus, the evidence 
presented here supports the null hypothesis for the acquirers—there is no difference in returns 
in takeovers by IBG affiliates.  
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6.7.3 Market vs. Fama-French (FF) Returns 
Here, the Fama-French results are presented and compared with those from the 
Market model for the same set of firms. The comparative graphs are provided in Figure A 
6.15 and 6.16 and the findings are summarized in Table 6.7.3.  
Table 6.7.3 Summary of Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM; Business Group Analysis 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Non-Business Group 
MM 
Market 0.50%   1.78% * 3.67% ** 8.03% ***   0 to +30 116 
FF 0.57%   1.71% * 4.26% ** 8.37% ***   -5 to +30 116 
OLS 
Market 0.38%  1.37% * 0.79%  -0.31%      119 
FF 0.40%   1.27%   1.31%   0.05%       119 
Business Groups 
MM 
Market 0.00%   0.88%   3.84% ** 8.47% ***   -1 to +30 57 
FF 0.07%   1.28% * 3.86% ** 6.80% ** -1 -1 to +30 57 
OLS 
Market -0.14%  0.50%  0.85%  0.82%      58 
FF -0.10%   0.90%   1.08%   -0.12%   -1   58 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
Comparing the two sub-sets, there is no difference in returns from the Fama-French 
model. The announcement impact is not significantly positive and the cumulative returns 
from both the sub-sets can be as high as 8% in the entire event-period. 
Comparing the two financial models, the Fama-French returns for various levels of 
analysis are not significantly different from the Market model returns for either of the sub-
groups or the respective regression techniques.  
Thus, there is no difference in returns from the two financial models in either of the 
regression methods at the conventional level. In fact, overall returns from the Market model 
and the Fama-French model are qualitatively comparable.  
Largely, as an acquirer, it makes no difference whether it is associated with a large 
IBG or not, and hence the null hypothesis is supported here. 
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6.8 Relatedness and Domestic Acquirers 
This section evaluates the abnormal returns obtained by the domestic acquirers when 
they acquire a related target. Related acquisitions refer to intra-group acquisitions where the 
two participating companies either already have an existing parent-subsidiary relationship or 
are two distinct entities controlled by the same ultimate parent company. 
For the convenience of comparing the differences, the CAAR graphs for the two sub-
sets-related and unrelated- are presented alongside one another for each type of regression 
technique.  
6.8.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
The MM regression based results are graphed in Figure 6.8.1 and tabulated in Table-
A 6.33 and 6.34 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 6.8.1 Domestic Acquirers and Relatedness Analysis (MM – All-Firms) 
While the CAARs for the related sub-set become significantly positive from Day -7 
onwards, there are no AARs that are significantly different from zero in the pre-event 
window. So are the Day-0 AAR and the CAAR, but the 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] of 2.33% is 
reliably positive. The CAARs continue to drift upwards to yield a 12.6% return. 
For the unrelated deals in the red dotted line, the CAARs are significantly positive 
from Day -1. While the announcement day AAR is positive, it lacks statistical significance. 
However, the CAAR on Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR are both significantly positive. The 
CAARs continue to rise, with the cumulative returns as high as 6%. 
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6.8.2 OLS Estimation Analysis 
In the OLS analysis, of the total 195 domestic acquirers, 141 deals were between 
unrelated  and 54 were between related entities. Figure 6.8.2 presents the CAARs for the two.  
 
Figure 6.8.2 Domestic Acquirers and Relatedness Analysis (OLS – All-Firms) 
The CAARs derived from the related deals are represented by the solid black line and 
are reported in Table-A 6.35. While the returns are mostly positive, neither of the AARs, 
CAARs or the 3 day CAAR is statistically significantly different from zero.  
The red dotted line represents the CAARs from the unrelated sub-set. The results are 
tabulated in Table-A 6.36. The CAARs are positive only in the first week post-event but are 
not significantly different from zero. So, are the Day-0 AAR and the 3 day CAAR.  
Table 6.8.1 summarizes the statistical findings from the two regressions methods 
discussed above. The comparative results for the same set of firms are graphed in Figure A 
6.17 and 6.18 in the appendix and the results from the OLS estimations are still not different 
from zero on conventional level. 
Table 6.8.1 Summary of Market Returns to Acquirers; OLS vs. MM; Relatedness Analysis 
Market 
Model 
Sub-set 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Unrelated 0.43%   1.28% ** 3.12% *** 6.31% *** -1 -1 to +30 138 
Related -0.25%   2.33% ** 4.36% * 12.61% *** +1 -7 to +30 53 
OLS 
Unrelated 0.29%  0.86% * -0.15%  -2.03%   -1  141 
Related -0.36%   1.94%   2.19%   5.21%       54 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
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Interestingly, each of the regression methods produce a dramatically different picture 
about the returns to the acquirers. While they both suggest that there are no abnormal returns 
on the announcement day, the MM estimator captures significant cumulative returns. In 
comparison, the returns from the OLS are negligible for the entire period, at least at the 5% 
level. The OLS CAARs have a mixed pattern of rising and falling, whereas those from the 
MM estimator rise continuously and are significantly positive.  
The stratum-specific differences in CAARs (related – unrelated) over selected 
intervals are presented in Table 6.8.2. 
Table 6.8.2 Comparison Related – Unrelated Acquirers 
CAAR Windows MM OLS 
Pre-event 
-20 to -1 1.93%   2.99%   
-15 to -1 2.08%  2.83%   
-10 to -1 2.01%   2.27%   
Post-event 
+1 to +10 4.06% * 4.86% ** 
+1 to 15 4.17%  5.41% ** 
+1 to +20 4.78% * 5.61% * 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
The stratum-specific analysis suggests that the difference between the related and 
unrelated CAARs is always positive and is occasionally significantly more than zero in the 
post-event period. The overall difference in 51 day CAARs [-20, +30] of 6.30% is also nearly 
significant at the 10% level from the MM estimations. While, this is not the case with OLS, 
yet OLS estimations observe significantly higher returns for the related acquirers in the post-
event period. 
To summarize, the evidence about the difference in returns from the two sub-sets is 
mixed. Though it appears that the related acquirers are rewarded more by the market 
particularly in the post-event period, the MM based estimates are reliable only at 10% level 
of significance. Understandably, in deals with their affiliates, acquirers have an absolute 
advantage with respect to information asymmetry. As the target is well-known a priori, the 
risk of incorrect valuation and other associated uncertainties do not exist for the acquirers. As 
such, they benefit more in generating post-event synergies. Further, as they all belong to the 
same business group, such M&As may be perceived as truly strategic—they pursue pure 
synergistic gains without other irrationalities such as agency conflicts and the hubris effect. 
However, as the results are mixed, the cross-sectional analysis will provide further 
verification of the impact.  
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6.8.3 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
Here, the Fama-French results for all the available firms are presented and compared 
with those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two regression 
techniques. The comparative graphs are provided in Figure A 6.19 and 6.20 and the findings 
are summarized in Table 6.8.3 (below). 
Table 6.8.3 Summary of Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM - Relatedness Analysis 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR Day-
0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Unrelated 
MM 
Market 0.40%   1.24% ** 3.51% *** 6.93% *** -1 -2 to +30 129 
FF 0.40%   1.24% ** 3.67% *** 6.18% *** -1 -4 to +30 129 
OLS 
Market 0.25%   0.82%   0.22%   -1.52%   -1   132 
FF 0.21%   0.78%   0.41%   -1.92%   -1   132 
Related 
MM 
Market 0.17%   2.19%  4.36%   11.83% **   +1 to +30 44 
FF 0.42%   2.55% ** 5.43% * 12.80% *** +1 -1 to +30 44 
OLS 
Market 0.10%  1.87%  2.51%  4.69%       45 
FF 0.31%   2.23%   3.67%   5.64%       45 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
Comparing the two sub-sets based on the FF model, the overall related-CAARs 
exceed the unrelated-CAARs at 10% (nearly), as compared to the OLS (MM) method. There 
is no significant difference in the announcement effect. 
When compared with the Market model, returns obtained from the Fama-French 
model are statistically identical, at least on the conventional level of significance. The 
magnitudes of the Day-0 AARs and the CAARs and the 3 day CAARs are comparable to the 
respective regression techniques. So is the window size of significantly positive returns 
around the event day for the AARs and CAARs. Even the overall CAARs do not differ 
significantly. However, the difference in outcomes due to the regression methods is clear. 
Qualitatively, there is no difference between the returns from the Market model and the FF 
model. 
In summary, while the overall CAARs from the two sub-sets do not differ at a 
conventional level, there is an indication that the post-event CAARs from the related sub-set 
may exceed the others. Hence, there is some support for the hypothesis that there is a 
difference in returns from the two takeovers. However, that will be verified further through 
cross-sectional analysis. 
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6.9 Summary - Returns to Acquirers 
Table 6.9.1 summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of abnormal returns to the 
Indian acquirer firms. 
Table 6.9.1 Summary Results; Domestic Indian Acquirers; All-Firms - VWI 
Model Betas 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 0.24%  1.58% *** 3.46% *** 8.05% *** -1 -7 to +30 191 
OLS 0.11%  1.16% ** 0.50%  -0.03%   -1   195 
SW-1 0.14%  1.20% ** 0.50%  -0.06%  -1  195 
SW-2 0.16%  1.23% ** 0.35%  -0.17%  -1  195 
SW-3 0.12%   1.19% ** 0.43%   0.00%   -1   195 
Fama-
French 
MM 0.41%  1.57% *** 4.12% *** 7.86% *** -1 -7 to +30 173 
OLS 0.23%   1.15% ** 1.24%  0.00%   -1   177 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
When compared with the target firms, abnormal returns to the acquirers are not as 
high. This could be because of the size effect—acquirers are generally larger companies and 
the returns are calculated in percentages. The significantly positive announcement effect is 
observed on the Day -1 and in 3 day CAARs. 
Depending on the financial model and the regression technique, the 3 day return lies 
between 1% and 1.50%, and overall returns in the event period can be as high as 8%. 
Clearly, there is sufficient evidence that the shareholders of Indian acquirer firms 
receive positive abnormal returns. These findings are in line with the existing literature on 
the emerging markets (Bhagat et al., 2011).  
Further, there is no evidence of higher benefits when the acquirer is affiliated to any 
IBGs. There is also no clear evidence of significant difference in acquirers’ returns in the 
takeover of the related targets.  
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6.10 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This section takes the analysis further and investigates the cross-sectional 
determinants of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) obtained by the 
participating Indian firms in the domestic dataset. This analysis regresses various firm and 
deal specific characteristics with the CAAR windows ranging from the days [-1, +1] to [-20, 
+20], with respect to the announcement day. While the smaller event windows capture the 
returns just in the days adjacent to the event day, the larger event windows ensure that the pre 
and post-event market reactions are also fully captured. The larger windows are particularly 
important in this study as quite often the significant CAARs in the event study analysis, occur 
long before and after the event.  
Both the target and the acquirer firms’ CAARs are regressed on a series of 
independent variables comprising Cash, Pct50, PctToe, BGroup, Related and 
Conglomerate35. The base equation takes the following form: 
CAARt1,t2  =  α0  + β1 Cash + β2 Pct50 + β3 PctToe + β4 BGroup + β5 Related
+ β6 Conglomerate + εi 
(6-1) 
where Cash variable is expected to be positive for both the sides; Pct50 should be 
positive for the targets and unclear for the acquirers; PctToe and Related are expected to be 
negative for the targets and positive for the acquirers; BGroup is ambiguous, and the 
Conglomerate should be negative for both.  
Further, the Market model CAARs from both the estimation techniques – the OLS 
and the MM from the event study analysis are examined here using the OLS regression with 
White-Heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  
This thesis confines the cross-sectional analysis to the OLS technique. Maronna and 
Yohai (2000) argue that the presence of multiple independent explanatory dummy variables 
                                                 
35 Recall from the methodology chapter, Cash is a dummy variable wherein the value of one is assigned for 
a cash offer and zero for shares or a combination of cash and share; Pct50 is a dummy variable that reflects 
acquisition of majority stake - one is assigned when either the acquired stake is 50% or more or when the 
existing stake is increased to 50% or more; PctToe is a continuous variable that represents the percentage 
shareholding already held by the acquirer prior to the announcement of the deal; BGroup is a dummy 
variable where one is assigned to the deal when the acquirer belongs to the top 60 Indian Business groups; 
Related deals are assigned one when the participating firms belong to the same parent company or already 
share parent-subsidiary relation; and Conglomerate is a dummy variable which is assigned one when the 
participating firms belong to different industry on the basis of 2 digit SIC codes. 
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can easily yield to collinear sub-samples created while executing various algorithms inherent 
to robust regressions procedures.  
6.10.1 Domestic Target Firms 
Table 6.10.1 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the independent 
variables used in this analysis for the target firms. While some of the variables are 
significantly correlated, none of them is of a higher enough order so as to make any impact 
on the analysis. Further, these variables have a mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 1.10 
with none exceeding 1.19 individually. Collectively, they rule out the possibility of the 
existence of any multicollinearity issues in the analysis. 
Table 6.10.1 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables - Targets 
Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe   BGroup     Related   
Pct50 0.1485          
  (0.0533) 
PctToe 0.0650  0.0152        
  (0.4068) (0.8462) 
BGroup 0.0973  0.1557 ** 0.0753      
  (0.2069) (0.0427) 
 
(0.3367) 
Related -0.0154  -0.0806  0.3260 *** 0.2083 ***   
  (0.8419) (0.2961) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0064) 
 
Conglomerate -0.1442  -0.1604 ** -0.1133  -0.0628  -0.0910  
  (0.0606) (0.0366) 
 
(0.1474) (0.4161) (0.2378) 
  p-values in parentheses; ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Table 6.10.2 presents the multivariate regression results for the various CAAR 
windows for the domestic target firms. The CAARs referred to here come from the OLS 
estimation of the abnormal returns in the event study analysis. The univariate results for each 
of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 6.53 to 6.57. The 
discussion below refers to both the multivariate and the univariate results. 
The event study analysis reveals that the CAARs that are reliably different from zero 
are scattered around Day-0 for several days. As the announcement effect is diluted in the run-
up and mark-up, regression based on larger CAAR windows has significant F-statistics and 
thus provides a more comprehensive picture of the analysis. The statistical significance for 
the model and the constituting variables fluctuate as the window size increases.   
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Table 6.10.2 Regression Analysis of the OLS CAARs – Domestic Target Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.1017  0.0816  0.0866  0.0463  0.0269    
(1.3965) 
 
(1.3127) (1.6544) (1.4941) (1.2595) 
 Pct50 0.1487 ** 0.1327 ** 0.0919 ** 0.1068 *** 0.0320 *  
(2.4215) 
 
(2.2854) 
 
(2.0845) 
 
(3.5202) 
 
(1.7414) 
 
 PctToe -0.3144 *** -0.2549 ** -0.2436 *** -0.0225  -0.0010   
(-2.7048) 
 
(-2.5275) 
 
(-3.2737) 
 
(-0.4160) 
 
(-0.0279) 
 
 BGroup 0.0834  0.0667  0.0452  -0.0012  -0.0198   
(1.6052) 
 
(1.4061) 
 
(1.2038) 
 
(-0.0440) 
 
(-1.1356) 
 
 Related -0.0317  -0.0060  0.0319  0.0122  0.0207   
(-0.5893) 
 
(-0.1239) 
 
(0.8196) 
 
(0.4662) 
 
(1.1621) 
 
 Conglomerate -0.0726  -0.0523  -0.0327  -0.0255  -0.0182   
(-1.2921) 
 
(-1.0160) 
 
(-0.7839) 
 
(-0.9352) 
 
(-1.1494) 
 
 Intercept 0.1161 ** 0.0971 * 0.0664  0.0305  0.0386 **  
(2.0657) 
 
(1.8597) 
 
(1.3781) 
 
(1.1088) 
 
(2.5972) 
 
  Observations 165   165   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 3.9802  3.1778  3.4476  2.8002  1.3281  
 p-value 0.0010 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0129 ** 0.2477  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0878   0.0649   0.0594   0.0615   0.0176   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Overall, the acquisition of a majority stake (Pct50) and the existence of a toehold 
interest (PctToe) emerge as the main factors driving the CAARs. The signs of both of these 
variables are consistent with the existing literature. Even in the univariate analysis of these 
windows, these two variables are mostly significantly different from zero. The variable Pct50 
produces higher and economically larger returns in the range of 3% to 15% (approximately) 
respectively when compared with its base dummy counterpart. From the investors’ 
perspective, acquiring a majority stake in an Indian company reflects managements’ 
confidence, as well as a long-term commitment. Also, as explained by LLSV, majority stakes 
are preferred by minority shareholders in countries with weaker legal systems as they help 
defend their own interests. The existing toehold (PctToe) can reduce the takeover premium 
by up to 31%. Toeholds are considered to be a profitable strategy for the acquirer; one which 
reduces the takeover premium for the targets (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Betton et al., 2009).  
Table 6.10.3 is also focused on the target firms. However, the CAARs are based on 
the MM estimations of the Market model in the event study analysis. The univariate analysis 
of these equations is presented in Table-A 6.58 to 6.62. 
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Table 6.10.3 Regression of CAARs based on MM Estimations - Domestic Target Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 
Cash 0.0761  0.0679  0.0670  0.0484  0.0257   
 (1.2091) (1.2575) (1.4974) (1.5229) (1.1573) 
 
Pct50 0.1458 ** 0.1314 ** 0.0985 ** 0.0949 *** 0.0277   
 (2.3812) 
 
(2.2743) 
 
(2.2482) 
 
(3.1341) 
 
(1.4736) 
 
PctToe -0.2449 ** -0.1998 ** -0.1967 *** -0.0218  -0.0042   
 (-2.2792) 
 
(-2.1504) 
 
(-2.8896) 
 
(-0.4082) (-0.1170) 
 
BGroup 0.0344  0.0351  0.0181  -0.0125  -0.0246   
 (0.6632) 
 
(0.7609) (0.5014) (-0.4677) (-1.3951) 
 
Related -0.0775  -0.0353  0.0034  0.0041  0.0175   
 (-1.5407) 
 
(-0.7874) (0.0975) (0.1531) (0.9863) 
 
Conglomerate -0.0560  -0.0280  -0.0193  -0.0252  -0.0207   
 (-1.0236) 
 
(-0.5680) (-0.4976) (-0.9212) (-1.3024) 
 
Intercept 0.2122 *** 0.1540 *** 0.1105 ** 0.0614 ** 0.0506 ***   
(4.0018) 
 
(3.1802) 
 
(2.5692) 
 
(2.1980) 
 
(3.4312) 
 
  Observations 160   160   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 3.7484  2.8741  2.8895  2.4003  1.2053  
 p-value 0.0017 *** 0.0111 ** 0.0107 ** 0.0303 ** 0.3065  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0740   0.0519   0.0489   0.0484   0.0153   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Once again, the model and the variables are significantly different from zero for the 
larger CAAR windows. The overall results are still identical to the previous analysis. The two 
variables Pct50 and PctToe continue to hold their dominance in the analysis in both the 
multivariate and the univariate analysis for the majority of the windows.  
Intriguingly, in the aggregate dataset analysis, the Cash variable had large and 
significant coefficients for both the univariate and the multivariate analyses. However, here 
it is consistently not different from zero for both the analyses, at least at the 5% level. This 
may be because nearly a third of the domestic deals have IBG acquirers, with nearly 80% of 
these acquirers using shares or combinations as a method of consideration, which is also 
argued to have a positive impact. The collective positive impact of BGroup and share based 
consideration might have moderated the overall Cash impact.  
Further, interestingly, depending on the length of the CAAR window, there is even 
signs of reversals for the variables Business Group (BGroup) and related in the regressions 
above. There is a cumulative effect of several factors in play here. Firstly, large mark-ups and 
run-ups suggest that announcement effect is not fully captured in the CAAR windows close 
to the event day. Secondly, the stratum-specific analysis done earlier confirms that the 
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Business Group (BGroup) effect is reflected more in the mark-up period which is in line with 
(Schwert, 1996) - the impact of significant deal characteristics is reflected more in the 
variation in mark-up. Likewise, stratum-specific analysis about relatedness confirms its 
significant impact in the distant run-up period. Thirdly, the CAARs tested here are 
symmetrical around Day-0. Hence, the true impact of these variables is captured only when 
the CAAR windows expand. To reconfirm, the regression analysis is performed again with 
several CAARs windows of varying lengths in both the mark-up and the run-up period. 
6.10.1.1 Alternative Analysis – Pre and Post-Event CAAR Windows 
As the event study makes it evident that the Business Group (BGroup) effect is 
prominent in the post-event days, another set of CAARs like [0, +2], [0, +5], [0, +7], [0, +10], 
[0, +15] is regressed with the given independent variables. Results are reported in Table-A 
6.37 and 6.38.  
In this analysis, Pct50 and BGroup beta coefficients are significantly positive. Thus, 
being taken over by a large business group is favoured by the markets. In fact, target 
shareholders may earn higher returns ranging from 6% to 10%, depending on the estimation 
method and CAAR window. Also, the variable PctToe loses its significance in post-event 
analysis. It is a variable that captures the impact of information asymmetry which is vital in 
determing the pre-event outcomes. 
As the announcement enters the market formally, the participants see the value in 
being taken over by IBGs and they react positively. This supports the findings from the event 
study analysis, which discards the tunnelling hypothesis theory that is commonly argued for 
such groups.  
In the run-up analysis, the related variable is consistently negative and does have 
coefficients that are reliably different form zero at 10% for the [-20, -1] window when the 
variable PctToe is dropped from the equation. As both of these variables capture the scope of 
information asymmetry, it may be that the marginal effect of relatedness is swamped by 
PctToe, which is significantly lower than zero. Thus, there is a mild support that related deals 
yield lower returns for the target firms. 
6.10.1.2 Interactive Dummies 
In order to further understand the role of large Indian Business Groups (IBGs) 
acquiring majority stakes, and whether deals within the affiliates of these groups have any 
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distinctive bearing on the outcomes, the same regressions were run again using the two 
multiplicative interactive dummies: RelBGroup (BGroup x Related) and BGroup50 (BGroup 
x Pct50). The multivariate results are reported in Table-A 6.39 to 6.42.  The univariate results 
for these variables are reported alongside the other univariate tables discussed above.  
The variable RelBGroup is mostly positive, implying that the target shareholders earn 
higher returns in the deals when the participating firms are affiliates of the top IBGs. This 
supports the findings from the event study analysis, which discards the tunnelling hypothesis 
theory that is generally associated with such IBGs. However, as the betas are not significantly 
different from zero, this is just an indication. In total, there are only 25 deals that qualify for 
this criterion. 
The variable BGroup50 is consistently positive and is also occasionally significantly 
positive in univariate analysis, though never in multivariate analysis. This indicates that being 
taken over by large IBGs with a majority stake may, in fact, yield higher returns. This again 
substantiates the findings from the event study analysis and provides some evidence to refute 
the tunnelling hypothesis. However, once again, the lack of betas that are significantly 
different from zero in multivariate analysis makes the argument merely suggestive.  
Overall, the regression analysis indicates that the participation of the large IBGs has 
a positive impact on the returns to the target shareholders. Thus, in the spirits of (Siegel and 
Choudhury, 2012), there is no evidence for the tunnelling hypothesis.  
The second factor that drives these returns for the target company shareholders in 
DMAs is the majority stake acquired by the acquiring firms, which is consistent with LLSV 
literature. They argue that in weaker legal systems with poor investor protection, block 
ownership shows a commitment against expropriation and is a way to persuade investor 
confidence. In a similar vein, Claessens et al. (1999) find higher value for corporate assets 
with greater insider cashflow ownership.  
Thirdly, the existing toehold interest of an acquirer adversely affects the target 
returns. While toeholds reduce the number of shares that must be purchased in order to gain 
control at a higher premium if the deal is successful, they also create capital gain if the 
toeholds have to be sold to a rival bidder. Regardless of the outcome of the deal, toehold 
interest bestows more bargaining powers on the acquirers. 
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6.10.2 Domestic Acquirer Firms 
Table 6.10.4 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the independent 
variables used in this analysis for the acquirer firms. While some of the variables are 
significantly correlated (except for the PctToe and the Related variables36), the coefficients 
are not of a high enough order so as to make any impact on the analysis. All these variables 
have a mean VIF of 1.12, with none exceeding 1.26 individually. Collectively, they rule out 
the possibility of any severe multicollinearity issues in the analysis.  
Table 6.10.4 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables - Acquirers 
Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe      BGroup   Related 
  
Pct50 0.1280 *         
  (0.0746) 
 
 
 
PctToe 0.0781  -0.0405        
  (0.2826) (0.5781) 
BGroup 0.1448 ** 0.0332  0.1469 **     
  (0.0435) 
 
(0.6448) (0.0426) 
 
Related 0.1061  -0.0747  0.4244 *** 0.1216 *   
  (0.1399) (0.2993) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0905) 
 
Conglomerate -0.0499  -0.1281 * -0.1528 ** 0.0840  -0.0616  
  (0.4884)   (0.0743)   (0.0348)   (0.2430)   (0.3921)   
  p-values in parentheses; *p<.010,** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Table 6.10.5 below presents the multivariate regression results for the various CAAR 
windows for the Domestic Acquirer firms. The CAARs used here are from the OLS 
estimation of the abnormal returns in the event study analysis. The univariate results for each 
of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 6.63 to 6.67. The 
discussion ahead refers to both the multivariate and the univariate analyses. 
  
                                                 
36 While the regressions results presented here use Related variable only, the regressions based on both of 
these variables simultaneously and also only with PctToe are also executed. When the two variables are 
regressed alongside (results reported in Table-A 6.43 and Table-A 6.44) the Related variable is 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. When only PctToe variable is used, it is not significantly 
different from zero. The F-statistics of the models still remains weak in both the scenarios. 
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Table 6.10.5 Regression Analysis of the OLS CAARs – Domestic Acquirer Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0413  0.0235  0.0073  0.0180  0.0050   
(0.9406) (0.5723) (0.2151) (0.5693) (0.3220) 
 Pct50 0.0481  0.0784 * 0.0487  0.0118  0.0070   
(1.0195) (1.7139) 
 
(1.4142) (0.5293) (0.5373) 
 BGroup -0.0143  -0.0123  -0.0106  -0.0116  -0.0082   
(-0.4277) (-0.3831) (-0.4080) (-0.6487) (-0.7871) 
 Related 0.0845 ** 0.0842 ** 0.0710 ** 0.0156  0.0126   
(2.0870) 
 
(2.0754) 
 
(2.3392) 
 
(0.7698) (1.2116) 
 Conglomerate 0.0470  0.0449  0.0288  0.0189  0.0097   
(1.1420) (1.1366) (0.9761) (0.9846) (0.8928) 
 Intercept -0.0493  -0.0423  -0.0188  0.0026  0.0050   
(-1.4950) (-1.4028) (-0.7654) (0.1800) (0.5449) 
  Observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 F-Statistics 1.0867  1.1219  1.1734  0.3651  0.5447  
 p-value 0.3691  0.3502  0.3238  0.8720  0.7422  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0123   0.0273   0.0161   -0.0139   -0.0144   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; Without PctToe variable 
The weak F-statistics for each these equations suggest that there is no significant 
relationship overall between the independent variables and the CAAR values at conventional 
levels of significance. Yet, the variable that seems to be partially governing the outcomes is 
the related variable. This implies that the related acquirers earn 7% to 8% higher returns than 
the unrelated ones. Further, these higher returns occur in larger CAAR windows (21 days and 
above), suggesting that the immediate announcement effect is unexplained. When compared 
with the results for the target firms, this variable is unambiguously positive, implying that 
taking over a related firm yields higher returns for the acquiring shareholders. 
Understandably, in deals with their affiliates, acquirers have an absolute advantage with 
respect to information asymmetry. As the target is well-known a priori, the risk of incorrect 
valuation and other associated uncertainties do not exist for them. As such, they benefit more 
in generating post-event synergies. 
Table 6.10.6 is similar to the last table, except that the CAARs are taken from the 
MM estimations of the Market model in the event study analysis. The univariate results for 
each of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 6.68 to 6.72.  
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Table 6.10.6 Regression Analysis of the MM CAARs – Domestic Acquirer Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0264  0.0145  0.0000  0.0139  0.0046   
(0.6493) (0.3750) (0.0007) (0.4377) (0.2977) 
 Pct50 0.0263  0.0544  0.0348  0.0043  0.0062   
(0.6739) (1.5537) (1.1361) (0.2088) (0.4706) 
 BGroup -0.0029  0.0027  0.0009  -0.0082  -0.0083   
(-0.0880) (0.0903) (0.0354) (-0.4620) (-0.7913) 
 Related 0.0637 * 0.0617 ** 0.0587 ** 0.0086  0.0126   
(1.9188) 
 
(2.0054) 
 
(2.1143) 
 
(0.4577) (1.2034) 
 Conglomerate 0.0326  0.0283  0.0203  0.0140  0.0091   
(0.8832) (0.8552) (0.7298) (0.7618) (0.8203) 
 Intercept 0.0255  0.0154  0.0179  0.0244  0.0096   
(0.7587) (0.5218) (0.7010) (1.6453) (1.0078) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.8979  1.1132  1.0507  0.2056  0.5227  
 p-value 0.4837  0.3549  0.3894  0.9598  0.7589  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0072   0.0028   -0.0012   -0.0214   -0.0164   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; Without PctToe variable 
On the statistical significance of the model and the variables, the results are 
qualitatively identical to the regression analysis of the OLS CAARs documented in Table 
6.10.5. The related variable generates higher returns of up to 6%, but overall, the models are 
weak. 
Further, the negative coefficients for the BGroup variable imply that the large IBG 
acquirers receive lesser returns when compared with their base dummy counterpart. Likewise, 
the positive coefficients of the variables Pct50 and Cash imply higher returns. However, none 
of them is different from zero in both the multivariate and univariate analyses.  
Interestingly, the Conglomerate variable, though not different from zero, has positive 
coefficients. This suggests that for the acquirers, diversification is seen as a positive move. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that the affiliates of the most diversified IBGs have higher 
Tobin’s q. As such, diversification across industries is key for large business houses in 
minimizing risks and creating internal factor markets. 
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6.10.2.1 Interactive Dummies 
In order to delve deeper into the question of whether large IBGs acquiring a majority 
stake, and the deals within the affiliates of these groups, have any distinctive bearing on the 
outcomes, the same regressions were run again using the two multiplicative interactive 
dummies: RelBGroup (BGroup x Related) and BGroup50 (BGroup x Pct50). The 
multivariate results are reported in Table-A 6.45 to 6.52. The univariate results for these are 
reported alongside the other univariate tables discussed above.  
The variable Pct50 is mostly positive, and the BGroup variable is consistently 
negative. Yet, the interactive dummy, BGroup50, is consistently positive and also 
occasionally significantly greater than zero in univariate analysis, although not in the 
multivariate setting. This indicates that acquisitions by large IBGs yield higher returns to the 
acquiring shareholders, but only when a majority stake is acquired. Otherwise, the returns are 
lower. This supports the findings from the event study analysis and provides some evidence 
against the tunnelling hypothesis. However, as the results are not statistically different from 
zero in the multivariate analysis, it makes the argument merely suggestive. 
The variable RelBGroup is consistently negative, implying that the acquirer 
shareholders earn lower returns in deals when the participating firms are related (as part of 
one of the top IBGs). This alludes to the fact that tunnelling may exist, but not when the 
acquirer belongs to any large IBG. However, as the results are not statistically different from 
zero, this is just an indication.  
To conclude, while acquirers do get positive returns on the announcement, the only 
attribute - existing relationship between the target and the acquirer firms partly explains these 
returns.  
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6.11 Overall Summary  
6.11.1 Abnormal Returns - Synergy 
The primary objective of this chapter is to address the second hypothesis (H2)  and 
also to evaluate synergy, agency and hubris motives in domestic M&As, which leads to the 
testing of two hypotheses: 
H2a:  There are no abnormal returns to the Indian target firms at the announcements of 
domestic M&As. 
H2b:  There are no abnormal returns to the Indian acquirer firms at the announcements of 
domestic M&As. 
As both the targets and acquirers gain positive abnormal returns at the announcement, 
there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses. Further, as both the sides gain 
positive returns, it shows that domestic M&As create synergies and are value enhancing 
strategies.  
Further, with regards to pre-bid returns, target returns show large run-ups, which is 
significantly higher than the mark-up return. This suggests that asymmetric information also 
plays a dominant role in the allocation of takeover premium. Whereas, for the acquirers, the 
pre-event window of a significantly positive CAARs is non-existent from OLS estimations, 
and is much smaller from the MM method relative to the target CAARs suggesting informed 
trading is rare. 
6.11.2 IBG Effects 
The chapter explores further the impact of participation of large IBGs as acquirers in 
the deals. The hypotheses thus tested are: 
H3a:  There is no difference in returns to the target shareholders from the takeovers by the 
large Indian Business Groups. 
H3b:  There is no difference in returns to the acquiring shareholders from the takeovers by the 
large Indian Business Groups. 
For the target firms, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The 
analysis overall points towards higher positive abnormal returns for the shareholders. These 
returns may be 5% to 10% higher than their counterparts. However, this positive influence 
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occurs after the announcement when the deal characteristics are learned by the market. The 
findings do not support tunnelling possibilities in takeovers by large IBGs.  
For the acquirer firms, evidence supports the null hypothesis. Both the event study 
and cross-sectional analyses show that the returns to the acquiring shareholders do not 
correlate to the status of the acquirer as an IBG. 
6.11.3 Relatedness Effects 
Finally, the chapter explores the role of relatedness in determining the returns 
generated by such deals. The two hypotheses thus tested are: 
H4a:  There is no difference in returns to the target shareholders from the takeovers by the 
related and unrelated acquirers. 
H4b:  There is no difference in returns to the acquirer shareholders from the takeovers of the 
related targets. 
There is sufficient evidence to support the null hypothesis for the target firms. 
Although the event study analysis provides some support for lower returns for target firms in 
related acqusitions, as well as the coefficients in the cross-sectional analysis, they are not 
signifiantly different from zero. 
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for the 
acquirers. Taking over related target firms yield higher returns for acquirers, and the cross-
sectional coefficients are significantly positive. 
6.11.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis  
For the target shareholders, the acquisition of a majority stake (>=50%) and being 
taken over by a large IBG are the two primary sources of positive abnormal returns. In 
comparison, the toehold interest of the acquirers leads to negative returns. 
On the other side, for the acquirers, the model is not significantly different from zero, 
yet there is an indication that being related to the target firms partially explains the positive 
abnormal returns.  
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6.11.5 Snapshot – Hypotheses 
 
 
  
Effect Hypotheses Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
H2 : 
There are no abnormal 
returns associated with 
the announcements of 
Domestic M&As (DMA) 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to both - the 
targets and acquiring 
shareholders at the 
announcement. 
 H5a: Synergy   As both the targets and acquirers gain 
positive returns, the 
total effect is positive 
for the combined 
wealth 
 H5b: Hubris   
 H5c: Agency   
Indian 
Business 
Groups 
H3 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns 
generated in the 
takeovers by the large 
Indian Business Groups. 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to the targets 
but insignificantly 
negative returns to the 
acquirers. 
Relatedness H4 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns 
generated in the 
takeovers by the Related 
acquirers.  
 
Insignificantly 
negative returns to the 
targets, but 
significantly positive 
returns to the 
acquirers. 
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 Cross-Border Deals 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the returns to the Indian target and acquirer 
firms in Cross-Border M&A (CBMA) deals. The CBMA dataset is comprised of the M&A 
deals where one of the participating firms is based in India, and the other is not. 
The first objective of this chapter is to test the M&A motive; to test whether there are 
synergies in the Indian CBMA deals for the shareholders, which in turn also tests for hubris 
and agency motives. The hypothesis tested here is: there are no abnormal returns to the 
participating Indian firms in CBMAs. And in the analysis, the total wealth effect from the 
deals is observed to determine the motive of CBMAs. 
 Further, Hofstede (1980) and House et al. (2002) summarize various risks in CBMAs 
as exposure to the incongruent economic, regulatory and cultural structures. Likewise, 
Brouthers (2002) argues the transaction costs (Economic risks), institutional (legal and 
regulatory environment) and cultural variables (investment risks) dictate the outcomes of the 
international ventures. The CAGE theory of Ghemawat (2001) suggests that the cost of these 
distances in often very high. Following that premises, chapter two outlined how India is 
placed akin to different nations on these paradigms (to recall, Figure 7.1.1 is reproduced 
below), which means that India is comprised of a unique mix of attributes, with no correlation 
in any other nation. This thesis identifies India as a common law country with business 
structures resembling civil law countries and unique socio-cultural anthropological attributes 
of some South Asian countries.  
This unique mix of attributes increases the complexities for Indian CBMAs. It is 
imperative to understand how they may affect the outcomes of CBMAs in India. Thus, 
another main thrust of this chapter is to evaluate the influence of various corporate 
governance models, institutional environments and cultures in Indian CBMAs. The 
hypotheses tested here are collectively described as: there is no difference in announcement 
returns derived from the deals between the Indian firms and the foreign firms pursuing 
different corporate governance models, originating from other institutional environment and 
with dissimilar cultures.  
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Figure 7.1.1 The Multidimensional Aspects of India 
The final, yet equally important, objective of the chapter is to evaluate various deal 
and firm-specific characteristics to determine the main driving forces for these returns. A 
thorough cross-sectional analysis is conducted to isolate the decisive factors that govern these 
outcomes. 
The chapter begins with the discussion about the Indian CBMA target firms and leads 
to the analysis of Indian CBMA acquirer firms. In the process, the impact of various financial 
models and regression techniques on the abnormal returns around the announcement day is 
discussed. Finally, the cross-sectional results are reported. 
Chapter five provides a sound basis for all relevant aspects of the methodology 
employed in this thesis. To restate, the announcement effect captured by the Fama-French 
model is identical to the Market model outcomes. However, the overall CAARs for 51 days 
are 1% higher on average for targets, but not for acquirers. However, the FF model is limited 
by its coverage for the entire sample. The Scholes andWilliams (SW) adjusted beta Market 
models replicate the original Market model returns. For the regression methods, the M 
estimators tend to follow the trend generated by the MM regressions overall for the same set 
of firms. However, due to the smaller sample size, they have the potential to alter the overall 
properties of the analysis. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the 
results obtained from the MM and the OLS regressions, and unlike the M estimators, sample 
size variation for the MM regression does not affect the quality of the results, and can be 
directly compared with the OLS based returns. Besides, given the properties of the dataset, 
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of the two robust regressions, the MM estimator is better suited. Finally, the Equally 
Weighted Index (EWI) analysis replicates the results obtained from the Value Weighted 
Index (VWI) models for the same set of firms, thus failing to provide any additional unique 
insight. 
Following chapter five, this chapter focuses on the outcomes from the Market model 
based on the VWI and with the OLS and the MM techniques. As discussed earlier, the 
MMregression does not estimate all the sample firms. The sub-set estimated by the MM 
regressions is referred to as ‘MM firms’. The Fama-French sub-set is referred to as ‘FF firms’. 
Further, the results from the Fama-French and the SW adjusted beta estimations are discussed 
for the primary hypothesis. For the other attributes, the Fama-French results are provided in 
Appendix Chapter 7 and are discussed in the main body.  
For brevity and relevance, only the major outcomes are compared, contrasted and 
reported in the main body of the chapter. Other subsidiary outcomes are reported in the 
appendix to this chapter. 
7.2 Returns to Indian Targets 
In the cross-border sample, after the filtering process discussed in the methodology 
chapter, there is a total of 138 firms identified as cross-border targets. Out of these 138 firms, 
104 firms are the Indian target companies, and the remaining firms are from the other 
nationalities taken over by the Indian companies.  
Figure 7.2.1 compares the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) obtained 
from the MM and the OLS regressions using the Market model for all the available firms 
over the 51 day event window [-20, +30] relative to the announcement day for the target firms 
in India.  
Also, as the MM estimator has slightly lesser firms, the solid blue line labelled as 
‘OLS-Same’ represents the CAARs from the OLS estimations for the same set of firms (MM 
firms – 99 firms). It facilitates the comparison of the returns from the two regression 
techniques by controlling the sample selection bias.  
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Figure 7.2.1 Market Returns to CBMA Targets - OLS vs. MM 
The CAARs derived from the MM estimator are represented by the solid black line 
and are reported in Table-A 7.1. The AARs are significantly positive for the days [-2, +2]. 
The CAARs, while they are positive since Day -19, gain statistical significance from Day -
14. Post-announcement, the CAARs drift upwards to 18%. Also, the 3 day CAAR of 7.87% 
is significantly greater than zero with t-statistics of 6.87.  
The OLS results are tabulated in Table-A 7.2. Although the OLS CAARs are positive 
from Day -11, it is since Day -2 that they are significantly positive. The AAR and the CAAR 
on Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR [-1, +1] of 7.01% are all significantly greater than zero. 
Though there is an evidence of a slight decline in the daily returns in the days after the event, 
overall there is a positive impact, not only on the announcement day, but also in the 
surrounding days. 
The blue line, OLS-Same, based on the MM firms sub-set, follows the same trajectory 
as of the OLS-All and confirms visually and statistically (tested below) that the sample 
variation does not change the overall properties of the results. These returns are presented in 
Table-A 7.3. This implies that the apparent divergence in the abnormal returns from the OLS 
and the MM method is purely due to the regression techniques. 
7.2.1 Market vs. Fama-French (FF) Model 
Figure 7.2.2 compares the two financial models and the two regression techniques 
for the same set of firms (FF firms). The OLS analysis is based on 93 common firms, and the 
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MM CAARs are based on the same 90 firms. The relevant tables are Table-A 7.4 to 7.7 in the 
appendix.  
The graphs in red the CAARs from the OLS regression, while the graphs in black are 
from the MM estimator. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market model, and 
the solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
The divergence in the black and the red graphs in the post-event period reflects the 
differences in the regression techniques. Evidently, the MM estimator produces higher 
returns. Also, while the MM CAARs continue to rise in the later part, those from the OLS 
gradually decline. 
 
Figure 7.2.2 Returns to CB Targets; Market vs. FF; OLS vs. MM  (All & Same-Firms) 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the market and the FF models for that regression technique. The solid line lies above the 
dotted line indicating that the returns from the FF model are consistently slightly higher. 
Noticeable, apart from this difference, the solid lines (FF model) in both the regressions trend 
precisely alongside the dotted lines (Market model).  
Table 7.2.1 provides the statistical summary of the various CAARs graphed above. 
The CAARs from the M regression are identical to those from the MM estimations, but due 
to the sample size variation, they are separately presented in Figure A 7.1 and 7.2 in the 
appendix. 
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Table 7.2.1 Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM Comparison 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 3.47% *** 7.87% *** 10.95% *** 18.40% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 99 
OLS-All 3.16% *** 7.01% *** 6.57% *** 7.34% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
OLS-Same 3.28% *** 7.31% *** 6.91% *** 8.26% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 99 
FF 
MM 
3.29% *** 7.57% *** 11.87% *** 18.84% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 90 
Market 3.39% *** 7.86% *** 10.63% *** 17.36% *** -2 to +2 -11 to +30 90 
FF 
OLS 
3.03% *** 7.00% *** 7.72% *** 7.29% *** -1 to +1 -9 to +30 93 
Market 3.11% *** 7.10% *** 6.15% *** 5.96% ** -1 to +1 -1 to +30 93 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The evidence presented here rejects the null hypothesis. There is sufficient evidence 
that the Indian target firms gain positive abnormal returns at the announcement of CBMA 
deals, which is in line with the findings from existing literature. The gains occur on both the 
event day, and over the surrounding days.  
Further, on the efficiency market hypothesis, there are no systematic significant 
average abnormal returns (AARs) for the days after the event. However, the impact may still 
last for up to two days from the announcements. Markets react relatively slowly to the 
announcements of CBMAs, when compared with domestic M&A (DMA) deals. 
The announcement day CAARs are higher than the AARs suggesting market 
participants are able to partially anticipate the takeover premiums and have already 
incorporated that information into the price of the target shares. There is a pre-bid price run-
up and some impact of informed trading here. Yet, the AARs on Day-0 are the highest 
abnormal returns generated in the entire event window on a single day. This suggests 
significant information releases only at the announcement, from which the shareholders gain 
positive returns. 
Though a crude measure, Table 7.2.2 (below) highlights the distribution of total 
premium generated between the run-ups and the mark-ups of CBMAs. 
Table 7.2.2 Run-Up vs. Mark-Up Returns to CBMA Indian Targets 
Model Regression 
Run-up  
[-20, -1] 
Mark-up  
[0, +30] 
Difference 
Market 
MM 7.49% 10.91% -3.43% 
OLS 3.41% 3.92% -0.51% 
FF 
MM 8.58% 10.25% -1.67% 
OLS 4.69% 2.61% 2.08% 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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The significantly positive AARs and CAARs on some days in the run-up period may 
indicate some form of informed trading. However, the difference between the run-up and 
mark-up CAARs is, in fact, negative and not different from zero. This indicates that the post-
event returns are higher, and that the informed traders are unable to benefit immensely. The 
role of information asymmetry is not that pronounced, implying that most of the uncertainty 
about the event is resolved only at the announcement.  
Further, there are striking differences in the results from the OLS and the MM 
regression for both the financial models. While both the regression methods indicate 
significantly positive abnormal returns on both the announcement day and the surrounding 
days, the magnitudes differ—the OLS returns are lower than the MM estimates. Even the 
window for significant CAARs [-14, +30] is larger for the MM estimates. Not only that, in 
the post-event days, while the CAARs from the MM regression are significantly positive and 
drift upwards, those from the OLS estimates (also statistically significantly positive) declined. 
This explains the divergence in the post-event slopes of the red and the black graphs. 
On comparing the two regression techniques, due to a large spread of significantly 
positive CAARs in the run-up and mark-up period, the test of differences in the returns on 
the announcement day (AAR) is statistically not different from zero. However, the differences 
in the CAARs for 3 day [-1, +1] and 51 day [-20, +30] are statistically different from zero at 
the 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. Also, there is no significant difference 
between the returns from the OLS-All and OLS-Same. This confirms that the divergence in 
the outcomes is fundamental to the regression techniques and is not sample specific. 
Evidently, as in other sub-sets, the OLS and the MM returns differ, not only in the 
magnitudes, but also in the directions of the outcomes.  
Further, on comparing the returns from the FF model with the Market model, 
qualitatively, they both capture comparable announcement effects at similar conventional 
levels. While the Day-0 AAR and 3 day CAAR are marginally higher than the Market model, 
the Day-0 CAARs and 51 day CAAR are higher than the FF model. So are the window sizes 
of significantly positive CAARs. The tests of differences in these abnormal returns based on 
the OLS estimations are not different from zero. However, based on the MM estimations, the 
differences in 3 day and 51 day CAARs are reliably greater than zero on the conventional 
level. Thus, depending on the regression method, the FF returns may be higher by 1% on 
average. 
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The main finding here is that there are significant positive returns to the shareholders 
due to M&As and, depending on the regression method, Fama-French returns may be higher 
by 1% (rounded) when compared with the Market model returns. However, the FF model is 
limited by its unavailability for the entire sample period. 
7.2.2 Market vs. Scholes and Williams (SW) Betas 
All three SW adjusted beta variants, along with the original Market model, are 
compared in this section. The set of common firms used is also the entire sample set. 
 
Figure 7.2.3 Returns from the Market and SW (1-3) Models; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Figure 7.2.3 is based on Table-A 7.2, 7.8 to 7.10. It serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
shows the abnormal returns from all the three SW adjusted beta variants. Secondly, it 
compares the returns with the original Market model for the same set of firms. Table 7.2.3 
provides the statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed in Figure 7.2.3. 
Table 7.2.3 Market and SW Models Comparison (All & Same-Firms) 
Model 
Regression 
Beta 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 3.16% *** 7.01% *** 6.57% *** 7.34% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-1 3.21% *** 7.19% *** 6.64% *** 7.04% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-2 3.21% *** 7.27% *** 6.40% *** 6.64% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-3 3.21% *** 7.22% *** 6.51% *** 6.92% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The SW variants also replicate the findings of the Market model. Qualitatively, all 
the relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically similar. The findings are in line with 
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Dyckman et al. (1984) and Davidson and Josev (2005) which advocate no significant 
improvement in the specifications or the power of tests using either of these modified betas. 
Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis over the Market model analysis from 
the SW adjusted betas of Market model. 
7.3 Corporate Governance Analysis 
Following the LLSV literature about the legal origin of corporate governance models, 
this thesis splits the cross-border acquirers by their corporate governance models in two 
categories: Anglo-Saxon (AS) and German/Japanese (GJ). While classifying English and 
German firms is straightforward, classifying French and Scandinavian firms is more difficult. 
However, the consensus is that they are closer to GJ than AS (García‐Castro et al., 2008). 
Further, as some acquiring countries (Bahrain, Oman and China) are not the part of the 
original LLSV literature, four sample firms are thus excluded in this analysis. Hence, this 
analysis uses 100 firms, of which 54 are taken over by acquirers with the GJ model, and the 
remaining 46 are taken over by firms with an AS model. 
7.3.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
The MM regression based results are graphed here in Figure 7.3.1 and tabulated in 
Table-A 7.11 and 7.12 in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1 Indian Targets and Corporate Governance Analysis (MM) 
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For the German/Japanese sub-set (GJ), the overall returns are considerably higher. 
The Day-0 AAR and the CAAR and the 3 day CAAR, are all statistically significantly 
different from zero. While the AARs are significantly positive just for the days [-1, +1], the 
CAARs are significantly positive from Day -11. And in the post–event period, they drift 
upwards to 22%, implying that investors continue to make smaller gains. 
With Anglo-Saxon category (AS), while the Day-0 CAAR and the 3 day CAAR of 
3.80% are significantly positive, the AAR Day-0 is not reliably different from zero at the 0.05 
level. Like GJ sub-set, the post-event CAARs drift upwards to 14%, implying that the market 
continues to generate smaller gains for subsequent weeks.  
7.3.2 OLS Estimation Analysis 
Figure 7.3.2 presents the CAARs for the two sub-sets and Table-A 7.13 and 7.14  
provide the results.  
 
Figure 7.3.2 Indian Targets and Corporate Governance Analysis (OLS) 
For the GJ category, the AAR and the CAAR on Day-0 and the 3 day CAAR all are 
significantly positive. Another important finding is the shape of the curve, which is very steep 
just around the event day. Here, the AARs and the CAARs are rarely significantly different 
from zero in the pre-event period which reflects investors’ inability in securing early access 
to the information. Generally, this is not the case in other analyses, and the role of information 
leakage is obvious. While this explains the significance of returns around Day-0, even the 
returns in the surrounding days are considerably higher for the GJ sub-set when compared 
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with those from the AS sub-set. Just the 3 day CAAR [-1. +1] can be as high as 9% to 12% 
on average, which is relatively enormous. 
For the AS category, the Day-0 CAAR and the 3 day CAAR of 3.20% are 
significantly positive. So is the case with a few days in the pre-event period. However, the 
AAR Day-0 is not reliably different from zero at 5%. Collectively, it suggests that the market 
has already partially absorbed the excess returns prior to the announcement day. Singificantly 
positive CAARs in the days [-1, +15] suggest post-event small additional gains. The CAARs 
can be as high as 8%, followed by a steady decline in the later weeks. 
7.3.3 Corporate Governance Analysis Snapshot 
Table 7.3.1 (below) summarizes the statistical findings of the Market model returns 
from the two regression methods discussed above. The comparative results for the same set 
of firms for each category are graphed in Figure A 7.6 and 7.7 in the appendix, and there is 
no statistical variation in the results. Hence, the sample reduction does not alter the properties 
of the results obtained from the OLS estimates. 
Table 7.3.1 Summary of CG Analysis; Market Model; OLS & MM 
Regression Sub-set 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
AS 1.52% * 3.80% *** 9.73% *** 13.92% ***   -11 to +30 44 
GJ 4.88% *** 10.33% *** 13.10% *** 21.59% *** -1 to +1 -9 to +30 51 
OLS 
AS 1.33% * 3.20% *** 6.45% *** 4.57%     -1 to +15 46 
GJ 4.43% *** 9.11% *** 7.58% *** 8.66% ** -1 to +1 0 to +30 54 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
When the MM estimations are compared with the OLS returns, the Day-0 AARs and 
the CAARs are identical with respect to their significance levels. However, the magnitudes 
of the MM returns are higher in both the cases. Further, in another contrast to the MM 
estimations, the OLS returns tend to fall in subsequent weeks for both the sub-sets.  
Further, following a methodology from Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Table 7.3.2 
(below) presents the differences in the two sub-sets’ CAARs (GJ – AS) over various strata of 
the event period, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the possible variations 
in the returns from the two sub-sets. 
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Table 7.3.2 Comparison GJ –AS for Indian Targets 
CAAR Windows MM OLS 
Pre-event 
-10 to -1 0.23%   -0.52%   
-5 to -1 2.31%   2.02%   
-3 to -1 0.74%   0.48%   
Event 
-1 to +1 6.53% ** 5.91% ** 
0 3.37% ** 3.11% ** 
Post-event 
+1 to +3 3.36%   3.79%   
+1 to 5 2.36%   3.08%   
+1 to +10 2.94%   2.64%   
Total -20 to +30 7.68%   4.09%   
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Though there are significantly positive returns from the takeovers from both the sub-
sets, the returns generated in the GJ group are consistently higher in all segments of the time 
period. The returns are significantly higher around the event, with Day-0 nearly at the 1% 
level. The announcement day effect can exceed by 6% to 7% (rounded). Further, despite there 
being a large difference in the overall CAARs visually, the test of difference in returns fails 
to reject the null hypothesis. However, this is because of the large standard deviations in the 
two sub-sets, which statistically reduce the power of the test for the total CAARs. 
Evidently, being taken over by the firms using GJ corporate governance models is 
favoured much more than the companies pursuing AS models in the Indian market. As 
Hofstede (1994) argues, it is the common practices, and not the common values, that ensure 
multinationals work together successfully.  
7.3.4 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
Here, the Fama-French results for all the available firms are presented and compared 
with those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two regression 
techniques. The comparative graphs are provided in Figure A 7.3 to 7.5 and the findings are 
summarized in Table 7.3.3 (below). 
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Table 7.3.3 Summary of CG Analysis; Market vs. FF Model; OLS & MM. 
Regression Category 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Anglo-Saxon 
MM 
Market 1.55% * 3.92% *** 10.16% *** 15.28% *** +1 -12 to +30 39 
FF 1.51% * 4.06% *** 11.31% *** 17.10% *** +1 to +2 -12 to +30 39 
OLS 
Market 1.35% * 3.28% *** 6.66% *** 5.03%     -2 to +13 41 
FF 1.33% * 3.68% *** 8.37% *** 7.27%     -9 to +5 41 
German/Japanese 
MM 
Market 4.67% *** 10.02% *** 12.17% *** 19.79% *** -1 to +1 -7 to +30 48 
FF 4.56% *** 9.48% *** 13.87% *** 21.68% *** -1 to +1 -11 to +30 48 
OLS 
Market 4.34% *** 9.12% *** 6.82% *** 7.24% * -1 to +1 0 to +28 49 
FF 4.27% *** 8.63% *** 8.74% *** 8.50% ** -1 to +1 -1 to +30 49 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
There are significantly positive returns to the targets in both the sub-sets, regardless 
of the choice of the financial model and regression technique. Though there is a slight 
variation in the magnitudes, the difference in the announcement effect and overall CAARs 
between the two models is not significant at the conventional level. Thus, the announcement 
effect from Fama-French model is comparable to the Market model and, qualitatively, both 
the models have similar outcomes.  
Evidently, the GJ takeovers produce larger returns to the target shareholders. The 
difference in returns due to regression techniques is visible even in FF returns. 
7.3.5 Corporate Governance Models and Political Framework 
While LLSV propounds that corporate governance practices are hard-wired into a 
country’s legal system, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) opine that countries have varied 
corporate governance systems, which may change over time, regardless of the legal origin of 
a country. This is primarily due to ‘domestic politics’: the institutional framework and the 
economic preferences of various economic stakeholders in the system that eventually 
determines the type of corporate governance model for a country. Consequently, numerous 
variants of corporate governance models may exist and eventually translate into ‘Diffused’ 
or ‘Blockholding’ ownership that can be either abusive or protective for investors. For 
instance, in France it is argued that, since the 1980s, their corporate governance model has 
been evolving and heading towards ‘Managerialism’. The Managerialism corporate 
governance model features a Diffused ownership structure. Meanwhile, other countries like 
Germany, Japan and Sweden have been pursuing corporate governance models engendering 
Blockholders. For India, the business house culture promotes Blockholding ownership. Based 
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on this theory, Aguilera and Jackson (2010), in their comprehensive study on comparative 
international corporate governance systems, produced the following table. 
Table 7.3.4 Adopted from Aguilera & Jackson (2010 p. 515)  
 
* X > Y: X’s preferences prevail in the political struggle over CG issues. O= Owners, M= Managers and W= 
Workers. 
To observe if there are any country specific variations in the returns, the following 
chart provides a snapshot of the CAARs generated up until the announcement from each 
country. The blue bars represent the countries with corporate governance models leading to 
Blockholding ownership, whereas the orange bars represent the countries pursuing Diffused 
ownership corporate governance models. Even when arranged by 3 day CAAR or AAR Day-
0, the countries with Diffused corporate governance models have lower returns. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.3 Country Specific Returns to Indian Targets (MM) 
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Table 7.3.5 (below) summarizes the statistical findings from the country analysis 
based on the Market model, estimated through the MM regression. 
Table 7.3.5 Summary - Indian Targets and Country Analysis (MM) 
Country 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs  
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Sweden 3.52%  11.16% ** 20.37% *** 30.60% *** -1 -1 to +30 10 
Germany 9.94% ** 17.62% ** 17.68% ** 29.41% ** 0 to +1 0 to +30 7 
Japan 3.65% ** 6.76% *** 14.03% *** 12.50%   0 -12 to +17 16 
Switzerland 5.79% * 15.24% ** 13.72% * 28.46% ***    6 
UK 2.88%  4.56%  10.05% * 17.57% **    12 
US 0.89%  3.83% *** 8.97% ** 14.69% *** +1 -19 to +30 24 
France 4.12%   5.19%   2.44%   11.35% *     6 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
It is evident that the takeovers from the countries with corporate governance models 
allowing ‘Blockholding ownership’ are favoured more than the takeovers with various 
measures. The returns from France are lowest in the spectrum.  
However, one has to be cautious; the findings should be interpreted as merely 
indicative due to the limitations posed by the sample sizes of each country.   
The next analysis is a reassessment of the corporate governance analysis, based on 
the models derived from the political framework. Following the literature, the countries are 
classified into the ‘Blockholder’ and ‘Diffused ownership’ sub-sets. This categorizes France 
with the United States and United Kingdom, and also allows for the inclusion of China in the 
analysis. 
Figure 7.3.4 presents the Market model results based on the MM regression. It also 
compares the results with the legal origin models from the LLSV Anglo-Saxon and 
German/Japanese models.  
The original CAARs from the AS and GJ models are presented in the blue graphs. 
The results from the models based on the political framework show even higher returns to the 
Blockholder37 sub-set when compared with GJ returns. And the returns from the Diffused 
sub-set are lower when compared with the AS CAARs.  
                                                 
37 The status of Switzerland was not clear but most likely it aligns with the blockholder model. So the 
analysis was performed both with and without Switzerland. There are no qualitative changes in the results. 
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Figure 7.3.4 Blockholding vs. Diffused Ownership (MM) 
Once again, despite having these returns spread out over the entire event window, the 
test of differences in means is significantly different from zero for the announcement day 
average returns (AAR Day-0) and 3 day CAARs for both the regression estimations. This 
implies that being taken over by a country pursuing the Blockholder corporate governance 
model is favoured more by the Indian market. 
Interestingly, in the classical shareholder/stakeholder dichotomy, the legal origin 
view from LLSV, and the political framework of corporate governance systems, regardless 
of the differences in their origin, all the systems converge eventually at ‘ownership patterns’ 
as an ultimate outcome. As discussed earlier, India is very well placed with regards to its  
corporate governance rules but scores poorly on its institutional environment due to 
executional incompetency. The concentrated ownership is seen as a commitment, which 
induces investor confidence. As a result, a natural hedge against the risk of expropriation for 
minority shareholders emeges in the countries that have weaker legal systems. Thus, it is 
natural that the Indian investors prefer the GJ or Blockholder models more.  
There is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the returns 
generated by the acquirers pursuing corporate governance models promoting concentrated 
shareholding are favoured more in the Indian markets.  
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7.4 Cultural Analysis 
Following the cultural classifications laid out in the iconic GLOBE Study in Figure 
7.4.1, the acquiring firms, by their ultimate parent company’s nationality, are divided into 
various cultural clusters. Such a classification is motivated by the literature that suggests that 
culture tends to flow from the acquirer to the target company. This classification allows the 
inclusion of ten additional target firms, which were acquired by an Indian firm with a parent 
company based overseas.  
The prominent clusters and respective observations in the data are Anglo (39), 
Confucian (24), Germanic (15), Latin Europe (9) and Nordic (11). The remaining countries 
not covered in the GLOBE study are clustered as Others. As the South Asia and Others 
clusters have only three observations each, their results are reported in the appendix.  
7.4.1 MM Estimation Analysis 
Figure 7.4.2 and Figure 7.4.3 represent graphically the 51 day CAARs for the Indian 
target firms when taken over by the acquirers from the various cultural clusters. For ease of 
presentation and discussion, returns from these clusters have been grouped in two separate 
 
Figure 7.4.1 Country Clusters According to the GLOBE Study 
Adopted from House et al., (2004, p 190) 
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graphs. The detailed statistical returns from these clusters are available in Table-A 7.15 to 
7.19 in the appendix. 
7.4.1.1 Confucian, Germanic and Nordic Clusters 
 
Figure 7.4.2 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Multiple Clusters - I;  (MM) 
In Confucian deals, the Day-0 AAR of 3% is statistically significant. While the 
CAARs are positive throughout, they significantly differ from zero for the days -11 to +20. 
The 3 day CAAR of 5.64% is also statistically significantly positive. Finally, the apparent 
decline in the returns in later days is not significant statistically.  
For Germanic deals, the CAARs are positive for the days -11 to +30 but are not 
significantly different from zero up until Day -1. The Day-0 AAR, CAAR along with the 3 
day CAAR of 14.42% are all significantly positive. The CAAR graph drifts upwards, 
suggesting small additional gains to the target shareholders. 
In Nordic acquisitions, similar to the Germanic deals, the CAARs are not different 
than zero until Day -2 but then after that they are statistically positive till the end. The Day-0 
CAAR and the 3 day CAAR of 12.24% are both significantly positive but not the AAR on 
Day-0. Further, the upward sloping curve with significant positive returns indicates small 
additional gains.  
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7.4.1.2 Anglo and Latin Europe Clusters 
 
Figure 7.4.3 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Multiple Clusters - II;  (MM) 
In Anglo deals, the CAARs are positive throughout the event window. However, they 
are statistically different from zero only from Day -11. The announcement day CAAR is 
significantly positive, as is the 3 day CAAR of 3.65%. However, the Day-0 AAR of 2% is 
not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
For Latin Europe deals, except for the Day-0 AAR of 4.26%, nothing else is 
significantly different from zero. 
7.4.1.3 South Asian and Other Cultures 
The South Asia and Other cultures categories both have three firms each and nothing 
is statistically significant in their analysis. While they are not graphed here, the statistical 
results for these clusters are provided in Table-A 7.20 and 7.21. 
7.4.2 OLS Estimations Analysis 
Figure 7.4.4 and Figure 7.4.5 graphically represent the CAARs from the OLS 
estimations. For ease of presentation and discussion, the CAARs are presented in two separate 
graphs. The detailed statistical returns from these clusters are provided in Table-A 7.22 to 
7.26 in the appendix. 
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7.4.2.1 Confucian, Germanic and Nordic Clusters 
 
Figure 7.4.4 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Multiple Clusters - I;  (OLS) 
In Confucian deals, the Day-0 AAR of 2.78% is statistically significant. While the 
CAARs are positive throughout, they are statistically different from zero for the Days -6 to 
+11. The 3 day CAAR of 4.73% is also significantly positive. The apparent decline in the 
returns in later days is not statistically significant.  
For Germanic deals, the CAARs are positive for the Days -9 to +30 but are 
insignificant up until the announcement day. The Day-0 AAR and CAAR, along with the 3 
day CAAR of 13.60%, are all significantly different than zero. The CAAR graph drifts 
upwards post-announcement, and the CAARs here are significantly positive. It suggests 
additional gains to the target shareholders. 
In Nordic acquisitions, similar to Germanic deals, the CAARs significantly positive 
from Day -1 until the end. The Day-0 CAAR and 3 day CAAR of 11.85% are both 
significantly positive, but not the AAR on Day-0. Further, the upward sloping curve with 
significant positive CAARs implies small additional gains.  
Interestingly, of the three clusters above, the AARs and the CAARs returns from the 
Confucian cluster, which is the closest to the South Asian culture where India belongs, are 
the lowest. 
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7.4.2.2 Anglo and Latin Europe Clusters 
 
Figure 7.4.5 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Multiple Clusters - II;  (OLS) 
In Anglo deals, the CAARs are positive throughout the event window. However, they 
gain statistical significance only from the Day -9. The announcement day CAAR is 
significantly positive, as is the 3 day CAAR of 3%. However, the Day-0 AAR of 1.78% is 
not statistically significant at the conventional level.  
For Latin Europe deals, all the relevant measurements are not significantly different 
from zero. Even the CAAR graph is erratic.   
7.4.2.3 South Asian and Other Cultures 
South Asia and Other cultures both have three firms each and nothing is statistically 
reliable in their analysis. While they are not graphed here, the statistical results for these 
clusters are provided in Table-A 7.27 and 7.28. 
7.4.3 Cultural Analysis Snapshot 
Table 7.4.1 provides the summary from the two regressions for all firms. The graphs 
based on OLS for MM firms (Same) are presented in Figure A 7.8 and 7.9. And there are no 
sample size discrepancies in the quality of the results at the conventional level of significance 
for OLS (All) and OLS (Same). 
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Table 7.4.1 Summary - Returns to Indian Targets from Various Cultures of Acquirers  
Regression Culture 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
Nordic 3.57%  12.24% ** 19.79% *** 35.57% *** -1 -2 to 30 11 
Germanic 6.15% *** 14.42% *** 14.55% *** 27.14% *** -1 to 1 -1 to 30 18 
Confucian 3.05% ** 5.64% *** 12.59% *** 12.71%   0 to 1 -11 to 18 22 
Anglo 2.00% * 3.65% ** 9.79% *** 11.91% ***  -11 to 30 44 
LE 4.26% ** 4.43%  0.10%   10.40% ** 0   8 
OLS  
Nordic 3.35%   11.85% ** 17.06% *** 28.55% ** -1 -1 to +30 11 
Germanic 5.88% *** 13.60% *** 9.18% *** 14.28% *** -1 to +1 0 to +30 18 
Confucian 2.78% ** 4.73% *** 8.48% *** 3.02%  0 -6 to +11 24 
Anglo 1.78% * 3.00% ** 6.14% *** 1.63%    -9 to +6 46 
LE 3.42% * 2.86%   -8.62% * -9.13% *   -6 to -1 9 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
With regards to the efficiency market hypothesis, there is no evidence of systematic 
AARs after the event. However, significantly positive AARs and CAARs in the pre-event 
days indicate incorporation of probabilistic takeover gains by the market in the share price. 
Likewise, significantly positive CAARs in the post-event period suggest small incremental 
returns to the shareholders.  
When the CAARs from the MM estimations are compared with those from the OLS, 
the curves reflect a similar trend for the Germanic, Nordic and Confucian clusters. The three 
clusters maintain the same order of magnitude and are also statistically significantly positive 
at similar levels. However, the magnitudes of the MM returns are more pronounced, 
especially for the latter two clusters. 
When the MM CAARs of Anglo and Latin Europe clusters are compared with their 
respective OLS counterparts, there is a substantial difference overall. The Day-0 CAAR for 
Anglo cluster from the MM estimates is larger, followed by an upward drift with significantly 
positive CAARs throughout. Even the window for significant CAARs is considerably larger 
from the MM estimates. The Latin Europe cluster is significantly positive for the Day-0 AAR 
and also the slope of the graph changes from negative to positive.  
Figure 7.4.6 provides a visual comparison of the OLS and MM CAARs up until Day-
0 from each of these clusters. Except for the Latin European cluster, each of these Day-0 
CAARs is significantly positive. 
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Figure 7.4.6 Cultural Analysis Snapshot 
In Figure 7.4.1, adopted from the GLOBE study, each country is classified under a 
cluster according to identical cultural properties. In addition, adjacent clusters are placed 
according to their cultural proximity to one another. 
Thus, if cultural proximity is a founding principle in CBMAs, then cluster distance 
can be relied upon to explain the variations in the magnitudes of the returns shown in Figure 
7.4.6. The further the distance, the lower the return should be. India belongs to the Southern 
Asia cluster, which is diametrically opposite to the Latin Europe cluster. This might explain 
negative or lower returns (though insignificant) from the Latin European cluster. Likewise, 
India is one, two, three and four clusters away from the Confucian, Nordic, Anglo and 
Germanic groups respectively. This might explain the significantly positive and higher 
returns from the Confucian cluster, and the relatively lower retunrs from the Anglo cluster. 
However, even higher returns from the Nordic cluster (when compared with the Confucian 
cluster) and also the Germanic cluster (when compared with the Anglo cluster) is inconsistent 
with the cultural proximity argument.  
Further, the statistical tests of differences in the announcement effect based on the  3 
day CAARs [-1, +1] for these cultural clusters (refer Table 7.4.2) demonstrate that the 
Germanic and Nordic clusters generate a significantly larger announcement effect when 
compared with the Anglo and Confucian clusters, according to both of the regression methods 
(Germanic and Confucian difference is nearly significant at 5%). And since the higher returns 
obtained are from the distant clusters, rather than the closer cluster, it does indicate that 
cultural proximity may not be the factor driving those returns.  
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Table 7.4.2 Cultural Comparison - Indian Targets 
Cultures 
3-Days CAARs  
(MM) 
3-Days CAARs  
(OLS) 
Anglo Confucian LE Nordic Anglo Confucian LE Nordic 
Germanic 10.78% ** 8.78% * 9.99%  2.18%  10.60% ** 8.87% * 10.74% * 1.75%   
Nordic 8.60% *** 6.60% ** 7.81%    8.85% *** 7.12% ** 8.99% *    
LE 0.79%  -1.21%      -0.14%  -1.87%       
Confucian 2.00%               1.73%               
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Further, despite there being a large difference in the overall CAARs visually, the test 
of difference in returns fails to reject the null hypothesis. However, this is because of the large 
standard deviations in the two sub-sets, which statistically reduce the power of the test for the 
total CAARs and increases the chances of Type-II errors. 
To summarize, as per the hypothesis, there is no evidence of higher returns from the 
proximate cultures and lower return from the distant ones. In fact, significantly positive 
abnormal returns across all cultures, bar one, give rise to the question: is culture and its 
proximity a dominant variable in Indian CBMAs at all? According to Hofstede (1984), 
culturally different firms grow as a result of the exchange of a new set of strengths 
capabilities, resources and knowledge. The Resource Based View (RBV) and Organisational 
Learning Theory suggest that the cultural and institutional differences present opportunities 
to acquire unique skills. Barkema et al. (1996) and Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) suggest 
that the greater the divergence, the higher the possibilities of new learning. 
Further, there is a strong indication of higher returns from the Nordic, Germanic and 
Confucian clusters and relatively lower returns from the Anglo cluster. The closer inspection 
reveals that these results reemphasize the findings from the corporate governance analysis. 
The Nordic, Germanic and Confucian clusters are dominated by countries following 
German/Japanese or Blockholder ownership corporate governance models, while the Anglo 
and Latin European countries are the countries who follow Anglo-Saxon or Diffused 
ownership corporate governance models. Here, France is included in the Latin European 
cluster. This conclusion once again points towards the corporate governance model as the 
more dominant argument. The findings support the argument by Hofstede (1994), which 
suggests that common practices, and not common values, keep multinationals together.  
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7.4.4 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
Finally, Fama-French analysis of these prominent cultural clusters using both the MM 
and the OLS estimations are graphed in Figure A 7.10 to  7.13 in the appendix and the 
statistical results are summarized in Table 7.4.3. 
Table 7.4.3 Summary of Cultural Analysis; Market vs. FF Model; OLS & MM. 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Confucian 
MM 
Market 2.80% ** 4.99% ** 11.47% ** 6.24%   0 -11 to +16 20 
FF 2.76% ** 4.97% ** 10.34% *** 5.52%   0 -7 to +16 20 
OLS 
Market 2.69% ** 4.46% ** 7.91% ** -3.51%   0 0 to +5 20 
FF 2.66% ** 4.47% ** 7.10% ** -4.05%   0 0 to +5 20 
Germanic 
MM 
Market 5.37% *** 13.20% *** 11.84% *** 23.63% *** -1 to +1 -1 to +30 17 
FF 5.27% *** 12.67% *** 13.76% *** 25.89% *** -1 to +1 -3 to +30 17 
OLS 
Market 5.10% ** 12.39% *** 6.55% ** 10.72% *** -1 to +1 0 to +30 17 
FF 5.02% ** 11.90% *** 8.53% *** 13.32% ***  0 to +1 0 to +30 17 
Nordic 
MM 
Market 3.57%   12.24% ** 19.79% *** 35.57% *** -1 -2 to 30 11 
FF 3.54%  12.12% ** 21.88% *** 38.36% *** -1 -10 to +30 11 
OLS 
Market 3.35%   11.85% ** 17.06% *** 28.55% ** -1 -1 to 30 11 
FF 3.42%   11.65% ** 19.05% *** 30.64% ** -1 -5 to +30 11 
Anglo 
MM 
Market 1.69%   3.24% * 10.55% *** 13.34 ***  -12 to +30 38 
FF 1.60%  3.14% * 11.13% *** 13.47 ***  -12 to +30 38 
OLS 
Market 1.42%   2.50% * 6.36% *** 1.53%     -9 to +6 40 
FF 1.38%   2.77% * 7.39% *** 2.02%     -9 to +5 40 
Latin Europe 
MM 
Market 4.69% * 5.41%   1.90%   12.45% **     7 
FF 4.15% * 3.26%  6.57%  14.49%      7 
OLS 
Market 3.65% * 3.51%   -8.29%   -9.58%     -6 to -1 8 
FF 3.32%   2.02%   -3.26%   -9.41%       8 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
As earlier, Fama-French CAARs are similar to the Market model returns with their 
respective regressions. Although the magnitude is slightly higher on the conventional level 
of statistical significance, the results are qualitatively comparable. 
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7.5 Institutional Environment Analysis 
The legal origin hypothesis established by LLSV is one of the most celebrated 
theories in finance literature. Accordingly, institutional environment analysis has been 
undertaken in order to understand whether the similarities in legal systems dictate the 
outcomes of Indian CBMAs. Weak law enforcement characterizes the emerging countries. 
Property rights for the acquiring firms and shareholder protection for the target firms thus 
become important issues. In such an environment, institutional harmonies should enhance the 
comfort and therefore the confidence of the participating companies.  
India, being a former British colony, has inherited the common law system, which 
generally scores high on both property rights and shareholder protection scales in LLSV 
literature. Therefore, theoretically, CBMAs with Commonwealth nations should exhibit more 
synergies, implying higher returns. Thus, the markets should favour deals from 
Commonwealth countries more than deals from the other nations. 
The 104 Indian CBMA target firms are reclassified into two segments: those which 
are taken over by acquirers from Commonwealth nations (CW), and others (NCW).  
7.5.1 MM Estimation Analysis  
The MM regression based results are graphed in Figure 7.5.1 and tabulated in Table-
A 7.29 and 7.30 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 7.5.1 Indian Targets; Institutional Analysis; All-Firms (MM) 
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In accordance with the proposition, the Day-0 CAAR of 13.80% from the CW 
acquirers is numerically higher than that of NCW nations which is only 10.41%. Further, 
while the CAARs for days [-1 to +30] are statistically significantly positive for the CW sub-
set, the announcement effect captured via AAR - Day-0 and 3 day CAAR both do not differ 
statistically from zero for them. The CAAR graphs for CW sub-set fluctuates due to the 
smaller sample size.  
For the NCW acquirers, the Day-0 AAR (3.88%) is higher from the CW acquirers 
and also significantly different from zero. So is the 3 day CAAR of 8.45%. Likewise, the 
CAARs are positive and significantly different from zero for the days [-14 to +30]. 
7.5.2 Market Model OLS Estimations 
Figure 7.5.2  presents the CAARs for the two sub-sets based on the OLS estimations 
of the abnormal returns. 
 
Figure 7.5.2 Indian Targets; Institutional Analysis; All-Firms (OLS) 
Once again, the CAARs from the CW group are numerically larger than the CAARs 
from the NCW group. For the CW group, the Day-0 CAAR of 10.91% is significantly positive 
but not the announcement day AAR or the 3 day CAAR. The CAAR graph for CW set of 
firms fluctuates due to the smaller sample size.  
On the other hand, the NCW group has Day-0 AAR of 3.22%, CAAR of 5.79% and 
a 3 day CAAR of 7.48%. All of these are statistically significantly different from zero. The 
CAARs are significantly positive for the days [-1 to +30]. 
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7.5.3 Institutional Framework Analysis Snapshot 
Table 7.5.1 (below) summarizes the statistical findings from the two regressions for 
all and same set of firms. The graphs based on the OLS for MM firms are presented in Figure 
A 7.14 and 7.15. There are no discrepancies in the quality of the results due to different sample 
sizes at conventional level of significance. 
Table 7.5.1 Summary of Institutional Analysis; Market Model; OLS & MM 
Regression Sub-set 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
MM 
NCW 3.58% *** 8.45% *** 10.41% *** 18.50% *** -1 to +1 -14 to +30 83 
CW 2.88%   4.86% * 13.80% ** 17.89% **   -1 to + 30 16 
OLS 
NCW 3.22% *** 7.48% *** 5.79% *** 6.74% ** -1 to +1 -1 to +30 88 
CW 2.81%   4.45%  10.91% ** 10.60% *   0 to +3 16 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.  
The Day-0 AARs and 3 day CAAR are significantly positive from the NCW sub-set 
but not from the CW sub-set at a conventional level. However, overall, there are positive 
returns to the targets from the two sub-sets but with varying magnitudes.  
Further, following a methodology from Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Table 7.5.2 
presents the differences in the two sub-sets’ CAARs (NCW – CW) over various strata of the 
event period and thus provides a more comprehensive understanding of the possible 
variations in the returns from the two sub-sets. 
Table 7.5.2 Comparison NCW – CW for Indian Targets 
CAAR Windows MM OLS 
Pre-event 
-10 to -1 -5.43%   -6.18% * 
-5 to -1 -3.05%   -3.32%   
-3 to -1 -1.87%   -2.17%   
Event 
-1 to +1 3.59%   3.03%   
0 0.70%   0.41%   
Post-event 
+1 to +3 3.20%   3.09%   
+1 to 5 4.29%   4.10%   
+1 to +10 4.35%   3.18%   
Total -20 to +30 0.61%   -3.86%   
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Though there are significantly positive returns from the takeovers from both the sub-
sets, there is no difference in the abnormal returns obtained by the two sub-sets at the 
conventional level for any of these strata. Further, returns from the NCW sub-set are higher 
in the post-event period, which suggests that the market favours NCW takeovers more when 
it learns about the acquirer. 
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The evidence presented here supports the null hypothesis. There is sufficient evidence 
that the returns obtained by the Indian target firms do not vary due to the CW origin of the 
acquirer. Alternatively put, institutional proximity does not have a decisive role in 
determining the outcomes of the returns to the target firms. Also, it is worth noting that 88 
(85%) of the firms in the sample set are taken over by the NCW countries, which suggests 
that legal system commonality is hardly a deterrent in Indian CBMAs.  
7.5.4 Market vs. Fama-French Returns 
The Fama-French results for all the available firms are presented and compared with 
those from the Market model for the same set of firms under the two regression techniques. 
The comparative graphs are provided in the Figure A 7.16 and 7.17 and the findings are 
summarized in Table 7.5.3. 
Table 7.5.3 Summary of Commonwealth Analysis; Market vs. FF Model; OLS & MM 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Non-Commonwealth Acquirers 
MM 
Market 3.44% *** 8.34% *** 9.62% *** 16.50% *** -1 to +1 -11 to +30 77 
FF 3.35% *** 8.01% *** 10.92% *** 17.89% *** -1 to +1 -16 to +30 77 
OLS 
Market 3.13% *** 7.52% *** 5.00% *** 4.69% * -1 to +1 -1 to +22 80 
FF 3.08% *** 7.43% *** 6.73% *** 6.23% ** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 80 
Commonwealth Acquirers 
MM 
Market 3.09% * 4.98%  16.64% ** 22.48% **   -2 to +30 13 
FF 2.89%  4.97%  17.47% ** 24.35% ***   -2 to +30 13 
OLS 
Market 3.03% * 4.52%  13.22% * 13.75% *     13 
FF 2.75% * 4.39%  13.82% ** 13.81% *   -1 to +3 13 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
There are significantly positive returns to the targets from both the sub-sets, 
regardless of the choice of the financial model and regression technique. Though there is a 
slight variation in the magnitudes, the difference in announcement effect and overall CAARs 
from the two models is not significant at a conventional level. Thus, the outcomes from the 
Fama-French model are comparable to the Market model and, qualitatively, both the models 
are identical.  
In summary, there is no difference in returns from the two sub-sets. Analysis supports 
the hypothesis, which states that there is no difference in returns to the targets due to the 
institutional differences with the acquirers. 
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7.6 Summary - Returns to Targets 
Table 7.6.1 summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of the abnormal returns to 
the Indian targets firms based on the Value Weighted Index (VWI). 
Table 7.6.1 Summary Results; Indian Targets; All-Firms - VWI 
Model 
Regression 
Betas 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 3.47% *** 7.87% *** 10.95% *** 18.40% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 99 
OLS 3.16% *** 7.01% *** 6.57% *** 7.34% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-1 3.21% *** 7.19% *** 6.64% *** 7.04% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-2 3.21% *** 7.27% *** 6.40% *** 6.64% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
SW-3 3.21% *** 7.22% *** 6.51% *** 6.92% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
FF 
MM 3.29% *** 7.57% *** 11.87% *** 18.84% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 90 
OLS 3.03% *** 7.00% *** 7.72% *** 7.29% *** -1 to +1 -9 to +30 93 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The announcement effect and overall CAARs are statistically significantly positive. 
When rounded to the nearest integer, the announcement day return ranges from 3% to 3.5% 
and the 3 day  return is around 7% to 8%. Depending on the financial model and regression 
technique, the overall CAARs can generate returns between 7% and 19%.  
Evidently, Indian target shareholders earn positive abnormal returns both at the 
announcement and in its surrounding days. 
Further, with respect to institutional similarities, there is no difference in returns from 
acquirers from dissimilar institutional frameworks. With respect to the cultural proximities 
argument, there are differences in returns from culturally different countries—the countries 
that are culturally distant produce higher returns. However, with respect to governance 
structure, the corporate governance model implications are significantly different from the 
two regimes. The evidence rejects the hypothesis about no difference in returns, and suggests 
that the acquisitions by firms pursuing German/Japanese model generate higher returns. 
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7.7 Returns to Indian Acquirers 
In the cross-border sample, subsequent to the filtering process discussed in the 
methodology chapter, there is a total of 233 firms identified as Indian acquirers. Of these 233 
firms, 195 acquirers participated in DMAs and the remaining 38 firms in CBMAs38.  
Figure 7.7.1 compares the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) obtained 
from the MM and the OLS regressions using the Market model for all the available firms 
over the 51 day event window [-20, +30] for the Indian acquirers .  
 
Figure 7.7.1 Returns to CB Acquirers - OLS vs. MM 
The CAARs derived from the MM estimator are represented by the solid black line 
and are reported in Table-A 7.33. The Day-0 AAR of 1.34% is significantly positive. Other 
variables like Day-0 CAAR (1.83%) and 3 day CAAR of 1.17%, while positive, do not differ 
from zero statistically on the conventional level of significance. 
The OLS CAARs are tabulated in Table-A 7.34. Similar to the MM estimations, the 
Day-0 AAR of 1.24% is significantly positive, but the Day-0 CAAR and 3 day CAAR do not 
differ from zero at conventional level. However, contrary to the positive MM CAARs 
(1.83%), the Day-0 CAAR (-1.15%) is negative.  
                                                 
38 One particular firm had unusually high abnormal returns with disproportionately large standard deviation. 
Being a small sample size, it had an adverse negative effect on the outcomes. Hence, the return presented 
here are based on 37 firms. However, with 38 firms, the MM announcement returns are 1.14% and OLS 
AAR-Day-0 is 1.04%. 
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7.7.1 Market vs. Fama-French (FF) Model 
The following compares the two financial models and the two regression techniques 
for the same set of firms (FF firms). The OLS and the MM analysis is based on 32 common 
firms39. The CAARs from the M regression are identical to those from the MM estimations, 
and are separately graphed in Figure A 7.19 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 7.7.2 Returns to CB Acquirers; Market vs. FF; OLS vs MM  (All & Same-Firms) 
The graphs in red represent the CAARs from the OLS regression, while those in black 
represent the MM estimator. The dotted lines represent the CAARs from the Market model, 
while the solid lines denote those from the Fama-French model.  
The divergence in the black and the red graphs in the post-event period reflects the 
differences in the regression techniques. Clearly, the MM estimator produces higher returns. 
Also, while the MM CAARs suggest a positive announcement effect, the OLS CAARs 
suggest negative returns. 
Comparing any solid line with the dotted line in the same colour shows the differences 
in the Market model and the FF model for that regression technique. Apparently, the returns 
from the FF model are consistently slightly higher. Except for that difference, notably, the 
solid lines (FF model) in both the regressions trend precisely alongside the dotted lines 
(Market model). 
                                                 
39 The troublesome firm discussed in the market model analysis is not the part of this analysis either as it 
did not have Fama-French variables available. 
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Table 7.7.1 provides a statistical summary of the various CAARs graphed above. The 
relevant tables for the FF model results are Table-A 7.35 to 7.38.  
Table 7.7.1 Market vs. FF Model; OLS vs. MM Comparison 
Regression Model 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR 
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 1.34% ** 1.17%   1.83%   -2.55%   0   37 
OLS 1.24% ** 0.92%   -1.15%  -8.77% *** 0 to +1   37 
FF 
MM 
1.37% ** 1.31%   1.95%   -1.71%   0   32 
Market 1.35% ** 1.15%   1.84%   -2.26%   0   32 
FF 
OLS 
1.23% ** 0.97%   -1.22%  -9.16% *** 0   32 
Market 1.25% ** 0.91%   -1.26%   -8.70% ** 0   32 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size.       
Both the regression techniques for both the models suggest significantly positive 
returns to the acquirers on the announcement day (Day-0 AAR). In conformity to the findings 
from other emerging countries and studies about India, there is sufficient evidence that the 
announcement of CBMA deals yield abnormal positive gains for the Indian acquirer firms.  
The two regression techniques, while agreeing on statistically significantly positive 
returns to the acquirers on the announcement day, present different trends for cumulative 
returns. While MM regressions from both the financial models suggest positive returns 
overall, the OLS results do not concur with that finding. Further, the test of differences in the 
returns for 3 days [-1, +1] and 51 days [-20, +30] is significantly different from zero at the 
conventional level.  
Comparing the FF model with the Market model yields no substantial difference 
between the two. The announcement effect (Day-0 AAR and 3 day CAAR) and the overall 
CAARs (51 day CAAR) are not significantly different from zero for both the regression 
methods.  
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7.7.2 Market vs. Scholes and Williams (SW) Adjusted Betas 
All three SW adjusted beta variants along with the original Market model are 
compared in this section. The set of common firms used is also the entire sample set. 
 
Figure 7.7.3 Returns from the Market and SW (1-3) Models; OLS (All & Same-Firms) 
Figure 7.7.3 is based on Table-A 7.34 7.39 to 7.41. It serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
shows the CAARs from all three SW adjusted beta variants. Secondly, it compares them with 
the original Market model for the same set of firms. 
Table 7.7.2 provides a statistical summary of all the CAARs graphed above.  
Table 7.7.2 Market and SW Betas Comparison (All & Same-Firms) 
Model Beta 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
Unadjusted 1.24% ** 0.92%   -1.15%   -8.77% *** 0 to +1   37 
SW-1 1.31% ** 0.95%   -1.32%  -9.39% *** 0   37 
SW-2 1.32% ** 0.93%   -1.31%  -9.51% *** 0 to +1   37 
SW-3 1.34% ** 1.02%   -0.68%   -8.50% *** 0   37 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The SW adjusted beta Market models also replicate the findings of the original 
Market model. Qualitatively, all the relevant aspects of the analysis are statistically similar. 
The findings are in line with Dyckman et al. (1984 and Davidson and Josev (2005), which 
suggest no significant improvement in the specifications or the power of tests using either of 
these modified betas. Thus, there is no unique value addition to the analysis over the 
unadjusted Market model analysis from the SW adjusted betas of Market model. 
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7.8 Summary Returns to Acquirers 
Table 7.8.1 (below) summarizes the findings of the entire analysis of the abnormal 
returns to the Indian targets firms based on the Value Weighted Index (VWI). 
Table 7.8.1 Summary Results; Indian Acquirers; All-firms-VWI 
Model Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Market 
MM 1.34% ** 1.17%   1.83%   -2.55%   0   37 
OLS 1.24% ** 0.92%   -1.15%   -8.77% *** 0 to +1   37 
SW-1 1.31% ** 0.95%   -1.32%   -9.39% *** 0   37 
SW-2 1.32% ** 0.93%  -1.31%  -9.51% *** 0 to +1   37 
SW-3 1.34% ** 1.02%   -0.68%   -8.50% *** 0   37 
FF 
MM 1.37% ** 1.31%  1.95%  -1.71%   0   32 
OLS 1.23% ** 0.97%   -1.22%   -9.16% *** 0   32 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The positive announcement effect is clear, as evidenced by the positive average 
abnormal returns on Day-0. However, post-event CAARs tend to be negative from both the 
regressions. 
Further, the event-study analysis for acquirers focussing on the effect of the corporate 
governance models, cultural and institutional distances is not conducted here due to a very 
small sample size available for such segmentations. Of the total 37 Indian acquirer firms in 
the sample, 26 takeovers occurred, with the targets based in the United States or the United 
Kingdom. They both rely on the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model, and belong to 
the Anglo culture. Once that is factored in, any further segmentation of the sample leaves the 
sub-sets insufficiently small for any robust and meaningful analysis.  
Instead, the impact of these aspects is studied directly in the cross-sectional analysis 
presented in the next section. 
The explanation for the dominance of the United States and United Kingdom targets 
in Indian acquisitions can be explained by (i) a common business language which helps to 
improve communication and bridge cultural and psychic distance, (ii) the fact that they are 
developed countries which allows access to better technology and skills not available at home 
(Buckley et al., 2012). 
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7.9 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This section takes the analysis further and investigates the cross-sectional 
determinants of the CAARs obtained by the participating Indian firms in the cross-border 
dataset. This analysis regresses various deal specific characteristics, in combination with the 
cultural, institutional and corporate governance variables, with the CAAR windows of 
varying time lengths ranging from the days [-1,+1] to [-10,+10] with respect to the 
announcement day. While the smaller event windows capture the returns just in the days 
adjacent to the event day, larger event windows ensure that pre and post-event market 
reactions are also adequately captured. However, one important difference in the CAARs of 
CBMAs, when compared with CAARs of the domestic dataset, is that the symmetrical 
window size of the CAARs is significantly different from zero, and is not as large as it is in 
the latter. Consequently, the largest window analysed here is [-10 to +10] with few smaller 
windows added to the analyses40. 
Both the target and acquirer CAARs are regressed with a combination of independent 
variables comprising Cash, Pct50, PctToe, Related, Conglomerate, CWA, CWT, GJ, 
Blockhold, Germanic, Nordic, Confucian, Anglo, Latin European and South Asian41.  
Further, the Market model CAARs from both the estimation techniques (the OLS and 
the MM from the event study analysis) are examined using the OLS regression with White-
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  
This thesis confines the cross-sectional analysis to the OLS technique only because 
Maronna and Yohai (2000) argue that the presence of multiple independent explanatory 
                                                 
40 The analyses based on even larger windows like [-15 to +15] and [-20 to +20] is provided in the appendix. 
As expected, neither the models, nor the variables are statistically significant in these regressions. 
41 Recall from the methodology chapter, Cash is a dummy variable wherein the value of one is assigned for 
a cash offer and zero for shares or a combination of cash and share; Pct50 is a dummy variable that reflects 
acquisition of majority stake - one is assigned when either the acquired stake is 50% or more or when the 
existing stake is increased to 50% or more; PctToe is a continuous variable that represents the percentage 
shareholding already held by the acquirer prior to the announcement of the deal; Related is 1 when the 
both the firms have common parent company; Conglomerate is one when the firms belong to same 
industry based on 2 digit SIC code; CWA is a dummy variable which is assigned one when the Acquirer 
is from a Commonwealth nation; CWT is a dummy variable when the Target belongs to a Commonwealth 
nation; GJ refers to the corporate governance model of the Acquirer. It is a dummy variable and is 
assigned one when the acquirer has German/Japanese corporate governance model. Based on Political 
framework of corporate governance models, Blockhold implies if the corporate governance model 
pursued by the Acquirer allows for blockholding ownership. It is one for Blockholding and zero for the 
Diffused ownership. Germanic, Nordic Confucian, Anglo, and LE all are dummy variables that represent 
originating cultures of the Acquirers and are assigned one for their respective cultures. 
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dummy variables can easily yield to collinear sub-samples created while executing various 
algorithms inherent to robust regressions procedures.  
7.9.1 Indian Target Firms 
Table 7.9.1 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the independent 
variables used in this analysis for the target firms. It is evident that the corporate governance 
variables (GJ and Blockhold) are significantly correlated with each other and also with the 
cultural variables. And some of them are in high enough order to influence the analysis. In 
fact, when these variables are executed simultaneously in one equation, the mean Variation 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is 3.50, with the highest VIF being 9 individually, and several others 
exceeding 5. Considering a possibility of multicollinearity in the analysis, the impact of the 
two corporate governance variables and the cultural variables is tested in separate equations42: 
Corporate Governance: 
Cultural Clusters: 
CAARt1,t2  = α0 +  β1 Cash + β2  Germanic + β3  Nordic +  β4  Confucian
+ β5  LE + β6  SA +  β7  CWA +  β8  Pct50 + β9  PctToe +    εi  
(7-3) 
where, Cash, Pct50 and CWA variables are expected to be positive; PctToe along 
with the Cultural variables are expected to have negative sign. The negative sign for Cultures 
because none of them belong to the same culture as India which is South Asian. In the 
corporate governance variables, the impact of Blockhold should be positive. However, the 
GJ variable is particularly ambiguous as, formally, India is Anglo-Saxon but, in practice, it 
adheres to the German/Japanese model.  
                                                 
42 The variables Related and Conglomerate are also tested but not reported here as they have significant 
correlation with other variables and thus tend to reduce the power of the model. Besides they have 
expected signs and their coefficients are not significantly different from zero. They also do not change 
the other variables at conventional levels. 
CAARt1,t2  = α0 +  β1 Cash + β2  GJ +  β3 CWA +  β4 Pct50 + β5 PctToe + εi  (7-1) 
CAARt1,t2  = α0 +  β1 Cash + β2Blockhold + β3 CWA + β4 Pct50 + β5 PctToe
+ εi  
(7-2) 
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Table 7.9.1 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables - Targets 
  Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe   CWA   Blockhold   GJ   Germanic   Nordic   Confucian   Anglo   LE   
 Pct50 -0.1955                       
  (0.0501) 
 PctToe 0.2528 ** -0.0362                    
  (0.0112) 
 
(0.7209) 
 CWA 0.0933  0.1125  -0.0519                  
  (0.3536) (0.2625) (0.6078) 
 Blockhold -0.0126  -0.0649  0.1818  -0.4212 ***               
  (0.9005) (0.5189) (0.0703) (0.0000) 
 
 GJ -0.0524  -0.0755  0.2068 ** -0.4729 *** 0.8867 ***             
  (0.6044) (0.4554) (0.0400) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
 Germanic -0.0465  -0.0450  0.0792  -0.1812  0.4302 *** 0.3877 ***           
  (0.6443) (0.6548) (0.4337) (0.0698) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
 Nordic 0.1270  -0.0331  0.3458 *** -0.1517  0.3601 *** 0.3245 *** -0.1460           
  (0.2056) (0.7421) (0.0004) 
 
(0.1300) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.1451) 
 Confucian -0.0435  0.0198  -0.1920  -0.1148  0.3889 *** 0.3137 *** -0.2332 ** -0.1952        
  (0.6660) (0.8442) (0.0556) (0.2530) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0189) 
 
(0.0505) 
 Anglo 0.0097  0.0281  -0.0823  0.3799 *** -0.7699 *** -0.8663 *** -0.3312 *** -0.2773 *** -0.4428 ***     
  (0.9233) (0.7801) (0.4158) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0050) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
 LE -0.0767  0.0111  0.0528  -0.1357  -0.0950  0.2903 *** -0.1306   -0.1093  -0.1746  -0.2481 **   
  (0.4459) (0.9123) (0.6019) (0.1760) (0.3446) (0.0034) 
 
(0.1929) (0.2764) (0.0807) (0.0124) 
 
 SA 0.0742  0.0062  -0.1464  0.0838  -0.1698  -0.1905  -0.0731  -0.0612  -0.0977  -0.1388  -0.0547  
   
(0.4608) (0.9509) (0.1461) (0.4047) (0.0895) (0.0576) (0.4677) (0.5434) (0.3312) (0.1664) (0.5868) 
 
    p-values in parentheses; ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
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Further, the Germanic, Nordic, Confucian and Latin European cultures share the 
same GJ corporate governance model. Likewise, companies emerging from the Anglo 
culture pursue the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model. In the same vein, the 
Blockhold variable also encapsulates these cultures, apart from the Latin European culture, 
which is classified with the Diffused category that consists of the Anglo countries. In fact, 
the effect of the corporate governance variables is sliced into these cultural variables. In 
essence, the equation (7-3) simply splits and dilutes the corporate governance effect into 
various cultures. So, the main equations for the analyses are equations (7-1) and (7-2). 
Therefore, the results from these equations are presented and discussed here, while the 
results from equation (7-3) are provided in the appendix for reference.  
7.9.1.1 Corporate Governance Analysis – Legal Origin 
Table 7.9.2 and Table 7.9.3 present the multivariate regression results for the 
various CAAR windows for the Indian CBMA target firms. The CAARs referred to here 
are taken from the OLS and MM estimations of the abnormal returns in the event analysis. 
The univariate results for each of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix 
in Table-A 7.46 to 7.55. 
Table 7.9.2 Regression Analysis of the OLS CAARs – CBMA Indian Target Firms 
              CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
              [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
            
 Cash 0.0668 * 0.0501  0.0379  0.0143  -0.0118  
            
 
(1.7555) 
 
(1.3601) (1.1159) (0.4251) (-0.4722) 
            
 GJ 0.0674 * 0.0942 ** 0.0905 ** 0.0853 *** 0.0591 *** 
            
 
(1.7460) 
 
(2.5484) 
 
(2.5541) 
 
(2.7286) 
 
(3.0076) 
 
            
 CWA 0.0846  0.0814  0.0589  0.0532  0.0203  
            
 
(1.3587) (1.5746) (1.2655) (1.1697) (0.7058) 
            
 Pct50 -0.0184  -0.0401  -0.0101  -0.0261  -0.0148  
            
 
(-0.4996) (-1.1673) (-0.2904) (-0.8023) (-0.6169) 
            
 PctToe 0.1253  0.1348 * 0.1246  0.0606  0.0684  
            
 
(1.6196) (1.7541) 
 
(1.6479) (0.8524) (1.2805) 
            
 Intercept -0.0268  -0.0319  -0.0184  0.0168  0.0255  
            
 
(-0.6542) (-0.9577) (-0.6497) (0.6752) (1.4689) 
              Observations 99   99   99   99   99   
             F-Statistics 2.4182  3.7236  3.3218  2.2744  2.4686  
             p-value 0.0415 ** 0.0041 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0534 * 0.0380 ** 
              Adj. R-Squared 0.0767   0.1172   0.0879   0.0420   0.0657   
            
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 7.9.3 Regression of the MM CAARs – CBMA India Target Firms - GJ 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0464  0.0401  0.0270  0.0093  -0.0135   
(1.1542) (1.0258) (0.7512) (0.2576) (-0.4986) 
 GJ 0.0790 * 0.0998 ** 0.0845 ** 0.0832 ** 0.0657 ***  
(1.9773) 
 
(2.5395) 
 
(2.3616) 
 
(2.5438) 
 
(3.1125) 
 
 CWA 0.0732  0.0752  0.0534  0.0472  0.0175   
(1.1985) (1.4512) (1.1365) (1.0303) (0.5978) 
 Pct50 -0.0292  -0.0491  -0.0304  -0.0350  -0.0100   
(-0.7541) (-1.2923) (-0.8790) (-1.0293) (-0.3806) 
 PctToe 0.0904  0.1137  0.1237  0.0541  0.0544   
(1.1607) (1.4350) (1.6326) (0.7492) (0.9869) 
 Intercept 0.0345  0.0086  0.0180  0.0406  0.0337 *  
(0.8055) (0.2447) (0.6102) (1.4707) (1.6666) 
 
  Observations 94   94   94   94   94   
 F-Statistics 1.8425  3.3040  3.0221  2.0247  2.4785  
 p-value 0.1128  0.0088 *** 0.0145 ** 0.0829 * 0.0378 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0470   0.1008   0.0843   0.0370   0.0663   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
In both the sets of regressions above, the regression equations are mostly significant 
at varying levels for the different CAAR windows.  
Further, the GJ corporate governance variable is the most prominent independent 
variable when it comes to explaining the variations in the CAARs. Even in the univariate 
analysis, it is consistently significantly positive. The positive coefficients here imply that 
the target firms gain 6% to 9% higher positive abnormal returns when taken over by 
companies pursuing the GJ model, when compared with those from Anglo-Saxon 
companies. 
7.9.1.2 Corporate Governance Analysis – Political Framework 
Following (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) for corporate governance models, the 
corporate governance attribute is reclassified into Blockholding and Diffused patterns of 
ownership possibilities. Table 7.9.4 and Table 7.9.5 are based on equation (7-2) and the 
CAARs are based on the OLS and the MM estimations respectively. The univariate analysis 
of these equations is presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 7.46 to 7.55. 
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Table 7.9.4 Regression of the OLS CAARs – CBMA India Target Firms - Blockhold 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0847 ** 0.0624 * 0.0462  0.0162  -0.0115   
(2.0942) 
 
(1.6738) 
 
(1.3537) (0.4982) (-0.4842) 
 Blockhold 0.1004 *** 0.1228 *** 0.1051 *** 0.0928 *** 0.0654 ***  
(2.6589) 
 
(3.4236) 
 
(3.0353) 
 
(2.9811) 
 
(3.2619) 
 
 CWA 0.0854  0.0811  0.0537  0.0487  0.0186   
(1.4148) (1.6360) (1.1940) (1.0919) (0.6462) 
 Pct50 0.0048  -0.0221  0.0031  -0.0204  -0.0120   
(0.1171) (-0.6044) (0.0868) (-0.6532) (-0.5396) 
 PctToe 0.0889  0.1079  0.1080  0.0554  0.0660   
(1.1194) (1.4295) (1.4633) (0.8162) (1.3005) 
 Intercept -0.0416  -0.0418  -0.0208  0.0186  0.0263   
(-1.0880) (-1.3583) (-0.8001) (0.7972) (1.6065) 
  Observations 100   100   100   100   100   
 F-Statistics 2.9715  4.7688  3.8514  2.5008  2.6491  
 p-value 0.0155 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0358 ** 0.0276 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.1002   0.1459   0.1063   0.0552   0.0829   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table 7.9.5 Regression of the MM CAARs – CBMA India Target Firms - Blockhold 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0643  0.0526  0.0363  0.0111  -0.0140   
(1.5161) (1.3358) (1.0098) (0.3226) (-0.5503) 
 Blockhold 0.1017 ** 0.1216 *** 0.0935 *** 0.0868 *** 0.0714 ***  
(2.5567) 
 
(3.1652) 
 
(2.6644) 
 
(2.6778) 
 
(3.3783) 
 
 CWA 0.0666  0.0698  0.0443  0.0401  0.0149   
(1.1252) (1.4056) (0.9744) (0.8931) (0.5108) 
 Pct50 -0.0041  -0.0292  -0.0154  -0.0288  -0.0073   
(-0.0967) (-0.7411) (-0.4389) (-0.8940) (-0.3086) 
 PctToe 0.0566  0.0877  0.1064  0.0493  0.0526   
(0.6900) (1.1122) (1.4215) (0.7103) (1.0106) 
 Intercept 0.0259  0.0028  0.0183  0.0448 * 0.0357 *  
(0.6503) (0.0884) (0.6798) (1.7640) 
 
(1.9236) 
 
  Observations 95   95   95   95   95   
 F-Statistics 2.1766  3.9464  3.0919  2.0064  2.6266  
 p-value 0.0637 * 0.0028 *** 0.0128 ** 0.0854 * 0.0291 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0621   0.1189   0.0877   0.0426   0.0851   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
In both the sets of regressions above, the regression equations are significant at 
varying levels for the different CAAR windows. Once again, the corporate governance 
variable Blockhold emerges as the most important driver for the CAARs. The coefficients 
are significant mostly at the 1% level.  
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Thus, it is evident that the governance model that promotes concentrated ownership 
is the most decisive determinant for returns obtained by the Indian target firms in CBMAs. 
The findings support the argument by LLSV that in countries with weaker legal systems, 
investors’ perceive ownership stake as a natural hedge against possible exploitation. 
7.9.1.3 Institutional Analysis 
The Commonwealth (CWA) countries tend to have similar institutional features, 
regulations and functions as they pursue common law systems like India. The CWA 
variable identifies acquirers as being from one of the commonwealth nations. In tandem 
with the given set of variables, the CWA coefficients are positive as expected, and yet they 
are not statistically significant in any of these regressions. In fact, the coefficients are indeed 
negative in univariate analysis though not different from zero. In sum, this indicates that 
institutional similarities do not drive the abnormal returns for Indian target firms. 
7.9.1.4 Cultural Analysis 
The results based on equation (7-3) for the OLS and the MM CAARs are provided 
in Table-A 7.44  and 7.45. The reference dummy used here represents the Anglo culture. 
The Germanic and Nordic coefficients are occasionally significantly positive at 
conventional level by the OLS and MM CAARs, implying significantly higher abnormal 
returns from them, when compared with the Anglo culture. Even the Confucian coefficients 
gain statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively from the OLS and MM 
estimations for the days [-7. +7].  
The positive returns from most of these cultures, and significantly higher returns 
from even more distant cultures, indicate that cultural proximity is not the decisive factor. 
In fact, the underlying common feature of these cultures is corporate governance model 
similarity. As discussed earlier, this regression (equation (7-3)) tends to split the corporate 
governance aspect into a few independent cultural variables, which is reflected in the results 
here.  
In other variables, interestingly, the Toehold and Pct50 variables have signs not 
consistent with the theory. However, they both lack statistical significance at the 
conventional levels in both the multivariate and univariate analyses. 
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7.9.1.5 Summary 
The regression analysis thus indicates that there is a clear preference for identical 
corporate governance features from target shareholders. Regardless of the institutional 
divergences, cultural distances, cash compensation, stake acquired and existing holdings, 
the target shareholders prefer being taken over by the companies pursuing the 
German/Japanese corporate governance model, which allows for higher investor protection 
in a country like India. 
7.9.2 Indian Acquirer Firms 
The literature on emerging markets multinational enterprises (EMNEs) and Indian 
CBMA acquirers unequivocally argues that these firms seek advanced technology, 
knowledge and managerial skills from more progressive and wealthy nations. This is also 
reflected in the sample set available for this thesis: the majority of the cross-border target 
firms are from the United States and the United Kingdom.   
Following that argument, a new variable is introduced to the analysis which 
measures the ‘economic distance’ of the Indian acquirer and the target country. This is a 
ratio of per capita real GDP of India over per capita real GDP of the target country 
(
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛
). The fraction implies that the lower the ED ratio, the higher the 
economic distance of that country from India. Alternatively put, this variable captures the 
role of targets from the developed nations to the Indian acquirers in the CBMAs. 
Further, as it is a small sub-set, mainly consisting of the United States and United 
Kingdom target firms, this analysis is arranged slightly differently. For corporate 
governance, institutional and cultural analysis, the respective dummy variables are 
organised as: (i) AS / Diffused variables are assigned a value of one when the target firms 
follow Anglo-Saxon / Diffused ownership corporate governance models, (ii) CWT is 
assigned a value of one when target firms originate from a commonwealth nation, and (iii) 
Anglo is assigned a value of one for the Anglo culture of the targets and zero for all others. 
Table 7.9.6 provides a Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix of all the variables 
available in this analysis for the Indian acquirer firms.  
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Table 7.9.6 Correlation Coefficient Matrix; Independent Variables - Acquirers 
 
  
  Variables Cash   Pct50   PctToe   CWT   ED   AST   Diffused   Anglo   
 Pct50 -0.1966                
  (0.2368) 
 PctToe -0.3646 ** 0.3343 **             
  (0.0288) 
 
(0.0463) 
 
 CWT -0.2820 * -0.2972 * 0.1440            
  (0.0863) 
 
(0.0700) 
 
(0.4021) 
 ED -0.1043  0.1976  0.0421  0.0314          
  (0.5333) (0.2343) (0.8073) (0.8514) 
 AS -0.1833  -0.2720 * -0.1104  0.0405  -0.5653 ***       
  (0.2707) (0.0985) 
 
(0.5215) (0.8091) (0.0002) 
 
 Diffused -0.1112  -0.1678  -0.1438  -0.0070  -0.5880 *** 0.9270 ***     
  (0.5062) (0.3139) (0.4027) (0.9665) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
 Anglo -0.0781  -0.1904  -0.0518  0.0063  -0.6503 *** 0.7363 *** 0.6667 ***   
  (0.6412) (0.2523) (0.7643) (0.9699) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
 
Conglomerate -0.1551 
 
-0.2168 
 
0.1110 
 
0.1869 
 
-0.0058 
 
0.0337 
 
0.0101 
 
0.0768 
 
    (0.3525)   (0.1910)   (0.5192)   (0.2613)   (0.9724)   (0.8407)   (0.9522)   (0.6468)   
 
  p-values in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Evidently, the corporate governance variables Anglo-Saxon and Diffused are 
significantly correlated with each other and also with the Anglo culture variable. Some of the 
higher coefficients may be influential for the analysis. In fact, when these variables are run 
simultaneously in one equation, the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 4.62 with the 
highest one being 15 individually and few others exceeding 4. Considering a possibility of 
multicollinearity in the analysis, the impact of the two corporate governance variables and 
the cultural variable is tested in separate equations43: 
Corporate Governance: 
CAARt1,t2 = α0 + β1 Cash+ β2 AS + β3 ED +  β4
CWT + β
5
 Pct50 + β
6
 PctToe + 
β
7
 Conglomerate  + εi  
(7-4) 
CAARt1,t2 = α0 + β1 Cash+ β2 Diffused + β3 ED +  β4
 CWT + β
5
 Pct50 + 
β
6
 PctToe + β
7
 Conglomerate  + εi  
(7-5) 
Cultural Clusters: 
CAARt1,  t2 = α0 + β1 Cash + β2 Anglo + β3 ED + β4 CWT + β5 Pct50 + 
β
6
 PctToe  +  β
7
 Conglomerate + εi  
(7-6) 
 
where, Cash, Pct50 PctToe and CWT variables are expected to be positive; The 
cultural variable Anglo is expected to have a negative sign as it is not the same culture as 
India which is SA (South Asia). In the corporate governance variables, the impact of Diffused 
target should be negative. However, Anglo-Saxon variable is particularly ambiguous as, 
formally, India is Anglo-Saxon but, in practice, it adopts the German/Japanese model.  
Another important revelation from the event study of CBMA acquirers is that the 
abnormal returns occur only in the days immediate to the announcement day. Hence, for the 
meaningful analysis, only the smaller CAAR windows are selected for the cross-sectional 
analysis presented here. 
  
                                                 
43 The variable Related is also tested but not reported here. It is highly correlated with the variable PctToe 
increasing the VIF factor overall. Besides, its coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
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7.9.2.1 Corporate Governance Analysis – Legal Origin 
Table 7.9.7 presents the multivariate regression results for the various CAAR 
windows based on the OLS and the MM methods respectively for the Indian CBMA acquirer 
firms. The univariate results for each of these regressions are presented separately in the 
appendix in Table-A 7.58 to 7.67. 
Table 7.9.7 Regression Analysis of the OLS CAARs – CBMA Indian Acquirer Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0064  -0.0120  -0.0414 * -0.0171  -0.0287 *  
(-0.1809) (-0.5405) (-1.7663) 
 
(-0.9817) (-1.9463) 
 
 AST 0.0065  -0.0342 * -0.0421  -0.0593 ** -0.0601 **  
(0.1377) (-1.7230) 
 
(-1.4859) (-2.1941) 
 
(-2.7530) 
 
 ED -0.0040  -0.2007 ** -0.2785 *** -0.3904 *** -0.4417 ***  
(-0.0230) (-2.7058) 
 
(-3.6238) 
 
(-3.9940) 
 
(-3.4612) 
 
 CWT -0.0177  -0.0006  -0.0306  -0.0190  -0.0088   
(-0.5013) (-0.0270) (-1.6350) (-1.2367) (-0.5745) 
 Pct50 0.0225  -0.0126  -0.0291  -0.0470  -0.0160   
(0.5221) (-0.4792) (-0.7154) (-1.6559) (-0.9313) 
 PctToe -0.0728  -0.0725 * -0.0063  0.0543 * 0.0206   
(-0.7280) (-1.7366) 
 
(-0.1372) (1.9535) 
 
(0.6098) 
 Conglomerate 0.0218  0.0554 ** 0.0163  -0.0122  0.0088   
(0.3972) (2.1021) 
 
(0.8490) (-0.7019) (0.7073) 
 Intercept -0.0236  0.0345  0.0739 * 0.0955 ** 0.0915 ***  
(-0.3788) (1.0609) (1.7783) 
 
(2.5488) 
 
(3.0212) 
 
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.3886  3.1869  5.3778  4.7208  2.5223  
 p-value 0.9008  0.0136 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0392 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.2084   0.0646   0.0989   0.3007   0.3458   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
The overall model and some variables are significantly different from zero in the 
smaller CAAR windows. As the CAAR windows get larger, the variables and the model get 
statistically weaker.  
The negative coefficients for Economic Distance imply that as the economic distance 
decreases, the acquirers get lesser returns. This validates the theory that EMNEs seek targets 
from wealthier and more advanced nations with whom they have higher economic distances. 
Further, the variable Anglo-Saxon implies that relatively lower returns are also associated 
with target firms with an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model. This suggests that there 
is less of a preference for targets with Anglo-Saxon corporate governance models. And 
finally, the significantly positive Conglomerate variable suggests that the acquirers are 
favoured more when they diversify, which is inconsistent with respect to the developed world. 
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However, it is also true for Indian firms, as diversification is one of the key aspects of Indian 
business houses. 
In the univariate analysis, the only variable that is consistently significantly negative 
is Economic Distance. It confirms that the acquirers are driven by the motive of acquiring 
targets from the advanced and wealthier nations.  
 
Table 7.9.8 Regression Analysis of the MM CAARs – CBMA Indian Acquirer Firms 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash 0.0008  -0.0085  -0.0388  -0.0161  -0.0274 *  
(0.0201) (-0.3024) (-1.5394) (-0.8854) (-1.7682) 
 
 AS 0.0241  -0.0234  -0.0345  -0.0561 ** -0.0575 **  
(0.4971) (-0.9582) (-1.1981) (-2.0544) 
 
(-2.5844) 
 
 ED 0.0189  -0.1836 * -0.2647 *** -0.3854 *** -0.4373 ***  
(0.1067) (-1.7444) 
 
(-3.1183) 
 
(-4.0385) 
 
(-3.5486) 
 
 CWT -0.0149  0.0053  -0.0261  -0.0200  -0.0117   
(-0.4117) (0.2033) (-1.3016) (-1.2667) (-0.7467) 
 Pct50 0.0347  -0.0010  -0.0209  -0.0453  -0.0164   
(0.7304) (-0.0280) (-0.4700) (-1.5533) (-0.9350) 
 PctToe -0.0584  -0.0652  0.0009  0.0541 * 0.0221   
(-0.6441) (-1.1361) (0.0177) (1.8775) 
 
(0.6671) 
 Conglomerate 0.0387  0.0701 ** 0.0253  -0.0083  0.0111   
(0.7893) (2.3670) 
 
(1.2103) (-0.4424) (0.8203) 
 Intercept -0.0281  0.0298  0.0697  0.0957 ** 0.0924 ***  
(-0.4192) (0.7005) (1.5802) (2.5251) 
 
(2.9693) 
 
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.4126  1.8514  3.4628  6.5102  2.5437  
 p-value 0.8860  0.1179  0.0089 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0379 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.1891   0.0208   0.0768   0.2675   0.3210   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
However, while there is a strong indication of the relevance of Economic Distance, 
the prevailing corporate governance model and diversification, the results should be 
interpreted with caution as the sample size is small.  
7.9.2.2 Corporate Governance Analysis – Political Framework 
Following (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) for corporate governance models, the 
corporate governance attribute is reclassified into Diffused and other possible patterns of 
ownership. Table 7.9.9 and Table 7.9.10 (below) are based on equation (7-5) and the CAARs 
are based on the OLS and the MM estimations respectively. The univariate results for each 
of these regressions are presented separately in the appendix in Table-A 7.58 to 7.67. 
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Once again, both the tables demonstrate the significant results in the smaller CAAR 
windows. As the CAAR windows grow larger, the variables, along with the models, become 
statistically weaker.  
Table 7.9.9 Regression of the OLS CAARs – CBMA India Acquirer Firms - Diffused 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0076  -0.0080  -0.0360 * -0.0081  -0.0221   
(-0.2311) (-0.3833) (-1.7132) 
 
(-0.4323) (-1.4482) 
 Diffused 0.0040  -0.0306 * -0.0353  -0.0438  -0.0549 **  
(0.0849) (-1.7310) 
 
(-1.4946) (-1.6793) (-2.3368) 
 
 ED -0.0102  -0.1963 ** -0.2660 *** -0.3551 *** -0.4376 ***  
(-0.0534) (-2.6823) 
 
(-3.1658) 
 
(-3.3260) 
 
(-3.1183) 
 
 CWT -0.0183  0.0016  -0.0277  -0.0144  -0.0051   
(-0.5215) (0.0726) (-1.5736) (-0.9334) (-0.3271) 
 Pct50 0.0208  -0.0046  -0.0190  -0.0320  -0.0021   
(0.5077) (-0.1789) (-0.4877) (-0.9411) (-0.1011) 
 PctToe -0.0730  -0.0760 * -0.0095  0.0522 * 0.0139   
(-0.7204) (-1.8942) 
 
(-0.2166) (1.8347) 
 
(0.4412) 
 Conglomerate 0.0215  0.0567 ** 0.0180  -0.0098  0.0111   
(0.3916) (2.1240) 
 
(1.0214) (-0.5802) (0.9144) 
 Intercept -0.0204  0.0284  0.0637 * 0.0745 * 0.0822 **  
(-0.3362) (0.9702) (1.8483) 
 
(2.0434) 
 
(2.6800) 
 
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.4001  3.2049  5.7046  3.1003  2.0281  
 p-value 0.8938  0.0133 ** 0.0004 *** 0.0156 ** 0.0881 * 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.2088   0.0537   0.0674   0.2018   0.3077   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
The variable Economic Distance emerges as the most prominent feature that 
unambiguously explains the returns obtained by the Indian acquirer firms in CBMAs. It is 
mostly significant even at the 1% level. This implies that, as the economic distance decreases, 
the acquirers receive lesser returns. This validates the theory that EMNEs seek targets from 
wealthier and more advanced nations nations. Further, relatively lower returns are associated 
with target firms that possess a corporate governance model that encourages Diffused 
ownership patterns. This suggests that the identical corporate governance models are relevant 
for the CBMA acquirers as well. And finally, the significantly positive Conglomerate variable 
suggests that acquirers are favoured more when they diversify—diversification is not 
necessarily a negative aspect of M&As in emerging world. 
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Table 7.9.10 Regression of the OLS CAARs – CBMA India Acquirer Firms - Diffused 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0023  -0.0057  -0.0343  -0.0075  -0.0210   
(-0.0665) (-0.2186) (-1.5289) (-0.3879) (-1.3351) 
 Diffused 0.0202  -0.0205  -0.0284  -0.0409  -0.0526 **  
(0.4277) (-0.9773) (-1.2217) (-1.5562) (-2.2068) 
 
 ED 0.0116  -0.1793 * -0.2528 *** -0.3504 *** -0.4336 ***  
(0.0605) (-1.7499) 
 
(-2.7798) 
 
(-3.3677) 
 
(-3.1989) 
 
 CWT -0.0165  0.0068  -0.0237  -0.0157  -0.0081   
(-0.4629) (0.2654) (-1.2577) (-0.9873) (-0.5126) 
 Pct50 0.0289  0.0045  -0.0126  -0.0311  -0.0031   
(0.6576) (0.1432) (-0.3030) (-0.9083) (-0.1474) 
 PctToe -0.0565  -0.0674  -0.0015  0.0524 * 0.0157   
(-0.6075) (-1.1871) (-0.0304) (1.8276) 
 
(0.5089) 
 Conglomerate 0.0377  0.0710 ** 0.0267  -0.0060  0.0133   
(0.7701) (2.3744) 
 
(1.3491) (-0.3259) (1.0041) 
 Intercept -0.0222  0.0251  0.0607  0.0752 * 0.0836 **  
(-0.3506) (0.6710) (1.6825) (2.0483) 
 
(2.6591) 
 
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.4242  1.8205  3.9029  4.2890  2.1109  
 p-value 0.8786  0.1241  0.0046 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0769 * 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.1920   0.0164   0.0549   0.1789   0.2874   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
In the univariate analysis, the only variable that is consistently significantly negative 
is Economic Distance. This confirms that acquirers are driven by the motive of securing better 
resources, both tangible and intangible, from advanced, and wealthier nations. The other 
variables have no significant influence on the decision. 
7.9.2.3 Cultural Analysis 
Further, as explained earlier, the cultural clusters simply dilute the corporate 
governance effect. Hence, the results based on the equation (7-6) are reported in the appendix 
in the Table-A 7.58 to 7.67. 
The Anglo-Saxon variable is occasionally significantly negative in the multivariate 
analysis, but never in the univariate analysis. This implies lower abnormal returns from Anglo 
targets when compared with the other cultures, which are comprised of targets from the 
Germanic, Confucian, South Asian, Eastern and Latin European cultures. Thus, cultural 
proximity does not appear to be a decisive factor in selecting targets for the Indian acquirers. 
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Further, it is counter-intuitive that the Anglo culture yields lower returns, though 
acquisitions of firms from developed countries is significant. The coefficients values suggest 
that the benefits of developed firms outweigh the cost of cultural distance.  
7.9.2.4 Institutional Analysis 
The Commonwealth countries tend to have similar institutional features, regulations 
and functions as they pursue a common law system, such as in India. The CWT variable 
suggests that if the target is from a commonwealth nation. It is not statistically significantly 
different from zero in any of these regressions. This indicates that the institutional similarities 
do not drive abnormal returns for Indian acquiring firms, which is not consistent with the 
findings of Buckley et al. (2012). 
7.9.3 Summary 
The regression analysis for acquirers indicates that there is a clear preference for 
targets from wealthy nations. Also, there are lower returns for acquiring targets with a 
corporate governance model that supports Diffused ownership. Further, there is no support 
for institutional similarities or cultural proximities with the target country in explaining 
CAARs. 
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7.10 Domestic vs. Cross-Border M&As 
This section compares the domestic M&As with the cross-border M&As. The 
analysis begins with a discussion about target firms in the two sub-sets. Figure 7.10.1 and 
Figure 7.10.2 present Market model CAARs from the MM and OLS regressions respectively 
for the Indian target firms. 
7.10.1 Return to Target Firms 
 
 
Figure 7.10.1 DMA vs. CBMA Indian Target Firms (MM) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10.2 DMA vs. CBMA Indian Target Firms (OLS) 
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Though domestic returns are consistently slightly higher, the overall trend in the 
returns from both the sub-sets is identical. Table 7.10.1 summarizes the main findings from 
the Market and FF models for the two sub-sets. 
Table 7.10.1 Summary Returns DMA vs. CBMA; Indian Targets 
Model Regression  
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Domestic M&As (DMA) 
Market 
MM 1.99% *** 4.77% *** 14.57% *** 18.48% *** -3 to 0 -19 to +30 165 
OLS 1.82% *** 4.15% *** 11.33% *** 8.48% *** -3 to 0 -12 to +30 170 
FF 
MM 1.95% *** 4.59% *** 15.43% *** 19.56% *** -6 to 0 -20 to +30 158 
OLS 1.77% *** 4.01% *** 12.27% *** 9.36% *** -3 to 0 -14 to +30 163 
Cross-border M&As (CBMA) 
Market 
MM 3.47% *** 7.87% *** 10.95% *** 18.40% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 99 
OLS 3.16% *** 7.01% *** 6.57% *** 7.34% *** -1 to +1 -2 to +30 104 
FF 
MM 3.29% *** 7.57% *** 11.87% *** 18.84% *** -2 to +2 -14 to +30 90 
OLS 3.03% *** 7.00% *** 7.72% *** 7.29% *** -1 to +1 -9 to +30 93 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
Evidently, the target shareholders in both the sub-sets gain positive abnormal returns 
at the announcement of M&A deals. The overall returns can be as high as 20%. However, 
interestingly, both the sub-sets generate these returns differently with respect to the timing 
relative to the announcement day. Table 7.10.2 presents the differences between the run-ups 
and the mark-ups of the two sub-sets. 
Table 7.10.2 Run-up vs Mark-Up Comparison; DMA vs. CBMA; Indian Targets 
Model Regression 
Run-up  
[-20, -1] 
Mark-up  
[0, +30] 
Difference 
Domestic (DMA) 
Market 
MM 12.58% 5.90% 6.69% *** 
OLS 9.50% -1.02% 10.53% *** 
FF 
MM 13.48% 6.08% 7.40% *** 
OLS 10.50% -1.14% 11.64% *** 
Cross-Border (CBMA) 
Market 
MM 7.49% 10.91% -3.43% 
OLS 3.41% 3.92% -0.51% 
FF 
MM 8.58% 10.25% -1.67% 
OLS 4.69% 2.61% 2.08% 
Clearly, there is a mark difference between the distributions of the total premium to 
the target shareholders in both the sub-sets. For domestic deals, the run-up is significantly 
higher than the mark-up, implying that the higher proportion of the total takeover premium 
is credited to traders’ active in the pre-event period. Alternatively put, the impact of 
information asymmetry and insider trading is more pronounced in domestic M&As. The 
event study analysis reports that significantly positive AARs and CAARs in the pre-event 
window for the domestic target firms occur frequently. However, for the CBMAs, the 
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difference between the run-up and mark-up CAARs is, in fact, negative and not different from 
zero. This indicates that the post-event returns are higher and that the informed traders are 
unable to benefit immensely at the cost of other shareholders. Thus,  the role of information 
asymmetry is not so pronounced. 
Further, a closer inspection of the returns generated suggests that the announcement 
effect captured in Day-0 AARs and 3 day CAARs is actually higher from the CBMAs. The 
test of differences in the returns from both the regressions for the two sub-sets suggest Day-
0 AAR is higher from CBMAs at 10% and 3 day at nearly 10%.  This explains why in the 
cross-sectional analysis of the aggregate database in chapter five, the Cross-Border variable 
was positive for smaller CAAR windows and negative for larger CAAR windows. Further, 
the stratum specific test of differences finds no significant difference in various post-event 
windows. However, the domestic deals yield significantly higher returns in pre-event 
windows at the 10% level. Finally, the overall CAARs generated from both the types of deals 
are not significantly different from zero. 
Clearly, the impact of information asymmetry varies in the two types of deals and 
that has implications in the allocation of total takeover premium generated during the event. 
7.10.2 Returns to Acquirer Firms 
Figure 7.10.3 and Figure 7.10.4 represent Market model CAARs from the MM and 
OLS regressions respectively for the Indian acquirer firms. 
 
 
Figure 7.10.3 DMA vs. CBMA Indian Acquirer Firms (MM) 
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Figure 7.10.4 DMA vs. CBMA Indian Acquirer Firms (OLS) 
 
The divergence in the CAAR graphs for both the sub-sets from both the regression 
methods suggest that the market reacts differently to the announcements of M&As. The 
CAARs from domestic acquisitions are higher than the cross-border deals for the acquirers. 
Table 7.10.3 provides a summary of the CAAR results from both the models and the 
regressions. 
Table 7.10.3 Summary Returns DMA vs. CBMA; Indian Acquirers 
Model Regression  
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Domestic M&As (DMA) 
Market 
MM 0.24%   1.58% *** 3.46% *** 8.05% *** -1 -7 to +30 191 
OLS 0.11%  1.16% ** 0.50%  -0.03%   -1   195 
FF 
MM 0.41%   1.57% *** 4.12% *** 7.86% *** -1 -7 to +30 173 
OLS 0.23%   1.15% ** 1.24%   0.00%   -1   177 
Cross-border M&As (CBMA) 
Market 
MM 1.34% ** 1.17%   1.83%   -2.55%   0   37 
OLS 1.24% ** 0.92%   -1.15%   -8.77% *** 0 to +1   37 
FF 
MM 1.37% ** 1.31%   1.95%   -1.71%   0   32 
OLS 1.23% ** 0.97%   -1.22%   -9.16% *** 0   32 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
The significantly positive announcement effect is captured on Day-0 for the CBMAs, 
whereas for domestic deals it occurs over 3 days [-1,+1]. However, the tests of differences 
between the two sub-sets for the returns on Day-0 or for 3 day CAARs are not significantly 
different from zero. Likewise, the tests of differences in pre-event returns are also not 
significantly different. However, the post-event returns are higher for domestic deals at 5% 
from the MM method and at 10% from the OLS. And the overall 51 day CAARs are also 
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higher at 5% from both the regressions techniques for domestic deals. Similarly, the FF 
returns are not different for Day-0 AARs, 3 day CAARs and the pre-event period. However, 
the post-event returns and the overall CAARs are higher at the 10% and 5% level respectively 
for domestic deals from both the regression techniques. The results are not consistent with 
the findings of (Rani et al., 2014) which report higher results for Indian acquires in CBMAs. 
Clearly, while there are significantly positive and comparable returns from both types 
of M&As at the announcements, as the market learns about the acquirer in the deal, the market 
participants favour domestic acquirers more. 
7.11 Foreign Firms 
The synergy motive argues that both the targets and the acquirers should receive 
positive outcomes on the announcement of M&As. Thus, this section briefly looks at the 
outcomes on the foreign participants in deals with the Indian firms. 
 
 
Figure 7.11.1 Return to Foreign Targets; MM vs. OLS 
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Figure 7.11.2 Return to Foreign Acquirers; MM vs. OLS 
Depending on the regression method, the foreign acquirers may or may not have 
positive returns overall. Table 7.11.1 summarizes the statistical findings for the foreign 
targets and the acquirers. 
Table 7.11.1 Summary of Foreign Firms; Market Model; OLS & MM 
Regression 
AAR   
Day-0 
3-Days 
CAAR 
CAAR  
Day-0 
51-Days 
CAAR 
 AARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
 CAARs 
(**) 
around 
Day-0 
n 
Targets 
MM 7.99% ** 4.22%   15.91% ** 4.42%   0 0 30 
OLS 6.88% ** 4.15% ** 12.23% *** 0.95%   0 0 to +7 34 
Acquirers 
MM 0.15%   0.09%   0.80%   2.96% **     111 
OLS 0.08%   -0.09%   -0.70%   -0.55%       112 
p-values: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. n represents sample size. 
There is clear evidence that the foreign target firms yield significantly positive returns 
when taken over by the Indian firms. However, for the foreign acquirers, while the 
announcement day returns Day-0 AARs are positive, they are not significantly different from 
zero. Further, the MM estimations are always positive, and the OLS estimations are mostly 
negative. 
To assess whether the corporate governance model plays a role here, as it does in the 
case of Indian targets, the returns to the acquirers are spilt into the Anglo-Saxon (AS) and 
German/Japanese (GJ) categories. Figure 7.11.3 and Figure 7.11.4 show the CAAR graphs 
from the MM and the OLS regression respectively.  
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Figure 7.11.3 CG-Analysis Foreign Acquirers; MM 
 
 
The test of differences between the overall CAARs from the GJ and AS sub-sets from 
both the regressions is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Thus, there is mild 
support for the theory that corporate governance models matter, even for the acquiring 
nations. 
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Figure 7.11.4 CG-Analysis Foreign Acquirers; OLS 
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7.12 Overall Summary 
7.12.1 Abnormal Returns - Synergy  
The primary objective of this chapter is to address the fifth hypothesis (H5)  and to 
evaluate synergy, agency and hubris motives in domestic M&As, leading to the testing of two 
hypotheses: 
H5a:  There are no abnormal returns to the Indian target firms at the announcements of cross-
border M&As. 
H5b:  There are no abnormal returns to the Indian acquirer firms at the announcement of 
cross-border M&As. 
 The evidence presented here supports two null hypotheses. The target shareholders, 
whether Indian or from other nationalities, make abnormal positive returns at the 
announcement of CBMAs. In terms of acquirers, the Indian acquirers make significantly 
positive returns in cross-border takeovers. However, the foreign acquirers make positive 
returns but are not different from zero when they take over Indian firms. Thus, the evidence 
overall supports the synergy hypothesis. It implies that M&As increase the combined wealth 
of the shareholders on both of the sides and, as such, CBMAs are generally beneficial. 
Further, the premise of this chapter is based on the set of characteristics unique to 
India. Chapter three summarizes the multidimensional aspects of India. This thesis identifies 
India as a common law country with business structures resembling civil law countries and 
with unique socio-cultural anthropological attributes of some South Asian countries. Thus, 
this chapter evaluates the influence of various corporate governance models, institutional 
environments and cultures in Indian CBMAs. 
7.12.2 Corporate Governance Effect  
To understand the roles that various corporate governance models play in the 
announcement returns of the two sides, the hypotheses tested are: 
H6a:  There is no difference in returns to the target shareholders from the takeovers by the 
firms with identical corporate governance models. 
H6b:  There is no difference in returns to the acquirer shareholders from the takeovers of the 
firms with identical corporate governance models. 
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The evidence presented rejects the null hypothesis and confirms that the corporate 
governance model matters in Indian CBMAs for both the sides. 
For the target firms, there is sufficient evidence of higher returns when taken over by 
an acquirer pursuing the German/Japanese corporate governance model. In fact, the 
announcement day effect can be exceeded by 6% to 7% (rounded) in such cases. Further, 
based on Aguilera and Jackson (2010) argument, when French acquirers are treated as Anglo-
Saxon to focus on the ownership pattern, the results are more pronounced than those of the 
GJ model analysis. It appears that the potential of Blockholding is the real driving factor in 
CBMAs in India. 
For the acquirers, Indian acquirers show significantly lower returns when pursuing 
targets with the Anglo-Saxon model.  
7.12.3 Cultural Proximity Effect 
As M&As are also described as marriage of two organizations, it is essentially an 
amalgamation of two cultures, particularly when it is cross-border in nature. Thus, Cultural 
Analysis is conducted to test whether socio-cultural-anthropological similarities explain the 
returns in CBMAs. The hypotheses tested are: 
H7a:  There is no difference in returns to the target shareholders from the takeovers by the 
culturally proximate acquirers. 
H7b:  There is no difference in returns to the acquirer shareholders from the takeovers of the 
culturally proximate targets. 
The evidence presented here does not support the null hypotheses. On the contrary, 
takeovers by culturally distant countries generate higher returns.  
The target returns show that there are significantly positive returns from the acquirers 
from multiple cultures and that the distant cultures produce higher returns than cultures in 
close proximity. Thus, the evidence rejects the hypothesis that there is no difference in returns 
from the culturally proximate. In fact, it suggest that culturally distant firms generate higher 
returns and the cultural proximity is not relevant. 
Even for the acquirers, Anglo-Saxon culture is associated with lower returns. More 
than culture, they are driven by the economic distance of the target nations. 
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To sum, of the three dimensions presented here, an identical corporate governance 
model, which eventually translates into investor protection, is the most relevant aspect that 
drives the returns of the CBMAs in India. 
7.12.4 Institutional Framework Effect 
The Commonwealth Inheritance effect is analysed to understand whether common 
institutional environments drive higher returns. The following hypothesis is tested to 
understand the role of institutional similarities in CBMAs: 
H8a:  There is no difference in returns to the target shareholders from the takeovers by the 
firms with identical institutional framework. 
H8b:  There is no difference in returns to the acquirer shareholders from the takeovers of the 
firms with identical institutional framework. 
The evidence presented supports the null hyptheses. It suggests that institutional 
similarity neither drives nor deters CBMAs on either of the sides. 
For the targets, 80% of the takeovers are by Non-Commonwealth acquirers and there 
is no significant difference between the results from the Commonwealth and Non-
Commonwealth returns.  
Similarly, for the acquirers, the Commonwealth attribute is not significantly different 
from zero. 
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7.12.5 Snapshot - Hypotheses 
 
Effect Hypotheses Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
H5 : 
There are no abnormal 
returns associated with the 
announcements of cross-
border M&As (CBMA) 
 
Significantly 
positive returns to 
both the targets 
and acquiring 
shareholders at the 
announcement. 
 H5a: Synergy   As both the targets and acquirers gain 
positive returns, 
the total effect is 
positive for the 
combined wealth. 
 H5b: Hubris   
 H5c: Agency   
Corporate 
Governance 
H6 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the deals with the firms 
with the identical corporate 
governance models. 
  
Indian targets and 
the acquirers both 
show significantly 
higher returns 
when dealing with 
the firms with 
German/Japanese 
model. 
Cultural 
Proximity 
H7 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the deals with the firms 
with cultural proximity. 
  
There is significant 
difference in 
returns from firms 
from different 
cultures and that 
the distant cultures 
produce higher 
returns. 
Institutional 
Framework 
H8 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the deals with the firms 
with the similar 
Institutional framework. 
 
There is no 
significant 
difference between 
the returns from 
the deals with the 
firms with or 
without identical 
institutional 
frameworks. 
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 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the main propositions and the findings from each of the chapters 
discussed earlier. It also discusses the limitations of this thesis and proposes possible 
directions for future research. 
8.2 Recapitulation 
Chapter 1   
Chapter one highlights the multidimensional contribution of this thesis to the existing 
literature. Firstly, it contributes to an understanding of the emerging markets, where there is 
a paucity of literature. These markets are gaining prominence in the global business 
landscape, and the finance literature argues that emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) are fundamentally different from those in developed countries. Thus, with the 
prevailing need for deliberate research into emerging markets, this research is well-timed.  
Secondly, this research is based on India’s markets. Not only is India one of the 
BRICS countries, it is also one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Apart from the 
rising and shining facts about India,  this thesis highlights some contradictory and intriguingly 
puzzling attributes about India. It is these attributes which make India a unique country 
amongst other emerging markets and thus necessitates further research.  
Thirdly, following the latest discussions about event-study methodology in statistical 
papers, this thesis introduces a robust regression technique to capture announcement effects 
in the analysis and compares them with the traditional OLS estimates. Thus, there is a 
methodological contribution to the literature in this work. 
Chapter 2  
Chapter two provides a detailed literature review aimed at identifying gaps in the 
literature on Indian M&As. It sifts through the wealth of literature about M&As in general, 
and about emerging and Indian markets in particular. It identifies the key elements that may 
have a bearing on Indian M&As. Emerging markets are characterized by weaker legal 
systems and large business groups which own majority stakes in the firms they control. 
Typically, these large shareholders are also the managers of the company. Alternatively put, 
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in an agency theory context, the principal and agents are the same identities. This is in sharp 
contrast to firms in the developed world. The direct outcome of such a system is that the 
outside shareholders become minority shareholders and face a risk of expropriation of their 
wealth by the majority stock owners. A typical threat of a takeover to control errant managers, 
which is one powerful tool in the hands of outside shareholders in the developed world, does 
not work here. Further, even the weaker legal system may not rescue these minority 
shareholders. Announcing M&As in such a setting surely yields a unique share market 
response. Further, in cross-border settings, this thesis develops a comprehensive framework 
which projects India as a common-law country with business structures and corporate 
governance model resembling civil-law countries. And yet, India is distant from either of the 
two in terms of its socio-cultural anthropological attributes. By defying existing principle 
theories in finance literature on various dimensions characteristically, India thus portrays a 
contradictory and intriguingly puzzling image. Therefore, to resolve this mystery, this chapter 
outlines a set of hypotheses focusing on the impact of factors such as ownership stake, cultural 
proximity, related institutional frameworks, comparable corporate governance models and 
economic distances on the returns obtained by the Indian shareholders. These hypotheses are 
subsequently tested in chapters five, six and seven. 
Chapter 3  
Chapter three details the methodology employed in the analysis. It is a two-stage 
analysis. The stage one is the event study which, aims to determine any abnormal returns 
associated with the announcements of M&As to the Indian shareholders in the deal. Stage 
two is a cross-sectional analysis which aims at identifying the factors that may explain the 
sources of abnormal returns obtained by these shareholders. The two financial models - 
Market and Fama-French three-factor - are used to calculate the abnormal returns for the 
event study. These abnormal returns are determined by using OLS and robust regression 
techniques. For cross-sectional analysis, the key factors identified in the literature are 
regressed with cumulative abnormal returns to isolate the ones that determine the source of 
these returns. Chapters five, six and seven, compare and report the returns from the two 
financial models along with the outcomes from a cross-sectional analysis. 
Chapter 4  
Chapter four outlines the description of the data used for the analysis. The deals are 
shortlisted from 1989 to 2013. The Fama-French variables are available from 1992 to 2012. 
Equally Weighted Index data is also available from 2000 to 2013. This chapter discusses the 
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limitations imposed by the data on the analysis and various measures adopted to deal with 
them. 
Chapter 5  
Chapter five contributes to this thesis in two ways: it investigates the overall abnormal 
returns from the aggregate dataset, and it also compares and contrasts the outcomes from the 
two financial models, their variants, two indices, and the regression techniques employed in 
this thesis. There are a number of key findings from this chapter.  
This chapter tests the first hypothesis (H1) about the creation of synergies with M&As 
by Indian firms. The following hypothesis is tested for both the targets and the acquirers. 
H1:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As to the 
participating Indian firms.  
The analysis rejects the hypothesis for both the sides in the deal as there are 
significantly positive abnormal returns associated with the announcements of M&As. 
For the target shareholders, the Day-0 return is around 2.5%, and the 3 day return is 
nearly 6%. Another important finding here is that the targets’ pre-bid run-up returns exceed 
the mark-up CAARs and the difference is statistically significant, which suggests that the 
higher proportion of the total takeover premium generated is gleaned away by the informed 
participants trading in run-up period. Thus, the role of asymmetric information and the extent 
of informed trading is dominant in determining the level of returns shareholders receive. The 
cross-sectional analysis for the target firms suggests that the abnormal returns occur when 
acquirers take a majority stake (>=50 %), and when they use cash as a consideration for 
settlement.  
For the acquirers, the announcement day impact is not statistically significant, but the 
3 day returns range between 1% and 1.5%, depending on the estimation method. Further, in 
comparison to the domestic deals, the cross-border deals yield lesser returns, and there is 
some indication of higher returns when a majority stake is acquired.  
There is no evidence of systematic average abnormal returns (AARs) to the new 
investors immediately after the public announcement of the event, which supports the 
efficiency market hypothesis.  
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Methodological Contributions 
a. Financial Models 
Secondly, comparing the two financial models, the Fama-French model replicates the 
trends of the Market model returns. Thus, while numerically Fama-French returns are 
marginally higher, on the announcement effect, qualitatively they are statistically alike. 
However, the overall 51 day CAARs [-20, +30] from the Fama-French model exceed the 
Market model CAARs statistically by 1% on average and that too only for the target 
shareholders. This implies that Fama-French models differ only for cumulated larger 
magnitudes.  
The Scholes and Williams adjusted betas replicate the returns obtained from the 
unadjusted Market model. Likewise, there is no inherent difference in the abnormal returns 
obtained from Market models calculated using equally weighted index and value weighted 
index. 
Overall, the Market model based on value weighted index appears to capture returns 
adequately and using other models or variants do not add unique values to the analysis. 
b. Regression Methods  
However, for regressions techniques, there are significant differences in the results 
from the robust and the OLS regressions. Quite often, the difference is not only in the 
magnitude of the returns but also in the direction and overall trend. OLS CAARs for the 
acquirers are mostly negative, whereas those from the robust regressions are significantly 
positive. These differences become more evident and amplify on a comparison of the returns 
for the entire event window (51 day CAARs). It clearly indicates that the event study 
outcomes are sensitive to the type of regression technique used. And if the data is affected by 
the outliers, robust regression techniques provide more reliable results as they weigh down 
their influence in the estimations and make reduals larger and more visible. 
Evidently, FF models may yield marginally higher returns overall but more than the 
financial models, the abnormal returns are sensitive to the regression techniques.  
Chapter 6  
Chapter six narrows down the analysis to domestic deals where the target and the 
acquiring firms both originate in India. Following the arguments presented in chapter two, 
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this chapter focuses on synergy effects, the role of Indian Business Groups as an acquirer and 
the relatedness effects when the participating firms are affiliated with each other.  
For evaluating synergy effects, the following hypothesis is tested for both the targets 
and the acquirers. 
H2:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of domestic M&As 
(DMAs) to the participating Indian firms. 
The analysis rejects the hypothesis for both the sides in the deal as there are 
significantly positive abnormal returns associated with the announcements of domestic 
M&As. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the synergy creation hypothesis. 
The 3 day announcement returns for the targets are around 4% and, depending on the 
regression methods, event period return can be as high as 20%. Further, with regards to pre-
bid returns, target returns show a large run-up, which is significantly higher than the mark-
up return, suggesting that asymmetric information also plays a dominant role.  
For the acquirers, 3 day returns are in the range of 1% to 1.5%, depending on the 
regression methods and model. The pre-bid window of significantly positive CAARs is non-
existent from OLS estimations and is lot smaller from the MM method, relative to the target 
CAARs, suggesting absence of informed trading. 
The chapter further explores the impact of the participation of large Indian Business 
Groups as acquirers in the deals. The hypotheses thus tested is: 
H3:  There is no difference in abnormal returns at the announcement of takeovers when 
acquirers belong to Indian Business Groups.  
The analysis rejects the hypothesis for the targets and fails to reject it for the acquirers. 
 For the target firms, the analysis overall points towards positive abnormal returns to 
the shareholders. These returns may be 5% to 10% higher from their counterparts. However, 
this positive influence occurs after the announcement, once the type of deal is learned by the 
market. The findings indicate a lack of tunnelling possibilities in takeovers involving large 
Indian Business Groups as acquirers.  
For the acquirer firms, there is clear evidence from both the analyses (event study and 
cross-sectional) that the returns to the acquiring shareholders are uncorrelated with the status 
of the acquirer as Indian Business Group or others. 
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Finally, the chapter explores the role of relatedness in determining the returns 
generated by such deals. The hypothesis tested is: 
H4:  There is no difference in abnormal returns at the announcement of takeovers when the 
targets and the acquirer are already affiliated.  
The analysis fails to reject the hypothesis for the targets and rejects it for the acquirers. 
For the target firms, acquisitions by related acquirers yield lower returns in event 
studies, as well as in cross-sectional analysis. But the difference in returns however or the 
negative correlation coefficient is not different from zero at the conventional level. 
On the other hand, for the acquirers, taking over related target firms yield higher 
returns, and the cross-sectional coefficients are significantly positive. 
Chapter 7 
The primary aim of chapter seven was to divulge the important aspects that drive 
returns to Indian firms in cross-border M&As. The premises of this chapter is based on the 
set of characteristics unique to India as explained in Figure 2.4.7 The Multidimensional 
Aspects of India (pg. 2-59). It further compares the returns between domestic and cross-border 
outcomes. 
For evaluating synergy effects, the following hypothesis is tested for both the targets 
and the acquirers. 
H5:  There are no abnormal returns associated with the announcements of cross-border 
M&As (CBMAs) to the participating Indian firms. 
The target shareholders, whether Indian or from other nationalities, make significant 
abnormal positive returns at the announcement of CBMAs. For the acquirers, the Indian 
acquirers make significantly positive returns in cross-border takeovers however the foreign 
acquirers though make positive returns but are not different from zero when they take over 
Indian firms.  
Thus, the evidence overall supports the synergy hypothesis in Indian acquisitions of 
foreign firms, and such CBMAs are  beneficial in general. However, it also alludes towards 
hubris effect for foreign acquirers. 
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The chapter further explores the impact of varying corporate governance practices of 
Indian and the foreign in the deals. The hypothesis tested is: 
H6:  There is no difference in returns to the Indian shareholders in the takeover deals with 
the firms with identical corporate governance models. 
Interestingly, Indian target shareholders respond more favourably to acquirers with 
the German/Japanese model of corporate governance, with overwhelming support from both 
the MM and OLS estimations. The returns are large and the test of differences of means for 
Day-0 returns is significant.  
Further, based on (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) argument that when French acquires 
are treated as Anglo-Saxon to isolate ownership pattern, the results from the GJ model are 
more pronounced. It appears that the potential of Blockholding or higher investor protection 
is the real driving factor in CBMAs in India. 
Indian acquirers show significantly lower returns when pursuing targets with Anglo-
Saxon model.  
Thus, the evidence presented here rejects the null hypothesis and confirms that the 
corporate governance model matters in Indian CBMAs for both the sides. 
Further, institutional distance has always been pointed out as one major hurdle in 
M&A integrations. The legal origin is described as fundamental to institutional frameworks 
of the nations. Hence, the Commonwealth Inheritance effect is analysed to understand 
whether a common institutional environment drives higher returns. The following hypothesis 
is tested to understand the role of institutional similarities in CBMAs: 
H7:  There is no difference in returns to the Indian shareholders from the takeovers deals 
with the culturally proximate firms. 
The target returns show that there are significantly positive returns from the acquirers 
from multiple cultures and that the distant cultures produce higher returns than the ones in 
proximity. Thus, the evidence rejects the hypothesis that there is no difference in returns from 
the culturally proximate. In fact, it suggest that the culturally distant firms generate higher 
returns and the cultural proximity is not relevant. 
The results are interesting in that distant cultures produce higher returns than cultures 
in close proximity. Moreover, while the returns are positive and CAARs are significant in 
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almost all the cases, the test of differences of mean fails to show that inter-cultural differences 
are important. 
H8:  There is no difference in returns to the Indian shareholders from the takeovers by the 
firms with identical institutional framework. 
For the targets, 80% of the takeovers are by Non-Commonwealth acquirers and there 
is no significant difference between the results from the Commonwealth and Non-
Commonwealth returns.  
Similarly, for the acquirers, the Commonwealth attribute is not significantly different 
from zero.  
Thus, the analysis suggests that institutional similarity neither drives nor deters 
CBMAs from both the sides. 
As M&As are also described as a marriage of two organizations, it is essentially an 
amalgamation of two cultures, especially when it is cross-border in nature. Thus, cultural 
analysis is conducted to ensure if socio-cultural-anthropological similarities explain the 
returns in CBMAs.  
To sum, of the three dimensions presented here, an identical corporate governance 
model, which eventually translates into higher investor protection, is the most relevant aspect 
that drives returns of the CBMAs in India. 
DMAs vs. CBMAs 
Finally, the returns between domestic and cross-border mergers are compared to 
understand if they vary significantly from each others. 
There are significantly positive and comparable returns from both the types of M&As 
at the announcements. However, as the market learns about the acquirer in the deal, the 
market participants favour domestic acquirers more, as reflected in overall CAARs generated 
in DMAs. However, the results also show stark differences in the patterns of the returns. 
There is no significant difference in the run-up or mark-up for the returns in targets for 
CBMAs, which implies lesser role of asymmetric information in CBMAs. This explains why 
the announcement effect is higher in CBMAs, yet overall CAARs are significantly less in 
CBMAs. 
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8.3 Research Limitation and Proposed Future Work 
The focus of this thesis is to analyse the successful M&A deals between publicly 
listed firms at the time of the announcement using the event study methodology in the Indian 
market, which is an emerging country.  
The premises of the analysis imposes a number of inherent restrictions on the scope 
of the analysis. Being an emerging country, the archives lack sufficient richness of data, 
especially for any long-term studies. Thus, this thesis is limited, and substantially affected, 
by the non-availability of data which could have added more dimensions to the analysis 
otherwise. The missing firms coupled with the missing data (both share price and accounting 
figures) restricted the sample size and comparative analysis of targets and the acquirers. 
Further, the event study methodology has a pre-requisite of an event window that is 
clear of other prominent events. This also affected the sample size as business world 
dynamics force companies to make major choices continually and frequently. This impact is 
more severe when a long event window is chosen. Further, as M&As tend to occur in waves, 
there is a concentration of takeovers in just a few years. A long event window quite often 
excludes the deals completed in rapid succession involving the same acquirers or targets 
under the purview of confounding effects. This thesis lost a large number of deals from the 
sample due to frequent takeover activities, especially in the large business houses which 
thrive on expansion and diversification and do so swiftly when conducive. 
Apart from these premises, future research should also account for other attributes 
like unsuccessful deals which are withdrawn later or are rumoured to occur earlier. As the 
literature suggests that the price reactions around such events do not fall back to the original 
levels, it would be interesting to compare their returns with successful bids. If available, more 
accounting variables pertaining to various relative measures of the participating firms should 
be incorporated to gain deeper insights. 
Further, though in the Indian context, (Bahl (2006), Tripathi (2008) and Taneja (2010) 
favour the three factor model as a better estimator of stock returns, this thesis reports no 
significant difference in the announcements returns from the Market or Fama-French models. 
The overall CAARs from Fama-French model, however, may be slightly higher but no 
difference in the trends at all. This finding is in line with MacKinlay (1997) who argues that 
for the event studies, gains from the multifactor models are limited. Future work should 
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consider the finding that the Market model, though relatively simple, captures the returns 
sufficiently.  
Further, the difference between robust regressions and OLS techniques is quite large 
to the extent that they portray entirely different scenarios of the outcomes. The magnitudes 
and the directions differs and future research should consider employing robust regressions 
in the analysis. 
8.4 Overall Summary 
This section outlines the various hypotheses tested in this thesis and the final 
outcomes of the analysis. 
Aggregate Analysis 
Effect Hypothesis Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
   
H1: 
There are no abnormal returns 
associated with the 
announcements of M&As. 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to both the 
targets and acquiring 
shareholders at the 
announcement. 
  H1a: Synergy   As both targets and acquirers gain 
positive abnormal 
returns, the total 
effect is positive for 
the combined wealth. 
  H1b: Hubris  
  H1c: Agency  
Domestic Analysis (DMA) 
Effect Hypotheses Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
H2 : 
There are no abnormal 
returns associated with the 
announcements of domestic 
M&As. 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to both the 
targets and acquiring 
shareholders at the 
announcement. 
  H2a: Synergy   As both targets and acquirers gain 
positive abnormal 
returns on average, 
the total effect is 
positive for the 
combined wealth. 
  H2b: Hubris  
  H2c: Agency  
Indian 
Business 
Group 
H3 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the takeovers by the large 
Indian Business Groups. 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to the targets 
but insignificantly 
negative returns to 
the acquirers. 
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Relatedness H4 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the takeovers by the 
Related acquirers.  
 
Insignificantly 
negative returns to 
the targets, but 
significantly positive 
returns to the 
acquirers. 
Cross- border Analysis (CBMA) 
Effect Hypotheses Targets Acquirers Notes 
Motive 
H5 : 
There are no abnormal 
returns associated with the 
announcements of cross-
border M&As. 
 
Significantly positive 
returns to both the 
targets and acquiring 
shareholders at the 
announcement. 
 H1a: Synergy   As both targets and 
acquirers gain positive 
returns, the total effect 
is positive for the 
combined wealth. 
 H1b: Hubris  
 H1c: Agency  
Corporate 
Governance 
H6 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the takeovers of the firms 
with the identical corporate 
governance models.  
 
Indian targets and the 
acquirers both show 
significantly higher 
returns when dealing 
with the firms with 
German/Japanese 
model. 
Cultural 
Proximity 
H7 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the takeovers of the firms 
with the cultural proximity. 
 
There is difference in 
returns with different 
cultures and that the 
distant cultures 
produce higher returns. 
Institutional 
Framework 
H8 : 
There is no difference in 
abnormal returns generated 
in the takeovers of the firms 
with the identical 
Institutional framework. 
 
There is no significant 
difference between the 
returns from the deals 
with the firms with or 
without identical 
Institutional 
frameworks. 
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Appendix 
 
  
 
The secondary graphs and detailed statistical findings are tabulated in Appendix 
Chapter 5 . These tables are labelled to provide the name of the financial model; type of firm; 
the type of sample set; the regression technique and the number of observations (in 
parenthesis) and the index used. For each day in the entire event window - Days [-20, +30], 
these tables provide average abnormal returns - AAR, median AARs, cumulative average 
abnormal returns - CAARs, averaged Standardized Abnormal Returns (SARa) along with 
their standard deviations and t-statistics, and averaged Standardized CAARs (SCARa) along 
with the respective standard deviations and the t-statistics. Finally, the tables also earmark 
the t-statistics significant at the 5% and 10% level for SARa and SCARa. While, the t-
statistics, significant at the 10% level, is provided in bold and italic numbers, that at 5% is 
further highlighted. Also, a 3-day analysis of the days [-1, +1] is provided. Other relevant 
graphs and various cross-sectional results are also presented here. 
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Fama-French Analysis based on M-firms sub-set 
 
 
 
Figure A 5.1 Returns to All Targets from FF- Model (M-firms) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 5.2 Returns to All Acquirers from FF- Model (M-firms) 
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Table-A 5.1 Market returns to Targets; All-firms; (MM, 264); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.28% 0.10% 0.28% 0.1110 1.2181 1.5061 0.1110 1.2181 1.5061 
-19 0.43% 0.15% 0.71% 0.1921 1.0388 3.0569 0.2143 1.1850 2.9894 
-18 0.13% -0.08% 0.84% 0.0589 1.1950 0.8149 0.2089 1.1303 3.0564 
-17 0.16% 0.02% 1.01% 0.0833 1.2682 1.0857 0.2226 1.2621 2.9160 
-16 0.18% -0.01% 1.18% 0.0431 1.1312 0.6301 0.2184 1.2602 2.8650 
-15 0.48% 0.18% 1.66% 0.1313 1.0884 1.9949 0.2530 1.2555 3.3311 
-14 0.48% 0.16% 2.14% 0.1660 1.3124 2.0915 0.2969 1.2494 3.9297 
-13 0.28% -0.07% 2.42% 0.0980 1.2785 1.2680 0.3124 1.2712 4.0637 
-12 0.72% 0.17% 3.14% 0.2201 1.1704 3.1095 0.3679 1.3430 4.5298 
-11 0.61% 0.36% 3.75% 0.1822 1.2905 2.3339 0.4067 1.3481 4.9874 
-10 0.57% 0.24% 4.32% 0.1450 1.3360 1.7946 0.4314 1.3843 5.1532 
-9 0.96% 0.29% 5.28% 0.2825 1.3858 3.3710 0.4946 1.3765 5.9414 
-8 -0.06% -0.04% 5.22% 0.0398 1.1648 0.5647 0.4863 1.3951 5.7629 
-7 0.67% 0.26% 5.89% 0.1824 1.2549 2.4030 0.5173 1.3687 6.2493 
-6 0.51% 0.06% 6.40% 0.2120 1.3937 2.5146 0.5545 1.3706 6.6894 
-5 0.67% 0.19% 7.07% 0.1941 1.4128 2.2718 0.5854 1.3653 7.0896 
-4 0.38% -0.12% 7.46% 0.1098 1.2157 1.4938 0.5946 1.3606 7.2253 
-3 0.66% 0.19% 8.11% 0.2254 1.3454 2.7696 0.6310 1.3630 7.6539 
-2 0.82% 0.26% 8.93% 0.2671 1.2603 3.5044 0.6754 1.3638 8.1884 
-1 1.74% 0.90% 10.67% 0.5966 1.7538 5.6246 0.7917 1.4239 9.1934 
0 2.54% 1.30% 13.21% 0.8245 2.3215 5.8720 0.9525 1.4911 10.5625 
1 1.64% 0.71% 14.86% 0.3804 2.1500 2.9255 1.0118 1.5358 10.8920 
2 0.56% 0.08% 15.42% 0.1527 1.4729 1.7143 1.0214 1.5839 10.6615 
3 -0.02% -0.03% 15.40% -0.0202 1.5130 -0.2204 0.9957 1.6201 10.1619 
4 -0.12% -0.05% 15.28% -0.0186 1.3061 -0.2349 0.9719 1.5902 10.1053 
5 -0.17% -0.14% 15.11% -0.0264 1.0169 -0.4295 0.9479 1.5666 10.0037 
6 0.05% -0.06% 15.16% 0.0252 1.1020 0.3787 0.9350 1.5527 9.9561 
7 0.13% 0.01% 15.29% 0.0595 1.1160 0.8814 0.9294 1.5498 9.9149 
8 -0.08% -0.16% 15.21% 0.0001 1.1453 0.0020 0.9132 1.5504 9.7394 
9 0.42% 0.16% 15.63% 0.1693 1.1677 2.3973 0.9288 1.5757 9.7463 
10 0.26% 0.22% 15.89% 0.0922 0.9540 1.5984 0.9303 1.5826 9.7187 
11 0.45% 0.21% 16.34% 0.1184 1.1444 1.7107 0.9366 1.5982 9.6892 
12 0.14% 0.10% 16.48% 0.0391 1.4923 0.4332 0.9291 1.6626 9.2392 
13 0.07% 0.00% 16.55% 0.0042 1.0927 0.0634 0.9160 1.6404 9.2326 
14 0.09% 0.06% 16.64% 0.0275 0.9153 0.4964 0.9075 1.6332 9.1869 
15 0.19% -0.06% 16.83% 0.0472 1.0201 0.7652 0.9027 1.6198 9.2138 
16 -0.23% -0.03% 16.60% -0.0836 1.1139 -1.2415 0.8766 1.6334 8.8734 
17 0.20% 0.06% 16.81% 0.0674 1.0412 1.0703 0.8759 1.6395 8.8339 
18 0.28% -0.01% 17.09% 0.0368 1.1779 0.5159 0.8705 1.6274 8.8444 
19 0.24% 0.21% 17.32% 0.0811 1.0567 1.2693 0.8724 1.6209 8.8990 
20 0.51% 0.13% 17.84% 0.1759 1.0070 2.8881 0.8892 1.6101 9.1306 
21 -0.33% -0.22% 17.51% -0.0630 0.9816 -1.0620 0.8688 1.6038 8.9564 
22 -0.29% -0.12% 17.23% -0.0786 0.9538 -1.3623 0.8466 1.6016 8.7403 
23 0.12% 0.01% 17.35% 0.0331 0.9759 0.5604 0.8420 1.6079 8.6579 
24 0.53% 0.24% 17.88% 0.1602 1.0033 2.6399 0.8564 1.5800 8.9619 
25 -0.01% -0.04% 17.87% 0.0198 0.9492 0.3450 0.8500 1.5782 8.9051 
26 -0.13% 0.03% 17.74% -0.0096 0.8958 -0.1766 0.8395 1.5664 8.8612 
27 0.10% 0.05% 17.84% 0.0330 1.0353 0.5273 0.8355 1.5580 8.8665 
28 0.16% 0.07% 18.00% 0.0320 0.9881 0.5361 0.8315 1.5502 8.8686 
29 0.18% 0.03% 18.18% 0.0790 1.1099 1.1771 0.8343 1.5443 8.9324 
30 0.27% 0.24% 18.45% 0.0818 0.9037 1.4971 0.8375 1.5407 8.9882 
          
-1 to 1     5.93% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06381 1.0401 2.1633 7.9493 
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Table-A 5.2 Market returns to Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 274); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.08% -0.09% -0.08% 0.0100 1.0202 0.1679 0.0100 1.0202 0.1679 
-19 0.30% 0.03% 0.23% 0.0981 0.9257 1.8206 0.0764 0.9818 1.3373 
-18 0.04% -0.20% 0.26% 0.0149 0.9946 0.2569 0.0710 0.9578 1.2733 
-17 -0.12% -0.12% 0.15% 0.0221 1.0177 0.3736 0.0726 1.0148 1.2280 
-16 -0.02% -0.10% 0.13% -0.0087 0.9893 -0.1502 0.0610 1.0153 1.0324 
-15 0.45% 0.08% 0.58% 0.0902 0.9614 1.6114 0.0925 1.0495 1.5143 
-14 0.32% 0.08% 0.91% 0.0745 1.0837 1.1811 0.1138 1.0389 1.8820 
-13 0.09% -0.24% 1.00% 0.0342 1.0819 0.5425 0.1186 1.0641 1.9137 
-12 0.60% 0.05% 1.60% 0.1391 1.0057 2.3759 0.1582 1.1183 2.4291 
-11 0.34% 0.35% 1.94% 0.1009 1.0827 1.6010 0.1820 1.1314 2.7621 
-10 0.40% 0.08% 2.34% 0.0783 1.0956 1.2277 0.1971 1.1664 2.9024 
-9 1.31% 0.19% 3.65% 0.2264 1.3911 2.7953 0.2541 1.1735 3.7184 
-8 -0.50% -0.25% 3.15% -0.0284 1.0389 -0.4688 0.2363 1.1793 3.4405 
-7 0.38% 0.00% 3.53% 0.0895 1.0688 1.4374 0.2516 1.1628 3.7155 
-6 0.33% -0.01% 3.86% 0.1167 1.1109 1.8038 0.2732 1.1698 4.0102 
-5 0.44% 0.06% 4.30% 0.1337 1.1958 1.9202 0.2979 1.1600 4.4107 
-4 0.11% -0.28% 4.42% 0.0335 1.0345 0.5562 0.2972 1.1605 4.3972 
-3 0.58% 0.00% 5.00% 0.1571 1.1201 2.4088 0.3258 1.1481 4.8733 
-2 0.67% 0.02% 5.67% 0.1849 1.0551 3.0104 0.3595 1.1444 5.3956 
-1 1.52% 0.51% 7.19% 0.4416 1.4353 5.2832 0.4492 1.1662 6.6144 
0 2.33% 1.22% 9.52% 0.6628 1.9439 5.8557 0.5830 1.2114 8.2651 
1 1.39% 0.30% 10.91% 0.2757 1.6800 2.8184 0.6284 1.2549 8.5992 
2 0.30% -0.17% 11.21% 0.0747 1.2542 1.0226 0.6301 1.2993 8.3287 
3 -0.17% -0.26% 11.04% -0.0717 1.3462 -0.9147 0.6022 1.3242 7.8101 
4 -0.23% -0.32% 10.81% -0.0785 1.1336 -1.1896 0.5744 1.3181 7.4836 
5 -0.41% -0.34% 10.40% -0.0661 0.9239 -1.2283 0.5502 1.3016 7.2598 
6 -0.12% -0.32% 10.29% -0.0097 0.9823 -0.1689 0.5381 1.2940 7.1417 
7 -0.37% -0.13% 9.91% -0.0884 1.0758 -1.4106 0.5117 1.3015 6.7518 
8 -0.38% -0.35% 9.53% -0.0877 1.0168 -1.4806 0.4865 1.3038 6.4082 
9 0.17% -0.07% 9.70% 0.0760 0.9824 1.3294 0.4922 1.3236 6.3865 
10 0.44% -0.02% 10.13% 0.0808 1.1137 1.2454 0.4987 1.3311 6.4346 
11 0.21% 0.00% 10.34% 0.0213 0.9787 0.3736 0.4946 1.3461 6.3105 
12 -0.09% -0.02% 10.26% -0.0303 1.2514 -0.4164 0.4818 1.3891 5.9567 
13 -0.12% -0.15% 10.14% -0.0245 0.9344 -0.4507 0.4705 1.3689 5.9023 
14 -0.04% -0.10% 10.09% -0.0088 0.8027 -0.1890 0.4622 1.3591 5.8403 
15 -0.10% -0.18% 10.00% -0.0376 0.8586 -0.7518 0.4495 1.3498 5.7185 
16 -0.52% -0.27% 9.48% -0.1636 0.9169 -3.0644 0.4165 1.3650 5.2398 
17 -0.12% -0.16% 9.36% -0.0332 0.9335 -0.6104 0.4056 1.3705 5.0818 
18 0.21% -0.07% 9.57% 0.0433 1.0238 0.7263 0.4073 1.3588 5.1471 
19 0.02% -0.03% 9.59% 0.0047 0.8820 0.0908 0.4029 1.3542 5.1093 
20 0.31% -0.04% 9.90% 0.0652 0.8002 1.3984 0.4081 1.3474 5.2014 
21 -0.47% -0.34% 9.43% -0.1092 0.9022 -2.0782 0.3864 1.3382 4.9585 
22 -0.51% -0.27% 8.92% -0.1367 0.8713 -2.6936 0.3610 1.3380 4.6338 
23 -0.42% -0.21% 8.50% -0.0901 1.0655 -1.4514 0.3433 1.3550 4.3511 
24 0.31% 0.08% 8.81% 0.0835 0.8836 1.6238 0.3519 1.3325 4.5356 
25 -0.27% -0.28% 8.55% -0.0462 0.8551 -0.9282 0.3413 1.3289 4.4103 
26 -0.11% -0.13% 8.44% -0.0398 0.9767 -0.7002 0.3318 1.3143 4.3355 
27 -0.35% -0.11% 8.09% -0.0260 1.0844 -0.4110 0.3246 1.2969 4.2981 
28 -0.08% -0.07% 8.01% -0.0262 0.8287 -0.5431 0.3175 1.2899 4.2272 
29 0.01% -0.08% 8.02% 0.0194 0.9500 0.3499 0.3171 1.2838 4.2412 
30 0.03% 0.10% 8.05% 0.0176 0.7937 0.3814 0.3164 1.2740 4.2650 
                    
-1 to 1     5.24% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06397 0.7968 1.7690 7.7355 
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Table-A 5.3 Market returns to Targets; MM firms; (OLS, 264); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.08% -0.07% 0.08% 0.0393 0.9740 0.6678 0.0393 0.9740 0.6678 
-19 0.23% 0.03% 0.32% 0.0960 0.8845 1.7972 0.0956 0.9490 1.6691 
-18 -0.08% -0.27% 0.23% 0.0089 1.0004 0.1471 0.0832 0.9318 1.4793 
-17 -0.05% -0.19% 0.19% 0.0156 1.0108 0.2552 0.0798 1.0140 1.3043 
-16 -0.04% -0.10% 0.15% -0.0144 0.9738 -0.2450 0.0650 1.0160 1.0593 
-15 0.26% 0.01% 0.41% 0.0630 0.9455 1.1046 0.0850 1.0449 1.3483 
-14 0.25% 0.03% 0.66% 0.0664 1.0541 1.0438 0.1038 1.0288 1.6720 
-13 0.09% -0.25% 0.75% 0.0220 1.0867 0.3362 0.1049 1.0524 1.6518 
-12 0.49% 0.02% 1.24% 0.1272 1.0005 2.1059 0.1413 1.1043 2.1200 
-11 0.42% 0.35% 1.66% 0.0989 1.0778 1.5204 0.1653 1.1196 2.4466 
-10 0.38% 0.01% 2.04% 0.0888 1.0990 1.3380 0.1844 1.1665 2.6190 
-9 0.78% 0.19% 2.82% 0.1948 1.1529 2.7989 0.2328 1.1577 3.3312 
-8 -0.26% -0.25% 2.56% -0.0060 1.0021 -0.0998 0.2220 1.1812 3.1133 
-7 0.47% 0.00% 3.03% 0.1030 1.0780 1.5835 0.2414 1.1694 3.4206 
-6 0.31% -0.06% 3.34% 0.1017 1.0878 1.5489 0.2595 1.1756 3.6572 
-5 0.49% 0.09% 3.83% 0.1478 1.2011 2.0382 0.2882 1.1692 4.0840 
-4 0.18% -0.28% 4.01% 0.0418 1.0375 0.6680 0.2898 1.1704 4.1014 
-3 0.43% -0.02% 4.44% 0.1378 1.1174 2.0436 0.3141 1.1564 4.4995 
-2 0.60% 0.02% 5.04% 0.1829 1.0568 2.8677 0.3477 1.1491 5.0127 
-1 1.53% 0.55% 6.57% 0.4541 1.4478 5.1967 0.4404 1.1717 6.2270 
0 2.35% 1.30% 8.92% 0.6831 1.9696 5.7462 0.5789 1.2202 7.8594 
1 1.47% 0.46% 10.39% 0.2983 1.7008 2.9058 0.6292 1.2654 8.2374 
2 0.36% -0.16% 10.76% 0.0853 1.2731 1.1106 0.6331 1.3130 7.9885 
3 -0.22% -0.24% 10.53% -0.0679 1.3075 -0.8604 0.6059 1.3405 7.4890 
4 -0.31% -0.32% 10.22% -0.0661 1.1051 -0.9907 0.5805 1.3285 7.2390 
5 -0.37% -0.36% 9.86% -0.0656 0.8811 -1.2326 0.5563 1.3121 7.0246 
6 -0.15% -0.32% 9.71% -0.0199 0.9351 -0.3526 0.5421 1.3047 6.8841 
7 -0.09% -0.07% 9.62% -0.0261 0.9330 -0.4628 0.5274 1.3023 6.7095 
8 -0.28% -0.33% 9.34% -0.0523 0.9759 -0.8877 0.5085 1.2971 6.4952 
9 0.23% -0.07% 9.58% 0.0946 0.9688 1.6183 0.5173 1.3145 6.5192 
10 0.05% -0.01% 9.62% 0.0339 0.8024 0.7009 0.5150 1.3190 6.4683 
11 0.23% 0.00% 9.85% 0.0269 0.9765 0.4566 0.5116 1.3328 6.3596 
12 -0.07% 0.01% 9.78% -0.0256 1.2697 -0.3334 0.4993 1.3790 5.9992 
13 -0.12% -0.18% 9.66% -0.0322 0.9268 -0.5762 0.4864 1.3648 5.9046 
14 -0.17% -0.12% 9.50% -0.0287 0.7859 -0.6055 0.4746 1.3583 5.7882 
15 -0.02% -0.17% 9.48% -0.0115 0.8418 -0.2269 0.4660 1.3438 5.7451 
16 -0.42% -0.25% 9.06% -0.1331 0.8778 -2.5118 0.4378 1.3520 5.3646 
17 0.02% -0.12% 9.08% 0.0114 0.8562 0.2207 0.4338 1.3487 5.3291 
18 0.07% -0.09% 9.16% 0.0044 0.9155 0.0790 0.4289 1.3420 5.2952 
19 0.03% -0.04% 9.19% 0.0098 0.8859 0.1839 0.4251 1.3389 5.2600 
20 0.29% -0.06% 9.48% 0.0636 0.8112 1.2990 0.4298 1.3318 5.3469 
21 -0.55% -0.39% 8.93% -0.1302 0.8174 -2.6396 0.4046 1.3182 5.0847 
22 -0.51% -0.32% 8.42% -0.1178 0.8027 -2.4309 0.3819 1.3095 4.8314 
23 -0.12% -0.20% 8.31% -0.0302 0.8376 -0.5979 0.3730 1.3141 4.7020 
24 0.32% 0.05% 8.63% 0.0843 0.8719 1.6025 0.3814 1.2914 4.8926 
25 -0.23% -0.28% 8.40% -0.0509 0.8408 -1.0038 0.3697 1.2935 4.7350 
26 -0.35% -0.14% 8.05% -0.0745 0.7564 -1.6315 0.3549 1.2850 4.5753 
27 -0.11% -0.11% 7.94% -0.0057 0.8375 -0.1137 0.3503 1.2750 4.5519 
28 -0.05% -0.04% 7.89% -0.0237 0.8332 -0.4722 0.3433 1.2667 4.4905 
29 -0.02% -0.14% 7.87% 0.0149 0.9310 0.2651 0.3420 1.2646 4.4804 
30 0.06% 0.08% 7.93% 0.0119 0.7724 0.2549 0.3403 1.2598 4.4751 
          
-1 to 1     5.36% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06426 0.8288 1.7738 7.7414 
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Table-A 5.4 Market returns to Targets; M firms; (M, 241); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.30% 0.06% 0.30% 0.1118 1.5056 1.1426 0.1118 1.5056 1.1426 
-19 0.40% 0.10% 0.70% 0.2315 1.3030 2.7341 0.2427 1.4707 2.5400 
-18 0.24% -0.10% 0.95% 0.0648 1.4288 0.6984 0.2356 1.3683 2.6500 
-17 0.26% 0.02% 1.21% 0.0661 1.6925 0.6015 0.2371 1.5490 2.3559 
-16 0.15% -0.07% 1.36% 0.0444 1.3156 0.5198 0.2320 1.5024 2.3761 
-15 0.49% 0.19% 1.84% 0.1939 1.4320 2.0845 0.2909 1.5094 2.9664 
-14 0.39% 0.29% 2.23% 0.2242 1.5336 2.2503 0.3541 1.4727 3.7005 
-13 0.22% -0.19% 2.45% 0.0508 1.6158 0.4834 0.3492 1.5102 3.5584 
-12 0.61% 0.14% 3.06% 0.2091 1.4022 2.2954 0.3989 1.6088 3.8161 
-11 0.52% 0.43% 3.58% 0.2214 1.5147 2.2492 0.4484 1.5849 4.3545 
-10 0.64% 0.23% 4.22% 0.1696 1.9366 1.3480 0.4787 1.6606 4.4368 
-9 0.93% 0.30% 5.15% 0.3181 1.7069 2.8681 0.5502 1.6728 5.0617 
-8 0.00% -0.06% 5.14% 0.0397 1.4260 0.4287 0.5396 1.6912 4.9104 
-7 0.73% 0.29% 5.87% 0.2074 1.5427 2.0692 0.5754 1.6648 5.3192 
-6 0.37% -0.02% 6.24% 0.1770 1.5176 1.7950 0.6016 1.6632 5.5666 
-5 0.60% 0.26% 6.83% 0.1699 1.8219 1.4349 0.6249 1.6805 5.7234 
-4 0.44% -0.03% 7.28% 0.1706 1.5114 1.7371 0.6477 1.6449 6.0600 
-3 0.60% 0.19% 7.88% 0.2632 1.5468 2.6190 0.6915 1.6491 6.4530 
-2 0.96% 0.25% 8.84% 0.3499 1.5303 3.5192 0.7533 1.6280 7.1214 
-1 1.70% 0.97% 10.54% 0.6408 2.1828 4.5181 0.8775 1.7045 7.9231 
0 2.63% 1.59% 13.17% 1.0083 2.8402 5.4639 1.0764 1.7673 9.3736 
1 1.67% 0.73% 14.84% 0.4585 2.7860 2.5327 1.1494 1.8330 9.6507 
2 0.61% 0.12% 15.45% 0.1325 1.7834 1.1438 1.1518 1.9068 9.2961 
3 0.13% 0.07% 15.58% -0.0614 2.2715 -0.4158 1.1150 1.9776 8.6774 
4 -0.01% -0.06% 15.58% -0.0047 1.5859 -0.0459 1.0915 1.9316 8.6969 
5 -0.12% -0.20% 15.46% -0.0261 1.2823 -0.3133 1.0652 1.8976 8.6393 
6 0.18% -0.12% 15.63% 0.0264 1.3702 0.2961 1.0504 1.8736 8.6282 
7 0.03% 0.01% 15.66% 0.0323 1.4124 0.3516 1.0375 1.8979 8.4136 
8 -0.04% -0.24% 15.62% -0.0297 1.5299 -0.2986 1.0140 1.8901 8.2562 
9 0.37% 0.16% 15.99% 0.1911 1.3881 2.1189 1.0318 1.9215 8.2645 
10 0.33% 0.19% 16.33% 0.1234 1.1046 1.7189 1.0372 1.9300 8.2710 
11 0.20% 0.01% 16.53% 0.0346 1.2847 0.4148 1.0270 1.9557 8.0817 
12 0.08% 0.14% 16.61% -0.0047 2.1195 -0.0340 1.0105 2.0732 7.5012 
13 0.15% 0.03% 16.76% 0.0341 1.3233 0.3969 1.0014 2.0483 7.5239 
14 0.11% 0.05% 16.87% 0.0290 1.0800 0.4130 0.9919 2.0428 7.4726 
15 0.19% -0.02% 17.06% 0.0255 1.3866 0.2833 0.9822 2.0417 7.4042 
16 -0.55% -0.16% 16.51% -0.2147 1.4728 -2.2432 0.9336 2.0678 6.9484 
17 0.25% 0.03% 16.75% 0.0412 1.2632 0.5014 0.9279 2.0868 6.8431 
18 0.13% -0.08% 16.88% -0.0222 1.5860 -0.2153 0.9124 2.0774 6.7594 
19 0.17% 0.24% 17.06% 0.0720 1.3558 0.8174 0.9123 2.0714 6.7780 
20 0.31% 0.03% 17.37% 0.1535 1.1304 2.0892 0.9250 2.0436 6.9664 
21 -0.37% -0.34% 17.01% -0.0672 1.4440 -0.7163 0.9036 2.0176 6.8926 
22 -0.17% -0.04% 16.83% -0.1049 1.4835 -1.0880 0.8770 2.0489 6.5877 
23 0.12% -0.03% 16.95% 0.0304 1.1269 0.4146 0.8716 2.0500 6.5435 
24 0.39% 0.20% 17.34% 0.1663 1.2111 2.1129 0.8866 2.0150 6.7719 
25 0.06% -0.04% 17.40% 0.0518 1.2143 0.6567 0.8846 1.9896 6.8427 
26 -0.14% 0.02% 17.26% -0.0138 1.0344 -0.2060 0.8731 1.9747 6.8047 
27 0.21% 0.15% 17.48% 0.0153 1.2726 0.1846 0.8662 1.9752 6.7489 
28 0.14% 0.05% 17.61% 0.0819 1.4392 0.8758 0.8690 1.9506 6.8565 
29 0.14% 0.03% 17.75% 0.0865 1.3348 0.9972 0.8725 1.9484 6.8918 
30 0.15% 0.20% 17.90% 0.0668 1.0341 0.9935 0.8732 1.9488 6.8961 
          
-1 to 1     6.00% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06212 1.2168 2.7605 6.7840 
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Table-A 5.5 Market returns to Targets; M firms; (OLS, 241); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.16% -0.10% 0.16% 0.0445 0.9927 0.6921 0.0445 0.9927 0.6921 
-19 0.23% 0.00% 0.38% 0.0987 0.8965 1.7004 0.1013 0.9638 1.6225 
-18 0.06% -0.27% 0.44% 0.0255 1.0234 0.3842 0.0974 0.9517 1.5801 
-17 0.09% -0.22% 0.53% 0.0375 1.0229 0.5659 0.1031 1.0317 1.5429 
-16 -0.03% -0.12% 0.49% -0.0154 0.9929 -0.2389 0.0853 1.0304 1.2788 
-15 0.28% 0.01% 0.78% 0.0700 0.9638 1.1224 0.1065 1.0670 1.5411 
-14 0.20% 0.20% 0.98% 0.0781 1.0370 1.1636 0.1281 1.0513 1.8819 
-13 0.07% -0.31% 1.05% 0.0066 1.1006 0.0921 0.1222 1.0852 1.7385 
-12 0.42% 0.08% 1.47% 0.1359 1.0228 2.0524 0.1605 1.1376 2.1787 
-11 0.37% 0.39% 1.84% 0.1044 1.0881 1.4820 0.1853 1.1476 2.4931 
-10 0.49% 0.11% 2.32% 0.1187 1.1161 1.6429 0.2124 1.1921 2.7521 
-9 0.79% 0.20% 3.12% 0.2074 1.1680 2.7420 0.2633 1.1845 3.4323 
-8 -0.17% -0.18% 2.95% 0.0069 0.9964 0.1073 0.2549 1.2113 3.2493 
-7 0.56% 0.07% 3.51% 0.1147 1.0893 1.6266 0.2763 1.2005 3.5536 
-6 0.21% -0.13% 3.72% 0.0933 1.1038 1.3058 0.2910 1.2090 3.7168 
-5 0.45% 0.11% 4.17% 0.1475 1.2241 1.8611 0.3186 1.2039 4.0871 
-4 0.28% -0.20% 4.45% 0.0704 1.0487 1.0371 0.3262 1.2043 4.1828 
-3 0.42% 0.01% 4.88% 0.1313 1.1043 1.8359 0.3479 1.1876 4.5245 
-2 0.80% 0.04% 5.67% 0.2175 1.0689 3.1423 0.3886 1.1754 5.1052 
-1 1.53% 0.63% 7.20% 0.4714 1.4845 4.9034 0.4841 1.1899 6.2831 
0 2.48% 1.38% 9.68% 0.7270 2.0114 5.5815 0.6311 1.2346 7.8939 
1 1.54% 0.54% 11.23% 0.3214 1.7542 2.8293 0.6851 1.2837 8.2422 
2 0.45% -0.12% 11.68% 0.0924 1.3082 1.0905 0.6893 1.3361 7.9674 
3 -0.04% -0.17% 11.64% -0.0372 1.3496 -0.4253 0.6672 1.3663 7.5415 
4 -0.16% -0.33% 11.48% -0.0440 1.1053 -0.6146 0.6449 1.3527 7.3627 
5 -0.28% -0.32% 11.20% -0.0497 0.8982 -0.8539 0.6227 1.3341 7.2075 
6 0.02% -0.33% 11.22% -0.0109 0.9395 -0.1787 0.6089 1.3241 7.1018 
7 -0.16% -0.09% 11.06% -0.0389 0.9341 -0.6427 0.5906 1.3273 6.8715 
8 -0.19% -0.32% 10.87% -0.0385 0.9809 -0.6058 0.5732 1.3157 6.7281 
9 0.22% -0.02% 11.09% 0.1096 0.9839 1.7207 0.5836 1.3358 6.7468 
10 0.15% -0.01% 11.24% 0.0355 0.7951 0.6891 0.5805 1.3387 6.6959 
11 0.03% -0.17% 11.28% -0.0003 0.9561 -0.0054 0.5713 1.3574 6.4991 
12 -0.09% 0.01% 11.18% -0.0190 1.3084 -0.2239 0.5592 1.4071 6.1378 
13 0.01% -0.09% 11.19% -0.0195 0.9217 -0.3264 0.5476 1.3951 6.0615 
14 -0.10% -0.06% 11.09% -0.0207 0.7945 -0.4015 0.5362 1.3885 5.9642 
15 0.03% -0.15% 11.11% -0.0010 0.8416 -0.0190 0.5286 1.3724 5.9479 
16 -0.71% -0.37% 10.41% -0.1815 0.8828 -3.1754 0.4915 1.3867 5.4738 
17 0.11% -0.09% 10.51% 0.0262 0.8339 0.4854 0.4893 1.3803 5.4739 
18 -0.04% -0.11% 10.47% -0.0092 0.9252 -0.1532 0.4815 1.3762 5.4032 
19 0.00% -0.03% 10.47% 0.0131 0.8972 0.2256 0.4775 1.3730 5.3709 
20 0.13% -0.08% 10.60% 0.0358 0.7937 0.6972 0.4772 1.3663 5.3940 
21 -0.56% -0.42% 10.04% -0.1402 0.8338 -2.5966 0.4499 1.3511 5.1422 
22 -0.36% -0.25% 9.68% -0.0890 0.8050 -1.7077 0.4311 1.3411 4.9636 
23 -0.09% -0.21% 9.59% -0.0247 0.8560 -0.4454 0.4224 1.3447 4.8510 
24 0.21% 0.04% 9.80% 0.0678 0.8688 1.2054 0.4278 1.3231 4.9932 
25 -0.12% -0.24% 9.68% -0.0401 0.8593 -0.7210 0.4172 1.3233 4.8688 
26 -0.31% -0.13% 9.37% -0.0735 0.7701 -1.4743 0.4020 1.3152 4.7204 
27 0.02% -0.05% 9.39% 0.0074 0.8065 0.1411 0.3989 1.3042 4.7230 
28 -0.05% -0.02% 9.34% -0.0228 0.8330 -0.4218 0.3915 1.2936 4.6741 
29 -0.02% -0.07% 9.32% 0.0200 0.9405 0.3285 0.3904 1.2944 4.6580 
30 -0.03% -0.02% 9.29% 0.0005 0.7723 0.0094 0.3866 1.2919 4.6220 
          
-1 to 1     5.55% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06264 0.8774 1.8287 7.4095 
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Table-A 5.6 Market returns to Targets; M-firms; (MM, 241); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.34% 0.10% 0.34% 0.1211 1.2175 1.5353 0.1211 1.2175 1.5353 
-19 0.43% 0.14% 0.77% 0.1876 1.0402 2.7844 0.2183 1.1812 2.8528 
-18 0.28% -0.11% 1.05% 0.0835 1.2074 1.0677 0.2265 1.1276 3.1000 
-17 0.30% 0.02% 1.34% 0.1107 1.2681 1.3480 0.2515 1.2510 3.1032 
-16 0.18% -0.02% 1.53% 0.0490 1.1261 0.6715 0.2469 1.2381 3.0777 
-15 0.52% 0.23% 2.04% 0.1478 1.0894 2.0944 0.2857 1.2545 3.5153 
-14 0.43% 0.25% 2.47% 0.1847 1.2417 2.2954 0.3343 1.2424 4.1532 
-13 0.25% -0.18% 2.72% 0.0769 1.2697 0.9354 0.3399 1.2789 4.1026 
-12 0.65% 0.20% 3.37% 0.2238 1.1856 2.9138 0.3951 1.3502 4.5163 
-11 0.56% 0.45% 3.92% 0.1952 1.2825 2.3497 0.4365 1.3429 5.0176 
-10 0.67% 0.28% 4.59% 0.1896 1.3342 2.1937 0.4734 1.3786 5.3004 
-9 0.97% 0.31% 5.56% 0.2914 1.3841 3.2501 0.5374 1.3827 5.9989 
-8 0.03% 0.03% 5.59% 0.0601 1.1541 0.8042 0.5330 1.4092 5.8377 
-7 0.76% 0.34% 6.35% 0.2025 1.2621 2.4760 0.5677 1.3853 6.3252 
-6 0.40% 0.05% 6.75% 0.1700 1.2904 2.0333 0.5923 1.3964 6.5475 
-5 0.63% 0.26% 7.38% 0.1964 1.4299 2.1204 0.6226 1.3980 6.8743 
-4 0.48% -0.04% 7.86% 0.1524 1.2218 1.9257 0.6410 1.3915 7.1103 
-3 0.64% 0.24% 8.51% 0.2329 1.3089 2.7461 0.6778 1.3903 7.5253 
-2 1.00% 0.29% 9.50% 0.3166 1.2506 3.9070 0.7324 1.3806 8.1880 
-1 1.74% 0.99% 11.24% 0.6164 1.7941 5.3026 0.8516 1.4321 9.1794 
0 2.67% 1.64% 13.91% 0.8888 2.3646 5.8019 1.0251 1.4947 10.5860 
1 1.72% 0.77% 15.63% 0.4080 2.2193 2.8378 1.0885 1.5448 10.8764 
2 0.65% 0.08% 16.27% 0.1587 1.5154 1.6166 1.0977 1.6005 10.5858 
3 0.16% 0.10% 16.43% 0.0211 1.5501 0.2105 1.0789 1.6376 10.1692 
4 0.03% -0.03% 16.46% -0.0123 1.2579 -0.1515 1.0546 1.6090 10.1169 
5 -0.09% -0.13% 16.37% -0.0042 1.0304 -0.0626 1.0333 1.5824 10.0793 
6 0.21% -0.06% 16.58% 0.0403 1.1019 0.5641 1.0217 1.5655 10.0744 
7 0.06% 0.04% 16.64% 0.0419 1.0907 0.5935 1.0112 1.5738 9.9179 
8 0.00% -0.16% 16.64% 0.0199 1.1464 0.2685 0.9974 1.5665 9.8277 
9 0.40% 0.19% 17.04% 0.1817 1.1646 2.4085 1.0138 1.5977 9.7943 
10 0.36% 0.20% 17.40% 0.1063 0.9192 1.7848 1.0164 1.6022 9.7915 
11 0.24% 0.09% 17.65% 0.0715 1.0926 1.0095 1.0130 1.6243 9.6264 
12 0.11% 0.11% 17.75% 0.0436 1.5257 0.4414 1.0051 1.6929 9.1646 
13 0.18% 0.04% 17.94% 0.0310 1.0547 0.4543 0.9956 1.6741 9.1791 
14 0.15% 0.12% 18.09% 0.0517 0.9055 0.8815 0.9900 1.6658 9.1734 
15 0.23% -0.06% 18.32% 0.0554 1.0004 0.8552 0.9854 1.6493 9.2222 
16 -0.52% -0.14% 17.80% -0.1441 1.1193 -1.9865 0.9483 1.6709 8.7602 
17 0.29% 0.11% 18.09% 0.0859 0.9959 1.3308 0.9496 1.6736 8.7586 
18 0.16% -0.06% 18.25% 0.0288 1.1613 0.3831 0.9420 1.6660 8.7275 
19 0.21% 0.25% 18.46% 0.0822 1.0351 1.2253 0.9432 1.6561 8.7904 
20 0.35% 0.09% 18.81% 0.1323 0.9328 2.1890 0.9522 1.6446 8.9373 
21 -0.33% -0.32% 18.48% -0.0776 0.9772 -1.2252 0.9289 1.6342 8.7732 
22 -0.13% -0.06% 18.34% -0.0394 0.9383 -0.6484 0.9120 1.6276 8.6490 
23 0.15% 0.00% 18.49% 0.0336 0.9749 0.5319 0.9066 1.6314 8.5780 
24 0.42% 0.24% 18.91% 0.1375 0.9838 2.1575 0.9170 1.6033 8.8286 
25 0.10% 0.01% 19.00% 0.0256 0.9603 0.4114 0.9108 1.5989 8.7922 
26 -0.10% 0.04% 18.90% -0.0039 0.8899 -0.0675 0.9004 1.5901 8.7408 
27 0.25% 0.19% 19.15% 0.0574 0.9949 0.8912 0.8993 1.5821 8.7742 
28 0.17% 0.08% 19.32% 0.0493 0.9738 0.7818 0.8971 1.5724 8.8067 
29 0.17% 0.05% 19.50% 0.0846 1.1016 1.1858 0.9001 1.5727 8.8340 
30 0.19% 0.24% 19.68% 0.0735 0.8856 1.2803 0.9015 1.5739 8.8409 
          
-1 to 1     6.12% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06222 1.1046 2.2229 7.6698 
 
 
 
  
  
5-9 
 
Table-A 5.7 FF returns to Targets; All-firms; (MM, 248); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.33% 0.04% 0.33% 0.1502 1.1917 2.0491 0.1502 1.1917 2.0491 
-19 0.43% 0.16% 0.76% 0.1872 1.0051 3.0217 0.2380 1.1603 3.3354 
-18 0.27% 0.03% 1.04% 0.0949 1.1713 1.3173 0.2495 1.1061 3.6673 
-17 0.23% 0.00% 1.26% 0.1105 1.1609 1.5469 0.2713 1.2170 3.6237 
-16 0.26% -0.06% 1.52% 0.0888 1.1133 1.2970 0.2824 1.2062 3.8058 
-15 0.45% 0.01% 1.98% 0.1169 1.0961 1.7333 0.3054 1.1993 4.1407 
-14 0.35% 0.10% 2.33% 0.1193 1.2608 1.5382 0.3276 1.1989 4.4428 
-13 0.27% 0.07% 2.60% 0.0811 1.2150 1.0858 0.3352 1.1939 4.5645 
-12 0.78% 0.17% 3.38% 0.2456 1.1652 3.4270 0.3979 1.2512 5.1707 
-11 0.68% 0.41% 4.06% 0.2226 1.2753 2.8311 0.4475 1.2721 5.7192 
-10 0.57% 0.16% 4.62% 0.1612 1.2516 2.0934 0.4752 1.3134 5.8826 
-9 1.02% 0.30% 5.64% 0.3260 1.3925 3.8056 0.5491 1.3346 6.6892 
-8 0.07% 0.07% 5.71% 0.0923 1.1533 1.3018 0.5532 1.3581 6.6223 
-7 0.85% 0.30% 6.56% 0.2442 1.2783 3.0994 0.5978 1.3382 7.2629 
-6 0.61% -0.06% 7.17% 0.2354 1.4123 2.7099 0.6387 1.3303 7.8055 
-5 0.88% 0.18% 8.05% 0.2451 1.4135 2.8195 0.6797 1.3529 8.1679 
-4 0.39% -0.11% 8.45% 0.1281 1.1949 1.7428 0.6904 1.3650 8.2232 
-3 0.68% 0.31% 9.13% 0.2585 1.3594 3.0909 0.7318 1.3724 8.6690 
-2 0.78% 0.08% 9.91% 0.2663 1.2793 3.3844 0.7733 1.3681 9.1894 
-1 1.79% 1.00% 11.70% 0.6084 1.8334 5.3951 0.8896 1.4403 10.0417 
0 2.43% 1.42% 14.13% 0.7899 2.1779 5.8968 1.0405 1.5023 11.2603 
1 1.44% 0.87% 15.58% 0.3254 2.0979 2.5215 1.0860 1.5484 11.4020 
2 0.59% 0.06% 16.16% 0.1605 1.4937 1.7468 1.0956 1.5940 11.1741 
3 -0.16% -0.08% 16.01% -0.0640 1.5302 -0.6796 1.0592 1.6383 10.5115 
4 -0.28% -0.31% 15.73% -0.0605 1.2783 -0.7699 1.0258 1.6016 10.4128 
5 -0.13% -0.12% 15.60% -0.0171 1.0345 -0.2689 1.0026 1.5852 10.2822 
6 0.15% -0.03% 15.75% 0.0770 1.1140 1.1242 0.9987 1.5804 10.2737 
7 0.10% 0.07% 15.85% 0.0543 1.1311 0.7808 0.9909 1.5842 10.1693 
8 -0.10% -0.20% 15.75% -0.0104 1.2161 -0.1390 0.9718 1.5876 9.9514 
9 0.39% 0.08% 16.15% 0.1686 1.2085 2.2675 0.9863 1.6092 9.9640 
10 0.19% 0.28% 16.34% 0.0814 1.0048 1.3170 0.9849 1.6158 9.9096 
11 0.36% 0.11% 16.70% 0.1003 1.1901 1.3699 0.9871 1.6346 9.8181 
12 0.05% -0.03% 16.74% 0.0020 1.5439 0.0215 0.9722 1.7084 9.2517 
13 0.12% 0.01% 16.87% 0.0178 1.1244 0.2567 0.9609 1.6861 9.2648 
14 0.02% -0.01% 16.89% 0.0207 0.9484 0.3541 0.9505 1.6808 9.1934 
15 0.29% 0.07% 17.18% 0.0732 1.0079 1.1787 0.9494 1.6613 9.2905 
16 -0.22% -0.10% 16.96% -0.0742 1.1759 -1.0230 0.9243 1.6800 8.9444 
17 0.25% 0.10% 17.20% 0.0927 1.0232 1.4701 0.9270 1.6826 8.9574 
18 0.40% 0.06% 17.60% 0.0697 1.1719 0.9654 0.9262 1.6732 8.9990 
19 0.25% 0.19% 17.85% 0.1002 1.0301 1.5775 0.9303 1.6661 9.0775 
20 0.44% 0.01% 18.30% 0.1514 1.0262 2.3886 0.9423 1.6454 9.3109 
21 -0.29% -0.33% 18.01% -0.0393 1.0198 -0.6237 0.9250 1.6406 9.1669 
22 -0.20% -0.12% 17.80% -0.0631 0.9655 -1.0572 0.9047 1.6376 8.9815 
23 0.09% 0.01% 17.89% 0.0272 0.9619 0.4563 0.8985 1.6480 8.8636 
24 0.51% 0.32% 18.40% 0.1611 0.9985 2.6057 0.9122 1.6289 9.1048 
25 -0.02% -0.16% 18.38% 0.0248 0.9678 0.4134 0.9059 1.6247 9.0652 
26 -0.11% -0.08% 18.27% -0.0091 0.9247 -0.1593 0.8950 1.6175 8.9958 
27 0.10% 0.01% 18.37% 0.0475 1.0273 0.7469 0.8924 1.6126 8.9973 
28 0.19% 0.04% 18.56% 0.0385 1.0187 0.6097 0.8888 1.6019 9.0200 
29 0.31% 0.06% 18.86% 0.1161 1.1119 1.6871 0.8961 1.5970 9.1228 
30 0.43% 0.27% 19.29% 0.1252 0.9295 2.1759 0.9047 1.5967 9.2112 
          
-1 to 1     5.67% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05998 0.9952 2.1352 7.5775 
 
 
 
  
  
5-10 
 
Table-A 5.8 FF returns to Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 256); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.00% -0.12% 0.00% 0.0448 1.0004 0.7536 0.0448 1.0004 0.7536 
-19 0.30% 0.06% 0.30% 0.0989 0.9089 1.8291 0.1014 0.9582 1.7832 
-18 0.19% -0.08% 0.49% 0.0362 0.9963 0.6116 0.1041 0.9352 1.8748 
-17 -0.10% -0.10% 0.40% 0.0348 0.9869 0.5940 0.1075 0.9867 1.8344 
-16 0.06% -0.21% 0.45% 0.0223 0.9850 0.3816 0.1061 0.9709 1.8406 
-15 0.43% -0.11% 0.88% 0.0786 0.9774 1.3554 0.1290 0.9945 2.1842 
-14 0.25% -0.01% 1.13% 0.0419 1.0408 0.6782 0.1350 0.9826 2.3142 
-13 0.06% -0.33% 1.19% 0.0063 1.0592 0.0999 0.1285 0.9941 2.1779 
-12 0.70% 0.00% 1.89% 0.1661 1.0116 2.7665 0.1766 1.0390 2.8626 
-11 0.42% 0.29% 2.31% 0.1333 1.0622 2.1087 0.2094 1.0588 3.3317 
-10 0.40% -0.01% 2.71% 0.0913 1.0559 1.4560 0.2272 1.0862 3.5228 
-9 1.41% 0.16% 4.12% 0.2593 1.4328 3.0488 0.2924 1.1230 4.3856 
-8 -0.37% -0.11% 3.76% 0.0104 1.0431 0.1683 0.2838 1.1295 4.2323 
-7 0.56% 0.10% 4.32% 0.1337 1.0898 2.0615 0.3089 1.1161 4.6624 
-6 0.46% 0.06% 4.78% 0.1352 1.1351 2.0061 0.3334 1.1201 5.0142 
-5 0.58% -0.12% 5.35% 0.1479 1.2410 2.0071 0.3598 1.1466 5.2858 
-4 0.15% -0.25% 5.50% 0.0537 1.0436 0.8674 0.3621 1.1594 5.2606 
-3 0.65% 0.27% 6.16% 0.1911 1.1619 2.7701 0.3969 1.1537 5.7947 
-2 0.64% 0.03% 6.80% 0.1852 1.0798 2.8889 0.4288 1.1512 6.2741 
-1 1.59% 0.99% 8.39% 0.4488 1.4994 5.0413 0.5182 1.1834 7.3755 
0 2.23% 1.18% 10.62% 0.6251 1.8236 5.7743 0.6421 1.2162 8.8929 
1 1.28% 0.73% 11.90% 0.2572 1.6578 2.6135 0.6822 1.2608 9.1134 
2 0.32% -0.08% 12.22% 0.0783 1.2721 1.0368 0.6835 1.3028 8.8374 
3 -0.32% -0.30% 11.90% -0.1055 1.3693 -1.2976 0.6474 1.3360 8.1619 
4 -0.37% -0.58% 11.52% -0.1297 1.1343 -1.9266 0.6084 1.3237 7.7416 
5 -0.39% -0.39% 11.13% -0.0740 0.9183 -1.3575 0.5821 1.3125 7.4704 
6 -0.06% -0.27% 11.07% 0.0127 0.9470 0.2251 0.5737 1.3110 7.3713 
7 -0.41% -0.06% 10.66% -0.0828 1.0924 -1.2760 0.5477 1.3198 6.9894 
8 -0.37% -0.32% 10.29% -0.0996 1.0626 -1.5787 0.5196 1.3235 6.6133 
9 0.14% -0.10% 10.43% 0.0662 1.0015 1.1129 0.5230 1.3318 6.6146 
10 0.41% 0.05% 10.83% 0.0735 1.1815 1.0477 0.5277 1.3394 6.6367 
11 0.08% -0.25% 10.92% -0.0117 1.0134 -0.1953 0.5174 1.3553 6.4299 
12 -0.19% -0.23% 10.72% -0.0714 1.3054 -0.9196 0.4969 1.4061 5.9521 
13 -0.11% -0.14% 10.62% -0.0213 0.9844 -0.3650 0.4859 1.3868 5.9017 
14 -0.09% -0.05% 10.53% -0.0074 0.8427 -0.1483 0.4776 1.3795 5.8318 
15 0.01% -0.04% 10.53% -0.0184 0.8541 -0.3624 0.4679 1.3665 5.7676 
16 -0.47% -0.34% 10.06% -0.1583 0.9829 -2.7075 0.4356 1.3865 5.2919 
17 -0.10% -0.02% 9.96% -0.0247 0.9162 -0.4525 0.4258 1.3876 5.1693 
18 0.15% -0.04% 10.11% 0.0467 1.0032 0.7816 0.4278 1.3838 5.2066 
19 0.00% 0.03% 10.12% 0.0102 0.8527 0.2012 0.4240 1.3814 5.1696 
20 0.21% -0.08% 10.33% 0.0385 0.8294 0.7781 0.4247 1.3672 5.2326 
21 -0.49% -0.57% 9.84% -0.1228 0.9174 -2.2456 0.4008 1.3593 4.9668 
22 -0.44% -0.29% 9.40% -0.1301 0.8867 -2.4606 0.3764 1.3594 4.6643 
23 -0.49% -0.20% 8.90% -0.1148 1.0722 -1.7917 0.3551 1.3779 4.3404 
24 0.32% 0.16% 9.23% 0.0817 0.9080 1.5049 0.3632 1.3611 4.4944 
25 -0.31% -0.42% 8.92% -0.0469 0.8631 -0.9087 0.3524 1.3554 4.3793 
26 -0.09% -0.23% 8.83% -0.0397 1.0418 -0.6374 0.3429 1.3506 4.2769 
27 -0.42% -0.21% 8.41% -0.0317 1.1281 -0.4700 0.3349 1.3292 4.2433 
28 -0.05% -0.10% 8.35% -0.0225 0.8655 -0.4347 0.3283 1.3211 4.1855 
29 0.10% -0.08% 8.45% 0.0457 0.9645 0.7931 0.3314 1.3158 4.2425 
30 0.16% 0.01% 8.61% 0.0449 0.8413 0.8932 0.3344 1.3093 4.3019 
          
-1 to 1     5.10% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06019 0.7685 1.7282 7.4906 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-11 
 
Table-A 5.9 FF returns to Targets; MM firms; (OLS, 248); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.15% -0.12% 0.15% 0.0744 0.9518 1.2747 0.0744 0.9518 1.2747 
-19 0.20% 0.06% 0.35% 0.0877 0.8614 1.6564 0.1145 0.9263 2.0155 
-18 0.08% -0.11% 0.43% 0.0310 0.9984 0.5057 0.1118 0.9087 2.0054 
-17 -0.01% -0.10% 0.42% 0.0317 0.9726 0.5313 0.1126 0.9855 1.8621 
-16 0.02% -0.21% 0.45% 0.0138 0.9645 0.2327 0.1068 0.9715 1.7928 
-15 0.22% -0.22% 0.67% 0.0463 0.9570 0.7888 0.1164 0.9889 1.9194 
-14 0.17% -0.02% 0.83% 0.0337 0.9989 0.5508 0.1203 0.9709 2.0202 
-13 0.06% -0.33% 0.89% -0.0075 1.0589 -0.1148 0.1099 0.9768 1.8349 
-12 0.57% -0.05% 1.46% 0.1496 1.0052 2.4262 0.1535 1.0182 2.4580 
-11 0.49% 0.28% 1.95% 0.1276 1.0545 1.9680 0.1857 1.0405 2.9103 
-10 0.37% -0.05% 2.32% 0.1023 1.0509 1.5876 0.2079 1.0822 3.1323 
-9 0.85% 0.17% 3.17% 0.2284 1.1807 3.1543 0.2650 1.1028 3.9183 
-8 -0.11% -0.06% 3.06% 0.0346 1.0002 0.5635 0.2642 1.1290 3.8157 
-7 0.65% 0.16% 3.71% 0.1485 1.0983 2.1997 0.2940 1.1211 4.2758 
-6 0.43% -0.03% 4.14% 0.1217 1.1091 1.7886 0.3155 1.1238 4.5775 
-5 0.64% -0.05% 4.78% 0.1705 1.2433 2.2359 0.3481 1.1540 4.9186 
-4 0.19% -0.25% 4.97% 0.0564 1.0467 0.8785 0.3514 1.1685 4.9030 
-3 0.47% 0.22% 5.44% 0.1686 1.1566 2.3765 0.3812 1.1610 5.3533 
-2 0.55% 0.02% 6.00% 0.1809 1.0832 2.7225 0.4125 1.1555 5.8205 
-1 1.59% 0.99% 7.59% 0.4579 1.5081 4.9509 0.5044 1.1896 6.9129 
0 2.24% 1.25% 9.82% 0.6439 1.8405 5.7040 0.6327 1.2249 8.4215 
1 1.32% 0.73% 11.14% 0.2712 1.6747 2.6401 0.6760 1.2711 8.6704 
2 0.39% -0.08% 11.53% 0.0887 1.2877 1.1229 0.6796 1.3159 8.4205 
3 -0.40% -0.30% 11.13% -0.1068 1.3318 -1.3070 0.6433 1.3514 7.7610 
4 -0.46% -0.57% 10.67% -0.1133 1.0937 -1.6894 0.6076 1.3324 7.4354 
5 -0.34% -0.42% 10.32% -0.0694 0.8993 -1.2574 0.5823 1.3223 7.1799 
6 -0.04% -0.25% 10.29% 0.0211 0.9564 0.3605 0.5755 1.3197 7.1108 
7 -0.15% -0.04% 10.14% -0.0351 0.9566 -0.5987 0.5585 1.3229 6.8830 
8 -0.32% -0.30% 9.82% -0.0773 1.0284 -1.2251 0.5344 1.3201 6.6004 
9 0.20% -0.07% 10.02% 0.0797 0.9974 1.3025 0.5400 1.3261 6.6394 
10 -0.05% 0.05% 9.97% 0.0139 0.8520 0.2655 0.5337 1.3268 6.5585 
11 0.09% -0.21% 10.06% -0.0023 1.0182 -0.0365 0.5249 1.3403 6.3855 
12 -0.18% -0.22% 9.87% -0.0695 1.3219 -0.8560 0.5046 1.3951 5.8978 
13 -0.09% -0.14% 9.78% -0.0257 0.9750 -0.4291 0.4928 1.3818 5.8150 
14 -0.23% -0.07% 9.55% -0.0296 0.8277 -0.5835 0.4807 1.3777 5.6886 
15 0.10% 0.04% 9.65% 0.0059 0.8378 0.1152 0.4750 1.3603 5.6933 
16 -0.39% -0.32% 9.26% -0.1287 0.9468 -2.2114 0.4474 1.3731 5.3130 
17 0.04% 0.00% 9.30% 0.0186 0.8460 0.3584 0.4445 1.3658 5.3065 
18 0.16% -0.04% 9.45% 0.0270 0.9172 0.4795 0.4431 1.3663 5.2872 
19 0.01% -0.01% 9.47% 0.0150 0.8511 0.2875 0.4398 1.3656 5.2515 
20 0.19% -0.15% 9.66% 0.0362 0.8395 0.7007 0.4400 1.3506 5.3123 
21 -0.57% -0.65% 9.08% -0.1279 0.8612 -2.4100 0.4152 1.3379 5.0600 
22 -0.44% -0.30% 8.64% -0.1194 0.8323 -2.3297 0.3923 1.3285 4.8146 
23 -0.15% -0.17% 8.49% -0.0451 0.8337 -0.8761 0.3811 1.3370 4.6478 
24 0.29% 0.13% 8.79% 0.0717 0.8969 1.2956 0.3875 1.3221 4.7784 
25 -0.26% -0.42% 8.53% -0.0493 0.8645 -0.9241 0.3761 1.3216 4.6397 
26 -0.34% -0.23% 8.19% -0.0754 0.8015 -1.5242 0.3612 1.3187 4.4659 
27 -0.17% -0.22% 8.02% -0.0084 0.8586 -0.1578 0.3563 1.3088 4.4384 
28 -0.04% -0.10% 7.98% -0.0225 0.8684 -0.4200 0.3495 1.2995 4.3847 
29 0.04% -0.10% 8.01% 0.0337 0.9470 0.5770 0.3507 1.2985 4.4039 
30 0.21% 0.01% 8.22% 0.0402 0.8183 0.7954 0.3528 1.2971 4.4354 
          
-1 to 1     5.15% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06006 0.7927 1.7265 7.4861 
 
 
 
  
  
5-12 
 
Table-A 5.10 Market returns to Targets; FF-Firms; (OLS, 256); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.10% -0.07% -0.10% 0.0121 1.0146 0.1977 0.0121 1.0146 0.1977 
-19 0.33% 0.06% 0.23% 0.1025 0.9062 1.8797 0.0810 0.9533 1.4122 
-18 0.13% -0.20% 0.36% 0.0279 0.9664 0.4794 0.0822 0.9487 1.4406 
-17 -0.20% -0.15% 0.16% -0.0059 0.9848 -0.0990 0.0683 0.9960 1.1394 
-16 0.02% -0.10% 0.18% 0.0100 0.9817 0.1689 0.0655 1.0027 1.0862 
-15 0.49% 0.09% 0.66% 0.0959 0.9390 1.6971 0.0989 1.0276 1.6006 
-14 0.18% -0.03% 0.84% 0.0273 1.0591 0.4284 0.1019 0.9987 1.6966 
-13 0.03% -0.25% 0.87% 0.0067 1.0470 0.1071 0.0977 1.0314 1.5751 
-12 0.60% 0.02% 1.47% 0.1359 1.0130 2.2296 0.1374 1.0918 2.0925 
-11 0.33% 0.38% 1.80% 0.1073 1.0880 1.6389 0.1643 1.1202 2.4381 
-10 0.31% 0.01% 2.11% 0.0589 1.0482 0.9345 0.1744 1.1586 2.5026 
-9 1.40% 0.16% 3.51% 0.2362 1.4147 2.7751 0.2352 1.1705 3.3400 
-8 -0.51% -0.27% 3.00% -0.0179 1.0518 -0.2833 0.2210 1.1875 3.0933 
-7 0.46% 0.05% 3.46% 0.1043 1.0737 1.6154 0.2408 1.1715 3.4171 
-6 0.38% -0.01% 3.84% 0.1250 1.1264 1.8446 0.2649 1.1855 3.7147 
-5 0.55% 0.02% 4.39% 0.1423 1.2015 1.9691 0.2921 1.1776 4.1234 
-4 0.00% -0.28% 4.39% 0.0248 1.0235 0.4026 0.2894 1.1802 4.0761 
-3 0.61% 0.01% 5.00% 0.1651 1.1329 2.4221 0.3201 1.1655 4.5661 
-2 0.68% 0.02% 5.68% 0.1909 1.0680 2.9708 0.3554 1.1596 5.0947 
-1 1.60% 0.57% 7.29% 0.4450 1.4448 5.1200 0.4459 1.1819 6.2713 
0 2.27% 1.07% 9.56% 0.6124 1.8150 5.6091 0.5687 1.2073 7.8314 
1 1.19% 0.26% 10.75% 0.2262 1.6333 2.3021 0.6039 1.2500 8.0315 
2 0.28% -0.19% 11.03% 0.0664 1.2646 0.8730 0.6045 1.2891 7.7955 
3 -0.34% -0.32% 10.69% -0.1125 1.3538 -1.3815 0.5688 1.3120 7.2069 
4 -0.25% -0.33% 10.44% -0.0890 1.1603 -1.2747 0.5395 1.3086 6.8537 
5 -0.43% -0.34% 10.00% -0.0808 0.9168 -1.4660 0.5132 1.2916 6.6049 
6 -0.25% -0.33% 9.75% -0.0476 0.9358 -0.8459 0.4944 1.2827 6.4077 
7 -0.38% -0.09% 9.37% -0.0782 1.0856 -1.1982 0.4707 1.2918 6.0574 
8 -0.38% -0.35% 8.99% -0.0906 1.0311 -1.4604 0.4457 1.2901 5.7434 
9 0.20% -0.10% 9.19% 0.0836 0.9825 1.4147 0.4535 1.3100 5.7545 
10 0.48% -0.01% 9.67% 0.0957 1.1377 1.3987 0.4633 1.3203 5.8335 
11 0.18% -0.09% 9.85% 0.0102 0.9931 0.1708 0.4578 1.3377 5.6891 
12 -0.15% -0.08% 9.70% -0.0467 1.2765 -0.6082 0.4427 1.3806 5.3306 
13 -0.15% -0.15% 9.55% -0.0248 0.9455 -0.4358 0.4319 1.3599 5.2794 
14 -0.08% -0.11% 9.47% -0.0165 0.8024 -0.3412 0.4229 1.3498 5.2080 
15 -0.06% -0.19% 9.41% -0.0321 0.8561 -0.6233 0.4116 1.3364 5.1202 
16 -0.55% -0.33% 8.86% -0.1757 0.9428 -3.0988 0.3771 1.3525 4.6352 
17 -0.17% -0.22% 8.70% -0.0462 0.9525 -0.8061 0.3646 1.3603 4.4561 
18 0.28% -0.07% 8.97% 0.0604 1.0406 0.9651 0.3696 1.3527 4.5422 
19 0.05% -0.02% 9.02% 0.0172 0.9033 0.3157 0.3677 1.3487 4.5320 
20 0.26% -0.08% 9.28% 0.0551 0.8191 1.1188 0.3718 1.3414 4.6072 
21 -0.51% -0.44% 8.77% -0.1265 0.8771 -2.3976 0.3478 1.3302 4.3465 
22 -0.47% -0.34% 8.30% -0.1362 0.8664 -2.6142 0.3229 1.3304 4.0355 
23 -0.48% -0.24% 7.82% -0.1006 1.0714 -1.5611 0.3041 1.3526 3.7374 
24 0.38% 0.09% 8.20% 0.1058 0.8907 1.9757 0.3165 1.3304 3.9545 
25 -0.37% -0.34% 7.83% -0.0721 0.8477 -1.4139 0.3024 1.3267 3.7889 
26 -0.12% -0.16% 7.71% -0.0490 0.9965 -0.8181 0.2920 1.3135 3.6955 
27 -0.32% -0.10% 7.38% -0.0162 1.1038 -0.2442 0.2866 1.2991 3.6675 
28 -0.05% 0.00% 7.34% -0.0185 0.8471 -0.3634 0.2810 1.2912 3.6181 
29 0.03% -0.08% 7.37% 0.0294 0.9662 0.5056 0.2823 1.2844 3.6544 
30 0.02% 0.08% 7.39% 0.0192 0.8057 0.3969 0.2822 1.2736 3.6843 
          
-1 to 1     5.06% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06181 0.7410 1.7114 7.1986 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-13 
 
Table-A 5.11 Market returns to Targets; FF-Firms; (MM, 248); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.28% 0.13% 0.28% 0.1207 1.2087 1.6006 0.1207 1.2087 1.6006 
-19 0.44% 0.15% 0.71% 0.1895 1.0111 3.0049 0.2193 1.1551 3.0443 
-18 0.23% -0.07% 0.94% 0.0771 1.1529 1.0723 0.2236 1.1098 3.2301 
-17 0.10% 0.02% 1.05% 0.0613 1.1730 0.8382 0.2243 1.2198 2.9482 
-16 0.22% -0.01% 1.26% 0.0635 1.1233 0.9060 0.2290 1.2301 2.9847 
-15 0.49% 0.22% 1.76% 0.1290 1.0528 1.9650 0.2617 1.2159 3.4511 
-14 0.32% 0.07% 2.08% 0.1052 1.2728 1.3245 0.2821 1.1971 3.7777 
-13 0.23% -0.06% 2.31% 0.0699 1.2144 0.9222 0.2885 1.2217 3.7865 
-12 0.71% 0.15% 3.01% 0.2138 1.1642 2.9448 0.3433 1.2984 4.2392 
-11 0.61% 0.40% 3.62% 0.1853 1.2899 2.3027 0.3843 1.3232 4.6563 
-10 0.48% 0.24% 4.10% 0.1171 1.2468 1.5063 0.4017 1.3717 4.6953 
-9 1.03% 0.27% 5.13% 0.2987 1.3844 3.4592 0.4709 1.3659 5.5266 
-8 -0.05% -0.04% 5.08% 0.0507 1.1666 0.6972 0.4664 1.3988 5.3463 
-7 0.75% 0.34% 5.83% 0.1998 1.2613 2.5392 0.5029 1.3732 5.8712 
-6 0.59% 0.07% 6.42% 0.2306 1.4083 2.6252 0.5454 1.3796 6.3378 
-5 0.81% 0.19% 7.24% 0.2237 1.3969 2.5670 0.5840 1.3718 6.8248 
-4 0.27% -0.13% 7.50% 0.0906 1.1828 1.2275 0.5885 1.3726 6.8739 
-3 0.67% 0.19% 8.17% 0.2354 1.3493 2.7974 0.6274 1.3725 7.3285 
-2 0.82% 0.28% 8.99% 0.2705 1.2709 3.4119 0.6727 1.3688 7.8793 
-1 1.83% 0.98% 10.82% 0.6042 1.7624 5.4962 0.7908 1.4286 8.8742 
0 2.47% 1.24% 13.29% 0.7707 2.1758 5.6787 0.9399 1.4727 10.2318 
1 1.43% 0.65% 14.73% 0.3009 2.0558 2.3469 0.9824 1.5148 10.3983 
2 0.55% 0.08% 15.28% 0.1449 1.4748 1.5757 0.9911 1.5541 10.2239 
3 -0.19% -0.13% 15.09% -0.0760 1.5029 -0.8111 0.9547 1.5880 9.6383 
4 -0.14% -0.05% 14.95% -0.0244 1.3327 -0.2932 0.9305 1.5598 9.5646 
5 -0.19% -0.14% 14.76% -0.0372 1.0351 -0.5762 0.9052 1.5367 9.4435 
6 -0.02% -0.07% 14.74% 0.0022 1.1113 0.0314 0.8887 1.5191 9.3786 
7 0.12% 0.03% 14.86% 0.0597 1.1356 0.8430 0.8839 1.5194 9.3267 
8 -0.09% -0.17% 14.77% -0.0082 1.1668 -0.1121 0.8670 1.5152 9.1740 
9 0.44% 0.12% 15.21% 0.1724 1.1780 2.3457 0.8839 1.5424 9.1879 
10 0.26% 0.26% 15.47% 0.0989 0.9679 1.6383 0.8873 1.5543 9.1525 
11 0.44% 0.23% 15.91% 0.1161 1.1643 1.5993 0.8939 1.5714 9.1201 
12 0.09% 0.05% 16.00% 0.0214 1.5144 0.2267 0.8840 1.6375 8.6544 
13 0.07% 0.01% 16.06% 0.0075 1.0916 0.1096 0.8721 1.6153 8.6566 
14 0.04% 0.05% 16.10% 0.0109 0.9095 0.1923 0.8614 1.6082 8.5879 
15 0.22% -0.07% 16.33% 0.0551 1.0214 0.8641 0.8586 1.5907 8.6536 
16 -0.25% -0.03% 16.08% -0.0916 1.1440 -1.2841 0.8318 1.6059 8.3044 
17 0.18% 0.05% 16.26% 0.0604 1.0526 0.9200 0.8306 1.6154 8.2433 
18 0.36% 0.01% 16.62% 0.0636 1.1887 0.8580 0.8301 1.6080 8.2761 
19 0.27% 0.27% 16.89% 0.0941 1.0816 1.3948 0.8345 1.6024 8.3494 
20 0.47% 0.06% 17.35% 0.1618 1.0250 2.5313 0.8495 1.5912 8.5595 
21 -0.34% -0.27% 17.02% -0.0594 0.9955 -0.9573 0.8302 1.5831 8.4073 
22 -0.25% -0.16% 16.76% -0.0824 0.9504 -1.3901 0.8079 1.5796 8.2001 
23 0.11% -0.04% 16.87% 0.0331 0.9762 0.5433 0.8037 1.5903 8.1018 
24 0.59% 0.24% 17.47% 0.1852 1.0048 2.9554 0.8223 1.5641 8.4290 
25 -0.07% -0.10% 17.39% -0.0024 0.9569 -0.0398 0.8130 1.5619 8.3446 
26 -0.14% -0.06% 17.25% -0.0167 0.9044 -0.2955 0.8018 1.5510 8.2882 
27 0.16% 0.14% 17.41% 0.0512 1.0181 0.8067 0.8008 1.5475 8.2969 
28 0.20% 0.11% 17.61% 0.0464 1.0030 0.7422 0.7993 1.5382 8.3305 
29 0.19% 0.03% 17.80% 0.0866 1.1290 1.2300 0.8035 1.5319 8.4090 
30 0.28% 0.24% 18.08% 0.0878 0.9082 1.5492 0.8078 1.5270 8.4819 
          
-1 to 1     5.74% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06171 0.9675 2.0994 7.3886 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-14 
 
Table-A 5.12 SW-1 returns to Targets; All-Firms; (OLS, 274); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.06% -0.05% 0.0174 1.0111 0.2976 0.0174 1.0111 0.2976 
-19 0.30% 0.14% 0.25% 0.0987 0.9275 1.8426 0.0821 0.9744 1.4586 
-18 0.04% -0.11% 0.29% 0.0171 1.0016 0.2951 0.0769 0.9581 1.3893 
-17 -0.13% -0.15% 0.15% 0.0148 1.0156 0.2515 0.0740 1.0143 1.2624 
-16 0.00% -0.06% 0.15% -0.0074 0.9769 -0.1313 0.0628 1.0038 1.0838 
-15 0.42% 0.02% 0.58% 0.0817 0.9651 1.4662 0.0907 1.0403 1.5100 
-14 0.31% 0.07% 0.89% 0.0694 1.0828 1.1090 0.1102 1.0245 1.8625 
-13 0.05% -0.26% 0.94% 0.0230 1.0796 0.3692 0.1112 1.0478 1.8380 
-12 0.63% 0.11% 1.56% 0.1436 1.0040 2.4768 0.1527 1.0990 2.4063 
-11 0.31% 0.36% 1.87% 0.0912 1.0971 1.4396 0.1738 1.1147 2.6987 
-10 0.39% 0.07% 2.27% 0.0749 1.0900 1.1897 0.1883 1.1541 2.8240 
-9 1.32% 0.23% 3.59% 0.2256 1.3875 2.8153 0.2454 1.1552 3.6775 
-8 -0.51% -0.30% 3.07% -0.0341 1.0494 -0.5625 0.2263 1.1635 3.3671 
-7 0.37% 0.02% 3.44% 0.0879 1.0706 1.4207 0.2415 1.1465 3.6476 
-6 0.33% -0.04% 3.78% 0.1196 1.1067 1.8708 0.2642 1.1544 3.9626 
-5 0.46% 0.01% 4.23% 0.1351 1.1976 1.9527 0.2896 1.1437 4.3840 
-4 0.10% -0.25% 4.34% 0.0299 1.0266 0.5045 0.2882 1.1447 4.3589 
-3 0.58% -0.04% 4.92% 0.1574 1.1161 2.4421 0.3172 1.1319 4.8518 
-2 0.65% 0.08% 5.57% 0.1760 1.0552 2.8871 0.3491 1.1252 5.3717 
-1 1.55% 0.61% 7.11% 0.4446 1.4233 5.4080 0.4397 1.1448 6.6495 
0 2.31% 1.10% 9.43% 0.6568 1.9408 5.8589 0.5724 1.1931 8.3059 
1 1.44% 0.34% 10.87% 0.2868 1.6723 2.9696 0.6204 1.2332 8.7095 
2 0.35% -0.09% 11.22% 0.0851 1.2554 1.1742 0.6245 1.2789 8.4543 
3 -0.20% -0.26% 11.02% -0.0780 1.3510 -0.9993 0.5954 1.3003 7.9283 
4 -0.24% -0.31% 10.78% -0.0773 1.1306 -1.1843 0.5679 1.2952 7.5919 
5 -0.40% -0.36% 10.38% -0.0659 0.9258 -1.2322 0.5440 1.2803 7.3564 
6 -0.11% -0.30% 10.27% -0.0060 0.9842 -0.1064 0.5327 1.2717 7.2516 
7 -0.37% -0.15% 9.90% -0.0870 1.0827 -1.3905 0.5066 1.2792 6.8568 
8 -0.41% -0.32% 9.49% -0.0966 1.0208 -1.6376 0.4799 1.2819 6.4814 
9 0.17% -0.04% 9.66% 0.0804 0.9845 1.4144 0.4865 1.3003 6.4776 
10 0.43% -0.11% 10.09% 0.0794 1.1195 1.2286 0.4929 1.3090 6.5188 
11 0.20% -0.15% 10.30% 0.0224 0.9860 0.3936 0.4891 1.3242 6.3941 
12 -0.10% -0.10% 10.20% -0.0359 1.2514 -0.4964 0.4753 1.3643 6.0323 
13 -0.09% -0.09% 10.10% -0.0191 0.9251 -0.3579 0.4650 1.3487 5.9697 
14 -0.11% -0.08% 10.00% -0.0217 0.8010 -0.4701 0.4547 1.3403 5.8730 
15 -0.13% -0.24% 9.87% -0.0481 0.8599 -0.9693 0.4403 1.3308 5.7280 
16 -0.51% -0.19% 9.36% -0.1626 0.9142 -3.0793 0.4076 1.3460 5.2424 
17 -0.09% -0.16% 9.27% -0.0250 0.9404 -0.4597 0.3981 1.3530 5.0941 
18 0.26% 0.02% 9.53% 0.0514 1.0200 0.8723 0.4012 1.3432 5.1712 
19 0.03% 0.00% 9.56% 0.0037 0.8721 0.0726 0.3967 1.3376 5.1349 
20 0.30% -0.01% 9.85% 0.0603 0.7948 1.3129 0.4013 1.3309 5.2200 
21 -0.49% -0.38% 9.36% -0.1158 0.8952 -2.2398 0.3786 1.3222 4.9575 
22 -0.56% -0.32% 8.81% -0.1515 0.8780 -2.9880 0.3511 1.3204 4.6032 
23 -0.43% -0.27% 8.38% -0.0909 1.0778 -1.4600 0.3333 1.3372 4.3161 
24 0.27% 0.04% 8.65% 0.0709 0.8726 1.4073 0.3402 1.3135 4.4843 
25 -0.20% -0.25% 8.45% -0.0319 0.8653 -0.6374 0.3318 1.3091 4.3877 
26 -0.11% -0.17% 8.34% -0.0381 0.9791 -0.6745 0.3227 1.2929 4.3209 
27 -0.32% -0.13% 8.02% -0.0266 1.0765 -0.4283 0.3154 1.2754 4.2821 
28 -0.07% -0.12% 7.95% -0.0267 0.8265 -0.5596 0.3084 1.2670 4.2141 
29 -0.03% -0.09% 7.92% 0.0116 0.9565 0.2095 0.3069 1.2581 4.2239 
30 0.04% 0.03% 7.96% 0.0215 0.7924 0.4699 0.3069 1.2493 4.2533 
          
-1 to 1     5.31% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06531 0.8015 1.7589 7.8890 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-15 
 
Table-A 5.13 SW-2 returns to Targets; All-Firms; (OLS, 274); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.08% -0.08% -0.08% 0.0175 1.0007 0.3041 0.0175 1.0007 0.3041 
-19 0.33% 0.12% 0.25% 0.1035 0.9315 1.9287 0.0856 0.9733 1.5263 
-18 0.04% -0.14% 0.29% 0.0140 0.9970 0.2439 0.0780 0.9544 1.4180 
-17 -0.11% -0.14% 0.19% 0.0220 1.0141 0.3770 0.0785 1.0101 1.3495 
-16 0.05% -0.01% 0.24% 0.0019 0.9753 0.0342 0.0711 1.0010 1.2330 
-15 0.43% 0.02% 0.67% 0.0830 0.9689 1.4873 0.0988 1.0347 1.6574 
-14 0.25% 0.07% 0.91% 0.0574 1.0729 0.9283 0.1131 1.0132 1.9386 
-13 0.01% -0.22% 0.93% 0.0145 1.0687 0.2354 0.1110 1.0326 1.8655 
-12 0.64% 0.17% 1.56% 0.1456 1.0027 2.5214 0.1532 1.0829 2.4554 
-11 0.24% 0.25% 1.80% 0.0781 1.1002 1.2322 0.1700 1.0962 2.6921 
-10 0.36% -0.02% 2.16% 0.0676 1.0835 1.0833 0.1825 1.1331 2.7956 
-9 1.30% 0.25% 3.47% 0.2179 1.3782 2.7452 0.2376 1.1356 3.6326 
-8 -0.52% -0.27% 2.94% -0.0350 1.0539 -0.5772 0.2186 1.1447 3.3149 
-7 0.36% -0.02% 3.30% 0.0892 1.0668 1.4522 0.2345 1.1286 3.6066 
-6 0.34% -0.04% 3.64% 0.1191 1.1210 1.8444 0.2573 1.1368 3.9290 
-5 0.44% 0.03% 4.08% 0.1272 1.1852 1.8637 0.2809 1.1297 4.3167 
-4 0.09% -0.25% 4.17% 0.0274 1.0279 0.4632 0.2792 1.1305 4.2869 
-3 0.56% 0.00% 4.73% 0.1516 1.1068 2.3779 0.3070 1.1186 4.7650 
-2 0.61% 0.04% 5.34% 0.1665 1.0559 2.7383 0.3371 1.1086 5.2785 
-1 1.58% 0.78% 6.92% 0.4434 1.4173 5.4311 0.4277 1.1286 6.5784 
0 2.34% 1.11% 9.25% 0.6552 1.9339 5.8815 0.5603 1.1802 8.2428 
1 1.44% 0.46% 10.70% 0.2844 1.6689 2.9586 0.6081 1.2185 8.6638 
2 0.36% -0.07% 11.06% 0.0853 1.2632 1.1728 0.6125 1.2655 8.4030 
3 -0.20% -0.30% 10.85% -0.0768 1.3610 -0.9794 0.5839 1.2861 7.8824 
4 -0.23% -0.22% 10.62% -0.0783 1.1330 -1.1998 0.5565 1.2807 7.5435 
5 -0.44% -0.30% 10.19% -0.0695 0.9359 -1.2895 0.5320 1.2665 7.2929 
6 -0.14% -0.29% 10.04% -0.0142 0.9766 -0.2527 0.5194 1.2583 7.1654 
7 -0.41% -0.18% 9.63% -0.0938 1.0826 -1.5035 0.4923 1.2678 6.7412 
8 -0.46% -0.25% 9.17% -0.1029 1.0241 -1.7449 0.4646 1.2739 6.3316 
9 0.18% -0.04% 9.35% 0.0810 0.9919 1.4182 0.4716 1.2945 6.3246 
10 0.37% -0.16% 9.72% 0.0702 1.1166 1.0920 0.4765 1.3042 6.3433 
11 0.18% -0.05% 9.91% 0.0211 0.9884 0.3714 0.4728 1.3216 6.2104 
12 -0.10% -0.06% 9.80% -0.0375 1.2526 -0.5201 0.4590 1.3621 5.8503 
13 -0.11% -0.10% 9.70% -0.0206 0.9323 -0.3841 0.4487 1.3484 5.7769 
14 -0.10% -0.11% 9.59% -0.0186 0.8027 -0.4019 0.4391 1.3404 5.6869 
15 -0.16% -0.24% 9.43% -0.0545 0.8600 -1.0997 0.4239 1.3291 5.5367 
16 -0.49% -0.21% 8.94% -0.1551 0.9085 -2.9629 0.3926 1.3438 5.0720 
17 -0.10% -0.07% 8.85% -0.0193 0.9272 -0.3614 0.3843 1.3502 4.9408 
18 0.23% 0.04% 9.07% 0.0421 1.0272 0.7114 0.3861 1.3407 4.9990 
19 -0.02% -0.02% 9.05% -0.0040 0.8733 -0.0791 0.3806 1.3353 4.9480 
20 0.25% 0.02% 9.30% 0.0528 0.8013 1.1429 0.3841 1.3261 5.0289 
21 -0.44% -0.35% 8.86% -0.1105 0.8961 -2.1414 0.3625 1.3173 4.7773 
22 -0.56% -0.30% 8.30% -0.1514 0.8787 -2.9904 0.3352 1.3133 4.4307 
23 -0.41% -0.25% 7.89% -0.0939 1.0885 -1.4977 0.3172 1.3305 4.1387 
24 0.26% 0.07% 8.15% 0.0664 0.8632 1.3363 0.3235 1.3074 4.2961 
25 -0.23% -0.28% 7.92% -0.0405 0.8480 -0.8289 0.3140 1.3000 4.1936 
26 -0.14% -0.11% 7.78% -0.0430 0.9761 -0.7648 0.3044 1.2819 4.1225 
27 -0.32% -0.03% 7.46% -0.0294 1.0847 -0.4705 0.2970 1.2643 4.0778 
28 -0.06% -0.16% 7.40% -0.0250 0.8330 -0.5205 0.2904 1.2588 4.0045 
29 -0.05% -0.11% 7.34% 0.0045 0.9596 0.0808 0.2881 1.2487 4.0050 
30 0.02% 0.00% 7.37% 0.0179 0.7932 0.3923 0.2877 1.2409 4.0255 
          
-1 to 1     5.36% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06532 0.7985 1.7521 7.9116 
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Table-A 5.14 SW-3 returns to Targets; All-Firms; (OLS, 274); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.08% -0.09% -0.08% 0.0154 0.9906 0.2707 0.0154 0.9906 0.2707 
-19 0.33% 0.08% 0.25% 0.1024 0.9249 1.9289 0.0833 0.9611 1.5099 
-18 0.04% -0.13% 0.30% 0.0122 0.9875 0.2149 0.0751 0.9405 1.3901 
-17 -0.09% -0.16% 0.21% 0.0238 1.0120 0.4091 0.0769 0.9983 1.3415 
-16 0.06% -0.02% 0.27% -0.0014 0.9706 -0.0243 0.0682 0.9904 1.1988 
-15 0.45% -0.04% 0.72% 0.0847 0.9672 1.5248 0.0968 1.0248 1.6451 
-14 0.26% 0.07% 0.98% 0.0606 1.0674 0.9888 0.1125 1.0042 1.9516 
-13 -0.03% -0.28% 0.95% 0.0012 1.0735 0.0196 0.1057 1.0237 1.7980 
-12 0.67% 0.14% 1.62% 0.1481 1.0031 2.5714 0.1490 1.0727 2.4192 
-11 0.24% 0.16% 1.86% 0.0751 1.1071 1.1814 0.1651 1.0902 2.6376 
-10 0.34% 0.03% 2.20% 0.0623 1.0792 1.0050 0.1762 1.1305 2.7144 
-9 1.31% 0.21% 3.51% 0.2198 1.3808 2.7722 0.2321 1.1318 3.5724 
-8 -0.54% -0.34% 2.98% -0.0412 1.0544 -0.6802 0.2116 1.1433 3.2235 
-7 0.35% 0.00% 3.33% 0.0833 1.0722 1.3539 0.2262 1.1290 3.4895 
-6 0.36% 0.00% 3.69% 0.1182 1.1126 1.8502 0.2490 1.1404 3.8034 
-5 0.43% 0.09% 4.11% 0.1246 1.1921 1.8212 0.2723 1.1306 4.1948 
-4 0.13% -0.19% 4.25% 0.0337 1.0163 0.5783 0.2723 1.1316 4.1918 
-3 0.57% -0.01% 4.82% 0.1506 1.0992 2.3860 0.3001 1.1198 4.6684 
-2 0.60% 0.02% 5.42% 0.1560 1.0614 2.5603 0.3279 1.1105 5.1435 
-1 1.58% 0.69% 7.00% 0.4443 1.4107 5.4859 0.4190 1.1302 6.4573 
0 2.37% 1.36% 9.37% 0.6644 1.9173 6.0359 0.5539 1.1779 8.1903 
1 1.45% 0.37% 10.82% 0.2874 1.6622 3.0117 0.6024 1.2157 8.6310 
2 0.38% -0.04% 11.20% 0.0829 1.2580 1.1480 0.6065 1.2594 8.3875 
3 -0.20% -0.25% 10.99% -0.0764 1.3563 -0.9810 0.5781 1.2821 7.8536 
4 -0.24% -0.28% 10.75% -0.0734 1.1182 -1.1428 0.5517 1.2760 7.5315 
5 -0.43% -0.29% 10.32% -0.0682 0.9405 -1.2638 0.5276 1.2596 7.2961 
6 -0.14% -0.34% 10.18% -0.0143 0.9776 -0.2545 0.5150 1.2512 7.1695 
7 -0.43% -0.20% 9.75% -0.0964 1.0704 -1.5689 0.4875 1.2595 6.7425 
8 -0.46% -0.31% 9.29% -0.1022 1.0296 -1.7296 0.4601 1.2670 6.3246 
9 0.19% 0.01% 9.47% 0.0846 0.9845 1.4971 0.4678 1.2842 6.3447 
10 0.38% -0.15% 9.85% 0.0694 1.1212 1.0785 0.4726 1.2941 6.3618 
11 0.19% -0.10% 10.04% 0.0241 0.9985 0.4206 0.4695 1.3135 6.2253 
12 -0.14% -0.11% 9.90% -0.0444 1.2649 -0.6115 0.4546 1.3549 5.8439 
13 -0.12% -0.12% 9.78% -0.0253 0.9204 -0.4786 0.4435 1.3422 5.7552 
14 -0.11% -0.12% 9.67% -0.0215 0.8071 -0.4638 0.4335 1.3377 5.6444 
15 -0.15% -0.27% 9.52% -0.0489 0.8508 -1.0011 0.4193 1.3263 5.5063 
16 -0.48% -0.16% 9.04% -0.1513 0.8960 -2.9420 0.3887 1.3380 5.0597 
17 -0.08% -0.12% 8.96% -0.0129 0.9073 -0.2469 0.3814 1.3418 4.9514 
18 0.20% 0.05% 9.16% 0.0300 1.0150 0.5143 0.3813 1.3316 4.9879 
19 -0.01% -0.07% 9.15% -0.0059 0.8688 -0.1180 0.3756 1.3267 4.9312 
20 0.25% 0.03% 9.40% 0.0533 0.7948 1.1671 0.3793 1.3178 5.0135 
21 -0.43% -0.32% 8.97% -0.1084 0.8954 -2.1093 0.3580 1.3079 4.7680 
22 -0.59% -0.40% 8.38% -0.1589 0.8723 -3.1725 0.3296 1.3014 4.4116 
23 -0.36% -0.28% 8.03% -0.0801 1.0851 -1.2853 0.3138 1.3151 4.1559 
24 0.23% 0.12% 8.25% 0.0569 0.8615 1.1496 0.3187 1.2927 4.2947 
25 -0.23% -0.31% 8.02% -0.0383 0.8558 -0.7798 0.3096 1.2836 4.2012 
26 -0.14% -0.19% 7.88% -0.0439 0.9713 -0.7877 0.2999 1.2673 4.1218 
27 -0.29% -0.07% 7.59% -0.0260 1.0800 -0.4199 0.2930 1.2480 4.0891 
28 -0.05% -0.12% 7.54% -0.0211 0.8225 -0.4478 0.2870 1.2423 4.0236 
29 -0.05% -0.15% 7.49% 0.0035 0.9561 0.0630 0.2846 1.2325 4.0215 
30 0.03% 0.01% 7.52% 0.0180 0.8012 0.3913 0.2843 1.2256 4.0402 
          
-1 to 1     5.40% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06467 0.8061 1.7362 8.0867 
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Table-A 5.15 Market returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (OLS, 226); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.08% -0.05% 0.0092 1.0514 0.1302 0.0092 1.0514 0.1302 
-19 0.36% 0.03% 0.31% 0.1234 0.8852 2.0729 0.0938 0.9629 1.4480 
-18 0.25% -0.28% 0.56% 0.0161 0.9272 0.2581 0.0859 0.9115 1.4005 
-17 -0.01% -0.04% 0.55% 0.0694 1.0282 1.0034 0.1090 1.0110 1.6038 
-16 -0.03% -0.10% 0.52% -0.0323 0.9822 -0.4893 0.0831 1.0338 1.1950 
-15 0.40% 0.14% 0.92% 0.0837 0.9841 1.2650 0.1100 1.0639 1.5377 
-14 0.46% 0.18% 1.38% 0.1001 1.0946 1.3603 0.1397 1.0532 1.9725 
-13 0.01% -0.24% 1.39% 0.0019 0.9716 0.0291 0.1314 1.0571 1.8477 
-12 0.20% -0.04% 1.59% 0.0712 0.9686 1.0930 0.1476 1.0928 2.0080 
-11 0.16% 0.23% 1.75% 0.0696 1.0687 0.9683 0.1620 1.0989 2.1923 
-10 0.17% -0.08% 1.92% 0.0619 1.0726 0.8583 0.1731 1.1255 2.2874 
-9 0.83% 0.19% 2.75% 0.1932 1.1767 2.4420 0.2215 1.1311 2.9125 
-8 -0.25% -0.28% 2.50% -0.0177 0.9675 -0.2715 0.2080 1.1384 2.7163 
-7 0.33% -0.02% 2.83% 0.0771 1.0793 1.0628 0.2210 1.1388 2.8860 
-6 0.44% 0.00% 3.27% 0.1340 1.0611 1.8782 0.2481 1.1546 3.1956 
-5 0.68% 0.18% 3.95% 0.1549 1.1323 2.0347 0.2790 1.1303 3.6703 
-4 0.22% -0.28% 4.17% 0.0534 1.0287 0.7723 0.2836 1.1413 3.6950 
-3 0.56% -0.01% 4.73% 0.1447 1.1321 1.9012 0.3097 1.1284 4.0817 
-2 0.65% 0.05% 5.38% 0.2014 1.0642 2.8148 0.3477 1.1186 4.6221 
-1 1.64% 0.71% 7.03% 0.4786 1.3985 5.0889 0.4459 1.1487 5.7723 
0 2.67% 1.84% 9.70% 0.7885 1.9914 5.8881 0.6072 1.2068 7.4819 
1 1.03% 0.22% 10.73% 0.2112 1.6744 1.8756 0.6383 1.2580 7.5447 
2 0.46% -0.19% 11.19% 0.0999 1.3368 1.1107 0.6451 1.3150 7.2949 
3 -0.14% -0.31% 11.04% -0.0655 1.0139 -0.9613 0.6181 1.3214 6.9561 
4 -0.33% -0.29% 10.71% -0.0864 1.0428 -1.2324 0.5884 1.3225 6.6155 
5 -0.39% -0.38% 10.32% -0.0687 0.8948 -1.1415 0.5635 1.3083 6.4043 
6 -0.17% -0.33% 10.15% -0.0279 0.9105 -0.4556 0.5476 1.3080 6.2249 
7 -0.31% -0.07% 9.83% -0.0498 0.9783 -0.7569 0.5283 1.3076 6.0074 
8 -0.07% -0.11% 9.77% -0.0100 1.0200 -0.1451 0.5172 1.3137 5.8546 
9 0.19% -0.15% 9.95% 0.0927 0.9776 1.4099 0.5255 1.3365 5.8464 
10 0.35% 0.05% 10.30% 0.0873 1.0395 1.2484 0.5326 1.3379 5.9196 
11 0.28% -0.09% 10.58% 0.0420 0.9836 0.6345 0.5316 1.3565 5.8275 
12 0.01% -0.15% 10.60% -0.0007 0.7643 -0.0145 0.5234 1.3780 5.6478 
13 -0.14% -0.06% 10.46% -0.0253 0.9219 -0.4088 0.5113 1.3641 5.5734 
14 -0.21% -0.11% 10.25% -0.0399 0.7741 -0.7667 0.4972 1.3456 5.4941 
15 -0.16% -0.17% 10.09% -0.0639 0.8220 -1.1565 0.4796 1.3490 5.2864 
16 -0.20% -0.22% 9.88% -0.1165 0.8949 -1.9358 0.4539 1.3611 4.9588 
17 -0.26% -0.35% 9.62% -0.0695 0.9607 -1.0758 0.4366 1.3796 4.7060 
18 0.00% -0.16% 9.62% 0.0094 1.0352 0.1354 0.4325 1.3705 4.6923 
19 -0.07% -0.10% 9.55% -0.0189 0.8725 -0.3221 0.4241 1.3605 4.6347 
20 0.43% -0.01% 9.98% 0.1033 0.7824 1.9630 0.4350 1.3565 4.7684 
21 -0.43% -0.33% 9.55% -0.1129 0.9247 -1.8149 0.4124 1.3454 4.5577 
22 -0.51% -0.43% 9.04% -0.1581 0.8693 -2.7038 0.3834 1.3466 4.2342 
23 -0.41% -0.21% 8.62% -0.0913 1.0974 -1.2373 0.3653 1.3705 3.9632 
24 0.37% 0.18% 8.99% 0.1035 0.7846 1.9623 0.3766 1.3449 4.1643 
25 -0.34% -0.30% 8.65% -0.0873 0.8715 -1.4901 0.3596 1.3439 3.9794 
26 0.00% -0.12% 8.65% -0.0132 0.9871 -0.1996 0.3539 1.3267 3.9662 
27 -0.19% 0.06% 8.46% 0.0186 1.1168 0.2482 0.3528 1.3101 4.0049 
28 -0.19% -0.09% 8.27% -0.0577 0.8452 -1.0148 0.3410 1.3072 3.8788 
29 -0.07% -0.14% 8.20% -0.0009 0.9329 -0.0136 0.3374 1.3036 3.8490 
30 0.16% 0.16% 8.36% 0.0491 0.7809 0.9353 0.3410 1.2955 3.9139 
          
-1 to 1     5.34% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06211 0.8535 1.8021 7.0428 
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Table-A 5.16 Market returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (OLS, 226); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.08% -0.15% -0.08% 0.0048 1.0378 0.0690 0.0048 1.0378 0.0690 
-19 0.34% -0.01% 0.26% 0.1165 0.8787 1.9675 0.0858 0.9561 1.3316 
-18 0.31% -0.32% 0.57% 0.0196 0.9485 0.3064 0.0814 0.9006 1.3406 
-17 -0.02% -0.10% 0.54% 0.0681 1.0136 0.9977 0.1045 1.0038 1.5453 
-16 -0.03% -0.16% 0.52% -0.0278 0.9656 -0.4270 0.0811 1.0300 1.1679 
-15 0.33% -0.12% 0.85% 0.0651 0.9854 0.9805 0.1006 1.0665 1.3995 
-14 0.43% 0.09% 1.28% 0.0885 1.1052 1.1878 0.1266 1.0545 1.7811 
-13 0.03% -0.19% 1.31% -0.0024 0.9789 -0.0368 0.1175 1.0555 1.6524 
-12 0.22% -0.04% 1.52% 0.0807 0.9817 1.2198 0.1377 1.0894 1.8758 
-11 0.22% 0.12% 1.74% 0.0878 1.0405 1.2519 0.1584 1.0902 2.1561 
-10 0.19% -0.04% 1.93% 0.0682 1.0557 0.9581 0.1716 1.1039 2.3064 
-9 0.82% 0.10% 2.75% 0.1996 1.1686 2.5343 0.2219 1.1231 2.9318 
-8 -0.15% -0.25% 2.60% 0.0075 0.9762 0.1142 0.2152 1.1269 2.8347 
-7 0.31% -0.09% 2.91% 0.0740 1.0849 1.0116 0.2272 1.1299 2.9840 
-6 0.46% 0.10% 3.37% 0.1383 1.0632 1.9302 0.2552 1.1407 3.3198 
-5 0.64% 0.05% 4.01% 0.1521 1.1286 2.0005 0.2851 1.1176 3.7860 
-4 0.20% -0.28% 4.21% 0.0529 1.0207 0.7691 0.2894 1.1298 3.8017 
-3 0.58% -0.02% 4.79% 0.1546 1.1257 2.0380 0.3177 1.1190 4.2136 
-2 0.63% 0.02% 5.41% 0.1988 1.0858 2.7167 0.3548 1.1127 4.7326 
-1 1.65% 0.75% 7.06% 0.4946 1.4095 5.2075 0.4564 1.1417 5.9332 
0 2.71% 1.76% 9.77% 0.8157 1.9919 6.0773 0.6234 1.2009 7.7042 
1 1.02% 0.36% 10.79% 0.2120 1.6937 1.8578 0.6543 1.2531 7.7487 
2 0.42% -0.14% 11.21% 0.1026 1.3650 1.1152 0.6613 1.3172 7.4510 
3 -0.25% -0.49% 10.96% -0.0932 1.0346 -1.3374 0.6284 1.3247 7.0394 
4 -0.36% -0.32% 10.61% -0.0985 1.0353 -1.4119 0.5960 1.3279 6.6606 
5 -0.40% -0.32% 10.21% -0.0652 0.8948 -1.0812 0.5716 1.3160 6.4462 
6 -0.17% -0.37% 10.04% -0.0295 0.9092 -0.4808 0.5553 1.3132 6.2748 
7 -0.28% -0.11% 9.76% -0.0386 0.9749 -0.5876 0.5380 1.3154 6.0694 
8 -0.14% -0.20% 9.62% -0.0329 1.0367 -0.4715 0.5225 1.3242 5.8553 
9 0.16% -0.16% 9.78% 0.0907 0.9748 1.3811 0.5303 1.3430 5.8596 
10 0.33% -0.06% 10.11% 0.0868 1.0593 1.2165 0.5372 1.3470 5.9190 
11 0.29% -0.11% 10.40% 0.0373 0.9803 0.5639 0.5354 1.3690 5.8034 
12 -0.02% -0.12% 10.39% -0.0172 0.7789 -0.3281 0.5242 1.3887 5.6016 
13 -0.19% -0.09% 10.20% -0.0325 0.9082 -0.5312 0.5108 1.3779 5.5020 
14 -0.22% -0.14% 9.98% -0.0440 0.7501 -0.8699 0.4961 1.3570 5.4249 
15 -0.18% -0.19% 9.80% -0.0688 0.8107 -1.2595 0.4777 1.3599 5.2127 
16 -0.15% -0.18% 9.65% -0.1000 0.8837 -1.6793 0.4547 1.3708 4.9229 
17 -0.24% -0.21% 9.40% -0.0622 0.9287 -0.9947 0.4386 1.3873 4.6919 
18 0.01% -0.24% 9.41% 0.0103 1.0493 0.1461 0.4346 1.3808 4.6708 
19 -0.13% -0.19% 9.28% -0.0303 0.8493 -0.5289 0.4243 1.3726 4.5879 
20 0.42% 0.04% 9.70% 0.1004 0.7830 1.9034 0.4348 1.3711 4.7065 
21 -0.48% -0.50% 9.22% -0.1204 0.9289 -1.9231 0.4110 1.3613 4.4809 
22 -0.52% -0.47% 8.70% -0.1584 0.8450 -2.7811 0.3821 1.3639 4.1574 
23 -0.41% -0.15% 8.29% -0.0933 1.1044 -1.2540 0.3636 1.3864 3.8927 
24 0.37% 0.08% 8.66% 0.1035 0.7951 1.9324 0.3750 1.3606 4.0905 
25 -0.30% -0.43% 8.36% -0.0735 0.8828 -1.2363 0.3601 1.3607 3.9272 
26 0.02% -0.16% 8.38% -0.0140 0.9950 -0.2090 0.3542 1.3472 3.9015 
27 -0.22% -0.04% 8.16% 0.0117 1.1265 0.1540 0.3522 1.3304 3.9283 
28 -0.16% -0.17% 8.00% -0.0497 0.8432 -0.8756 0.3414 1.3237 3.8279 
29 -0.04% -0.17% 7.96% 0.0000 0.9134 -0.0003 0.3380 1.3197 3.8009 
30 0.19% 0.00% 8.15% 0.0537 0.7893 1.0100 0.3422 1.3146 3.8631 
          
-1 to 1     5.38% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06083 0.8789 1.8007 7.2435 
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Table-A 5.17 Market returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (MM, 220); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.38% 0.16% 0.38% 0.1344 1.2408 1.5712 0.1344 1.2408 1.5712 
-19 0.62% 0.17% 0.99% 0.2340 1.0119 3.3551 0.2605 1.1701 3.2298 
-18 0.37% -0.11% 1.37% 0.0697 1.0678 0.9472 0.2530 1.0576 3.4696 
-17 0.29% 0.08% 1.66% 0.1533 1.2137 1.8318 0.2957 1.2335 3.4776 
-16 0.20% -0.01% 1.86% 0.0325 1.1174 0.4221 0.2790 1.2569 3.2203 
-15 0.47% 0.30% 2.33% 0.1233 1.0996 1.6266 0.3051 1.2478 3.5465 
-14 0.58% 0.23% 2.91% 0.1972 1.3227 2.1629 0.3570 1.2392 4.1788 
-13 0.18% -0.12% 3.09% 0.0706 1.1695 0.8762 0.3589 1.2452 4.1808 
-12 0.43% 0.15% 3.52% 0.1546 1.1317 1.9819 0.3899 1.3005 4.3491 
-11 0.35% 0.35% 3.86% 0.1393 1.2734 1.5866 0.4139 1.3043 4.6036 
-10 0.42% 0.24% 4.28% 0.1335 1.2645 1.5319 0.4349 1.3361 4.7223 
-9 1.12% 0.30% 5.39% 0.3226 1.3883 3.3712 0.5096 1.3479 5.4838 
-8 -0.03% -0.10% 5.36% 0.0263 1.1173 0.3417 0.4969 1.3477 5.3483 
-7 0.58% 0.20% 5.94% 0.1722 1.2609 1.9811 0.5248 1.3347 5.7041 
-6 0.63% 0.14% 6.57% 0.2053 1.2395 2.4028 0.5600 1.3508 6.0142 
-5 0.95% 0.33% 7.52% 0.2472 1.2913 2.7774 0.6041 1.3168 6.6543 
-4 0.43% -0.12% 7.95% 0.1195 1.1692 1.4832 0.6150 1.3238 6.7392 
-3 0.67% 0.18% 8.62% 0.2287 1.3326 2.4900 0.6516 1.3250 7.1338 
-2 0.92% 0.34% 9.54% 0.3066 1.2561 3.5404 0.7046 1.3125 7.7867 
-1 1.94% 1.15% 11.48% 0.6548 1.6895 5.6221 0.8331 1.3837 8.7340 
0 2.87% 2.30% 14.34% 0.9906 2.3310 6.1644 1.0292 1.4640 10.1982 
1 1.32% 0.54% 15.66% 0.2998 2.1137 2.0575 1.0695 1.5276 10.1559 
2 0.68% 0.08% 16.34% 0.1797 1.5670 1.6637 1.0834 1.5908 9.8797 
3 0.11% -0.13% 16.45% 0.0055 1.1047 0.0729 1.0618 1.5979 9.6387 
4 -0.09% -0.02% 16.37% -0.0126 1.1293 -0.1616 1.0378 1.5815 9.5189 
5 -0.19% -0.15% 16.18% -0.0350 0.9666 -0.5246 1.0108 1.5603 9.3969 
6 0.07% -0.06% 16.25% 0.0354 1.0642 0.4827 0.9987 1.5541 9.3219 
7 0.25% 0.12% 16.50% 0.1036 0.9142 1.6440 1.0003 1.5386 9.4304 
8 0.27% -0.01% 16.77% 0.1026 1.1456 1.2989 1.0019 1.5406 9.4337 
9 0.45% 0.08% 17.22% 0.1771 1.1567 2.2204 1.0174 1.5723 9.3869 
10 0.35% 0.28% 17.57% 0.1161 0.9662 1.7429 1.0217 1.5848 9.3519 
11 0.59% 0.23% 18.16% 0.1579 1.1401 2.0084 1.0336 1.6004 9.3682 
12 0.29% 0.08% 18.45% 0.0844 0.9247 1.3242 1.0325 1.6352 9.1590 
13 0.05% 0.07% 18.49% 0.0163 1.0545 0.2248 1.0200 1.6237 9.1122 
14 -0.01% 0.05% 18.48% 0.0044 0.8490 0.0749 1.0060 1.6091 9.0695 
15 0.09% -0.06% 18.58% 0.0174 0.9801 0.2582 0.9949 1.6130 8.9472 
16 0.09% 0.02% 18.67% -0.0115 1.1060 -0.1512 0.9794 1.6193 8.7740 
17 0.06% 0.02% 18.73% 0.0488 1.0494 0.6748 0.9744 1.6394 8.6215 
18 0.24% -0.05% 18.97% 0.0322 1.2137 0.3843 0.9670 1.6294 8.6082 
19 0.14% 0.21% 19.11% 0.0587 1.0501 0.8111 0.9641 1.6158 8.6551 
20 0.66% 0.18% 19.76% 0.2248 0.9784 3.3324 0.9874 1.6024 8.9381 
21 -0.22% -0.19% 19.55% -0.0536 0.9789 -0.7945 0.9673 1.5957 8.7928 
22 -0.26% -0.23% 19.29% -0.0777 0.9047 -1.2462 0.9441 1.5915 8.6050 
23 0.21% 0.03% 19.50% 0.0515 0.9658 0.7728 0.9411 1.6034 8.5136 
24 0.59% 0.31% 20.08% 0.1821 0.8843 2.9874 0.9577 1.5737 8.8277 
25 -0.08% -0.05% 20.00% -0.0168 0.9691 -0.2513 0.9447 1.5760 8.6958 
26 -0.06% 0.04% 19.94% 0.0153 0.8350 0.2662 0.9369 1.5642 8.6883 
27 0.30% 0.31% 20.25% 0.1003 0.9697 1.5006 0.9415 1.5562 8.7766 
28 0.05% 0.03% 20.30% 0.0008 0.9856 0.0116 0.9320 1.5540 8.6999 
29 0.15% -0.04% 20.44% 0.0534 1.0862 0.7126 0.9302 1.5537 8.6847 
30 0.35% 0.28% 20.80% 0.1153 0.8823 1.8954 0.9372 1.5520 8.7594 
          
-1 to 1     6.12% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06218 1.1230 2.1878 7.4460 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-20 
 
Table-A 5.18 Market returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (MM, 220); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.33% 0.09% 0.33% 0.1298 1.2323 1.5193 0.1298 1.2323 1.5193 
-19 0.60% 0.16% 0.93% 0.2303 1.0044 3.3082 0.2546 1.1662 3.1499 
-18 0.42% -0.07% 1.36% 0.0804 1.0901 1.0649 0.2543 1.0481 3.5012 
-17 0.28% 0.14% 1.64% 0.1553 1.2029 1.8625 0.2979 1.2259 3.5062 
-16 0.22% -0.04% 1.85% 0.0420 1.1004 0.5513 0.2852 1.2518 3.2879 
-15 0.42% 0.08% 2.27% 0.1073 1.1022 1.4048 0.3042 1.2510 3.5086 
-14 0.54% 0.13% 2.80% 0.1895 1.3567 2.0154 0.3532 1.2428 4.1013 
-13 0.16% -0.05% 2.97% 0.0663 1.1825 0.8089 0.3539 1.2470 4.0946 
-12 0.47% 0.19% 3.43% 0.1707 1.1476 2.1461 0.3905 1.3048 4.3187 
-11 0.41% 0.31% 3.84% 0.1639 1.2530 1.8875 0.4223 1.3066 4.6639 
-10 0.45% 0.25% 4.29% 0.1491 1.2546 1.7151 0.4476 1.3248 4.8755 
-9 1.12% 0.31% 5.40% 0.3364 1.3866 3.5007 0.5257 1.3502 5.6178 
-8 0.09% -0.09% 5.49% 0.0653 1.1275 0.8362 0.5232 1.3472 5.6036 
-7 0.56% 0.23% 6.05% 0.1719 1.2695 1.9535 0.5501 1.3378 5.9330 
-6 0.64% 0.10% 6.69% 0.2186 1.2406 2.5430 0.5879 1.3495 6.2859 
-5 0.94% 0.28% 7.63% 0.2554 1.2883 2.8601 0.6330 1.3183 6.9294 
-4 0.41% -0.07% 8.04% 0.1244 1.1615 1.5458 0.6443 1.3244 7.0202 
-3 0.67% 0.14% 8.71% 0.2450 1.3313 2.6553 0.6839 1.3263 7.4406 
-2 0.88% 0.36% 9.59% 0.3110 1.2829 3.4977 0.7370 1.3142 8.0924 
-1 1.97% 1.20% 11.57% 0.6812 1.7065 5.7597 0.8707 1.3815 9.0941 
0 2.94% 2.33% 14.51% 1.0258 2.3285 6.3572 1.0735 1.4636 10.5839 
1 1.32% 0.62% 15.83% 0.3034 2.1734 2.0144 1.1135 1.5302 10.5008 
2 0.67% 0.11% 16.49% 0.1874 1.6064 1.6832 1.1281 1.6030 10.1553 
3 0.02% -0.22% 16.51% -0.0216 1.1388 -0.2732 1.1000 1.6130 9.8401 
4 -0.11% -0.01% 16.40% -0.0217 1.1211 -0.2793 1.0734 1.5997 9.6823 
5 -0.17% -0.08% 16.23% -0.0219 0.9736 -0.3250 1.0483 1.5811 9.5672 
6 0.06% -0.25% 16.30% 0.0379 1.0638 0.5137 1.0360 1.5738 9.4983 
7 0.30% 0.16% 16.59% 0.1160 0.9150 1.8294 1.0392 1.5643 9.5862 
8 0.20% -0.04% 16.80% 0.0811 1.1756 0.9959 1.0362 1.5706 9.5203 
9 0.44% 0.09% 17.24% 0.1808 1.1569 2.2554 1.0518 1.5991 9.4914 
10 0.35% 0.20% 17.59% 0.1209 0.9917 1.7594 1.0564 1.6117 9.4582 
11 0.59% 0.19% 18.18% 0.1574 1.1408 1.9909 1.0676 1.6334 9.4313 
12 0.26% 0.05% 18.44% 0.0703 0.9401 1.0786 1.0635 1.6676 9.2026 
13 0.01% 0.04% 18.45% 0.0077 1.0350 0.1068 1.0491 1.6572 9.1348 
14 -0.02% -0.02% 18.43% -0.0001 0.8275 -0.0025 1.0340 1.6403 9.0961 
15 0.08% -0.05% 18.51% 0.0194 0.9645 0.2899 1.0228 1.6436 8.9790 
16 0.14% 0.02% 18.65% 0.0020 1.0974 0.0269 1.0092 1.6489 8.8314 
17 0.08% 0.08% 18.73% 0.0597 1.0199 0.8439 1.0055 1.6693 8.6915 
18 0.24% 0.07% 18.97% 0.0374 1.2332 0.4375 0.9985 1.6621 8.6686 
19 0.10% 0.06% 19.07% 0.0540 1.0330 0.7543 0.9945 1.6501 8.6961 
20 0.67% 0.27% 19.74% 0.2264 0.9746 3.3521 1.0176 1.6398 8.9548 
21 -0.23% -0.28% 19.51% -0.0537 0.9832 -0.7887 0.9972 1.6338 8.8070 
22 -0.25% -0.25% 19.26% -0.0729 0.8820 -1.1928 0.9744 1.6327 8.6112 
23 0.22% 0.07% 19.47% 0.0603 0.9683 0.8980 0.9723 1.6451 8.5284 
24 0.59% 0.25% 20.07% 0.1850 0.8982 2.9726 0.9890 1.6148 8.8381 
25 -0.02% -0.17% 20.05% 0.0037 0.9817 0.0543 0.9788 1.6208 8.7138 
26 -0.02% 0.05% 20.03% 0.0190 0.8454 0.3246 0.9711 1.6132 8.6861 
27 0.30% 0.20% 20.33% 0.1022 0.9748 1.5130 0.9757 1.6067 8.7623 
28 0.07% -0.04% 20.40% 0.0106 0.9839 0.1555 0.9672 1.6014 8.7147 
29 0.16% 0.03% 20.56% 0.0598 1.0636 0.8106 0.9659 1.6015 8.7027 
30 0.40% 0.28% 20.96% 0.1252 0.8892 2.0324 0.9739 1.6036 8.7636 
          
-1 to 1     6.23% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06102 1.1607 2.2034 7.6013 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-21 
 
Table-A 5.19 SW-1 returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (OLS, 226); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.07% -0.15% -0.07% 0.0075 1.0343 0.1075 0.0075 1.0343 0.1076 
-19 0.35% 0.11% 0.28% 0.1206 0.8854 2.0245 0.0905 0.9510 1.4155 
-18 0.33% -0.31% 0.61% 0.0284 0.9599 0.4401 0.0903 0.9084 1.4786 
-17 0.00% -0.07% 0.61% 0.0692 1.0130 1.0154 0.1128 1.0125 1.6569 
-16 -0.02% -0.18% 0.59% -0.0284 0.9477 -0.4456 0.0882 1.0284 1.2753 
-15 0.30% -0.09% 0.88% 0.0582 0.9872 0.8757 0.1043 1.0596 1.4630 
-14 0.41% 0.04% 1.30% 0.0872 1.1077 1.1701 0.1295 1.0441 1.8438 
-13 -0.04% -0.19% 1.26% -0.0155 0.9864 -0.2340 0.1156 1.0427 1.6486 
-12 0.26% 0.02% 1.52% 0.0900 0.9937 1.3472 0.1390 1.0741 1.9243 
-11 0.19% 0.25% 1.71% 0.0770 1.0601 1.0804 0.1563 1.0793 2.1525 
-10 0.19% -0.03% 1.90% 0.0668 1.0538 0.9424 0.1691 1.0986 2.2889 
-9 0.85% 0.16% 2.75% 0.2053 1.1720 2.6049 0.2212 1.1111 2.9600 
-8 -0.15% -0.23% 2.60% 0.0084 0.9912 0.1256 0.2148 1.1191 2.8544 
-7 0.31% -0.04% 2.91% 0.0720 1.0904 0.9811 0.2263 1.1204 3.0027 
-6 0.45% 0.07% 3.37% 0.1375 1.0616 1.9257 0.2541 1.1333 3.3335 
-5 0.62% 0.11% 3.99% 0.1474 1.1357 1.9301 0.2829 1.1132 3.7784 
-4 0.17% -0.22% 4.16% 0.0495 1.0153 0.7249 0.2865 1.1283 3.7745 
-3 0.59% 0.10% 4.75% 0.1604 1.1168 2.1357 0.3162 1.1173 4.2076 
-2 0.60% 0.00% 5.35% 0.1916 1.0955 2.5999 0.3517 1.1103 4.7096 
-1 1.70% 0.82% 7.05% 0.5054 1.4024 5.3574 0.4558 1.1426 5.9309 
0 2.74% 1.97% 9.80% 0.8174 1.9741 6.1564 0.6232 1.1998 7.7227 
1 1.05% 0.36% 10.85% 0.2217 1.6812 1.9609 0.6561 1.2482 7.8153 
2 0.49% -0.04% 11.33% 0.1178 1.3576 1.2904 0.6663 1.3112 7.5547 
3 -0.26% -0.48% 11.08% -0.0965 1.0469 -1.3711 0.6326 1.3200 7.1246 
4 -0.37% -0.37% 10.71% -0.0978 1.0304 -1.4112 0.6002 1.3240 6.7401 
5 -0.39% -0.36% 10.32% -0.0659 0.8941 -1.0952 0.5756 1.3114 6.5260 
6 -0.18% -0.49% 10.15% -0.0268 0.9084 -0.4394 0.5597 1.3049 6.3771 
7 -0.26% -0.11% 9.89% -0.0364 0.9879 -0.5472 0.5427 1.3080 6.1694 
8 -0.13% -0.23% 9.75% -0.0354 1.0428 -0.5047 0.5267 1.3171 5.9460 
9 0.18% -0.14% 9.94% 0.0949 0.9836 1.4340 0.5352 1.3346 5.9621 
10 0.34% -0.03% 10.27% 0.0860 1.0572 1.2096 0.5419 1.3399 6.0134 
11 0.32% -0.18% 10.59% 0.0490 0.9873 0.7372 0.5421 1.3622 5.9164 
12 -0.04% -0.17% 10.54% -0.0241 0.8015 -0.4473 0.5296 1.3833 5.6917 
13 -0.18% -0.09% 10.37% -0.0322 0.9099 -0.5269 0.5162 1.3768 5.5742 
14 -0.25% -0.24% 10.12% -0.0533 0.7401 -1.0704 0.4997 1.3581 5.4709 
15 -0.23% -0.26% 9.89% -0.0828 0.8147 -1.5111 0.4790 1.3577 5.2451 
16 -0.13% -0.17% 9.76% -0.1015 0.8750 -1.7252 0.4557 1.3680 4.9533 
17 -0.24% -0.14% 9.52% -0.0622 0.9460 -0.9771 0.4396 1.3842 4.7218 
18 0.04% -0.17% 9.56% 0.0152 1.0566 0.2139 0.4364 1.3776 4.7097 
19 -0.13% -0.22% 9.43% -0.0296 0.8442 -0.5219 0.4262 1.3676 4.6336 
20 0.45% 0.08% 9.88% 0.1073 0.7791 2.0482 0.4377 1.3675 4.7593 
21 -0.45% -0.38% 9.43% -0.1164 0.9245 -1.8726 0.4145 1.3584 4.5370 
22 -0.55% -0.55% 8.88% -0.1715 0.8551 -2.9821 0.3835 1.3595 4.1942 
23 -0.39% -0.09% 8.48% -0.0874 1.1116 -1.1695 0.3660 1.3807 3.9409 
24 0.33% 0.10% 8.81% 0.0924 0.7938 1.7312 0.3757 1.3530 4.1280 
25 -0.25% -0.38% 8.57% -0.0610 0.8783 -1.0331 0.3626 1.3530 3.9841 
26 0.02% -0.16% 8.59% -0.0105 0.9986 -0.1567 0.3571 1.3389 3.9658 
27 -0.18% -0.10% 8.41% 0.0167 1.1245 0.2202 0.3558 1.3210 4.0046 
28 -0.15% -0.22% 8.26% -0.0477 0.8686 -0.8170 0.3453 1.3132 3.9099 
29 -0.08% -0.06% 8.18% -0.0077 0.9284 -0.1239 0.3408 1.3075 3.8751 
30 0.21% -0.03% 8.39% 0.0550 0.7876 1.0386 0.3451 1.3028 3.9384 
          
-1 to 1     5.50% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06104 0.8917 1.7902 7.4056 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5-22 
 
Table-A 5.20 SW-2 returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (OLS, 226); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.10% -0.18% -0.10% 0.0042 1.0327 0.0605 0.0042 1.0327 0.0606 
-19 0.39% 0.07% 0.29% 0.1272 0.8933 2.1272 0.0929 0.9536 1.4556 
-18 0.32% -0.30% 0.60% 0.0243 0.9597 0.3777 0.0899 0.9064 1.4814 
-17 0.01% -0.05% 0.61% 0.0722 1.0129 1.0657 0.1140 1.0113 1.6837 
-16 0.01% -0.17% 0.62% -0.0261 0.9482 -0.4106 0.0903 1.0277 1.3124 
-15 0.32% 0.05% 0.94% 0.0656 0.9895 0.9905 0.1092 1.0545 1.5470 
-14 0.35% 0.05% 1.29% 0.0742 1.1001 1.0085 0.1291 1.0364 1.8619 
-13 -0.12% -0.18% 1.17% -0.0284 0.9735 -0.4352 0.1108 1.0310 1.6054 
-12 0.28% 0.07% 1.45% 0.0958 0.9984 1.4335 0.1364 1.0620 1.9185 
-11 0.14% 0.08% 1.59% 0.0703 1.0643 0.9873 0.1516 1.0650 2.1271 
-10 0.19% -0.18% 1.79% 0.0635 1.0497 0.9033 0.1637 1.0854 2.2533 
-9 0.84% 0.16% 2.62% 0.1982 1.1636 2.5459 0.2139 1.0988 2.9094 
-8 -0.20% -0.29% 2.43% 0.0012 0.9952 0.0184 0.2059 1.1077 2.7773 
-7 0.27% -0.09% 2.70% 0.0699 1.0924 0.9556 0.2171 1.1109 2.9198 
-6 0.41% 0.11% 3.11% 0.1274 1.0650 1.7877 0.2426 1.1257 3.2204 
-5 0.62% 0.11% 3.73% 0.1430 1.1264 1.8965 0.2707 1.1092 3.6462 
-4 0.16% -0.26% 3.89% 0.0506 1.0185 0.7424 0.2748 1.1258 3.6481 
-3 0.56% 0.08% 4.45% 0.1542 1.1051 2.0855 0.3034 1.1165 4.0613 
-2 0.58% -0.07% 5.03% 0.1895 1.1007 2.5724 0.3388 1.1074 4.5722 
-1 1.74% 0.88% 6.77% 0.5072 1.4000 5.4131 0.4437 1.1390 5.8201 
0 2.76% 1.68% 9.53% 0.8179 1.9767 6.1830 0.6114 1.1950 7.6454 
1 1.03% 0.37% 10.56% 0.2177 1.6755 1.9419 0.6438 1.2412 7.7504 
2 0.51% -0.01% 11.07% 0.1221 1.3631 1.3386 0.6551 1.3055 7.4981 
3 -0.25% -0.44% 10.82% -0.0947 1.0485 -1.3496 0.6220 1.3148 7.0692 
4 -0.39% -0.40% 10.43% -0.1039 1.0276 -1.5108 0.5886 1.3174 6.6768 
5 -0.37% -0.31% 10.06% -0.0626 0.8965 -1.0439 0.5649 1.3043 6.4723 
6 -0.19% -0.39% 9.87% -0.0320 0.9018 -0.5295 0.5482 1.2970 6.3162 
7 -0.25% -0.09% 9.62% -0.0350 0.9796 -0.5342 0.5317 1.3011 6.1064 
8 -0.15% -0.27% 9.46% -0.0379 1.0481 -0.5406 0.5154 1.3134 5.8642 
9 0.21% -0.10% 9.68% 0.1024 0.9917 1.5436 0.5255 1.3324 5.8927 
10 0.31% -0.01% 9.99% 0.0831 1.0524 1.1800 0.5318 1.3392 5.9342 
11 0.30% -0.15% 10.29% 0.0469 0.9874 0.7104 0.5318 1.3620 5.8341 
12 -0.05% -0.17% 10.23% -0.0260 0.8052 -0.4826 0.5191 1.3843 5.6034 
13 -0.17% -0.09% 10.07% -0.0299 0.9155 -0.4877 0.5063 1.3802 5.4813 
14 -0.25% -0.15% 9.82% -0.0505 0.7321 -1.0306 0.4904 1.3624 5.3793 
15 -0.25% -0.26% 9.57% -0.0859 0.8177 -1.5700 0.4693 1.3590 5.1598 
16 -0.13% -0.19% 9.44% -0.0975 0.8705 -1.6743 0.4468 1.3680 4.8808 
17 -0.21% -0.10% 9.23% -0.0494 0.9436 -0.7820 0.4329 1.3831 4.6771 
18 -0.04% -0.09% 9.19% -0.0020 1.0617 -0.0280 0.4270 1.3784 4.6290 
19 -0.17% -0.14% 9.02% -0.0351 0.8525 -0.6155 0.4161 1.3693 4.5407 
20 0.44% 0.15% 9.46% 0.1063 0.7849 2.0234 0.4276 1.3676 4.6716 
21 -0.38% -0.33% 9.08% -0.1060 0.9202 -1.7221 0.4061 1.3588 4.4658 
22 -0.52% -0.52% 8.55% -0.1680 0.8574 -2.9272 0.3757 1.3580 4.1343 
23 -0.38% -0.16% 8.18% -0.0879 1.1166 -1.1758 0.3582 1.3788 3.8820 
24 0.32% 0.11% 8.50% 0.0876 0.7952 1.6452 0.3673 1.3510 4.0620 
25 -0.26% -0.34% 8.24% -0.0688 0.8715 -1.1789 0.3531 1.3484 3.9131 
26 0.01% -0.18% 8.25% -0.0116 0.9947 -0.1744 0.3476 1.3332 3.8964 
27 -0.18% -0.08% 8.08% 0.0146 1.1321 0.1922 0.3461 1.3168 3.9273 
28 -0.16% -0.17% 7.91% -0.0499 0.8796 -0.8478 0.3354 1.3111 3.8228 
29 -0.14% -0.07% 7.77% -0.0177 0.9403 -0.2817 0.3295 1.3041 3.7759 
30 0.20% -0.09% 7.97% 0.0489 0.7873 0.9280 0.3331 1.3005 3.8276 
          
-1 to 1     5.53% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06141 0.8907 1.7844 7.4589 
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Table-A 5.21 SW-3 returns to Targets; EWI-Firms; (OLS, 226); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.13% -0.18% -0.13% -0.0021 1.0204 -0.0305 -0.0021 1.0204 -0.0304 
-19 0.39% 0.03% 0.26% 0.1279 0.8909 2.1410 0.0890 0.9456 1.4033 
-18 0.33% -0.20% 0.59% 0.0239 0.9522 0.3744 0.0865 0.8935 1.4431 
-17 0.01% -0.05% 0.60% 0.0706 1.0076 1.0455 0.1102 0.9956 1.6507 
-16 0.01% -0.07% 0.61% -0.0263 0.9452 -0.4152 0.0868 1.0180 1.2714 
-15 0.33% -0.02% 0.95% 0.0639 0.9897 0.9633 0.1053 1.0445 1.5038 
-14 0.36% 0.04% 1.31% 0.0802 1.0945 1.0932 0.1278 1.0284 1.8538 
-13 -0.13% -0.25% 1.18% -0.0352 0.9806 -0.5351 0.1071 1.0277 1.5547 
-12 0.30% 0.05% 1.48% 0.0987 1.0002 1.4714 0.1339 1.0569 1.8894 
-11 0.14% 0.01% 1.62% 0.0660 1.0730 0.9168 0.1479 1.0637 2.0734 
-10 0.16% -0.16% 1.78% 0.0555 1.0482 0.7892 0.1577 1.0875 2.1631 
-9 0.83% 0.06% 2.61% 0.1947 1.1693 2.4834 0.2072 1.0996 2.8106 
-8 -0.18% -0.28% 2.43% -0.0018 0.9974 -0.0264 0.1986 1.1104 2.6675 
-7 0.27% -0.07% 2.70% 0.0645 1.0986 0.8756 0.2086 1.1152 2.7901 
-6 0.39% 0.08% 3.09% 0.1196 1.0712 1.6654 0.2324 1.1332 3.0589 
-5 0.63% 0.07% 3.72% 0.1423 1.1379 1.8644 0.2606 1.1125 3.4938 
-4 0.22% -0.20% 3.94% 0.0579 1.0110 0.8540 0.2669 1.1275 3.5301 
-3 0.58% 0.11% 4.52% 0.1551 1.1010 2.1007 0.2959 1.1198 3.9410 
-2 0.60% -0.03% 5.12% 0.1842 1.1082 2.4782 0.3303 1.1112 4.4328 
-1 1.73% 0.95% 6.85% 0.5075 1.3983 5.4125 0.4354 1.1424 5.6836 
0 2.80% 1.84% 9.66% 0.8261 1.9709 6.2509 0.6052 1.1949 7.5531 
1 1.06% 0.38% 10.72% 0.2211 1.6730 1.9706 0.6384 1.2390 7.6837 
2 0.51% 0.08% 11.23% 0.1182 1.3580 1.2980 0.6490 1.2990 7.4509 
3 -0.24% -0.41% 10.99% -0.0895 1.0414 -1.2813 0.6171 1.3096 7.0269 
4 -0.42% -0.43% 10.58% -0.1050 1.0185 -1.5374 0.5836 1.3117 6.6355 
5 -0.35% -0.34% 10.23% -0.0598 0.9028 -0.9883 0.5605 1.2977 6.4419 
6 -0.18% -0.38% 10.05% -0.0297 0.9092 -0.4876 0.5443 1.2912 6.2870 
7 -0.25% -0.10% 9.81% -0.0354 0.9608 -0.5494 0.5278 1.2935 6.0858 
8 -0.17% -0.27% 9.64% -0.0392 1.0570 -0.5537 0.5114 1.3067 5.8363 
9 0.22% -0.13% 9.86% 0.1078 0.9836 1.6340 0.5224 1.3229 5.8895 
10 0.33% 0.02% 10.19% 0.0841 1.0538 1.1902 0.5290 1.3316 5.9252 
11 0.32% -0.07% 10.51% 0.0497 0.9978 0.7428 0.5295 1.3570 5.8191 
12 -0.07% -0.12% 10.44% -0.0309 0.8151 -0.5661 0.5160 1.3774 5.5871 
13 -0.19% -0.15% 10.25% -0.0348 0.9078 -0.5719 0.5024 1.3742 5.4520 
14 -0.27% -0.20% 9.98% -0.0561 0.7340 -1.1397 0.4857 1.3580 5.3336 
15 -0.25% -0.27% 9.73% -0.0845 0.8100 -1.5562 0.4648 1.3558 5.1124 
16 -0.13% -0.23% 9.60% -0.0948 0.8582 -1.6481 0.4429 1.3622 4.8483 
17 -0.17% -0.13% 9.43% -0.0395 0.9295 -0.6331 0.4306 1.3760 4.6668 
18 -0.04% -0.14% 9.39% -0.0108 1.0475 -0.1542 0.4233 1.3707 4.6054 
19 -0.14% -0.10% 9.25% -0.0366 0.8494 -0.6418 0.4122 1.3611 4.5165 
20 0.43% 0.10% 9.68% 0.1059 0.7813 2.0214 0.4237 1.3589 4.6498 
21 -0.39% -0.44% 9.29% -0.1060 0.9178 -1.7215 0.4023 1.3484 4.4488 
22 -0.55% -0.49% 8.73% -0.1732 0.8558 -3.0184 0.3711 1.3444 4.1171 
23 -0.33% -0.14% 8.41% -0.0727 1.1096 -0.9775 0.3559 1.3627 3.8954 
24 0.30% 0.08% 8.71% 0.0800 0.8083 1.4753 0.3639 1.3365 4.0605 
25 -0.26% -0.38% 8.46% -0.0667 0.8780 -1.1321 0.3501 1.3311 3.9221 
26 0.00% -0.18% 8.46% -0.0127 0.9868 -0.1918 0.3445 1.3183 3.8970 
27 -0.14% -0.08% 8.32% 0.0227 1.1239 0.3010 0.3442 1.2997 3.9490 
28 -0.14% -0.12% 8.18% -0.0479 0.8506 -0.8401 0.3338 1.2935 3.8485 
29 -0.12% -0.17% 8.06% -0.0190 0.9434 -0.2999 0.3277 1.2874 3.7966 
30 0.21% -0.06% 8.26% 0.0536 0.7891 1.0138 0.3320 1.2832 3.8588 
          
-1 to 1     5.60% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06148 0.8975 1.7837 7.5044 
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Table-A 5.22 Market Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 229); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.21% 0.00% 0.21% 0.2478 3.0306 1.3025 0.2478 3.0306 1.3025 
-19 0.07% -0.02% 0.28% -0.0173 1.1573 -0.2387 0.1630 2.2540 1.1517 
-18 -0.12% -0.22% 0.17% -0.1093 1.3706 -1.2695 0.0700 1.7141 0.6505 
-17 0.49% 0.25% 0.65% 0.2136 1.4798 2.2984 0.1674 1.6741 1.5926 
-16 0.00% -0.29% 0.65% 0.0469 1.3954 0.5349 0.1707 1.6275 1.6703 
-15 -0.04% -0.08% 0.61% 0.0202 1.3338 0.2410 0.1641 1.6333 1.5998 
-14 -0.15% -0.19% 0.46% -0.0592 1.3735 -0.6869 0.1295 1.5028 1.3724 
-13 0.25% 0.12% 0.72% 0.1169 1.5037 1.2385 0.1625 1.5625 1.6562 
-12 -0.11% -0.30% 0.61% -0.0266 1.2702 -0.3332 0.1443 1.4451 1.5906 
-11 -0.11% -0.18% 0.50% -0.0462 1.1181 -0.6584 0.1223 1.3997 1.3916 
-10 -0.06% -0.14% 0.44% 0.0167 1.4692 0.1806 0.1216 1.4830 1.3063 
-9 0.67% 0.17% 1.12% 0.1859 1.4703 2.0141 0.1701 1.3693 1.9788 
-8 -0.01% 0.02% 1.10% 0.0012 1.6484 0.0115 0.1638 1.4879 1.7532 
-7 0.41% 0.11% 1.51% 0.1200 1.6941 1.1278 0.1899 1.3779 2.1949 
-6 0.06% 0.02% 1.58% 0.0581 1.2156 0.7613 0.1985 1.3717 2.3042 
-5 0.19% 0.07% 1.77% 0.0694 1.2498 0.8847 0.2095 1.3152 2.5371 
-4 0.03% -0.05% 1.81% -0.1191 2.5437 -0.7458 0.1744 1.2361 2.2466 
-3 -0.04% -0.17% 1.77% 0.0438 1.5341 0.4545 0.1798 1.2496 2.2913 
-2 0.19% 0.00% 1.96% 0.0116 1.5387 0.1197 0.1776 1.2424 2.2771 
-1 0.78% 0.23% 2.74% 0.3668 2.1629 2.7012 0.2552 1.3470 3.0169 
0 0.39% 0.12% 3.13% 0.1249 2.0050 0.9921 0.2763 1.3596 3.2362 
1 0.33% 0.00% 3.45% 0.1510 2.1137 1.1376 0.3021 1.3289 3.6207 
2 0.55% 0.10% 4.00% 0.2686 2.3569 1.8147 0.3515 1.4542 3.8492 
3 0.04% -0.07% 4.04% 0.0518 1.8660 0.4423 0.3546 1.3579 4.1596 
4 0.27% -0.01% 4.31% 0.0536 1.1393 0.7490 0.3582 1.3433 4.2468 
5 -0.04% -0.19% 4.27% 0.0796 1.5891 0.7981 0.3669 1.3734 4.2541 
6 -0.22% -0.01% 4.05% -0.0224 1.5876 -0.2251 0.3557 1.4229 3.9810 
7 0.33% 0.03% 4.37% 0.1400 2.2605 0.9864 0.3757 1.4812 4.0399 
8 0.19% -0.10% 4.56% 0.0869 1.4187 0.9753 0.3853 1.5485 3.9630 
9 -0.11% -0.18% 4.46% -0.0655 1.3545 -0.7699 0.3669 1.4902 3.9212 
10 0.19% 0.05% 4.64% 0.1416 1.6383 1.3761 0.3864 1.4718 4.1809 
11 -0.01% 0.00% 4.64% -0.0128 1.3051 -0.1556 0.3780 1.4299 4.2102 
12 0.21% -0.03% 4.85% 0.0851 1.2104 1.1200 0.3871 1.4607 4.2202 
13 0.57% 0.11% 5.42% 0.1985 1.1905 2.6563 0.4154 1.4524 4.5550 
14 0.03% 0.04% 5.45% -0.0023 1.1141 -0.0322 0.4090 1.4714 4.4272 
15 -0.14% -0.12% 5.31% -0.1704 1.6716 -1.6232 0.3749 1.4447 4.1331 
16 0.00% -0.15% 5.30% 0.0283 1.3853 0.3257 0.3745 1.4814 4.0258 
17 -0.22% -0.17% 5.09% -0.0420 1.2730 -0.5261 0.3627 1.5139 3.8154 
18 -0.02% 0.20% 5.07% 0.0489 1.4466 0.5380 0.3658 1.5601 3.7345 
19 -0.05% 0.02% 5.02% -0.1005 1.7191 -0.9307 0.3453 1.5057 3.6527 
20 -0.12% 0.00% 4.90% -0.0013 1.5809 -0.0127 0.3409 1.5560 3.4892 
21 -0.03% -0.05% 4.86% 0.0150 1.9853 0.1200 0.3391 1.6056 3.3638 
22 -0.02% 0.10% 4.85% 0.1138 1.6423 1.1039 0.3525 1.6390 3.4254 
23 0.39% 0.01% 5.23% 0.1321 1.3718 1.5333 0.3684 1.5711 3.7346 
24 -0.02% -0.06% 5.22% 0.0925 1.7952 0.8204 0.3781 1.6503 3.6485 
25 -0.05% -0.15% 5.17% -0.0306 1.3181 -0.3696 0.3694 1.6113 3.6514 
26 0.39% 0.03% 5.56% 0.1358 1.2362 1.7501 0.3853 1.5780 3.8887 
27 0.26% 0.00% 5.82% 0.1127 1.3242 1.3552 0.3975 1.5943 3.9710 
28 0.05% -0.04% 5.86% 0.0844 1.2987 1.0347 0.4055 1.6491 3.9161 
29 0.09% -0.14% 5.95% 0.0086 1.4553 0.0936 0.4026 1.6081 3.9876 
30 0.38% 0.06% 6.33% 0.1784 1.2031 2.3615 0.4236 1.6446 4.1025 
          
-1 to 1     1.49% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04158 0.3711 1.8317 3.2264 
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Table-A 5.23 Market Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 233); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.00% -0.07% 0.00% 0.0198 0.9312 0.3470 0.0198 0.9312 0.3470 
-19 -0.03% -0.17% -0.04% -0.0375 0.9513 -0.6439 -0.0125 0.9352 -0.2188 
-18 -0.23% -0.42% -0.27% -0.0846 1.0355 -1.3336 -0.0591 0.9777 -0.9864 
-17 0.37% 0.15% 0.10% 0.1158 1.0881 1.7367 0.0067 0.9697 0.1131 
-16 -0.19% -0.44% -0.08% -0.0353 0.9893 -0.5819 -0.0098 1.0259 -0.1554 
-15 -0.21% -0.25% -0.29% -0.0575 1.0934 -0.8578 -0.0324 1.0304 -0.5128 
-14 -0.32% -0.23% -0.61% -0.0595 1.1184 -0.8682 -0.0525 0.9888 -0.8659 
-13 0.20% 0.03% -0.41% 0.0701 1.2789 0.8948 -0.0243 1.1062 -0.3583 
-12 -0.23% -0.47% -0.64% -0.0740 0.9469 -1.2751 -0.0476 1.0291 -0.7542 
-11 -0.22% -0.35% -0.86% -0.0639 0.9590 -1.0867 -0.0653 1.0234 -1.0415 
-10 -0.15% -0.31% -1.01% -0.0347 1.0217 -0.5541 -0.0728 1.0258 -1.1570 
-9 0.46% 0.07% -0.55% 0.1212 1.0974 1.8015 -0.0347 1.0419 -0.5429 
-8 -0.16% -0.15% -0.71% -0.0598 1.0305 -0.9465 -0.0499 1.0553 -0.7714 
-7 0.24% -0.15% -0.47% 0.0788 0.9605 1.3378 -0.0270 1.0765 -0.4096 
-6 0.02% -0.07% -0.45% 0.0083 1.0197 0.1325 -0.0240 1.1003 -0.3555 
-5 -0.04% -0.11% -0.50% -0.0074 1.0345 -0.1175 -0.0251 1.0593 -0.3862 
-4 -0.14% -0.25% -0.64% -0.0548 1.0078 -0.8868 -0.0376 1.0075 -0.6091 
-3 -0.14% -0.34% -0.78% -0.0485 0.9715 -0.8140 -0.0480 1.0233 -0.7649 
-2 0.07% -0.14% -0.71% 0.0125 0.9294 0.2186 -0.0438 1.0025 -0.7135 
-1 0.62% 0.18% -0.09% 0.1759 1.0958 2.6181 -0.0034 1.0381 -0.0536 
0 0.26% 0.05% 0.17% 0.1249 1.4430 1.4127 0.0239 1.0702 0.3649 
1 0.23% -0.16% 0.40% 0.0746 1.4991 0.8117 0.0393 1.0774 0.5950 
2 0.43% -0.07% 0.83% 0.1416 1.3434 1.7198 0.0680 1.0989 1.0089 
3 -0.09% -0.23% 0.74% -0.0216 1.1171 -0.3160 0.0621 1.0996 0.9215 
4 0.11% -0.10% 0.84% 0.0153 0.9412 0.2647 0.0639 1.1014 0.9466 
5 -0.19% -0.43% 0.65% -0.0409 0.9773 -0.6820 0.0547 1.0958 0.8137 
6 -0.39% -0.17% 0.26% -0.1050 1.0725 -1.5970 0.0334 1.1062 0.4930 
7 0.29% -0.06% 0.56% 0.0867 0.9795 1.4442 0.0492 1.1214 0.7159 
8 0.02% -0.16% 0.58% -0.0387 1.0179 -0.6206 0.0412 1.1222 0.5985 
9 -0.24% -0.48% 0.34% -0.0539 0.9827 -0.8944 0.0306 1.1278 0.4432 
10 0.07% -0.05% 0.41% 0.0453 1.0045 0.7365 0.0383 1.1439 0.5460 
11 -0.13% -0.15% 0.28% -0.0194 0.9101 -0.3486 0.0342 1.1712 0.4770 
12 0.05% -0.22% 0.32% -0.0018 0.9555 -0.0312 0.0334 1.1839 0.4603 
13 0.38% -0.09% 0.70% 0.1021 0.9314 1.7879 0.0504 1.1903 0.6910 
14 -0.11% -0.16% 0.59% -0.0598 0.8941 -1.0904 0.0396 1.1819 0.5465 
15 -0.23% -0.25% 0.36% -0.1033 1.0653 -1.5815 0.0218 1.1979 0.2972 
16 -0.17% -0.36% 0.19% -0.0784 1.0492 -1.2183 0.0086 1.1733 0.1202 
17 -0.38% -0.27% -0.18% -0.1260 0.8962 -2.2934 -0.0119 1.1618 -0.1672 
18 -0.18% -0.01% -0.36% -0.0315 1.0895 -0.4710 -0.0168 1.1501 -0.2382 
19 -0.21% -0.12% -0.57% -0.0594 1.0812 -0.8956 -0.0260 1.1154 -0.3797 
20 -0.36% -0.33% -0.93% -0.1026 1.2111 -1.3825 -0.0417 1.1235 -0.6051 
21 -0.21% -0.16% -1.14% -0.0549 1.0834 -0.8264 -0.0496 1.1200 -0.7231 
22 -0.31% -0.11% -1.45% -0.0786 0.8761 -1.4642 -0.0611 1.0933 -0.9110 
23 0.27% -0.17% -1.18% 0.0650 0.9740 1.0894 -0.0505 1.0860 -0.7594 
24 -0.15% -0.15% -1.33% -0.0251 1.1138 -0.3674 -0.0537 1.1057 -0.7927 
25 -0.29% -0.28% -1.62% -0.1037 1.0536 -1.6060 -0.0684 1.0949 -1.0197 
26 0.15% -0.09% -1.47% 0.0423 0.9941 0.6935 -0.0615 1.0805 -0.9291 
27 0.10% -0.14% -1.37% 0.0422 1.0413 0.6614 -0.0548 1.0814 -0.8267 
28 -0.15% -0.16% -1.52% -0.0199 0.8532 -0.3800 -0.0571 1.0898 -0.8544 
29 -0.13% -0.29% -1.65% -0.0196 0.9762 -0.3272 -0.0593 1.0773 -0.8975 
30 0.25% -0.01% -1.40% 0.0728 1.0217 1.1623 -0.0485 1.0800 -0.7325 
          
-1 to 1     1.11% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04167 0.2167 1.4301 2.4724 
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Table-A 5.24 Market returns to Acquirers; MM firms; (OLS, 229); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.04% -0.07% 0.04% 0.0274 0.9309 0.4737 0.0274 0.9309 0.4737 
-19 -0.09% -0.17% -0.05% -0.0529 0.9375 -0.9061 -0.0180 0.9367 -0.3084 
-18 -0.27% -0.42% -0.32% -0.0985 1.0221 -1.5480 -0.0715 0.9627 -1.1939 
-17 0.34% 0.13% 0.02% 0.1109 1.0939 1.6283 -0.0065 0.9592 -0.1091 
-16 -0.20% -0.44% -0.18% -0.0369 0.9969 -0.5941 -0.0223 1.0221 -0.3507 
-15 -0.21% -0.25% -0.38% -0.0497 1.0756 -0.7423 -0.0407 1.0269 -0.6361 
-14 -0.32% -0.19% -0.70% -0.0685 1.0959 -1.0041 -0.0635 0.9879 -1.0331 
-13 0.10% 0.03% -0.60% 0.0394 1.2048 0.5252 -0.0455 1.0784 -0.6779 
-12 -0.25% -0.47% -0.86% -0.0743 0.9442 -1.2648 -0.0677 1.0019 -1.0852 
-11 -0.27% -0.36% -1.12% -0.0766 0.9531 -1.2906 -0.0884 0.9847 -1.4425 
-10 -0.19% -0.35% -1.32% -0.0477 1.0134 -0.7564 -0.0987 0.9732 -1.6291 
-9 0.50% 0.07% -0.81% 0.1283 1.0981 1.8777 -0.0574 0.9922 -0.9300 
-8 -0.17% -0.16% -0.98% -0.0619 1.0390 -0.9566 -0.0723 1.0120 -1.1484 
-7 0.25% -0.11% -0.73% 0.0823 0.9682 1.3658 -0.0477 1.0407 -0.7365 
-6 -0.05% -0.08% -0.78% -0.0101 1.0041 -0.1619 -0.0487 1.0524 -0.7435 
-5 0.04% -0.02% -0.74% 0.0215 0.9979 0.3459 -0.0418 1.0271 -0.6536 
-4 -0.13% -0.25% -0.87% -0.0515 0.9869 -0.8388 -0.0530 0.9892 -0.8614 
-3 -0.17% -0.38% -1.04% -0.0578 0.9710 -0.9559 -0.0652 0.9997 -1.0472 
-2 0.03% -0.18% -1.01% -0.0009 0.9186 -0.0156 -0.0636 0.9678 -1.0562 
-1 0.59% 0.18% -0.42% 0.1662 1.0903 2.4492 -0.0248 0.9952 -0.4011 
0 0.25% -0.03% -0.17% 0.1221 1.4543 1.3487 0.0024 1.0275 0.0374 
1 0.20% -0.16% 0.03% 0.0699 1.5086 0.7443 0.0172 1.0382 0.2668 
2 0.40% -0.10% 0.43% 0.1320 1.3423 1.5795 0.0444 1.0510 0.6784 
3 -0.14% -0.25% 0.30% -0.0351 1.1051 -0.5106 0.0363 1.0386 0.5611 
4 0.09% -0.13% 0.39% 0.0102 0.9344 0.1759 0.0376 1.0378 0.5819 
5 -0.19% -0.45% 0.20% -0.0446 0.9697 -0.7394 0.0281 1.0236 0.4411 
6 -0.34% -0.17% -0.14% -0.0998 1.0468 -1.5316 0.0084 1.0258 0.1311 
7 0.18% -0.06% 0.04% 0.0533 0.9398 0.9112 0.0183 1.0337 0.2843 
8 0.02% -0.23% 0.06% -0.0393 1.0264 -0.6159 0.0107 1.0398 0.1649 
9 -0.25% -0.47% -0.19% -0.0607 0.9837 -0.9905 -0.0006 1.0486 -0.0089 
10 0.02% -0.05% -0.16% 0.0293 0.9932 0.4745 0.0047 1.0552 0.0715 
11 -0.18% -0.21% -0.35% -0.0342 0.8945 -0.6151 -0.0014 1.0725 -0.0214 
12 0.00% -0.24% -0.35% -0.0236 0.9137 -0.4151 -0.0055 1.0823 -0.0819 
13 0.42% -0.09% 0.07% 0.1109 0.9311 1.9126 0.0136 1.0921 0.1997 
14 -0.11% -0.16% -0.04% -0.0603 0.9018 -1.0748 0.0032 1.0860 0.0470 
15 -0.29% -0.26% -0.33% -0.1256 1.0459 -1.9298 -0.0178 1.0881 -0.2629 
16 -0.09% -0.26% -0.42% -0.0482 1.0014 -0.7736 -0.0255 1.0843 -0.3777 
17 -0.37% -0.27% -0.79% -0.1227 0.8996 -2.1907 -0.0451 1.0755 -0.6730 
18 -0.17% 0.00% -0.96% -0.0398 1.0474 -0.6100 -0.0508 1.0628 -0.7685 
19 -0.21% -0.15% -1.17% -0.0566 1.0670 -0.8516 -0.0591 1.0395 -0.9141 
20 -0.29% -0.26% -1.46% -0.0786 1.1944 -1.0574 -0.0707 1.0641 -1.0673 
21 -0.23% -0.20% -1.69% -0.0578 1.0618 -0.8740 -0.0788 1.0704 -1.1821 
22 -0.21% -0.05% -1.89% -0.0472 0.8396 -0.9031 -0.0850 1.0543 -1.2959 
23 0.25% -0.17% -1.64% 0.0610 0.9770 1.0028 -0.0749 1.0481 -1.1476 
24 -0.12% -0.15% -1.76% -0.0106 1.1049 -0.1537 -0.0756 1.0726 -1.1325 
25 -0.22% -0.28% -1.98% -0.0781 1.0251 -1.2245 -0.0863 1.0706 -1.2950 
26 0.21% -0.09% -1.77% 0.0582 0.9755 0.9581 -0.0769 1.0643 -1.1608 
27 0.11% -0.04% -1.66% 0.0516 1.0335 0.8014 -0.0687 1.0692 -1.0315 
28 -0.09% -0.16% -1.76% -0.0037 0.8416 -0.0701 -0.0685 1.0776 -1.0208 
29 -0.11% -0.29% -1.87% -0.0122 0.9768 -0.2015 -0.0695 1.0654 -1.0483 
30 0.28% -0.01% -1.60% 0.0743 0.9574 1.2465 -0.0584 1.0753 -0.8729 
          
-1 to 1     1.04% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04198 0.2068 1.4357 2.3142 
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Table-A 5.25 Market Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (M, 214); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.12% -0.04% 0.12% 0.0376 1.1438 0.5114 0.0376 1.1438 0.5114 
-19 0.07% -0.07% 0.19% 0.0138 1.2719 0.1691 0.0364 1.1954 0.4732 
-18 -0.10% -0.31% 0.09% -0.0966 1.3605 -1.1038 -0.0261 1.3070 -0.3100 
-17 0.36% 0.24% 0.45% 0.0673 1.7796 0.5882 0.0111 1.3006 0.1326 
-16 -0.05% -0.27% 0.40% 0.1335 2.2870 0.9082 0.0696 1.3544 0.7997 
-15 0.02% -0.06% 0.42% -0.0596 1.9724 -0.4696 0.0393 1.2761 0.4785 
-14 -0.08% -0.05% 0.34% 0.1008 2.0195 0.7762 0.0744 1.3395 0.8644 
-13 0.23% 0.09% 0.57% 0.1167 1.6253 1.1166 0.1109 1.4916 1.1563 
-12 -0.10% -0.34% 0.47% -0.0315 1.3745 -0.3570 0.0940 1.3797 1.0600 
-11 -0.09% -0.27% 0.38% -0.0065 1.2525 -0.0804 0.0872 1.3740 0.9866 
-10 -0.17% -0.27% 0.21% -0.0524 1.3235 -0.6154 0.0673 1.3488 0.7762 
-9 0.60% 0.15% 0.82% 0.2086 1.7103 1.8971 0.1247 1.3537 1.4323 
-8 -0.01% 0.07% 0.81% -0.0190 1.2150 -0.2433 0.1145 1.3495 1.3196 
-7 0.39% 0.07% 1.20% 0.1859 1.3302 2.1741 0.1600 1.3867 1.7950 
-6 0.08% -0.03% 1.28% -0.0199 1.7521 -0.1768 0.1495 1.4139 1.6442 
-5 0.11% 0.04% 1.39% 0.1171 1.7529 1.0388 0.1740 1.3495 2.0052 
-4 0.01% -0.10% 1.40% 0.0158 1.2193 0.2020 0.1726 1.3048 2.0577 
-3 0.03% -0.25% 1.43% -0.0724 1.6087 -0.6996 0.1507 1.3260 1.7678 
-2 0.10% 0.00% 1.53% 0.0530 1.0954 0.7519 0.1588 1.2922 1.9118 
-1 0.72% 0.24% 2.25% 0.3069 1.3556 3.5214 0.2234 1.3191 2.6347 
0 0.47% 0.13% 2.72% 0.2094 1.9490 1.6708 0.2637 1.3857 2.9604 
1 0.39% -0.01% 3.11% 0.1603 2.1597 1.1546 0.2919 1.4309 3.1726 
2 0.25% -0.03% 3.35% 0.1687 1.8280 1.4357 0.3206 1.4428 3.4564 
3 0.04% -0.20% 3.39% 0.0123 1.4146 0.1354 0.3164 1.4355 3.4281 
4 0.16% -0.08% 3.55% 0.0756 1.2066 0.9745 0.3251 1.4251 3.5484 
5 -0.08% -0.25% 3.47% 0.0525 1.4581 0.5600 0.3291 1.3960 3.6667 
6 -0.21% -0.06% 3.26% -0.1239 1.2913 -1.4927 0.2991 1.3886 3.3501 
7 0.12% -0.01% 3.38% 0.0847 1.1059 1.1913 0.3097 1.3998 3.4413 
8 0.18% -0.11% 3.56% -0.0272 1.7304 -0.2447 0.2993 1.4303 3.2544 
9 -0.19% -0.28% 3.37% -0.0113 1.4953 -0.1177 0.2922 1.4097 3.2236 
10 0.26% 0.17% 3.63% 0.1300 1.3055 1.5485 0.3108 1.4134 3.4198 
11 0.02% 0.04% 3.65% 0.0599 1.1844 0.7871 0.3165 1.4271 3.4491 
12 0.18% -0.04% 3.83% 0.0501 1.1945 0.6528 0.3204 1.4339 3.4751 
13 0.46% 0.07% 4.29% 0.2060 1.2245 2.6166 0.3510 1.4346 3.8050 
14 0.07% -0.03% 4.36% -0.0380 1.1934 -0.4952 0.3395 1.4315 3.6884 
15 -0.19% -0.19% 4.17% -0.1205 1.4322 -1.3082 0.3147 1.4499 3.3753 
16 -0.24% -0.26% 3.93% -0.1010 1.2001 -1.3094 0.2938 1.4507 3.1497 
17 -0.33% -0.21% 3.60% -0.1353 1.1951 -1.7615 0.2679 1.4224 2.9297 
18 0.02% 0.19% 3.62% 0.0272 1.2805 0.3304 0.2688 1.3793 3.0312 
19 -0.02% 0.05% 3.60% 0.0362 1.4180 0.3971 0.2712 1.3476 3.1297 
20 -0.21% -0.09% 3.39% -0.0768 1.6495 -0.7245 0.2558 1.3884 2.8660 
21 -0.06% -0.06% 3.32% -0.0356 1.4217 -0.3897 0.2473 1.3959 2.7553 
22 -0.05% 0.09% 3.27% 0.0188 1.1280 0.2589 0.2472 1.3608 2.8260 
23 0.24% -0.12% 3.51% 0.1015 1.2233 1.2901 0.2597 1.3537 2.9840 
24 0.15% -0.10% 3.65% 0.1275 1.4641 1.3546 0.2758 1.3718 3.1272 
25 -0.23% -0.21% 3.42% -0.1292 1.3034 -1.5415 0.2538 1.3866 2.8465 
26 0.42% 0.10% 3.84% 0.1612 1.2913 1.9414 0.2746 1.3874 3.0780 
27 0.27% -0.03% 4.11% 0.1362 1.4295 1.4815 0.2913 1.3963 3.2453 
28 0.10% -0.01% 4.21% 0.0527 1.1313 0.7244 0.2959 1.4142 3.2541 
29 0.09% -0.21% 4.30% 0.0821 1.3323 0.9585 0.3045 1.4100 3.3591 
30 0.33% 0.08% 4.64% 0.1474 1.2652 1.8126 0.3222 1.4195 3.5298 
          
-1 to 1     1.58% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04049 0.3906 1.9344 3.1409 
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Table-A 5.26 Market Returns to Acquirers; M-firms; (OLS, 214); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.01% -0.15% -0.01% -0.0017 0.8754 -0.0295 -0.0017 0.8754 -0.0295 
-19 -0.08% -0.18% -0.09% -0.0537 0.9300 -0.9012 -0.0391 0.9067 -0.6737 
-18 -0.23% -0.39% -0.32% -0.0897 1.0490 -1.3352 -0.0837 0.9653 -1.3545 
-17 0.26% 0.14% -0.06% 0.0750 1.0073 1.1625 -0.0350 0.9360 -0.5841 
-16 -0.20% -0.41% -0.26% -0.0535 0.8814 -0.9483 -0.0553 0.9456 -0.9124 
-15 -0.11% -0.17% -0.38% -0.0357 1.0983 -0.5072 -0.0650 0.9664 -1.0504 
-14 -0.22% -0.16% -0.60% -0.0437 1.1029 -0.6187 -0.0767 0.9468 -1.2649 
-13 0.10% 0.01% -0.50% 0.0359 1.2304 0.4550 -0.0591 1.0579 -0.8719 
-12 -0.22% -0.50% -0.72% -0.0734 0.9584 -1.1957 -0.0802 0.9678 -1.2932 
-11 -0.22% -0.37% -0.94% -0.0644 0.9534 -1.0540 -0.0964 0.9603 -1.5673 
-10 -0.28% -0.45% -1.22% -0.0730 1.0292 -1.1071 -0.1139 0.9474 -1.8774 
-9 0.46% 0.07% -0.76% 0.1309 1.1098 1.8419 -0.0713 0.9894 -1.1248 
-8 -0.13% -0.12% -0.89% -0.0448 0.9678 -0.7224 -0.0809 0.9979 -1.2657 
-7 0.26% -0.15% -0.63% 0.0821 0.9523 1.3468 -0.0560 1.0274 -0.8510 
-6 -0.04% -0.09% -0.67% -0.0067 0.9926 -0.1059 -0.0558 1.0418 -0.8369 
-5 -0.02% -0.12% -0.68% 0.0195 1.0256 0.2968 -0.0492 1.0179 -0.7546 
-4 -0.12% -0.26% -0.81% -0.0478 0.9721 -0.7677 -0.0593 0.9832 -0.9419 
-3 -0.09% -0.34% -0.90% -0.0317 0.9325 -0.5300 -0.0651 0.9871 -1.0298 
-2 -0.03% -0.17% -0.93% -0.0113 0.8411 -0.2089 -0.0660 0.9673 -1.0645 
-1 0.58% 0.18% -0.35% 0.1590 1.0577 2.3467 -0.0287 0.9825 -0.4566 
0 0.35% 0.01% 0.00% 0.1524 1.4726 1.6156 0.0052 1.0185 0.0799 
1 0.28% -0.13% 0.28% 0.0808 1.5332 0.8226 0.0223 1.0311 0.3379 
2 0.14% -0.12% 0.42% 0.0737 1.2834 0.8969 0.0372 1.0428 0.5569 
3 -0.10% -0.26% 0.32% -0.0347 1.1000 -0.4922 0.0293 1.0347 0.4426 
4 0.02% -0.20% 0.34% 0.0089 0.9494 0.1468 0.0305 1.0375 0.4594 
5 -0.21% -0.46% 0.13% -0.0568 0.9829 -0.9017 0.0188 1.0203 0.2877 
6 -0.31% -0.19% -0.19% -0.1098 0.9986 -1.7173 -0.0027 1.0138 -0.0414 
7 0.00% -0.07% -0.19% 0.0205 0.8724 0.3666 0.0012 1.0267 0.0187 
8 0.05% -0.16% -0.14% -0.0439 1.0439 -0.6566 -0.0069 1.0298 -0.1052 
9 -0.28% -0.48% -0.42% -0.0744 0.9811 -1.1835 -0.0204 1.0396 -0.3064 
10 0.13% 0.04% -0.29% 0.0365 0.9850 0.5781 -0.0135 1.0405 -0.2029 
11 -0.11% -0.16% -0.41% -0.0193 0.8987 -0.3346 -0.0167 1.0577 -0.2466 
12 0.01% -0.24% -0.40% -0.0261 0.9201 -0.4427 -0.0210 1.0704 -0.3063 
13 0.34% -0.09% -0.06% 0.0991 0.8805 1.7579 -0.0037 1.0856 -0.0530 
14 -0.05% -0.22% -0.10% -0.0535 0.8504 -0.9827 -0.0127 1.0718 -0.1847 
15 -0.32% -0.27% -0.42% -0.1276 1.0722 -1.8574 -0.0338 1.0789 -0.4886 
16 -0.31% -0.40% -0.73% -0.0920 0.9385 -1.5308 -0.0484 1.0769 -0.7021 
17 -0.45% -0.27% -1.18% -0.1468 0.9011 -2.5429 -0.0716 1.0640 -1.0506 
18 -0.12% 0.01% -1.30% -0.0320 1.0066 -0.4958 -0.0758 1.0420 -1.1356 
19 -0.14% -0.09% -1.44% -0.0301 1.0427 -0.4505 -0.0796 1.0204 -1.2179 
20 -0.35% -0.32% -1.79% -0.0951 1.2230 -1.2141 -0.0935 1.0458 -1.3954 
21 -0.21% -0.22% -2.00% -0.0564 1.0577 -0.8329 -0.1011 1.0484 -1.5049 
22 -0.21% -0.11% -2.21% -0.0645 0.8413 -1.1962 -0.1097 1.0276 -1.6667 
23 0.12% -0.23% -2.09% 0.0374 0.9739 0.5998 -0.1028 1.0253 -1.5655 
24 0.04% -0.15% -2.05% 0.0216 0.9715 0.3466 -0.0984 1.0390 -1.4794 
25 -0.38% -0.29% -2.42% -0.1092 0.9040 -1.8852 -0.1135 1.0459 -1.6937 
26 0.26% -0.08% -2.17% 0.0753 1.0006 1.1747 -0.1013 1.0440 -1.5144 
27 0.16% -0.02% -2.01% 0.0674 1.0513 1.0013 -0.0905 1.0492 -1.3463 
28 -0.01% -0.15% -2.02% 0.0057 0.8557 0.1032 -0.0887 1.0578 -1.3098 
29 -0.05% -0.28% -2.07% -0.0044 0.9955 -0.0692 -0.0885 1.0487 -1.3172 
30 0.24% -0.01% -1.83% 0.0694 0.9789 1.1072 -0.0779 1.0573 -1.1501 
          
-1 to 1     1.21% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04082 0.2264 1.4494 2.4387 
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Table-A 5.27 Market Returns to Acquirers; M-firms; (MM, 214); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.16% -0.05% 0.16% 0.0532 1.0118 0.8161 0.0532 1.0118 0.8161 
-19 0.10% -0.02% 0.26% 0.0037 1.0621 0.0543 0.0402 1.0346 0.6038 
-18 -0.07% -0.30% 0.19% -0.0591 1.2163 -0.7547 -0.0013 1.1390 -0.0175 
-17 0.39% 0.26% 0.58% 0.1217 1.1585 1.6319 0.0597 1.1077 0.8378 
-16 -0.02% -0.25% 0.56% 0.0282 1.0537 0.4154 0.0660 1.1029 0.9301 
-15 0.05% -0.03% 0.61% 0.0210 1.2740 0.2559 0.0689 1.1334 0.9436 
-14 -0.06% -0.08% 0.56% 0.0280 1.2802 0.3402 0.0743 1.1102 1.0401 
-13 0.26% 0.11% 0.81% 0.1113 1.4381 1.2025 0.1089 1.2444 1.3593 
-12 -0.06% -0.34% 0.76% -0.0106 1.1300 -0.1451 0.0992 1.1569 1.3313 
-11 -0.06% -0.22% 0.70% -0.0059 1.0755 -0.0849 0.0922 1.1457 1.2501 
-10 -0.14% -0.25% 0.56% -0.0358 1.1659 -0.4764 0.0771 1.1262 1.0639 
-9 0.64% 0.15% 1.20% 0.2292 1.2958 2.7469 0.1400 1.1806 1.8420 
-8 0.02% 0.09% 1.22% 0.0053 1.0862 0.0763 0.1360 1.1840 1.7840 
-7 0.42% 0.13% 1.65% 0.1622 1.1079 2.2739 0.1744 1.2126 2.2340 
-6 0.11% 0.02% 1.75% 0.0419 1.1448 0.5684 0.1793 1.2179 2.2867 
-5 0.14% 0.07% 1.90% 0.0762 1.1728 1.0090 0.1927 1.1862 2.5228 
-4 0.04% -0.09% 1.94% 0.0175 1.0915 0.2497 0.1912 1.1476 2.5873 
-3 0.06% -0.19% 1.99% 0.0063 1.0523 0.0934 0.1873 1.1505 2.5283 
-2 0.14% 0.01% 2.13% 0.0530 0.9379 0.8779 0.1944 1.1240 2.6868 
-1 0.75% 0.24% 2.88% 0.2551 1.1936 3.3200 0.2466 1.1433 3.3495 
0 0.51% 0.16% 3.39% 0.2284 1.6987 2.0880 0.2904 1.1868 3.8011 
1 0.42% 0.00% 3.81% 0.1709 1.8717 1.4179 0.3202 1.2126 4.1014 
2 0.28% 0.04% 4.10% 0.1452 1.4935 1.5102 0.3434 1.2351 4.3189 
3 0.06% -0.14% 4.16% 0.0251 1.2622 0.3086 0.3413 1.2246 4.3293 
4 0.20% -0.05% 4.36% 0.0733 1.0691 1.0645 0.3491 1.2230 4.4335 
5 -0.05% -0.21% 4.31% 0.0108 1.1432 0.1472 0.3444 1.2163 4.3985 
6 -0.19% -0.05% 4.13% -0.0849 1.1395 -1.1569 0.3216 1.2151 4.1118 
7 0.16% 0.00% 4.28% 0.0899 1.0001 1.3959 0.3328 1.2247 4.2214 
8 0.21% -0.10% 4.50% 0.0234 1.1966 0.3037 0.3314 1.2252 4.2012 
9 -0.17% -0.21% 4.33% -0.0372 1.1238 -0.5135 0.3190 1.2313 4.0248 
10 0.29% 0.15% 4.62% 0.1217 1.1444 1.6514 0.3357 1.2303 4.2384 
11 0.05% 0.07% 4.68% 0.0509 1.0269 0.7702 0.3394 1.2468 4.2283 
12 0.21% -0.02% 4.89% 0.0520 1.0562 0.7640 0.3433 1.2567 4.2430 
13 0.49% 0.12% 5.38% 0.1735 1.0135 2.6583 0.3679 1.2640 4.5213 
14 0.11% 0.03% 5.48% -0.0049 0.9841 -0.0771 0.3618 1.2576 4.4689 
15 -0.16% -0.15% 5.33% -0.0917 1.2768 -1.1160 0.3415 1.2718 4.1704 
16 -0.21% -0.22% 5.12% -0.0760 1.0719 -1.1015 0.3243 1.2765 3.9465 
17 -0.31% -0.20% 4.81% -0.1142 1.0373 -1.7099 0.3015 1.2528 3.7382 
18 0.05% 0.21% 4.86% 0.0253 1.1370 0.3461 0.3017 1.2203 3.8398 
19 0.02% 0.04% 4.88% 0.0369 1.2129 0.4732 0.3037 1.1905 3.9627 
20 -0.18% -0.08% 4.70% -0.0602 1.4378 -0.6508 0.2906 1.2294 3.6715 
21 -0.03% -0.03% 4.67% 0.0041 1.2124 0.0520 0.2877 1.2324 3.6265 
22 -0.02% 0.10% 4.65% 0.0105 0.9711 0.1672 0.2860 1.2051 3.6858 
23 0.26% -0.08% 4.91% 0.0957 1.0868 1.3684 0.2971 1.1994 3.8479 
24 0.17% -0.06% 5.08% 0.0815 1.1589 1.0928 0.3060 1.2182 3.9012 
25 -0.20% -0.18% 4.88% -0.0663 1.0355 -0.9944 0.2928 1.2316 3.6932 
26 0.45% 0.11% 5.34% 0.1616 1.1545 2.1746 0.3133 1.2279 3.9630 
27 0.30% 0.01% 5.64% 0.1338 1.2307 1.6886 0.3293 1.2376 4.1331 
28 0.13% 0.01% 5.77% 0.0654 0.9871 1.0287 0.3353 1.2483 4.1719 
29 0.13% -0.15% 5.90% 0.0735 1.1632 0.9812 0.3423 1.2436 4.2755 
30 0.36% 0.09% 6.26% 0.1370 1.1221 1.8957 0.3581 1.2540 4.4356 
          
-1 to 1     1.69% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04046 0.3778 1.6991 3.4535 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-30 
 
Table-A 5.28 FF Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 205); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.11% 0.05% 0.11% 0.1961 3.0320 0.9867 0.1961 3.0320 0.9867 
-19 0.14% -0.11% 0.24% 0.0005 1.1809 0.0060 0.1390 2.2592 0.9385 
-18 0.04% -0.16% 0.28% -0.0479 1.3758 -0.5313 0.0858 1.7306 0.7565 
-17 0.50% 0.26% 0.78% 0.2176 1.5287 2.1718 0.1831 1.6986 1.6448 
-16 0.05% -0.12% 0.83% 0.0553 1.3851 0.6095 0.1886 1.6320 1.7625 
-15 -0.05% -0.18% 0.77% 0.0263 1.3460 0.2983 0.1829 1.6235 1.7183 
-14 -0.09% -0.10% 0.69% -0.0457 1.3765 -0.5063 0.1520 1.5196 1.5263 
-13 0.24% 0.17% 0.92% 0.1008 1.4717 1.0449 0.1779 1.5663 1.7323 
-12 -0.10% -0.38% 0.82% -0.0476 1.2239 -0.5936 0.1518 1.4467 1.6008 
-11 -0.07% -0.16% 0.75% -0.0427 1.1384 -0.5716 0.1305 1.3776 1.4454 
-10 -0.10% -0.23% 0.65% -0.0083 1.4310 -0.0883 0.1220 1.4479 1.2850 
-9 0.61% 0.22% 1.26% 0.1551 1.4907 1.5826 0.1616 1.3289 1.8551 
-8 0.06% -0.04% 1.32% 0.0228 1.6864 0.2058 0.1616 1.4549 1.6948 
-7 0.51% 0.03% 1.83% 0.1312 1.7240 1.1612 0.1908 1.3354 2.1798 
-6 0.10% -0.04% 1.93% 0.0528 1.1979 0.6727 0.1980 1.3223 2.2839 
-5 0.20% 0.08% 2.13% 0.0960 1.2836 1.1409 0.2156 1.2947 2.5408 
-4 0.19% -0.01% 2.31% -0.0784 2.5457 -0.4699 0.1903 1.2159 2.3873 
-3 0.05% -0.11% 2.37% 0.0869 1.5229 0.8709 0.2054 1.2416 2.5237 
-2 0.11% 0.00% 2.48% -0.0236 1.5676 -0.2299 0.1945 1.2340 2.4044 
-1 0.75% 0.35% 3.23% 0.3710 2.2088 2.5626 0.2725 1.3383 3.1061 
0 0.56% 0.16% 3.78% 0.1837 1.8984 1.4759 0.3060 1.3316 3.5051 
1 0.22% 0.01% 4.01% 0.0825 1.8288 0.6884 0.3165 1.3066 3.6945 
2 0.60% 0.10% 4.60% 0.2760 2.3895 1.7618 0.3670 1.4259 3.9267 
3 0.07% -0.05% 4.67% 0.0471 1.8388 0.3908 0.3689 1.3234 4.2527 
4 0.31% 0.07% 4.98% 0.0470 1.0949 0.6550 0.3708 1.3078 4.3255 
5 0.00% -0.13% 4.98% 0.0971 1.5926 0.9302 0.3827 1.3539 4.3121 
6 -0.24% -0.05% 4.74% -0.0397 1.6086 -0.3764 0.3679 1.4059 3.9919 
7 0.30% 0.05% 5.04% 0.1212 2.2779 0.8116 0.3842 1.4617 4.0094 
8 0.24% 0.06% 5.28% 0.1302 1.4406 1.3790 0.4017 1.5289 4.0075 
9 -0.25% -0.47% 5.03% -0.1346 1.3600 -1.5096 0.3703 1.4709 3.8407 
10 0.21% 0.13% 5.24% 0.1481 1.6822 1.3434 0.3909 1.4564 4.0945 
11 -0.12% -0.11% 5.12% -0.0483 1.3089 -0.5626 0.3762 1.4077 4.0771 
12 0.23% 0.15% 5.36% 0.0930 1.1990 1.1838 0.3867 1.4376 4.1031 
13 0.54% 0.07% 5.89% 0.1839 1.2245 2.2908 0.4125 1.4435 4.3591 
14 0.05% 0.08% 5.94% 0.0129 1.1643 0.1695 0.4087 1.4693 4.2437 
15 -0.21% -0.19% 5.73% -0.2039 1.6763 -1.8507 0.3692 1.4377 3.9171 
16 -0.16% -0.35% 5.57% -0.0321 1.3465 -0.3628 0.3589 1.4704 3.7230 
17 -0.28% -0.18% 5.30% -0.0636 1.2256 -0.7896 0.3438 1.5052 3.4846 
18 -0.04% 0.02% 5.25% 0.0636 1.4196 0.6817 0.3495 1.5642 3.4083 
19 -0.03% 0.04% 5.22% -0.0898 1.7450 -0.7830 0.3309 1.5036 3.3577 
20 -0.14% -0.14% 5.08% -0.0026 1.5071 -0.0258 0.3265 1.5496 3.2138 
21 -0.21% -0.21% 4.87% -0.0648 1.8828 -0.5234 0.3126 1.5931 2.9931 
22 0.05% 0.11% 4.92% 0.1532 1.6552 1.4078 0.3321 1.6291 3.1101 
23 0.51% 0.02% 5.43% 0.1591 1.4075 1.7149 0.3522 1.5703 3.4210 
24 -0.09% -0.21% 5.34% 0.0520 1.8276 0.4320 0.3560 1.6571 3.2769 
25 -0.17% -0.32% 5.17% -0.0967 1.3518 -1.0854 0.3380 1.6086 3.2053 
26 0.40% 0.16% 5.57% 0.1482 1.2468 1.8035 0.3558 1.5737 3.4492 
27 0.26% 0.06% 5.83% 0.1314 1.2649 1.5758 0.3709 1.5940 3.5498 
28 -0.04% -0.08% 5.79% 0.0368 1.3065 0.4275 0.3724 1.6465 3.4501 
29 0.06% -0.20% 5.86% -0.0227 1.4604 -0.2362 0.3655 1.6051 3.4737 
30 0.51% 0.16% 6.37% 0.2431 1.2179 3.0279 0.3956 1.6442 3.6707 
          
-1 to 1     1.53% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03794 0.3679 1.8554 3.0249 
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Table-A 5.29 FF Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 209); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.13% -0.05% -0.0149 0.9270 -0.2517 -0.0149 0.9270 -0.2517 
-19 0.07% -0.19% 0.02% -0.0148 0.9603 -0.2412 -0.0211 0.9391 -0.3501 
-18 -0.07% -0.24% -0.05% -0.0282 1.0453 -0.4206 -0.0335 1.0040 -0.5202 
-17 0.36% 0.05% 0.31% 0.1181 1.1606 1.5889 0.0301 1.0157 0.4624 
-16 -0.12% -0.17% 0.20% -0.0125 0.9835 -0.1986 0.0213 1.0550 0.3154 
-15 -0.19% -0.28% 0.01% -0.0454 1.1232 -0.6316 0.0009 1.0683 0.0133 
-14 -0.24% -0.15% -0.24% -0.0360 1.1432 -0.4922 -0.0128 1.0561 -0.1889 
-13 0.16% -0.01% -0.08% 0.0308 1.2492 0.3855 -0.0010 1.1376 -0.0144 
-12 -0.24% -0.51% -0.32% -0.1006 0.9197 -1.7075 -0.0345 1.0635 -0.5067 
-11 -0.18% -0.20% -0.50% -0.0558 0.9712 -0.8967 -0.0504 1.0276 -0.7655 
-10 -0.19% -0.51% -0.69% -0.0606 0.9923 -0.9531 -0.0663 1.0127 -1.0222 
-9 0.37% 0.11% -0.32% 0.0924 1.1317 1.2713 -0.0367 1.0228 -0.5600 
-8 -0.05% -0.10% -0.38% -0.0281 1.0660 -0.4121 -0.0430 1.0350 -0.6488 
-7 0.31% -0.13% -0.07% 0.0890 1.0046 1.3830 -0.0177 1.0537 -0.2619 
-6 0.01% -0.15% -0.05% -0.0128 0.9976 -0.2001 -0.0204 1.0684 -0.2980 
-5 -0.03% 0.01% -0.09% 0.0109 1.0866 0.1560 -0.0171 1.0583 -0.2517 
-4 0.00% -0.06% -0.09% -0.0227 0.9972 -0.3553 -0.0220 1.0118 -0.3393 
-3 -0.05% -0.36% -0.14% -0.0239 0.9060 -0.4123 -0.0270 1.0320 -0.4085 
-2 0.00% -0.21% -0.14% -0.0119 0.9735 -0.1903 -0.0290 1.0160 -0.4458 
-1 0.61% 0.18% 0.47% 0.1835 1.1684 2.4520 0.0127 1.0547 0.1883 
0 0.39% 0.07% 0.86% 0.1707 1.3535 1.9690 0.0496 1.0722 0.7229 
1 0.12% -0.10% 0.98% 0.0256 1.2618 0.3165 0.0539 1.0858 0.7750 
2 0.51% 0.07% 1.49% 0.1583 1.4162 1.7447 0.0857 1.1032 1.2129 
3 -0.06% -0.16% 1.43% -0.0212 1.1008 -0.3004 0.0796 1.1033 1.1261 
4 0.14% -0.20% 1.57% 0.0074 0.9266 0.1244 0.0794 1.1017 1.1256 
5 -0.20% -0.32% 1.38% -0.0362 0.9984 -0.5663 0.0708 1.1116 0.9943 
6 -0.38% -0.21% 0.99% -0.1164 1.0980 -1.6553 0.0471 1.1258 0.6527 
7 0.23% -0.12% 1.22% 0.0634 0.9983 0.9920 0.0582 1.1356 0.8004 
8 0.08% -0.13% 1.30% -0.0061 1.0550 -0.0908 0.0560 1.1331 0.7722 
9 -0.41% -0.67% 0.89% -0.1222 0.9944 -1.9181 0.0328 1.1399 0.4491 
10 0.09% -0.03% 0.98% 0.0515 1.0621 0.7564 0.0415 1.1636 0.5568 
11 -0.22% -0.23% 0.76% -0.0425 0.9106 -0.7283 0.0333 1.1815 0.4404 
12 0.05% -0.05% 0.81% 0.0119 0.9311 0.1998 0.0349 1.1904 0.4577 
13 0.29% -0.11% 1.10% 0.0746 0.9830 1.1854 0.0472 1.2078 0.6098 
14 -0.08% -0.05% 1.02% -0.0476 0.9403 -0.7900 0.0385 1.1995 0.5005 
15 -0.28% -0.29% 0.74% -0.1326 1.0926 -1.8888 0.0159 1.2073 0.2057 
16 -0.32% -0.55% 0.42% -0.1426 1.0322 -2.1505 -0.0077 1.1804 -0.1012 
17 -0.39% -0.30% 0.03% -0.1416 0.8732 -2.5242 -0.0304 1.1702 -0.4059 
18 -0.23% -0.28% -0.20% -0.0350 1.0988 -0.4957 -0.0356 1.1640 -0.4780 
19 -0.21% -0.21% -0.41% -0.0495 1.1314 -0.6817 -0.0430 1.1273 -0.5956 
20 -0.35% -0.32% -0.76% -0.1063 1.1489 -1.4406 -0.0590 1.1300 -0.8155 
21 -0.39% -0.20% -1.15% -0.1399 1.0531 -2.0687 -0.0798 1.1272 -1.1056 
22 -0.25% -0.16% -1.40% -0.0485 0.9026 -0.8371 -0.0863 1.1046 -1.2195 
23 0.41% -0.18% -0.99% 0.1018 1.0006 1.5799 -0.0701 1.1115 -0.9844 
24 -0.28% -0.14% -1.27% -0.0809 1.1620 -1.0803 -0.0812 1.1356 -1.1168 
25 -0.43% -0.52% -1.71% -0.1681 1.1236 -2.3223 -0.1049 1.1190 -1.4634 
26 0.17% 0.05% -1.53% 0.0479 0.9994 0.7448 -0.0969 1.1005 -1.3739 
27 0.09% -0.10% -1.44% 0.0578 1.0222 0.8781 -0.0876 1.0999 -1.2429 
28 -0.22% -0.10% -1.66% -0.0596 0.8822 -1.0480 -0.0951 1.1047 -1.3440 
29 -0.10% -0.21% -1.76% -0.0431 0.9919 -0.6748 -0.1002 1.0969 -1.4258 
30 0.36% 0.15% -1.40% 0.1249 1.0487 1.8493 -0.0819 1.1061 -1.1555 
          
-1 to 1     1.12% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0378 0.2193 1.4708 2.3274 
 
 
 
  
  
5-32 
 
Table-A 5.30 FF Returns to Acquirers; MM firms; (OLS, 205); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.00% -0.13% 0.00% -0.0056 0.9256 -0.0929 -0.0056 0.9256 -0.0929 
-19 0.01% -0.21% 0.01% -0.0313 0.9477 -0.5097 -0.0260 0.9419 -0.4272 
-18 -0.11% -0.24% -0.10% -0.0423 1.0321 -0.6336 -0.0457 0.9906 -0.7128 
-17 0.34% 0.04% 0.24% 0.1139 1.1676 1.5067 0.0174 1.0057 0.2667 
-16 -0.12% -0.17% 0.12% -0.0122 0.9918 -0.1907 0.0101 1.0525 0.1476 
-15 -0.19% -0.28% -0.07% -0.0352 1.1056 -0.4920 -0.0052 1.0678 -0.0752 
-14 -0.23% -0.12% -0.30% -0.0430 1.1188 -0.5935 -0.0211 1.0597 -0.3070 
-13 0.04% -0.04% -0.25% 0.0015 1.1999 0.0197 -0.0192 1.1220 -0.2638 
-12 -0.25% -0.43% -0.50% -0.0986 0.9157 -1.6636 -0.0509 1.0495 -0.7497 
-11 -0.21% -0.20% -0.71% -0.0633 0.9770 -1.0009 -0.0683 1.0089 -1.0463 
-10 -0.25% -0.54% -0.96% -0.0777 0.9822 -1.2219 -0.0886 0.9806 -1.3955 
-9 0.41% 0.08% -0.55% 0.0984 1.1308 1.3411 -0.0563 0.9896 -0.8785 
-8 -0.05% -0.10% -0.61% -0.0277 1.0754 -0.3980 -0.0617 1.0079 -0.9458 
-7 0.33% -0.13% -0.27% 0.0936 1.0135 1.4272 -0.0344 1.0320 -0.5158 
-6 -0.06% -0.20% -0.33% -0.0319 0.9806 -0.5030 -0.0415 1.0341 -0.6206 
-5 0.04% 0.01% -0.29% 0.0401 1.0525 0.5888 -0.0302 1.0380 -0.4499 
-4 0.01% -0.06% -0.28% -0.0216 0.9821 -0.3396 -0.0345 1.0019 -0.5319 
-3 -0.08% -0.39% -0.35% -0.0329 0.9050 -0.5624 -0.0413 1.0174 -0.6269 
-2 -0.06% -0.22% -0.41% -0.0277 0.9612 -0.4453 -0.0465 0.9907 -0.7258 
-1 0.58% 0.18% 0.17% 0.1728 1.1640 2.2933 -0.0068 1.0212 -0.1023 
0 0.37% 0.03% 0.54% 0.1674 1.3659 1.8932 0.0299 1.0390 0.4447 
1 0.09% -0.10% 0.63% 0.0204 1.2696 0.2486 0.0335 1.0569 0.4900 
2 0.47% 0.05% 1.10% 0.1465 1.4155 1.5996 0.0633 1.0648 0.9190 
3 -0.11% -0.17% 0.99% -0.0378 1.0842 -0.5392 0.0543 1.0509 0.7980 
4 0.11% -0.22% 1.10% -0.0013 0.9201 -0.0225 0.0529 1.0453 0.7817 
5 -0.20% -0.36% 0.90% -0.0422 0.9873 -0.6608 0.0436 1.0472 0.6432 
6 -0.33% -0.24% 0.57% -0.1106 1.0743 -1.5915 0.0215 1.0544 0.3147 
7 0.11% -0.16% 0.67% 0.0264 0.9554 0.4272 0.0261 1.0561 0.3818 
8 0.09% -0.13% 0.76% -0.0041 1.0644 -0.0598 0.0249 1.0598 0.3623 
9 -0.42% -0.64% 0.34% -0.1303 0.9952 -2.0223 0.0006 1.0695 0.0093 
10 0.06% -0.03% 0.39% 0.0368 1.0546 0.5392 0.0072 1.0857 0.1031 
11 -0.28% -0.26% 0.11% -0.0592 0.8929 -1.0246 -0.0033 1.0920 -0.0473 
12 -0.01% -0.09% 0.10% -0.0135 0.8830 -0.2370 -0.0056 1.0970 -0.0795 
13 0.35% -0.09% 0.45% 0.0861 0.9838 1.3519 0.0092 1.1207 0.1268 
14 -0.08% -0.05% 0.37% -0.0470 0.9491 -0.7652 0.0011 1.1158 0.0155 
15 -0.36% -0.30% 0.02% -0.1582 1.0720 -2.2743 -0.0252 1.1085 -0.3507 
16 -0.23% -0.55% -0.22% -0.1108 0.9780 -1.7455 -0.0430 1.1026 -0.6021 
17 -0.40% -0.33% -0.61% -0.1399 0.8764 -2.4602 -0.0650 1.0944 -0.9178 
18 -0.21% -0.27% -0.83% -0.0416 1.0493 -0.6111 -0.0708 1.0891 -1.0048 
19 -0.22% -0.23% -1.05% -0.0495 1.1238 -0.6792 -0.0777 1.0608 -1.1324 
20 -0.28% -0.29% -1.33% -0.0808 1.1317 -1.0999 -0.0894 1.0784 -1.2805 
21 -0.41% -0.26% -1.73% -0.1438 1.0292 -2.1526 -0.1104 1.0847 -1.5727 
22 -0.14% -0.14% -1.87% -0.0160 0.8703 -0.2838 -0.1116 1.0713 -1.6090 
23 0.37% -0.20% -1.50% 0.0952 1.0049 1.4550 -0.0961 1.0787 -1.3762 
24 -0.24% -0.12% -1.74% -0.0645 1.1539 -0.8591 -0.1045 1.1083 -1.4572 
25 -0.35% -0.52% -2.10% -0.1407 1.0974 -1.9698 -0.1239 1.1000 -1.7407 
26 0.24% 0.05% -1.86% 0.0660 0.9801 1.0344 -0.1131 1.0890 -1.6044 
27 0.10% -0.08% -1.76% 0.0674 1.0136 1.0222 -0.1022 1.0922 -1.4466 
28 -0.15% -0.10% -1.91% -0.0419 0.8704 -0.7393 -0.1071 1.0969 -1.5090 
29 -0.09% -0.21% -2.00% -0.0366 0.9929 -0.5664 -0.1112 1.0887 -1.5779 
30 0.39% 0.16% -1.61% 0.1279 0.9777 2.0104 -0.0923 1.1052 -1.2910 
          
-1 to 1     1.04% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03812 0.2082 1.4789 2.1748 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5-33 
 
Table-A 5.31 Market Returns to Acquirers; FF-firms; (OLS, 209); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.07% -0.22% -0.07% -0.0113 0.9534 -0.1828 -0.0113 0.9534 -0.1828 
-19 -0.04% -0.17% -0.11% -0.0540 0.9392 -0.8850 -0.0462 0.9247 -0.7688 
-18 -0.19% -0.36% -0.30% -0.0749 1.0622 -1.0852 -0.0810 0.9799 -1.2715 
-17 0.34% 0.12% 0.04% 0.0987 1.1046 1.3747 -0.0208 0.9712 -0.3293 
-16 -0.24% -0.44% -0.20% -0.0562 0.9856 -0.8781 -0.0437 1.0209 -0.6592 
-15 -0.19% -0.25% -0.40% -0.0523 1.0996 -0.7326 -0.0613 1.0111 -0.9329 
-14 -0.32% -0.25% -0.71% -0.0615 1.1420 -0.8282 -0.0800 0.9788 -1.2574 
-13 0.30% 0.05% -0.41% 0.0871 1.3169 1.0176 -0.0440 1.1031 -0.6141 
-12 -0.21% -0.49% -0.62% -0.0678 0.9469 -1.1024 -0.0641 1.0318 -0.9563 
-11 -0.20% -0.35% -0.82% -0.0508 0.9840 -0.7940 -0.0769 1.0328 -1.1456 
-10 -0.16% -0.31% -0.97% -0.0494 1.0000 -0.7610 -0.0882 1.0288 -1.3195 
-9 0.47% 0.07% -0.51% 0.1160 1.1123 1.6049 -0.0510 1.0403 -0.7540 
-8 -0.12% -0.16% -0.62% -0.0456 1.0697 -0.6561 -0.0616 1.0541 -0.8997 
-7 0.27% -0.15% -0.35% 0.0700 0.9770 1.1032 -0.0407 1.0667 -0.5866 
-6 0.00% -0.08% -0.36% -0.0013 1.0211 -0.0190 -0.0396 1.0893 -0.5595 
-5 -0.03% -0.01% -0.38% 0.0079 1.0723 0.1137 -0.0364 1.0454 -0.5354 
-4 -0.10% -0.16% -0.48% -0.0409 0.9962 -0.6316 -0.0452 0.9933 -0.7003 
-3 -0.05% -0.33% -0.53% -0.0287 0.9117 -0.4837 -0.0507 1.0168 -0.7670 
-2 0.03% -0.21% -0.50% -0.0086 0.9226 -0.1440 -0.0513 1.0033 -0.7870 
-1 0.62% 0.03% 0.12% 0.1821 1.1216 2.4986 -0.0093 1.0470 -0.1366 
0 0.37% 0.05% 0.49% 0.1527 1.3151 1.7866 0.0242 1.0537 0.3542 
1 0.07% -0.09% 0.56% 0.0148 1.2289 0.1854 0.0268 1.0723 0.3853 
2 0.48% -0.10% 1.04% 0.1489 1.3839 1.6559 0.0573 1.0954 0.8051 
3 -0.15% -0.23% 0.90% -0.0427 1.0669 -0.6159 0.0474 1.0965 0.6651 
4 0.15% -0.08% 1.05% 0.0174 0.9401 0.2855 0.0499 1.1004 0.6981 
5 -0.21% -0.42% 0.84% -0.0436 0.9780 -0.6862 0.0404 1.0979 0.5662 
6 -0.43% -0.15% 0.40% -0.1217 1.0824 -1.7305 0.0162 1.1120 0.2244 
7 0.27% -0.06% 0.67% 0.0740 1.0026 1.1364 0.0299 1.1269 0.4086 
8 0.08% -0.15% 0.75% -0.0130 1.0579 -0.1896 0.0270 1.1299 0.3674 
9 -0.34% -0.54% 0.42% -0.0800 0.9811 -1.2555 0.0119 1.1394 0.1609 
10 0.11% -0.01% 0.53% 0.0627 1.0044 0.9601 0.0230 1.1573 0.3055 
11 -0.17% -0.15% 0.35% -0.0188 0.9130 -0.3171 0.0193 1.1881 0.2498 
12 0.09% -0.16% 0.44% 0.0194 0.9685 0.3090 0.0224 1.2042 0.2859 
13 0.43% -0.05% 0.87% 0.1221 0.9483 1.9811 0.0430 1.2150 0.5444 
14 -0.13% -0.13% 0.74% -0.0680 0.9107 -1.1490 0.0309 1.2080 0.3932 
15 -0.13% -0.17% 0.61% -0.0723 1.0730 -1.0368 0.0184 1.2226 0.2314 
16 -0.30% -0.45% 0.30% -0.1267 1.0089 -1.9321 -0.0027 1.1916 -0.0347 
17 -0.41% -0.31% -0.10% -0.1394 0.9156 -2.3438 -0.0253 1.1784 -0.3301 
18 -0.07% 0.00% -0.17% 0.0223 1.0866 0.3161 -0.0214 1.1729 -0.2805 
19 -0.21% -0.07% -0.39% -0.0578 1.1183 -0.7953 -0.0302 1.1366 -0.4095 
20 -0.35% -0.36% -0.73% -0.1091 1.2240 -1.3714 -0.0469 1.1427 -0.6317 
21 -0.35% -0.25% -1.08% -0.1100 1.0711 -1.5808 -0.0633 1.1353 -0.8584 
22 -0.23% 0.00% -1.31% -0.0460 0.8917 -0.7932 -0.0696 1.1064 -0.9680 
23 0.33% -0.17% -0.98% 0.0869 1.0127 1.3213 -0.0557 1.1008 -0.7785 
24 -0.15% -0.15% -1.12% -0.0344 1.1495 -0.4607 -0.0602 1.1220 -0.8256 
25 -0.36% -0.32% -1.49% -0.1447 1.0327 -2.1558 -0.0809 1.1064 -1.1248 
26 0.17% -0.09% -1.32% 0.0432 1.0004 0.6644 -0.0737 1.0925 -1.0382 
27 0.10% -0.24% -1.22% 0.0500 1.0138 0.7591 -0.0657 1.0946 -0.9239 
28 -0.21% -0.17% -1.43% -0.0477 0.8376 -0.8761 -0.0718 1.1035 -1.0020 
29 -0.20% -0.29% -1.64% -0.0548 0.9624 -0.8771 -0.0789 1.0904 -1.1133 
30 0.35% 0.03% -1.28% 0.1209 1.0156 1.8321 -0.0612 1.0931 -0.8613 
          
-1 to 1     1.06% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03771 0.2018 1.4560 2.1333 
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Table-A 5.32 Market Returns to Acquirers; FF-firms; (MM, 205); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.14% -0.07% 0.14% 0.2323 3.1934 1.0965 0.2323 3.1934 1.0965 
-19 0.06% -0.02% 0.20% -0.0419 1.1533 -0.5477 0.1346 2.3503 0.8635 
-18 -0.08% -0.18% 0.12% -0.1059 1.4174 -1.1260 0.0488 1.7715 0.4152 
-17 0.48% 0.21% 0.60% 0.2037 1.5115 2.0319 0.1441 1.7289 1.2566 
-16 -0.05% -0.30% 0.55% 0.0234 1.4215 0.2477 0.1393 1.6699 1.2580 
-15 -0.03% -0.08% 0.52% 0.0305 1.3508 0.3406 0.1397 1.6646 1.2649 
-14 -0.14% -0.21% 0.38% -0.0694 1.4080 -0.7428 0.1031 1.5322 1.0142 
-13 0.34% 0.12% 0.72% 0.1396 1.5513 1.3562 0.1458 1.5907 1.3815 
-12 -0.07% -0.29% 0.65% -0.0155 1.2877 -0.1809 0.1323 1.4720 1.3547 
-11 -0.09% -0.18% 0.56% -0.0359 1.1541 -0.4685 0.1141 1.4302 1.2033 
-10 -0.07% -0.14% 0.48% 0.0013 1.4885 0.0131 0.1092 1.5173 1.0852 
-9 0.68% 0.17% 1.17% 0.1738 1.5000 1.7467 0.1547 1.3861 1.6831 
-8 0.02% -0.01% 1.19% 0.0150 1.7279 0.1307 0.1528 1.5160 1.5198 
-7 0.44% 0.08% 1.63% 0.1087 1.7657 0.9284 0.1763 1.3849 1.9196 
-6 0.04% 0.02% 1.67% 0.0472 1.2239 0.5819 0.1825 1.3713 2.0068 
-5 0.22% 0.11% 1.89% 0.0872 1.2977 1.0134 0.1986 1.3102 2.2847 
-4 0.09% -0.02% 1.98% -0.1154 2.6579 -0.6543 0.1646 1.2286 2.0205 
-3 0.05% -0.17% 2.02% 0.0763 1.5372 0.7484 0.1780 1.2485 2.1493 
-2 0.14% -0.14% 2.17% -0.0252 1.5779 -0.2409 0.1675 1.2501 2.0196 
-1 0.77% 0.18% 2.93% 0.3794 2.2616 2.5288 0.2481 1.3702 2.7293 
0 0.50% 0.12% 3.43% 0.1520 1.9131 1.1982 0.2753 1.3545 3.0637 
1 0.17% 0.00% 3.60% 0.0729 1.8375 0.5982 0.2845 1.3270 3.2318 
2 0.60% 0.09% 4.19% 0.2829 2.4632 1.7313 0.3372 1.4633 3.4741 
3 -0.01% -0.07% 4.18% 0.0246 1.8800 0.1970 0.3351 1.3555 3.7273 
4 0.32% 0.03% 4.50% 0.0515 1.1432 0.6794 0.3386 1.3398 3.8106 
5 -0.06% -0.14% 4.45% 0.0817 1.6406 0.7509 0.3481 1.3778 3.8090 
6 -0.26% 0.00% 4.19% -0.0342 1.6339 -0.3155 0.3350 1.4339 3.5223 
7 0.29% 0.01% 4.47% 0.1201 2.3676 0.7650 0.3517 1.4941 3.5485 
8 0.25% -0.09% 4.73% 0.1247 1.4791 1.2711 0.3687 1.5716 3.5370 
9 -0.20% -0.24% 4.52% -0.1052 1.3710 -1.1566 0.3433 1.5125 3.4221 
10 0.23% 0.11% 4.75% 0.1623 1.6864 1.4511 0.3669 1.4917 3.7081 
11 -0.06% 0.05% 4.69% -0.0221 1.3334 -0.2496 0.3572 1.4461 3.7241 
12 0.25% -0.03% 4.94% 0.1088 1.2372 1.3259 0.3707 1.4843 3.7652 
13 0.64% 0.14% 5.58% 0.2259 1.2210 2.7891 0.4039 1.4806 4.1131 
14 0.00% 0.04% 5.58% -0.0131 1.1436 -0.1733 0.3959 1.5056 3.9643 
15 -0.05% -0.03% 5.53% -0.1433 1.7238 -1.2537 0.3665 1.4736 3.7494 
16 -0.13% -0.20% 5.40% -0.0189 1.3680 -0.2081 0.3584 1.5088 3.5811 
17 -0.24% -0.22% 5.16% -0.0507 1.3119 -0.5827 0.3454 1.5456 3.3694 
18 0.10% 0.21% 5.25% 0.1166 1.4575 1.2061 0.3596 1.6052 3.3776 
19 -0.05% 0.07% 5.21% -0.1088 1.7964 -0.9135 0.3379 1.5468 3.2933 
20 -0.10% 0.00% 5.11% -0.0023 1.6028 -0.0220 0.3334 1.5977 3.1459 
21 -0.17% -0.06% 4.94% -0.0491 2.0463 -0.3620 0.3218 1.6478 2.9444 
22 0.09% 0.20% 5.03% 0.1707 1.7067 1.5075 0.3441 1.6842 3.0800 
23 0.44% 0.06% 5.47% 0.1558 1.4324 1.6395 0.3636 1.6118 3.4011 
24 -0.01% -0.09% 5.46% 0.0918 1.8747 0.7385 0.3733 1.6970 3.3159 
25 -0.11% -0.19% 5.36% -0.0761 1.3036 -0.8802 0.3580 1.6496 3.2713 
26 0.41% 0.03% 5.76% 0.1390 1.2512 1.6754 0.3744 1.6162 3.4925 
27 0.27% -0.01% 6.04% 0.1318 1.2929 1.5366 0.3895 1.6389 3.5829 
28 -0.01% -0.08% 6.03% 0.0546 1.3093 0.6286 0.3933 1.6985 3.4909 
29 0.02% -0.14% 6.05% -0.0321 1.4789 -0.3277 0.3848 1.6543 3.5069 
30 0.50% 0.17% 6.55% 0.2388 1.2035 2.9916 0.4145 1.6934 3.6899 
          
-1 to 1     1.43% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03804 0.3489 1.8727 2.8089 
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Table-A 5.33 SW-1 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 233); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.02% -0.01% 0.02% 0.0287 0.9269 0.5102 0.0287 0.9269 0.5102 
-19 -0.03% -0.16% -0.01% -0.0374 0.9471 -0.6521 -0.0062 0.9219 -0.1110 
-18 -0.30% -0.50% -0.31% -0.1002 1.0191 -1.6230 -0.0629 0.9625 -1.0790 
-17 0.36% 0.09% 0.05% 0.1120 1.0966 1.6863 0.0015 0.9640 0.0262 
-16 -0.19% -0.42% -0.14% -0.0373 1.0022 -0.6141 -0.0153 1.0271 -0.2460 
-15 -0.20% -0.35% -0.33% -0.0556 1.0953 -0.8375 -0.0367 1.0321 -0.5863 
-14 -0.29% -0.27% -0.62% -0.0511 1.1382 -0.7416 -0.0533 0.9998 -0.8795 
-13 0.24% 0.04% -0.39% 0.0774 1.2875 0.9923 -0.0225 1.1212 -0.3307 
-12 -0.21% -0.43% -0.60% -0.0655 0.9498 -1.1378 -0.0430 1.0345 -0.6862 
-11 -0.26% -0.38% -0.86% -0.0755 0.9484 -1.3143 -0.0647 1.0309 -1.0356 
-10 -0.16% -0.25% -1.02% -0.0359 1.0126 -0.5849 -0.0725 1.0256 -1.1666 
-9 0.43% 0.09% -0.59% 0.1120 1.0895 1.6973 -0.0371 1.0410 -0.5876 
-8 -0.19% -0.16% -0.79% -0.0715 1.0267 -1.1495 -0.0554 1.0570 -0.8657 
-7 0.27% -0.09% -0.52% 0.0832 0.9694 1.4172 -0.0312 1.0777 -0.4775 
-6 0.02% -0.02% -0.49% 0.0090 1.0043 0.1485 -0.0278 1.1006 -0.4167 
-5 -0.03% -0.06% -0.53% -0.0045 1.0469 -0.0714 -0.0280 1.0551 -0.4386 
-4 -0.13% -0.26% -0.65% -0.0503 1.0143 -0.8189 -0.0394 1.0030 -0.6484 
-3 -0.12% -0.38% -0.77% -0.0449 0.9586 -0.7737 -0.0489 1.0142 -0.7956 
-2 0.05% -0.07% -0.72% 0.0080 0.9204 0.1442 -0.0457 0.9949 -0.7588 
-1 0.58% 0.13% -0.15% 0.1627 1.0916 2.4597 -0.0082 1.0351 -0.1308 
0 0.29% 0.02% 0.15% 0.1288 1.4499 1.4668 0.0201 1.0680 0.3108 
1 0.27% -0.05% 0.42% 0.0853 1.4979 0.9400 0.0378 1.0756 0.5806 
2 0.44% -0.09% 0.86% 0.1364 1.3470 1.6718 0.0655 1.0930 0.9885 
3 -0.12% -0.24% 0.74% -0.0295 1.1210 -0.4343 0.0581 1.0922 0.8773 
4 0.08% -0.15% 0.82% 0.0063 0.9346 0.1111 0.0581 1.0920 0.8788 
5 -0.22% -0.50% 0.60% -0.0521 0.9798 -0.8785 0.0468 1.0871 0.7103 
6 -0.37% -0.18% 0.23% -0.0961 1.0615 -1.4942 0.0274 1.0977 0.4122 
7 0.33% -0.10% 0.56% 0.0985 0.9963 1.6322 0.0455 1.1132 0.6753 
8 0.05% -0.23% 0.61% -0.0348 1.0219 -0.5616 0.0383 1.1147 0.5670 
9 -0.24% -0.45% 0.37% -0.0531 0.9920 -0.8839 0.0279 1.1209 0.4116 
10 0.06% -0.10% 0.43% 0.0450 0.9980 0.7441 0.0356 1.1391 0.5155 
11 -0.15% -0.20% 0.28% -0.0270 0.9193 -0.4840 0.0302 1.1638 0.4290 
12 -0.01% -0.26% 0.27% -0.0170 0.9675 -0.2904 0.0268 1.1800 0.3752 
13 0.36% -0.07% 0.63% 0.0980 0.9181 1.7618 0.0432 1.1884 0.6005 
14 -0.13% -0.07% 0.50% -0.0628 0.8688 -1.1939 0.0320 1.1782 0.4481 
15 -0.24% -0.30% 0.26% -0.1076 1.0721 -1.6569 0.0136 1.1947 0.1880 
16 -0.22% -0.29% 0.04% -0.0959 1.0352 -1.5290 -0.0023 1.1727 -0.0330 
17 -0.40% -0.30% -0.36% -0.1358 0.8970 -2.4985 -0.0243 1.1606 -0.3462 
18 -0.14% -0.01% -0.50% -0.0235 1.0894 -0.3562 -0.0278 1.1472 -0.3998 
19 -0.20% -0.15% -0.71% -0.0604 1.0912 -0.9132 -0.0370 1.1120 -0.5490 
20 -0.36% -0.26% -1.06% -0.1058 1.2108 -1.4421 -0.0531 1.1206 -0.7815 
21 -0.17% -0.26% -1.24% -0.0439 1.0974 -0.6607 -0.0592 1.1144 -0.8768 
22 -0.32% -0.14% -1.56% -0.0801 0.8840 -1.4953 -0.0707 1.0869 -1.0739 
23 0.25% -0.17% -1.31% 0.0606 0.9893 1.0107 -0.0608 1.0798 -0.9290 
24 -0.17% -0.17% -1.48% -0.0279 1.1199 -0.4107 -0.0642 1.0953 -0.9682 
25 -0.29% -0.31% -1.77% -0.1047 1.0426 -1.6575 -0.0790 1.0876 -1.1987 
26 0.18% -0.10% -1.59% 0.0500 1.0027 0.8237 -0.0708 1.0708 -1.0920 
27 0.11% -0.21% -1.48% 0.0449 1.0459 0.7092 -0.0636 1.0708 -0.9806 
28 -0.17% -0.23% -1.65% -0.0232 0.8606 -0.4448 -0.0663 1.0808 -1.0121 
29 -0.15% -0.35% -1.80% -0.0225 0.9864 -0.3770 -0.0688 1.0673 -1.0640 
30 0.25% -0.01% -1.54% 0.0739 1.0338 1.1796 -0.0578 1.0734 -0.8884 
          
-1 to 1     1.14% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04221 0.2175 1.4235 2.5227 
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Table-A 5.34 SW-2 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 233); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% 0.07% 0.01% 0.0287 0.9196 0.5091 0.0287 0.9196 0.5091 
-19 -0.06% -0.22% -0.05% -0.0433 0.9505 -0.7420 -0.0103 0.9165 -0.1829 
-18 -0.27% -0.48% -0.32% -0.0937 1.0278 -1.4849 -0.0625 0.9630 -1.0572 
-17 0.38% 0.20% 0.06% 0.1190 1.0928 1.7746 0.0054 0.9599 0.0917 
-16 -0.22% -0.44% -0.16% -0.0479 0.9976 -0.7818 -0.0166 1.0204 -0.2646 
-15 -0.20% -0.25% -0.36% -0.0560 1.1059 -0.8244 -0.0380 1.0235 -0.6045 
-14 -0.34% -0.28% -0.70% -0.0649 1.1550 -0.9160 -0.0597 1.0022 -0.9705 
-13 0.19% -0.07% -0.51% 0.0636 1.2929 0.8013 -0.0334 1.1275 -0.4821 
-12 -0.21% -0.37% -0.73% -0.0656 0.9559 -1.1180 -0.0533 1.0328 -0.8411 
-11 -0.28% -0.36% -1.00% -0.0777 0.9481 -1.3357 -0.0752 1.0258 -1.1939 
-10 -0.19% -0.37% -1.19% -0.0444 1.0189 -0.7101 -0.0851 1.0174 -1.3621 
-9 0.41% 0.11% -0.77% 0.1093 1.0911 1.6325 -0.0499 1.0324 -0.7871 
-8 -0.21% -0.11% -0.98% -0.0733 1.0253 -1.1651 -0.0683 1.0502 -1.0589 
-7 0.27% -0.12% -0.71% 0.0856 0.9724 1.4344 -0.0429 1.0715 -0.6522 
-6 0.02% -0.05% -0.68% 0.0100 1.0129 0.1613 -0.0388 1.0984 -0.5762 
-5 -0.01% -0.01% -0.69% 0.0015 1.0427 0.0236 -0.0372 1.0559 -0.5746 
-4 -0.12% -0.28% -0.82% -0.0504 1.0184 -0.8070 -0.0484 1.0066 -0.7827 
-3 -0.13% -0.38% -0.94% -0.0471 0.9616 -0.7974 -0.0581 1.0190 -0.9288 
-2 0.08% -0.03% -0.87% 0.0172 0.9284 0.3015 -0.0526 0.9978 -0.8589 
-1 0.58% 0.13% -0.29% 0.1601 1.0867 2.4006 -0.0155 1.0381 -0.2427 
0 0.32% 0.08% 0.02% 0.1389 1.4455 1.5657 0.0152 1.0712 0.2315 
1 0.27% -0.16% 0.30% 0.0833 1.5004 0.9051 0.0326 1.0773 0.4937 
2 0.47% 0.02% 0.77% 0.1447 1.3474 1.7492 0.0621 1.0947 0.9241 
3 -0.06% -0.25% 0.71% -0.0178 1.1260 -0.2573 0.0572 1.0942 0.8510 
4 0.09% -0.12% 0.80% 0.0086 0.9392 0.1493 0.0577 1.0951 0.8587 
5 -0.21% -0.50% 0.59% -0.0453 0.9893 -0.7455 0.0477 1.0922 0.7119 
6 -0.34% -0.17% 0.24% -0.0907 1.0675 -1.3838 0.0294 1.1015 0.4346 
7 0.31% -0.12% 0.55% 0.0939 0.9867 1.5509 0.0466 1.1183 0.6789 
8 0.02% -0.21% 0.57% -0.0446 1.0278 -0.7076 0.0375 1.1194 0.5458 
9 -0.23% -0.38% 0.34% -0.0490 0.9943 -0.8025 0.0279 1.1239 0.4049 
10 0.03% -0.19% 0.37% 0.0407 1.0135 0.6540 0.0348 1.1426 0.4960 
11 -0.11% -0.21% 0.26% -0.0150 0.9161 -0.2670 0.0316 1.1643 0.4420 
12 0.01% -0.24% 0.27% -0.0129 0.9631 -0.2183 0.0289 1.1803 0.3983 
13 0.37% -0.07% 0.64% 0.1004 0.9329 1.7540 0.0456 1.1896 0.6252 
14 -0.13% -0.02% 0.51% -0.0627 0.8703 -1.1737 0.0344 1.1825 0.4739 
15 -0.25% -0.28% 0.26% -0.1098 1.0785 -1.6580 0.0156 1.1958 0.2129 
16 -0.19% -0.29% 0.07% -0.0861 1.0333 -1.3569 0.0013 1.1724 0.0175 
17 -0.43% -0.30% -0.36% -0.1401 0.8960 -2.5467 -0.0215 1.1607 -0.3015 
18 -0.16% -0.05% -0.52% -0.0302 1.0997 -0.4479 -0.0260 1.1496 -0.3691 
19 -0.21% -0.21% -0.74% -0.0620 1.0972 -0.9202 -0.0355 1.1178 -0.5176 
20 -0.38% -0.22% -1.11% -0.1107 1.2324 -1.4631 -0.0524 1.1251 -0.7582 
21 -0.17% -0.25% -1.29% -0.0436 1.0985 -0.6471 -0.0585 1.1183 -0.8518 
22 -0.35% -0.16% -1.63% -0.0832 0.8937 -1.5170 -0.0705 1.0917 -1.0517 
23 0.24% -0.16% -1.39% 0.0578 0.9915 0.9502 -0.0609 1.0862 -0.9142 
24 -0.16% -0.12% -1.56% -0.0275 1.1266 -0.3971 -0.0644 1.1007 -0.9527 
25 -0.34% -0.32% -1.90% -0.1189 1.0577 -1.8322 -0.0812 1.0930 -1.2103 
26 0.17% -0.19% -1.73% 0.0454 1.0051 0.7363 -0.0737 1.0727 -1.1194 
27 0.11% -0.11% -1.63% 0.0415 1.0464 0.6467 -0.0669 1.0691 -1.0201 
28 -0.15% -0.13% -1.77% -0.0185 0.8584 -0.3507 -0.0689 1.0785 -1.0407 
29 -0.14% -0.36% -1.91% -0.0209 0.9912 -0.3437 -0.0712 1.0628 -1.0908 
30 0.25% 0.02% -1.66% 0.0742 1.0467 1.1555 -0.0601 1.0665 -0.9175 
          
-1 to 1     1.16% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04223 0.2208 1.4130 2.5456 
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Table-A 5.35 SW-3 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 233); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.03% -0.05% 0.03% 0.0322 0.9071 0.5795 0.0322 0.9071 0.5795 
-19 -0.04% -0.18% -0.01% -0.0358 0.9467 -0.6182 -0.0026 0.9067 -0.0464 
-18 -0.23% -0.43% -0.24% -0.0834 1.0259 -1.3273 -0.0503 0.9512 -0.8626 
-17 0.36% 0.13% 0.12% 0.1099 1.0873 1.6502 0.0114 0.9470 0.1970 
-16 -0.23% -0.41% -0.12% -0.0527 0.9793 -0.8785 -0.0133 0.9971 -0.2185 
-15 -0.19% -0.22% -0.31% -0.0542 1.1070 -0.7998 -0.0343 1.0056 -0.5572 
-14 -0.32% -0.24% -0.63% -0.0571 1.1452 -0.8138 -0.0534 0.9888 -0.8809 
-13 0.19% 0.03% -0.44% 0.0645 1.2999 0.8095 -0.0271 1.1145 -0.3972 
-12 -0.22% -0.38% -0.66% -0.0659 0.9627 -1.1169 -0.0475 1.0283 -0.7545 
-11 -0.28% -0.32% -0.94% -0.0800 0.9476 -1.3777 -0.0704 1.0220 -1.1241 
-10 -0.19% -0.42% -1.13% -0.0499 1.0061 -0.8094 -0.0821 1.0125 -1.3244 
-9 0.40% 0.05% -0.74% 0.0981 1.0967 1.4608 -0.0503 1.0247 -0.8016 
-8 -0.19% -0.15% -0.92% -0.0702 1.0217 -1.1211 -0.0678 1.0419 -1.0624 
-7 0.28% -0.07% -0.64% 0.0862 0.9806 1.4359 -0.0423 1.0625 -0.6496 
-6 0.04% -0.06% -0.60% 0.0134 1.0176 0.2157 -0.0374 1.0902 -0.5597 
-5 0.04% 0.01% -0.57% 0.0138 1.0526 0.2136 -0.0327 1.0507 -0.5088 
-4 -0.11% -0.35% -0.68% -0.0477 1.0200 -0.7633 -0.0433 1.0017 -0.7063 
-3 -0.11% -0.36% -0.79% -0.0411 0.9541 -0.7038 -0.0518 1.0131 -0.8349 
-2 0.08% -0.07% -0.71% 0.0151 0.9193 0.2689 -0.0470 0.9893 -0.7749 
-1 0.61% 0.13% -0.10% 0.1681 1.0879 2.5222 -0.0082 1.0303 -0.1296 
0 0.29% 0.05% 0.19% 0.1309 1.4631 1.4604 0.0206 1.0709 0.3137 
1 0.25% -0.11% 0.43% 0.0731 1.4948 0.7981 0.0357 1.0778 0.5405 
2 0.49% 0.04% 0.93% 0.1488 1.3369 1.8175 0.0659 1.0917 0.9860 
3 -0.07% -0.24% 0.86% -0.0241 1.1333 -0.3474 0.0596 1.0871 0.8953 
4 0.11% -0.10% 0.97% 0.0132 0.9377 0.2295 0.0611 1.0856 0.9181 
5 -0.22% -0.50% 0.76% -0.0489 0.9936 -0.8031 0.0503 1.0802 0.7599 
6 -0.34% -0.15% 0.42% -0.0899 1.0528 -1.3943 0.0320 1.0883 0.4806 
7 0.32% -0.13% 0.74% 0.0966 0.9806 1.6076 0.0497 1.1044 0.7348 
8 0.01% -0.22% 0.74% -0.0498 1.0346 -0.7855 0.0396 1.1061 0.5845 
9 -0.23% -0.34% 0.51% -0.0468 1.0019 -0.7630 0.0304 1.1100 0.4469 
10 0.02% -0.09% 0.53% 0.0384 1.0245 0.6121 0.0368 1.1283 0.5323 
11 -0.10% -0.21% 0.43% -0.0132 0.9251 -0.2336 0.0339 1.1483 0.4816 
12 0.02% -0.26% 0.45% -0.0146 0.9724 -0.2447 0.0308 1.1653 0.4318 
13 0.37% -0.04% 0.82% 0.0925 0.9264 1.6303 0.0462 1.1785 0.6403 
14 -0.10% -0.05% 0.71% -0.0573 0.8748 -1.0695 0.0359 1.1718 0.4998 
15 -0.25% -0.21% 0.46% -0.1083 1.0767 -1.6420 0.0173 1.1817 0.2393 
16 -0.17% -0.26% 0.29% -0.0818 1.0174 -1.3129 0.0036 1.1564 0.0513 
17 -0.44% -0.29% -0.15% -0.1417 0.8929 -2.5899 -0.0194 1.1424 -0.2771 
18 -0.17% -0.12% -0.32% -0.0375 1.1019 -0.5559 -0.0251 1.1339 -0.3621 
19 -0.21% -0.16% -0.54% -0.0597 1.0970 -0.8884 -0.0343 1.1040 -0.5068 
20 -0.36% -0.19% -0.89% -0.1079 1.2330 -1.4287 -0.0507 1.1096 -0.7460 
21 -0.16% -0.26% -1.05% -0.0414 1.1009 -0.6135 -0.0565 1.1056 -0.8340 
22 -0.34% -0.20% -1.39% -0.0842 0.8916 -1.5421 -0.0687 1.0762 -1.0416 
23 0.24% -0.11% -1.16% 0.0554 1.0103 0.8952 -0.0595 1.0702 -0.9081 
24 -0.18% -0.09% -1.34% -0.0344 1.1288 -0.4970 -0.0640 1.0837 -0.9639 
25 -0.33% -0.33% -1.67% -0.1136 1.0569 -1.7541 -0.0800 1.0749 -1.2154 
26 0.15% -0.21% -1.52% 0.0401 1.0056 0.6504 -0.0733 1.0547 -1.1351 
27 0.17% -0.09% -1.35% 0.0515 1.0431 0.8060 -0.0651 1.0500 -1.0126 
28 -0.14% -0.17% -1.49% -0.0162 0.8631 -0.3073 -0.0668 1.0593 -1.0292 
29 -0.16% -0.29% -1.65% -0.0235 0.9895 -0.3870 -0.0694 1.0446 -1.0850 
30 0.30% 0.07% -1.35% 0.0888 1.0560 1.3731 -0.0563 1.0470 -0.8780 
          
-1 to 1     1.14% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04359 0.2148 1.4187 2.4717 
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Table-A 5.36 Market Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 194); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.07% -0.13% -0.07% -0.0047 0.9785 -0.0740 -0.0047 0.9785 -0.0740 
-19 -0.05% -0.28% -0.12% -0.0613 0.8924 -1.0485 -0.0467 0.9200 -0.7748 
-18 -0.22% -0.52% -0.34% -0.0988 1.0232 -1.4739 -0.0952 0.9436 -1.5396 
-17 0.37% -0.06% 0.03% 0.1076 1.0944 1.5006 -0.0286 0.9440 -0.4629 
-16 -0.29% -0.37% -0.26% -0.0608 0.9647 -0.9627 -0.0528 1.0133 -0.7956 
-15 -0.10% -0.22% -0.36% -0.0079 1.0683 -0.1135 -0.0514 1.0310 -0.7618 
-14 -0.43% -0.35% -0.79% -0.0838 1.1068 -1.1561 -0.0793 1.0043 -1.2056 
-13 -0.06% -0.07% -0.86% -0.0342 1.2025 -0.4344 -0.0863 1.0832 -1.2161 
-12 -0.45% -0.43% -1.31% -0.1159 0.8949 -1.9773 -0.1200 1.0135 -1.8074 
-11 -0.37% -0.28% -1.68% -0.1018 0.9663 -1.6086 -0.1460 0.9979 -2.2339 
-10 -0.24% -0.46% -1.91% -0.0569 1.0112 -0.8589 -0.1564 0.9849 -2.4241 
-9 0.52% 0.00% -1.39% 0.1266 1.1330 1.7056 -0.1132 1.0165 -1.6999 
-8 -0.07% -0.26% -1.46% -0.0367 0.9282 -0.6036 -0.1189 1.0172 -1.7849 
-7 0.23% -0.26% -1.24% 0.0505 0.9887 0.7796 -0.1011 1.0443 -1.4781 
-6 -0.12% -0.19% -1.36% -0.0492 0.9044 -0.8303 -0.1104 1.0639 -1.5838 
-5 0.05% -0.19% -1.31% 0.0185 0.9603 0.2943 -0.1022 1.0358 -1.5070 
-4 -0.16% -0.44% -1.47% -0.0492 0.9835 -0.7632 -0.1111 1.0032 -1.6909 
-3 -0.12% -0.32% -1.59% -0.0460 0.9229 -0.7612 -0.1188 1.0082 -1.7995 
-2 0.05% -0.21% -1.54% 0.0000 0.9071 0.0006 -0.1157 0.9820 -1.7980 
-1 0.56% 0.10% -0.98% 0.1715 1.0661 2.4561 -0.0744 1.0047 -1.1301 
0 0.54% -0.05% -0.44% 0.2072 1.3827 2.2878 -0.0274 1.0113 -0.4131 
1 0.24% -0.18% -0.20% 0.0509 1.3099 0.5933 -0.0159 1.0358 -0.2341 
2 0.17% -0.24% -0.03% 0.0707 1.3815 0.7814 -0.0008 1.0692 -0.0113 
3 -0.17% -0.27% -0.20% -0.0544 1.0659 -0.7798 -0.0119 1.0509 -0.1727 
4 0.13% -0.10% -0.06% 0.0178 0.9512 0.2862 -0.0081 1.0599 -0.1164 
5 -0.23% -0.36% -0.30% -0.0456 0.9881 -0.7049 -0.0169 1.0500 -0.2453 
6 -0.50% -0.36% -0.80% -0.1318 1.0839 -1.8562 -0.0419 1.0590 -0.6043 
7 0.22% -0.12% -0.57% 0.0625 0.9742 0.9796 -0.0293 1.0645 -0.4209 
8 0.09% -0.23% -0.48% -0.0182 1.0345 -0.2686 -0.0322 1.0682 -0.4605 
9 -0.42% -0.55% -0.90% -0.1235 0.9478 -1.9886 -0.0542 1.0734 -0.7711 
10 0.01% -0.02% -0.89% 0.0217 1.0340 0.3210 -0.0494 1.0822 -0.6973 
11 -0.30% -0.11% -1.19% -0.0634 0.8634 -1.1202 -0.0599 1.0871 -0.8405 
12 0.05% -0.11% -1.14% -0.0003 0.8932 -0.0052 -0.0590 1.0939 -0.8233 
13 0.35% 0.00% -0.78% 0.0957 0.9093 1.6062 -0.0417 1.0988 -0.5795 
14 -0.20% -0.21% -0.99% -0.0779 0.8730 -1.3620 -0.0543 1.0961 -0.7560 
15 -0.17% -0.24% -1.16% -0.0921 1.0604 -1.3259 -0.0689 1.0956 -0.9596 
16 0.00% -0.33% -1.16% -0.0300 1.0186 -0.4492 -0.0729 1.0884 -1.0219 
17 -0.34% -0.44% -1.51% -0.1316 0.8984 -2.2364 -0.0932 1.0872 -1.3092 
18 -0.13% -0.07% -1.64% 0.0019 1.0706 0.0264 -0.0917 1.0825 -1.2939 
19 -0.05% -0.12% -1.70% 0.0089 1.1135 0.1214 -0.0892 1.0519 -1.2943 
20 -0.22% -0.30% -1.92% -0.0725 1.1912 -0.9291 -0.0994 1.0665 -1.4230 
21 -0.20% -0.32% -2.12% -0.0739 1.0244 -1.1008 -0.1096 1.0603 -1.5783 
22 -0.20% -0.14% -2.32% -0.0348 0.8676 -0.6124 -0.1136 1.0534 -1.6470 
23 0.25% -0.09% -2.07% 0.0615 1.0137 0.9257 -0.1031 1.0525 -1.4952 
24 -0.12% -0.27% -2.19% -0.0154 1.1306 -0.2073 -0.1042 1.0814 -1.4712 
25 -0.21% -0.35% -2.40% -0.0940 1.0211 -1.4059 -0.1169 1.0766 -1.6583 
26 0.38% -0.15% -2.01% 0.1075 1.0185 1.6120 -0.1000 1.0729 -1.4230 
27 0.06% -0.18% -1.95% 0.0502 1.0017 0.7655 -0.0917 1.0793 -1.2971 
28 -0.20% -0.14% -2.15% -0.0407 0.8459 -0.7345 -0.0966 1.0840 -1.3602 
29 -0.13% -0.32% -2.28% -0.0227 0.9571 -0.3621 -0.0988 1.0703 -1.4096 
30 0.44% 0.08% -1.83% 0.1341 0.9521 2.1499 -0.0791 1.0768 -1.1210 
          
-1 to 1     1.34% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03659 0.2480 1.4658 2.5835 
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Table-A 5.37 Market Returns to Acquirers; EWI-firms; (OLS, 194); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% -0.17% 0.01% 0.0234 0.9726 0.3665 0.0234 0.9726 0.3665 
-19 -0.07% -0.18% -0.06% -0.0569 0.8821 -0.9823 -0.0237 0.9052 -0.3984 
-18 -0.30% -0.48% -0.36% -0.1191 1.0631 -1.7057 -0.0881 0.9677 -1.3862 
-17 0.38% 0.13% 0.01% 0.1074 1.0739 1.5220 -0.0226 0.9523 -0.3617 
-16 -0.30% -0.43% -0.29% -0.0710 0.9464 -1.1421 -0.0520 1.0118 -0.7822 
-15 -0.07% -0.17% -0.36% -0.0033 1.0688 -0.0470 -0.0488 1.0038 -0.7402 
-14 -0.40% -0.34% -0.76% -0.0824 1.1212 -1.1193 -0.0763 0.9659 -1.2032 
-13 0.06% 0.01% -0.70% 0.0013 1.2276 0.0165 -0.0709 1.0800 -1.0000 
-12 -0.41% -0.48% -1.11% -0.0901 0.9170 -1.4960 -0.0969 0.9932 -1.4855 
-11 -0.39% -0.38% -1.50% -0.1016 0.9724 -1.5910 -0.1241 0.9783 -1.9310 
-10 -0.21% -0.43% -1.71% -0.0553 1.0371 -0.8121 -0.1350 0.9633 -2.1333 
-9 0.57% 0.07% -1.14% 0.1405 1.1098 1.9271 -0.0887 0.9890 -1.3651 
-8 -0.16% -0.24% -1.30% -0.0731 0.9429 -1.1802 -0.1055 0.9914 -1.6197 
-7 0.28% -0.17% -1.02% 0.0634 0.9734 0.9915 -0.0847 1.0114 -1.2750 
-6 -0.10% -0.12% -1.11% -0.0353 0.9028 -0.5950 -0.0909 1.0331 -1.3401 
-5 0.07% -0.05% -1.04% 0.0186 0.9762 0.2901 -0.0834 1.0061 -1.2620 
-4 -0.13% -0.26% -1.18% -0.0372 0.9927 -0.5709 -0.0899 0.9686 -1.4136 
-3 -0.15% -0.34% -1.32% -0.0619 0.9338 -1.0088 -0.1020 0.9875 -1.5724 
-2 0.04% -0.19% -1.29% -0.0060 0.9054 -0.1004 -0.1006 0.9557 -1.6032 
-1 0.57% -0.04% -0.72% 0.1693 1.0898 2.3646 -0.0602 0.9837 -0.9323 
0 0.45% -0.07% -0.27% 0.1744 1.3362 1.9876 -0.0207 0.9914 -0.3182 
1 0.21% -0.13% -0.06% 0.0433 1.3015 0.5065 -0.0110 1.0232 -0.1639 
2 0.19% -0.18% 0.13% 0.0732 1.3659 0.8157 0.0045 1.0454 0.0653 
3 -0.15% -0.24% -0.02% -0.0411 1.0573 -0.5922 -0.0040 1.0268 -0.0593 
4 0.19% -0.06% 0.17% 0.0388 0.9527 0.6207 0.0038 1.0334 0.0567 
5 -0.28% -0.46% -0.11% -0.0600 0.9512 -0.9607 -0.0080 1.0231 -0.1190 
6 -0.52% -0.32% -0.64% -0.1359 1.0769 -1.9214 -0.0340 1.0402 -0.4977 
7 0.19% -0.10% -0.45% 0.0546 0.9610 0.8643 -0.0231 1.0535 -0.3335 
8 0.13% -0.12% -0.32% -0.0072 1.0529 -0.1048 -0.0240 1.0611 -0.3447 
9 -0.37% -0.53% -0.69% -0.1010 0.9708 -1.5845 -0.0421 1.0709 -0.5981 
10 0.09% 0.01% -0.60% 0.0451 0.9779 0.7020 -0.0333 1.0750 -0.4714 
11 -0.33% -0.20% -0.93% -0.0743 0.8515 -1.3293 -0.0459 1.0823 -0.6457 
12 0.08% -0.17% -0.85% 0.0097 0.8978 0.1641 -0.0435 1.0922 -0.6066 
13 0.40% -0.09% -0.45% 0.1120 0.9190 1.8551 -0.0237 1.0990 -0.3279 
14 -0.20% -0.20% -0.65% -0.0753 0.8592 -1.3348 -0.0361 1.0950 -0.5014 
15 -0.13% -0.19% -0.78% -0.0738 1.0477 -1.0730 -0.0479 1.0963 -0.6647 
16 -0.06% -0.37% -0.84% -0.0414 1.0180 -0.6184 -0.0540 1.0886 -0.7554 
17 -0.33% -0.31% -1.16% -0.1176 0.9148 -1.9572 -0.0724 1.0861 -1.0145 
18 -0.12% 0.09% -1.28% 0.0038 1.0678 0.0543 -0.0708 1.0827 -0.9960 
19 -0.06% -0.02% -1.33% 0.0000 1.1001 -0.0004 -0.0699 1.0505 -1.0137 
20 -0.26% -0.24% -1.60% -0.0807 1.2162 -1.0097 -0.0817 1.0698 -1.1624 
21 -0.24% -0.39% -1.84% -0.0870 1.0464 -1.2657 -0.0941 1.0667 -1.3435 
22 -0.18% -0.08% -2.02% -0.0258 0.8598 -0.4564 -0.0970 1.0552 -1.3989 
23 0.26% -0.16% -1.76% 0.0697 1.0181 1.0419 -0.0853 1.0528 -1.2342 
24 -0.10% -0.15% -1.86% -0.0126 1.1374 -0.1692 -0.0863 1.0830 -1.2128 
25 -0.22% -0.30% -2.08% -0.1016 1.0125 -1.5282 -0.1003 1.0799 -1.4143 
26 0.33% -0.04% -1.75% 0.0908 1.0047 1.3753 -0.0860 1.0770 -1.2158 
27 0.07% -0.26% -1.68% 0.0533 0.9898 0.8196 -0.0774 1.0847 -1.0865 
28 -0.19% -0.22% -1.88% -0.0432 0.8414 -0.7817 -0.0828 1.0944 -1.1517 
29 -0.13% -0.37% -2.00% -0.0252 0.9634 -0.3989 -0.0855 1.0786 -1.2073 
30 0.41% -0.01% -1.59% 0.1153 0.9472 1.8526 -0.0685 1.0864 -0.9606 
          
-1 to 1     1.23% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03678 0.2234 1.4696 2.3147 
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Table-A 5.38 Market Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 193); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.17% 0.05% 0.17% 0.2550 3.2889 0.9775 0.2550 3.2889 0.9775 
-19 0.07% -0.10% 0.24% -0.0261 1.0487 -0.3139 0.1618 2.3892 0.8540 
-18 -0.06% -0.32% 0.18% -0.1129 1.4107 -1.0088 0.0670 1.7859 0.4728 
-17 0.54% 0.19% 0.72% 0.2247 1.4813 1.9123 0.1703 1.7433 1.2319 
-16 -0.10% -0.19% 0.62% 0.0042 1.3550 0.0387 0.1542 1.6823 1.1558 
-15 0.05% -0.14% 0.67% 0.0749 1.2918 0.7307 0.1713 1.6819 1.2844 
-14 -0.24% -0.21% 0.43% -0.0805 1.3503 -0.7516 0.1282 1.5251 1.0598 
-13 0.13% 0.11% 0.56% 0.0337 1.5132 0.2812 0.1319 1.5899 1.0456 
-12 -0.28% -0.29% 0.28% -0.0710 1.2188 -0.7342 0.1007 1.4491 0.8758 
-11 -0.18% -0.12% 0.11% -0.0608 1.1211 -0.6834 0.0763 1.4108 0.6816 
-10 -0.07% -0.21% 0.04% 0.0267 1.5196 0.2215 0.0808 1.5142 0.6726 
-9 0.71% 0.09% 0.75% 0.1787 1.4953 1.5064 0.1289 1.4053 1.1565 
-8 0.11% -0.11% 0.86% 0.0654 1.4133 0.5837 0.1420 1.4864 1.2044 
-7 0.42% 0.04% 1.28% 0.0898 1.7941 0.6312 0.1608 1.3489 1.5033 
-6 0.02% -0.05% 1.31% 0.0250 1.0772 0.2929 0.1618 1.3639 1.4961 
-5 0.24% -0.04% 1.54% 0.0645 1.2063 0.6743 0.1728 1.3033 1.6719 
-4 0.02% -0.20% 1.56% -0.1285 2.7268 -0.5942 0.1365 1.2258 1.4041 
-3 0.02% -0.25% 1.59% 0.0845 1.5613 0.6825 0.1526 1.2378 1.5542 
-2 0.23% -0.06% 1.81% 0.0099 1.6004 0.0782 0.1508 1.2332 1.5416 
-1 0.80% 0.28% 2.61% 0.4221 2.2492 2.3662 0.2414 1.3294 2.2889 
0 0.69% 0.14% 3.30% 0.2257 1.9787 1.4384 0.2848 1.3121 2.7367 
1 0.34% -0.03% 3.64% 0.1213 1.9202 0.7963 0.3041 1.2863 2.9809 
2 0.33% 0.04% 3.97% 0.2001 2.4767 1.0187 0.3391 1.4708 2.9072 
3 0.03% -0.11% 3.99% 0.0471 1.9171 0.3095 0.3416 1.3529 3.1836 
4 0.36% 0.01% 4.36% 0.0726 1.1523 0.7943 0.3492 1.3434 3.2776 
5 -0.06% -0.20% 4.29% 0.0920 1.6745 0.6927 0.3605 1.3811 3.2908 
6 -0.28% -0.18% 4.02% -0.0303 1.6447 -0.2320 0.3479 1.4514 3.0225 
7 0.34% 0.10% 4.35% 0.1305 2.3936 0.6872 0.3663 1.5274 3.0237 
8 0.28% 0.00% 4.63% 0.1383 1.4484 1.2039 0.3856 1.6017 3.0356 
9 -0.25% -0.32% 4.38% -0.1388 1.3447 -1.3015 0.3538 1.5374 2.9014 
10 0.18% 0.09% 4.56% 0.1513 1.7463 1.0926 0.3752 1.5155 3.1216 
11 -0.12% -0.03% 4.44% -0.0487 1.3130 -0.4678 0.3607 1.4488 3.1389 
12 0.30% 0.02% 4.74% 0.1327 1.2150 1.3767 0.3783 1.4815 3.2195 
13 0.53% 0.11% 5.27% 0.2005 1.1771 2.1471 0.4071 1.4652 3.5029 
14 -0.04% 0.00% 5.23% -0.0121 1.0747 -0.1416 0.3992 1.4900 3.3776 
15 -0.01% -0.03% 5.23% -0.1313 1.7464 -0.9482 0.3717 1.4528 3.2258 
16 0.09% -0.16% 5.31% 0.0725 1.4323 0.6386 0.3786 1.4901 3.2032 
17 -0.18% -0.38% 5.14% -0.0352 1.2996 -0.3419 0.3678 1.5393 3.0127 
18 0.08% 0.19% 5.22% 0.1287 1.4870 1.0909 0.3837 1.6058 3.0125 
19 0.09% 0.04% 5.31% -0.0212 1.7420 -0.1536 0.3755 1.5237 3.1072 
20 -0.06% -0.06% 5.26% 0.0225 1.5884 0.1788 0.3744 1.5674 3.0119 
21 -0.04% -0.19% 5.22% -0.0027 2.0618 -0.0165 0.3695 1.6097 2.8943 
22 0.07% 0.17% 5.29% 0.1602 1.7468 1.1560 0.3896 1.6600 2.9592 
23 0.36% -0.01% 5.65% 0.1224 1.4193 1.0872 0.4036 1.5891 3.2023 
24 -0.01% -0.22% 5.63% 0.1047 1.8875 0.6995 0.4147 1.6826 3.1075 
25 0.00% -0.16% 5.63% -0.0370 1.3263 -0.3516 0.4047 1.6327 3.1255 
26 0.58% 0.10% 6.21% 0.2012 1.3006 1.9501 0.4297 1.5972 3.3924 
27 0.23% 0.00% 6.44% 0.1326 1.2402 1.3483 0.4444 1.6123 3.4750 
28 -0.05% -0.01% 6.39% 0.0541 1.3498 0.5050 0.4475 1.6743 3.3703 
29 0.10% -0.10% 6.49% 0.0026 1.4925 0.0219 0.4434 1.6302 3.4294 
30 0.56% 0.21% 7.05% 0.2607 1.2122 2.7118 0.4756 1.6637 3.6039 
          
-1 to 1     1.83% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03707 0.4440 1.8669 2.9988 
 
 
 
  
  
5-41 
 
Table-A 5.39 Market Returns to Acquirers; EWI-firms; (MM, 193); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.26% -0.05% 0.26% 0.2862 3.2819 1.3096 0.2862 3.2819 1.3096 
-19 0.05% -0.01% 0.31% -0.0254 1.0387 -0.3674 0.1844 2.3805 1.1633 
-18 -0.14% -0.30% 0.17% -0.1388 1.4443 -1.4428 0.0705 1.7986 0.5882 
-17 0.54% 0.29% 0.71% 0.2242 1.4691 2.2915 0.1731 1.7457 1.4890 
-16 -0.12% -0.29% 0.59% -0.0115 1.3411 -0.1289 0.1497 1.6813 1.3369 
-15 0.05% -0.01% 0.65% 0.0731 1.2921 0.8498 0.1665 1.6643 1.5021 
-14 -0.23% -0.22% 0.42% -0.0825 1.3655 -0.9074 0.1230 1.4955 1.2345 
-13 0.23% 0.11% 0.65% 0.0627 1.5206 0.6191 0.1372 1.5796 1.3040 
-12 -0.25% -0.29% 0.40% -0.0493 1.2391 -0.5975 0.1129 1.4255 1.1893 
-11 -0.21% -0.25% 0.19% -0.0681 1.1353 -0.9013 0.0856 1.3874 0.9260 
-10 -0.06% -0.24% 0.13% 0.0210 1.5416 0.2046 0.0879 1.4934 0.8839 
-9 0.76% 0.17% 0.88% 0.1906 1.4801 1.9333 0.1392 1.3791 1.5154 
-8 0.02% -0.09% 0.90% 0.0220 1.4231 0.2322 0.1398 1.4594 1.4386 
-7 0.46% 0.02% 1.36% 0.0970 1.7846 0.8161 0.1607 1.3110 1.8402 
-6 0.05% 0.01% 1.41% 0.0368 1.0767 0.5131 0.1647 1.3294 1.8604 
-5 0.24% 0.07% 1.65% 0.0588 1.2243 0.7210 0.1742 1.2685 2.0618 
-4 0.04% -0.05% 1.69% -0.1244 2.7280 -0.6850 0.1388 1.1815 1.7640 
-3 -0.01% -0.17% 1.68% 0.0623 1.5710 0.5950 0.1496 1.2047 1.8641 
-2 0.22% -0.12% 1.91% 0.0030 1.5969 0.0284 0.1463 1.1968 1.8352 
-1 0.79% 0.16% 2.70% 0.4144 2.2634 2.7489 0.2352 1.2997 2.7175 
0 0.58% 0.11% 3.28% 0.1835 1.9362 1.4234 0.2696 1.2810 3.1601 
1 0.31% 0.01% 3.59% 0.1087 1.9083 0.8552 0.2866 1.2579 3.4208 
2 0.34% 0.03% 3.92% 0.1979 2.4694 1.2032 0.3215 1.4385 3.3563 
3 0.04% -0.09% 3.96% 0.0569 1.9140 0.4461 0.3264 1.3214 3.7087 
4 0.42% 0.10% 4.38% 0.0923 1.1608 1.1944 0.3382 1.3108 3.8745 
5 -0.13% -0.20% 4.25% 0.0700 1.6523 0.6365 0.3454 1.3511 3.8388 
6 -0.30% -0.09% 3.95% -0.0370 1.6448 -0.3380 0.3318 1.4318 3.4799 
7 0.30% 0.00% 4.25% 0.1171 2.3876 0.7367 0.3480 1.5153 3.4482 
8 0.31% 0.03% 4.56% 0.1485 1.4664 1.5204 0.3695 1.5910 3.4873 
9 -0.22% -0.24% 4.33% -0.1238 1.3681 -1.3588 0.3407 1.5291 3.3456 
10 0.26% 0.13% 4.59% 0.1735 1.7059 1.5271 0.3663 1.5019 3.6622 
11 -0.15% 0.00% 4.44% -0.0638 1.3067 -0.7326 0.3493 1.4371 3.6494 
12 0.31% -0.01% 4.75% 0.1386 1.2148 1.7134 0.3681 1.4730 3.7520 
13 0.57% 0.05% 5.31% 0.2107 1.1876 2.6647 0.3988 1.4553 4.1144 
14 -0.05% 0.00% 5.26% -0.0124 1.0672 -0.1750 0.3909 1.4794 3.9676 
15 0.04% -0.01% 5.30% -0.1173 1.7428 -1.0103 0.3659 1.4440 3.8049 
16 0.04% -0.15% 5.34% 0.0531 1.4338 0.5562 0.3697 1.4813 3.7471 
17 -0.16% -0.24% 5.18% -0.0251 1.3183 -0.2858 0.3607 1.5301 3.5396 
18 0.10% 0.26% 5.28% 0.1251 1.4929 1.2582 0.3761 1.5968 3.5364 
19 0.07% 0.10% 5.35% -0.0393 1.7374 -0.3398 0.3651 1.5139 3.6214 
20 -0.09% 0.02% 5.26% 0.0104 1.6239 0.0961 0.3623 1.5618 3.4828 
21 -0.08% -0.18% 5.18% -0.0215 2.0806 -0.1548 0.3546 1.6074 3.3126 
22 0.07% 0.20% 5.25% 0.1673 1.7453 1.4393 0.3760 1.6552 3.4108 
23 0.36% 0.01% 5.61% 0.1313 1.4326 1.3762 0.3915 1.5845 3.7098 
24 0.01% -0.06% 5.62% 0.1074 1.8969 0.8502 0.4031 1.6779 3.6075 
25 -0.03% -0.16% 5.59% -0.0535 1.3215 -0.6081 0.3908 1.6288 3.6028 
26 0.52% 0.12% 6.11% 0.1788 1.2858 2.0880 0.4127 1.5934 3.8892 
27 0.20% -0.06% 6.32% 0.1286 1.2338 1.5654 0.4270 1.6097 3.9827 
28 -0.05% -0.08% 6.27% 0.0437 1.3455 0.4880 0.4288 1.6765 3.8409 
29 0.10% -0.22% 6.36% -0.0051 1.5001 -0.0512 0.4238 1.6308 3.9021 
30 0.53% 0.17% 6.89% 0.2376 1.2127 2.9420 0.4529 1.6677 4.0777 
          
-1 to 1     1.68% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03711 0.4080 1.8643 3.2857 
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Table-A 5.40 SW-1 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 194); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.06% -0.13% -0.06% 0.0032 0.9813 0.0496 0.0032 0.9813 0.0496 
-19 -0.01% -0.24% -0.06% -0.0498 0.8918 -0.8563 -0.0329 0.9080 -0.5568 
-18 -0.22% -0.55% -0.29% -0.0974 1.0134 -1.4748 -0.0831 0.9330 -1.3673 
-17 0.39% -0.08% 0.10% 0.1109 1.1024 1.5438 -0.0165 0.9398 -0.2701 
-16 -0.28% -0.41% -0.18% -0.0588 0.9743 -0.9261 -0.0411 1.0160 -0.6207 
-15 -0.08% -0.22% -0.26% -0.0054 1.0693 -0.0773 -0.0397 1.0359 -0.5883 
-14 -0.43% -0.42% -0.69% -0.0804 1.1284 -1.0935 -0.0672 1.0156 -1.0147 
-13 -0.04% 0.03% -0.73% -0.0295 1.2217 -0.3701 -0.0732 1.1040 -1.0180 
-12 -0.41% -0.44% -1.14% -0.1034 0.9079 -1.7483 -0.1035 1.0250 -1.5499 
-11 -0.41% -0.33% -1.55% -0.1133 0.9571 -1.8173 -0.1340 1.0121 -2.0325 
-10 -0.26% -0.47% -1.81% -0.0587 1.0111 -0.8913 -0.1455 0.9945 -2.2454 
-9 0.50% -0.09% -1.31% 0.1193 1.1274 1.6240 -0.1049 1.0237 -1.5723 
-8 -0.09% -0.30% -1.40% -0.0434 0.9279 -0.7174 -0.1128 1.0292 -1.6820 
-7 0.23% -0.32% -1.17% 0.0466 0.9961 0.7180 -0.0962 1.0576 -1.3964 
-6 -0.08% -0.15% -1.25% -0.0381 0.8895 -0.6576 -0.1028 1.0784 -1.4631 
-5 0.05% -0.11% -1.20% 0.0160 0.9728 0.2531 -0.0955 1.0485 -1.3984 
-4 -0.14% -0.38% -1.34% -0.0444 0.9918 -0.6868 -0.1035 1.0131 -1.5671 
-3 -0.10% -0.27% -1.44% -0.0411 0.9046 -0.6979 -0.1102 1.0116 -1.6723 
-2 0.03% -0.22% -1.41% -0.0034 0.8997 -0.0576 -0.1081 0.9859 -1.6823 
-1 0.52% 0.17% -0.90% 0.1615 1.0653 2.3270 -0.0692 1.0108 -1.0508 
0 0.58% -0.04% -0.31% 0.2112 1.3758 2.3560 -0.0215 1.0133 -0.3249 
1 0.29% -0.17% -0.03% 0.0622 1.3141 0.7259 -0.0077 1.0441 -0.1133 
2 0.18% -0.26% 0.15% 0.0654 1.3867 0.7238 0.0061 1.0724 0.0873 
3 -0.21% -0.35% -0.07% -0.0652 1.0577 -0.9466 -0.0073 1.0518 -0.1072 
4 0.14% -0.09% 0.07% 0.0192 0.9532 0.3096 -0.0034 1.0577 -0.0486 
5 -0.24% -0.40% -0.17% -0.0546 0.9923 -0.8437 -0.0140 1.0483 -0.2048 
6 -0.47% -0.33% -0.64% -0.1207 1.0697 -1.7324 -0.0370 1.0566 -0.5369 
7 0.26% -0.18% -0.38% 0.0761 0.9926 1.1769 -0.0219 1.0619 -0.3167 
8 0.14% -0.28% -0.23% -0.0060 1.0312 -0.0887 -0.0226 1.0652 -0.3261 
9 -0.42% -0.48% -0.65% -0.1191 0.9590 -1.9058 -0.0440 1.0733 -0.6291 
10 0.00% -0.07% -0.66% 0.0182 1.0214 0.2728 -0.0400 1.0817 -0.5678 
11 -0.29% -0.14% -0.94% -0.0616 0.8757 -1.0800 -0.0503 1.0846 -0.7116 
12 -0.01% -0.09% -0.95% -0.0152 0.9053 -0.2583 -0.0522 1.0927 -0.7327 
13 0.34% -0.05% -0.61% 0.0918 0.8860 1.5909 -0.0356 1.0964 -0.4990 
14 -0.21% -0.20% -0.82% -0.0771 0.8529 -1.3870 -0.0482 1.0928 -0.6764 
15 -0.18% -0.32% -1.00% -0.0961 1.0743 -1.3723 -0.0635 1.0937 -0.8910 
16 -0.03% -0.22% -1.03% -0.0420 0.9925 -0.6496 -0.0695 1.0902 -0.9790 
17 -0.37% -0.48% -1.40% -0.1429 0.9009 -2.4336 -0.0918 1.0886 -1.2941 
18 -0.09% 0.02% -1.49% 0.0108 1.0645 0.1561 -0.0889 1.0803 -1.2626 
19 -0.07% -0.20% -1.55% 0.0063 1.1284 0.0863 -0.0868 1.0484 -1.2700 
20 -0.21% -0.25% -1.77% -0.0717 1.1936 -0.9213 -0.0969 1.0638 -1.3977 
21 -0.17% -0.31% -1.93% -0.0610 1.0359 -0.9040 -0.1051 1.0545 -1.5302 
22 -0.21% -0.20% -2.14% -0.0316 0.8767 -0.5523 -0.1087 1.0461 -1.5950 
23 0.28% -0.13% -1.86% 0.0659 1.0269 0.9854 -0.0975 1.0449 -1.4326 
24 -0.12% -0.31% -1.98% -0.0176 1.1348 -0.2387 -0.0991 1.0682 -1.4235 
25 -0.20% -0.28% -2.18% -0.0978 1.0109 -1.4844 -0.1124 1.0694 -1.6131 
26 0.43% 0.00% -1.75% 0.1218 1.0172 1.8372 -0.0934 1.0653 -1.3462 
27 0.08% -0.19% -1.67% 0.0547 1.0040 0.8355 -0.0846 1.0707 -1.2123 
28 -0.23% -0.23% -1.91% -0.0480 0.8457 -0.8717 -0.0906 1.0761 -1.2917 
29 -0.16% -0.30% -2.07% -0.0259 0.9695 -0.4097 -0.0933 1.0633 -1.3469 
30 0.43% 0.02% -1.64% 0.1272 0.9693 2.0139 -0.0746 1.0724 -1.0674 
          
-1 to 1     1.39% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03671 0.2511 1.4631 2.6338 
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Table-A 5.41 SW-2 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 194); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.08% -0.09% -0.08% 0.0004 0.9758 0.0057 0.0004 0.9758 0.0057 
-19 -0.05% -0.26% -0.13% -0.0547 0.8989 -0.9243 -0.0384 0.9062 -0.6440 
-18 -0.18% -0.49% -0.31% -0.0879 1.0232 -1.3045 -0.0822 0.9393 -1.3277 
-17 0.38% -0.05% 0.07% 0.1112 1.1020 1.5321 -0.0155 0.9411 -0.2506 
-16 -0.29% -0.43% -0.22% -0.0619 0.9692 -0.9695 -0.0416 1.0067 -0.6270 
-15 -0.08% -0.17% -0.31% -0.0074 1.0804 -0.1033 -0.0410 1.0247 -0.6067 
-14 -0.45% -0.46% -0.76% -0.0897 1.1535 -1.1798 -0.0718 1.0094 -1.0798 
-13 -0.07% -0.08% -0.82% -0.0372 1.2279 -0.4603 -0.0803 1.1081 -1.1005 
-12 -0.42% -0.46% -1.24% -0.1056 0.9142 -1.7541 -0.1110 1.0204 -1.6505 
-11 -0.40% -0.42% -1.64% -0.1104 0.9651 -1.7366 -0.1402 1.0068 -2.1135 
-10 -0.28% -0.49% -1.92% -0.0650 1.0165 -0.9702 -0.1532 0.9872 -2.3563 
-9 0.49% -0.10% -1.43% 0.1190 1.1323 1.5958 -0.1124 1.0121 -1.6851 
-8 -0.09% -0.14% -1.52% -0.0419 0.9339 -0.6805 -0.1196 1.0195 -1.7801 
-7 0.22% -0.25% -1.30% 0.0467 1.0029 0.7065 -0.1027 1.0517 -1.4829 
-6 -0.10% -0.12% -1.40% -0.0447 0.8886 -0.7632 -0.1108 1.0732 -1.5670 
-5 0.06% -0.06% -1.34% 0.0192 0.9798 0.2973 -0.1025 1.0421 -1.4926 
-4 -0.13% -0.41% -1.47% -0.0405 0.9956 -0.6179 -0.1092 1.0087 -1.6439 
-3 -0.12% -0.30% -1.59% -0.0438 0.9120 -0.7292 -0.1165 1.0085 -1.7533 
-2 0.05% -0.13% -1.54% 0.0026 0.8995 0.0441 -0.1128 0.9805 -1.7461 
-1 0.53% 0.13% -1.01% 0.1590 1.0622 2.2717 -0.0744 1.0077 -1.1205 
0 0.61% -0.15% -0.40% 0.2231 1.3625 2.4850 -0.0239 1.0096 -0.3596 
1 0.28% -0.18% -0.13% 0.0593 1.3219 0.6810 -0.0107 1.0428 -0.1561 
2 0.20% -0.16% 0.07% 0.0733 1.3825 0.8053 0.0048 1.0705 0.0681 
3 -0.19% -0.27% -0.12% -0.0592 1.0570 -0.8505 -0.0074 1.0526 -0.1065 
4 0.12% -0.13% 0.00% 0.0151 0.9517 0.2404 -0.0042 1.0583 -0.0606 
5 -0.22% -0.27% -0.22% -0.0455 0.9928 -0.6956 -0.0131 1.0497 -0.1889 
6 -0.44% -0.28% -0.66% -0.1126 1.0751 -1.5893 -0.0345 1.0592 -0.4941 
7 0.23% -0.21% -0.43% 0.0686 0.9790 1.0631 -0.0209 1.0645 -0.2981 
8 0.14% -0.29% -0.29% -0.0092 1.0306 -0.1359 -0.0223 1.0683 -0.3162 
9 -0.39% -0.44% -0.68% -0.1114 0.9634 -1.7546 -0.0422 1.0761 -0.5954 
10 -0.04% -0.04% -0.72% 0.0154 1.0287 0.2279 -0.0387 1.0826 -0.5433 
11 -0.26% -0.07% -0.97% -0.0505 0.8779 -0.8740 -0.0471 1.0831 -0.6597 
12 0.02% -0.13% -0.96% -0.0063 0.9059 -0.1050 -0.0474 1.0923 -0.6594 
13 0.37% -0.07% -0.59% 0.0986 0.9027 1.6578 -0.0298 1.0951 -0.4136 
14 -0.17% -0.21% -0.76% -0.0640 0.8564 -1.1350 -0.0402 1.0938 -0.5583 
15 -0.17% -0.23% -0.94% -0.0943 1.0821 -1.3228 -0.0554 1.0905 -0.7710 
16 -0.01% -0.24% -0.95% -0.0324 0.9882 -0.4983 -0.0600 1.0855 -0.8385 
17 -0.40% -0.43% -1.34% -0.1466 0.8984 -2.4764 -0.0829 1.0828 -1.1628 
18 -0.13% 0.01% -1.47% 0.0009 1.0682 0.0131 -0.0817 1.0775 -1.1513 
19 -0.07% -0.22% -1.55% 0.0053 1.1353 0.0709 -0.0799 1.0481 -1.1566 
20 -0.24% -0.25% -1.79% -0.0790 1.2117 -0.9902 -0.0912 1.0638 -1.3017 
21 -0.17% -0.31% -1.96% -0.0636 1.0444 -0.9244 -0.0999 1.0541 -1.4393 
22 -0.21% -0.18% -2.17% -0.0304 0.8944 -0.5157 -0.1034 1.0455 -1.5014 
23 0.29% -0.08% -1.88% 0.0655 1.0331 0.9629 -0.0924 1.0449 -1.3416 
24 -0.12% -0.31% -2.01% -0.0158 1.1381 -0.2111 -0.0937 1.0683 -1.3311 
25 -0.25% -0.36% -2.26% -0.1129 1.0178 -1.6834 -0.1093 1.0692 -1.5517 
26 0.42% 0.00% -1.84% 0.1199 1.0146 1.7943 -0.0906 1.0619 -1.2956 
27 0.07% -0.18% -1.77% 0.0515 1.0089 0.7750 -0.0823 1.0647 -1.1727 
28 -0.25% -0.21% -2.02% -0.0526 0.8432 -0.9462 -0.0889 1.0685 -1.2632 
29 -0.16% -0.38% -2.18% -0.0273 0.9672 -0.4292 -0.0919 1.0526 -1.3251 
30 0.41% 0.02% -1.77% 0.1251 0.9742 1.9486 -0.0735 1.0598 -1.0524 
          
-1 to 1     1.42% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03651 0.2548 1.4572 2.6542 
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Table-A 5.42 SW-3 Returns to Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 194); EWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.12% -0.05% 0.0049 0.9765 0.0772 0.0049 0.9765 0.0772 
-19 -0.04% -0.25% -0.09% -0.0519 0.8979 -0.8798 -0.0332 0.9033 -0.5594 
-18 -0.15% -0.46% -0.25% -0.0787 1.0161 -1.1792 -0.0725 0.9322 -1.1847 
-17 0.39% -0.06% 0.14% 0.1095 1.1000 1.5152 -0.0081 0.9326 -0.1319 
-16 -0.29% -0.38% -0.15% -0.0640 0.9536 -1.0214 -0.0358 0.9906 -0.5508 
-15 -0.08% -0.15% -0.23% -0.0086 1.0788 -0.1210 -0.0362 1.0126 -0.5445 
-14 -0.41% -0.38% -0.64% -0.0769 1.1373 -1.0298 -0.0626 0.9991 -0.9540 
-13 -0.09% 0.00% -0.72% -0.0385 1.2325 -0.4753 -0.0722 1.0965 -1.0020 
-12 -0.43% -0.46% -1.16% -0.1080 0.9140 -1.7992 -0.1040 1.0154 -1.5600 
-11 -0.40% -0.30% -1.55% -0.1099 0.9591 -1.7448 -0.1335 0.9985 -2.0350 
-10 -0.28% -0.51% -1.83% -0.0711 1.0043 -1.0782 -0.1487 0.9777 -2.3155 
-9 0.47% -0.09% -1.36% 0.1078 1.1382 1.4425 -0.1112 1.0038 -1.6871 
-8 -0.08% -0.27% -1.44% -0.0416 0.9255 -0.6847 -0.1184 1.0096 -1.7856 
-7 0.23% -0.27% -1.21% 0.0486 1.0061 0.7357 -0.1011 1.0371 -1.4843 
-6 -0.09% -0.18% -1.30% -0.0402 0.8969 -0.6822 -0.1081 1.0617 -1.5496 
-5 0.10% -0.09% -1.20% 0.0294 0.9845 0.4547 -0.0973 1.0348 -1.4313 
-4 -0.12% -0.46% -1.32% -0.0341 0.9934 -0.5231 -0.1027 1.0020 -1.5597 
-3 -0.10% -0.30% -1.41% -0.0378 0.9010 -0.6385 -0.1087 1.0007 -1.6533 
-2 0.06% -0.11% -1.36% 0.0043 0.8966 0.0738 -0.1048 0.9731 -1.6392 
-1 0.56% 0.11% -0.79% 0.1657 1.0606 2.3781 -0.0651 1.0000 -0.9908 
0 0.60% -0.06% -0.20% 0.2190 1.3707 2.4326 -0.0157 1.0057 -0.2379 
1 0.25% -0.15% 0.05% 0.0518 1.3318 0.5920 -0.0043 1.0438 -0.0629 
2 0.24% -0.19% 0.28% 0.0818 1.3707 0.9086 0.0128 1.0657 0.1834 
3 -0.18% -0.27% 0.10% -0.0620 1.0576 -0.8929 -0.0001 1.0443 -0.0014 
4 0.13% -0.26% 0.23% 0.0188 0.9494 0.3011 0.0037 1.0487 0.0532 
5 -0.21% -0.35% 0.02% -0.0433 1.0001 -0.6597 -0.0049 1.0377 -0.0720 
6 -0.44% -0.32% -0.42% -0.1128 1.0621 -1.6176 -0.0265 1.0451 -0.3865 
7 0.24% -0.18% -0.18% 0.0713 0.9711 1.1182 -0.0126 1.0508 -0.1822 
8 0.13% -0.25% -0.05% -0.0137 1.0324 -0.2017 -0.0149 1.0558 -0.2148 
9 -0.39% -0.44% -0.44% -0.1091 0.9738 -1.7059 -0.0346 1.0641 -0.4945 
10 -0.05% -0.02% -0.49% 0.0148 1.0466 0.2157 -0.0313 1.0684 -0.4466 
11 -0.26% -0.15% -0.75% -0.0487 0.8938 -0.8301 -0.0395 1.0668 -0.5632 
12 0.03% -0.13% -0.72% -0.0091 0.9197 -0.1508 -0.0404 1.0766 -0.5719 
13 0.35% -0.02% -0.37% 0.0876 0.8955 1.4893 -0.0248 1.0847 -0.3484 
14 -0.16% -0.20% -0.53% -0.0622 0.8581 -1.1037 -0.0350 1.0843 -0.4911 
15 -0.18% -0.25% -0.72% -0.0929 1.0774 -1.3135 -0.0500 1.0782 -0.7057 
16 -0.01% -0.24% -0.72% -0.0293 0.9744 -0.4574 -0.0541 1.0708 -0.7694 
17 -0.42% -0.46% -1.14% -0.1488 0.8959 -2.5288 -0.0775 1.0652 -1.1082 
18 -0.14% -0.06% -1.28% -0.0049 1.0691 -0.0702 -0.0773 1.0638 -1.1066 
19 -0.06% -0.21% -1.34% 0.0084 1.1390 0.1120 -0.0750 1.0360 -1.1026 
20 -0.24% -0.25% -1.58% -0.0785 1.2288 -0.9720 -0.0864 1.0500 -1.2521 
21 -0.17% -0.29% -1.75% -0.0665 1.0487 -0.9651 -0.0956 1.0443 -1.3934 
22 -0.18% -0.19% -1.93% -0.0293 0.8962 -0.4977 -0.0989 1.0339 -1.4568 
23 0.26% -0.10% -1.67% 0.0618 1.0480 0.8974 -0.0885 1.0333 -1.3038 
24 -0.18% -0.28% -1.85% -0.0302 1.1418 -0.4022 -0.0920 1.0546 -1.3281 
25 -0.27% -0.47% -2.12% -0.1132 1.0111 -1.7045 -0.1077 1.0555 -1.5532 
26 0.40% -0.18% -1.72% 0.1149 1.0239 1.7080 -0.0898 1.0493 -1.3026 
27 0.13% -0.18% -1.59% 0.0630 1.0024 0.9568 -0.0797 1.0507 -1.1554 
28 -0.23% -0.17% -1.81% -0.0448 0.8413 -0.8107 -0.0853 1.0541 -1.2324 
29 -0.16% -0.29% -1.98% -0.0319 0.9585 -0.5066 -0.0890 1.0402 -1.3023 
30 0.42% 0.04% -1.56% 0.1318 0.9917 2.0229 -0.0696 1.0470 -1.0128 
          
-1 to 1     1.40% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03715 0.2520 1.4707 2.6086 
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Table-A 5.43 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
Cash 0.0174          0.0066   
(1.2590) (0.4261) 
Pct50   0.0202        0.0188   
(1.2756) (1.1266) 
PctToe     0.0416      0.0310   
(1.4001) (1.0397) 
CB       0.0286 **   0.0228   
(2.0545) 
 
(1.5065) 
Conglomerate         -0.0226  -0.0123   
(-1.6121) (-0.8398) 
Intercept 0.0474 *** 0.0470 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0415 *** 0.0609 *** 0.0368 ***  
(5.8694) 
 
(6.3534) 
 
(5.4494) 
 
(5.2556) 
 
(7.7171) 
 
(2.9283) 
 
Observations 274   274   268   274   274   268   
F-Statistics 1.5850  1.6271  1.9601  4.2211  2.5990  1.7434  
p-value 0.2091  0.2032  0.1627  0.0409 ** 0.1081  0.1250  
Adj. R-Squared 0.0016   0.0031   0.0044   0.0126   0.0064   0.0153   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.44 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
Cash 0.0590 **         0.0529 **  
(2.5143) 
 
(2.2559) 
 
Pct50   0.0689 ***       0.0690 ***  
(2.7235) 
 
(2.6660) 
 
PctToe     0.0630      0.0382   
(1.3456) (0.8276) 
CB       0.0377 *   0.0127   
(1.6657) 
 
(0.5692) 
Conglomerate         -0.0408 * -0.0146   
(-1.7487) 
 
(-0.6492) 
Intercept 0.0485 *** 0.0471 *** 0.0562 *** 0.0512 *** 0.0808 *** 0.0276   
(3.6282) 
 
(3.7162) 
 
(3.9062) 
 
(3.5849) 
 
(5.9547) 
 
(1.3367) 
Observations 274   274   268   274   274   268   
F-Statistics 6.3219  7.4172  1.8107  2.7745  3.0580  3.3407  
p-value 0.0125 ** 0.0069 *** 0.1796  0.0969 * 0.0815 * 0.0061 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0176   0.0240   0.0031   0.0063   0.0079   0.0462   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.45 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-10,+10] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
Cash 0.0826 ***         0.0986 ***  
(2.6321) 
 
(2.9638) 
 
Pct50   0.0626 *       0.0597 *  
(1.9532) 
 
(1.8261) 
 
PctToe     -0.0615      -0.0999   
(-1.0140) (-1.6208) 
CB       0.0081    -0.0242   
(0.2798) (-0.8131) 
Conglomerate         -0.0439  -0.0276   
(-1.4388) (-0.8732) 
Intercept 0.0581 *** 0.0653 *** 0.0928 *** 0.0789 *** 0.0985 *** 0.0750 **  
(3.2028) 
 
(3.6330) 
 
(4.5883) 
 
(3.7389) 
 
(5.0814) 
 
(2.1882) 
 
Observations 274   274   268   274   274   268   
F-Statistics 6.9279  3.8149  1.0281  0.0783  2.0701  2.8614  
p-value 0.0090 *** 0.0518 * 0.3115  0.7798  0.1514  0.0155 ** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0191   0.0088   -0.0002   -0.0034   0.0037   0.0335   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.46 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-15,+15] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
Cash 0.0770 **         0.0972 **  
(2.0238) 
 
(2.4890) 
 
Pct50   0.1047 **       0.0997 **  
(2.5398) 
 
(2.3613) 
 
PctToe     -0.0886      -0.1322 *  
(-1.1699) (-1.7392) 
 
CB       -0.0015    -0.0432   
(-0.0425) (-1.2053) 
Conglomerate         -0.0708 * -0.0513   
(-1.8137) 
 
(-1.3137) 
Intercept 0.0765 *** 0.0708 *** 0.1175 *** 0.0992 *** 0.1253 *** 0.1066 ***  
(3.3610) 
 
(3.2963) 
 
(4.7146) 
 
(3.8295) 
 
(5.5936) 
 
(2.7923) 
 
Observations 274   274   268   274   274   268   
F-Statistics 4.0959  6.4508  1.3687  0.0018  3.2897  3.2942  
p-value 0.0440 ** 0.0116 ** 0.2431  0.9661  0.0708 * 0.0067 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0094   0.0193   0.0011   -0.0037   0.0089   0.0406   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.47 Univariate Regression Analysis – OLS CAARs [-20,+20] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
Cash 0.0902 **         0.1173 **  
(2.0276) 
 
(2.5686) 
 
Pct50   0.1121 **       0.1067 **  
(2.5318) 
 
(2.4173) 
 
PctToe     -0.1106      -0.1679 *  
(-1.2889) (-1.9422) 
 
CB       -0.0178    -0.0681 *  
(-0.4550) (-1.7269) 
 
Conglomerate         -0.0976 ** -0.0813 *  
(-2.2629) 
 
(-1.8867) 
 
Intercept 0.0730 *** 0.0691 *** 0.1216 *** 0.1057 *** 0.1356 *** 0.1263 ***  
(2.9939) 
 
(2.8536) 
 
(4.4192) 
 
(3.6665) 
 
(5.4922) 
 
(3.0172) 
 
Observations 274   274   268   274   274   268   
F-Statistics 4.1111  6.4099  1.6611  0.2071  5.1205  3.8333  
p-value 0.0436 ** 0.0119 ** 0.1986  0.6495  0.0244 ** 0.0023 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0109   0.0178   0.0024   -0.0030   0.0158   0.0547   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.48 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
Cash 0.0160          0.0040   
(1.1399) (0.2503) 
Pct50   0.0184        0.0162   
(1.1638) (0.9781) 
PctToe     0.0349      0.0228   
(1.1588) (0.7500) 
CB       0.0310 **   0.0261 *  
(2.2016) 
 
(1.6925) 
 
Conglomerate         -0.0247 * -0.0152   
(-1.7650) 
 
(-1.0575) 
Intercept 0.0546 *** 0.0544 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0477 *** 0.0688 *** 0.0466 ***  
(6.6903) 
 
(7.1887) 
 
(6.3545) 
 
(5.9682) 
 
(8.4916) 
 
(3.7258) 
 
Observations 264   264   258   264   264   258   
F-Statistics 1.2994  1.3545  1.3428  4.8469  3.1152  1.7091  
p-value 0.2554  0.2456  0.2476  0.0286 ** 0.0787 * 0.1329  
Adj. R-Squared 0.0007   0.0018   0.0020   0.0155   0.0086   0.0155   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 5.49 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
Cash 0.0571 **         0.0507 **  
(2.4325) 
 
(2.1514) 
 
Pct50   0.0548 **       0.0543 **  
(2.2134) 
 
(2.1346) 
 
PctToe     0.0544      0.0305   
(1.1909) (0.6728) 
CB       0.0381 *   0.0153   
(1.7021) 
 
(0.6892) 
Conglomerate         -0.0359  -0.0119   
(-1.5474) (-0.5316) 
Intercept 0.0704 *** 0.0725 *** 0.0789 *** 0.0728 *** 0.1009 *** 0.0529 **  
(5.3070) 
 
(5.6489) 
 
(5.5169) 
 
(5.0944) 
 
(7.4952) 
 
(2.5474) 
 
Observations 264   264   258   264   264   258   
F-Statistics 5.9171  4.8990  1.4183  2.8973  2.3944  2.5121  
p-value 0.0157 ** 0.0277 ** 0.2348  0.0899 * 0.1230  0.0305 ** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0172   0.0145   0.0016   0.0068   0.0057   0.0327   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 5.50 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-10,+10] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
Cash 0.0680 **         0.0783 ***  
(2.3539) 
 
(2.6124) 
 
Pct50   0.0613 *       0.0574 *  
(1.9220) 
 
(1.7810) 
 
PctToe     -0.0660      -0.0965 *  
(-1.1570) (-1.6791) 
 
CB       0.0191    -0.0060   
(0.6894) (-0.2139) 
Conglomerate         -0.0322  -0.0152   
(-1.0876) (-0.5160) 
Intercept 0.1016 *** 0.1052 *** 0.1330 *** 0.1143 *** 0.1338 *** 0.1087 ***  
(5.7321) 
 
(6.2897) 
 
(6.9888) 
 
(5.7792) 
 
(7.4223) 
 
(3.5703) 
 
Observations 264   264   258   264   264   258   
F-Statistics 5.5407  3.6943  1.3386  0.4753  1.1828  2.4113  
p-value 0.0193 ** 0.0557 * 0.2484  0.4912  0.2778  0.0370 ** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0140   0.0098   0.0009   -0.0022   0.0008   0.0251   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 5.51 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-15,+15] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
Cash 0.0615 *         0.0743 **  
(1.7437) 
 
(2.0908) 
 
Pct50   0.0998 **       0.0937 **  
(2.4369) 
 
(2.2255) 
 
PctToe     -0.0965      -0.1292 *  
(-1.3559) (-1.8221) 
 
CB       0.0158    -0.0160   
(0.4584) (-0.4645) 
Conglomerate         -0.0490  -0.0289   
(-1.2811) (-0.7714) 
Intercept 0.1386 *** 0.1300 *** 0.1767 *** 0.1506 *** 0.1755 *** 0.1534 ***  
(6.1296) 
 
(6.3572) 
 
(7.2974) 
 
(6.0627) 
 
(8.3242) 
 
(4.3439) 
 
Observations 264   264   258   264   264   258   
F-Statistics 3.0406  5.9387  1.8385  0.2101  1.6411  2.4828  
p-value 0.0824 * 0.0155 ** 0.1763  0.6471  0.2013  0.0323 ** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0055   0.0193   0.0028   -0.0031   0.0030   0.0281   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 5.52 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-20,+20] - Targets 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
Cash 0.0657          0.0851 **  
(1.5941) (2.0446) 
 
Pct50   0.0989 **       0.0912 **  
(2.2038) 
 
(2.0121) 
 
PctToe     -0.1225      -0.1662 **  
(-1.5177) (-2.0675) 
 
CB       -0.0051    -0.0423   
(-0.1318) (-1.1015) 
Conglomerate         -0.0738 * -0.0597   
(-1.7102) 
 
(-1.4102) 
Intercept 0.1592 *** 0.1522 *** 0.2030 *** 0.1803 *** 0.2069 *** 0.2011 ***  
(6.4334) 
 
(6.5383) 
 
(7.5004) 
 
(6.4690) 
 
(8.9937) 
 
(5.1691) 
 
Observations 264   264   258   264   264   258   
F-Statistics 2.5410  4.8569  2.3033  0.0174  2.9247  2.6307  
p-value 0.1121  0.0284 ** 0.1303  0.8952  0.0884 * 0.0244 ** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0047   0.0143   0.0046   -0.0038   0.0085   0.0325   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 5.53 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
Cash 0.0039          0.0032   
(0.3427) (0.2716) 
Pct50   0.0002        0.0038   
(0.0217) (0.3274) 
PctToe     0.0113      0.0125   
(0.5849) (0.6450) 
CB       -0.0033    -0.0040   
(-0.3660) (-0.3944) 
Conglomerate         0.0067  0.0079   
(0.6943) (0.7988) 
Intercept 0.0103 ** 0.0110 ** 0.0094 * 0.0116 ** 0.0090  0.0058   
(2.0282) 
 
(2.1527) 
 
(1.8518) 
 
(2.2142) 
 
(1.6131) (0.7154) 
Observations 233   233   227   233   233   227   
F-Statistics 0.1174  0.0005  0.3421  0.1339  0.4821  0.3047  
p-value 0.7322  0.9827  0.5592  0.7147  0.4882  0.9098  
Adj. R-Squared -0.0039   -0.0043   -0.0031   -0.0040   -0.0023   -0.0172   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
Table-A 5.54 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
Cash 0.0079          0.0122   
(0.3728) (0.5155) 
Pct50   0.0021        0.0073   
(0.1170) (0.3872) 
PctToe     0.0099      0.0111   
(0.2522) (0.2841) 
CB       -0.0253 **   -0.0227   
(-2.0465) 
 
(-1.5299) 
Conglomerate         0.0217  0.0210   
(1.3059) (1.2105) 
Intercept 0.0096  0.0105  0.0101  0.0152 * 0.0043  0.0028   
(1.1890) (1.2251) (1.1661) (1.7284) 
 
(0.4935) (0.2186) 
Observations 233   233   227   233   233   227   
F-Statistics 0.1390  0.0137  0.0636  4.1880  1.7053  1.1019  
p-value 0.7096  0.9069  0.8012  0.0418 ** 0.1929  0.3603  
Adj. R-Squared -0.0036   -0.0043   -0.0041   0.0024   0.0034   -0.0077   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.55 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-10,+10] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
Cash -0.0011          0.0112   
(-0.0442) (0.4278) 
Pct50   0.0426        0.0417   
(1.5339) (1.3933) 
PctToe     0.0033      -0.0009   
(0.0709) (-0.0194) 
CB       -0.0493 **   -0.0521 **  
(-2.4425) 
 
(-2.2799) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0225  0.0216   
(0.8761) (0.7837) 
Intercept 0.0129  0.0019  0.0126  0.0208  0.0058  0.0020   
(0.9745) (0.1499) (0.8890) (1.5585) (0.4308) (0.0885) 
Observations 233   233   227   233   233   227   
F-Statistics 0.0020  2.3529  0.0050  5.9657  0.7676  1.9443  
p-value 0.9648  0.1264  0.9435  0.0153 ** 0.3819  0.0881 * 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0043   0.0070   -0.0044   0.0066   -0.0008   0.0038   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.56 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-15,+15] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
Cash 0.0120          0.0245   
(0.3986) (0.7688) 
Pct50   0.0790 **       0.0848 **  
(2.2406) 
 
(2.1855) 
 
PctToe     0.0664      0.0631   
(1.2737) (1.1990) 
CB       -0.0696 **   -0.0672 **  
(-2.4871) 
 
(-2.2117) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0312  0.0374   
(0.9186) (1.0422) 
Intercept 0.0022  -0.0156  -0.0033  0.0158  -0.0052  -0.0299   
(0.1360) (-1.0078) (-0.1855) (0.9705) (-0.3347) (-1.1701) 
Observations 233   233   227   233   233   227   
F-Statistics 0.1589  5.0201  1.6222  6.1858  0.8439  2.8403  
p-value 0.6906  0.0260 ** 0.2041  0.0136 ** 0.3593  0.0165 ** 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0039   0.0210   0.0003   0.0099   0.0001   0.0307   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.57 Univariate Regression Analysis - OLS CAARs [-20,+20] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
Cash 0.0186          0.0376   
(0.5500) (1.0731) 
Pct50   0.0575        0.0629   
(1.5274) (1.5664) 
PctToe     0.0841      0.0812   
(1.5158) (1.4289) 
CB       -0.0795 **   -0.0804 **  
(-2.3525) 
 
(-2.1990) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0429  0.0457   
(1.1701) (1.1699) 
Intercept -0.0127  -0.0238  -0.0185  0.0037  -0.0225  -0.0425   
(-0.6981) (-1.3471) (-0.9418) (0.2083) (-1.2836) (-1.4942) 
Observations 233   233   227   233   233   227   
F-Statistics 0.3025  2.3328  2.2978  5.5341  1.3691  2.5992  
p-value 0.5829  0.1280  0.1310  0.0195 ** 0.2432  0.0262 ** 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0034   0.0066   0.0019   0.0108   0.0026   0.0214   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.58 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
Cash 0.0038          0.0032   
(0.3325) (0.2612) 
Pct50   -0.0017        0.0029   
(-0.1526) (0.2496) 
PctToe     0.0147      0.0158   
(0.7547) (0.8043) 
CB       -0.0050    -0.0042   
(-0.5347) (-0.4028) 
Conglomerate         0.0065  0.0076   
(0.6660) (0.7450) 
Intercept 0.0142 *** 0.0154 *** 0.0130 ** 0.0158 *** 0.0129 ** 0.0098   
(2.7161) 
 
(2.9146) 
 
(2.4861) 
 
(2.9350) 
 
(2.2524) 
 
(1.1483) 
Observations 229   229   223   229   229   223   
F-Statistics 0.1106  0.0233  0.5695  0.2859  0.4436  0.3295  
p-value 0.7398  0.8788  0.4513  0.5934  0.5061  0.8948  
Adj. R-Squared -0.0040   -0.0043   -0.0022   -0.0037   -0.0026   -0.0172   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.59 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
Cash 0.0028          0.0078   
(0.1287) (0.3257) 
Pct50   -0.0043        0.0024   
(-0.2573) (0.1337) 
PctToe     0.0146      0.0144   
(0.3656) (0.3614) 
CB       -0.0308 **   -0.0261   
(-2.2773) 
 
(-1.6339) 
Conglomerate         0.0208  0.0184   
(1.2789) (1.0848) 
Intercept 0.0264 *** 0.0280 *** 0.0256 *** 0.0320 *** 0.0205 ** 0.0219   
(3.2614) 
 
(3.1408) 
 
(2.9500) 
 
(3.6396) 
 
(2.2469) 
 
(1.6365) 
Observations 229   229   223   229   229   223   
F-Statistics 0.0166  0.0662  0.1336  5.1862  1.6357  1.2336  
p-value 0.8977  0.7972  0.7150  0.0237 ** 0.2022  0.2944  
Adj. R-Squared -0.0043   -0.0041   -0.0037   0.0057   0.0027   -0.0081   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.60 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-10,+10] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
Cash -0.0071          0.0056   
(-0.2765) (0.2053) 
Pct50   0.0298        0.0314   
(1.1827) (1.1696) 
PctToe     0.0190      0.0131   
(0.3965) (0.2639) 
CB       -0.0545 ***   -0.0532 **  
(-2.6229) 
 
(-2.2231) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0195  0.0171   
(0.8020) (0.6436) 
Intercept 0.0428 *** 0.0339 ** 0.0397 *** 0.0505 *** 0.0354 ** 0.0347   
(3.2162) 
 
(2.4773) 
 
(2.7984) 
 
(3.7638) 
 
(2.4905) 
 
(1.4510) 
Observations 229   229   223   229   229   223   
F-Statistics 0.0765  1.3988  0.1572  6.8795  0.6431  1.9713  
p-value 0.7824  0.2382  0.6921  0.0093 *** 0.4234  0.0840 * 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0041   0.0012   -0.0039   0.0092   -0.0017   -0.0011   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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Table-A 5.61 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-15,+15] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
Cash 0.0023          0.0160   
(0.0758) (0.5072) 
Pct50   0.0602 **       0.0685 **  
(2.0966) 
 
(2.2487) 
 
PctToe     0.0876 *     0.0809   
(1.6702) 
 
(1.4968) 
CB       -0.0769 ***   -0.0709 **  
(-2.6607) 
 
(-2.2215) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0239  0.0280   
(0.8081) (0.8914) 
Intercept 0.0461 *** 0.0313 * 0.0364 ** 0.0593 *** 0.0391 ** 0.0196   
(2.9160) 
 
(1.9159) 
 
(2.1510) 
 
(3.8201) 
 
(2.3759) 
 
(0.7197) 
Observations 229   229   223   229   229   223   
F-Statistics 0.0057  4.3958  2.7894  7.0794  0.6530  3.4050  
p-value 0.9396  0.0371 ** 0.0963 * 0.0084 *** 0.4199  0.0055 *** 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0044   0.0118   0.0047   0.0149   -0.0015   0.0273   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
 
 
Table-A 5.62 Univariate Regression Analysis - MM CAARs [-20,+20] - Acquirers 
CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
[-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
Cash 0.0048          0.0252   
(0.1461) (0.7365) 
Pct50   0.0390        0.0493   
(1.1862) (1.4704) 
PctToe     0.1028 *     0.0964 *  
(1.8589) 
 
(1.6654) 
 
CB       -0.0912 ***   -0.0858 **  
(-2.5992) 
 
(-2.2073) 
 
Conglomerate         0.0389  0.0382   
(1.1403) (1.0506) 
Intercept 0.0481 *** 0.0391 ** 0.0381 * 0.0641 *** 0.0369 * 0.0235   
(2.6344) 
 
(2.0697) 
 
(1.9584) 
 
(3.6366) 
 
(1.9694) 
 
(0.7583) 
Observations 229   229   223   229   229   223   
F-Statistics 0.0214  1.4070  3.4553  6.7557  1.3004  2.8006  
p-value 0.8840  0.2368  0.0644 * 0.0100 *** 0.2554  0.0179 ** 
Adj. R-Squared -0.0043   0.0007   0.0053   0.0163   0.0014   0.0198   
t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
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The secondary graphs and detailed statistical findings are tabulated in Appendix 
Chapter 6 . These tables are labelled to provide the name of the financial model; type of firm; 
the type of sample set; the regression technique and the number of observations (in 
parenthesis) and the index used. For each day in the entire event window - Days [-20, +30], 
these tables provide average abnormal returns - AAR, median AARs, cumulative average 
abnormal returns - CAARs, averaged Standardized Abnormal Returns (SARa) along with 
their standard deviations and t-statistics, and averaged Standardized CAARs (SCARa) along 
with the respective standard deviations and the t-statistics. Finally, the tables also earmark 
the t-statistics significant at the 5% and 10% level for SARa and SCARa. While, the t-
statistics, significant at the 10% level, is provided in bold and italic numbers, that at 5% is 
further highlighted. Also, a 3-Day analysis of the days [-1, +1] is provided. Other relevant 
graphs and various cross-sectional results are also presented here. 
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Returns to Domestic Targets 
 
Overall Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.1 Market returns to Domestic Targets – M-firms (All regressions) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.2 Fama-French returns to Domestic Targets – M-firms (All-regressions) 
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Business Group Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.3 Domestic Targets and Non-Business Group Analysis (Same-firms) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.4 Domestic Targets and Business Group Analysis (Same-firms) 
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Figure A 6.5 Domestic Targets; Market vs. FF  Business Groups Analysis;  OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.6 Domestic Targets; Market vs. FF  Business Groups Analysis;  MM 
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Relatedness Analysis 
 
 
Figure A 6.7 Domestic Targets and Unrelated firms Analysis; OLS vs. MM (Same-firms) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.8 Domestic Targets and Related firms Analysis; OLS vs. MM (Same-firms) 
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Figure A 6.9 Domestic Targets; Market vs. FF Relatedness Analysis;  OLS 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.10 Domestic Targets; Market vs. FF Relatedness Analysis;  MM 
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Returns to Acquirers 
 
Overall Returns 
 
 
Figure A 6.11 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers – (All regressions) 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure A 6.12 Fama-French returns to Domestic Targets – (All-regressions) 
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Business Group Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.13 Domestic Acquirers and Non-Business Group Analysis (Same-firms) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.14 Domestic Acquirers and Business Group Analysis (Same-firms) 
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Figure A 6.15 Domestic Acquirers; Market vs. FF  Business Groups Analysis;  OLS 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.16 Domestic Acquirers; Market vs. FF  Business Groups Analysis;  MM 
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Relatedness Analysis 
 
 
Figure A 6.17 Domestic Acquirers and Unrelated firms Analysis; OLS vs. MM (Same-firms) 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.18 Domestic Acquirers and Related firms Analysis; OLS vs. MM (Same-firms) 
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Figure A 6.19 Domestic Acquirers; Market vs. FF Relatedness Analysis;  OLS 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 6.20 Domestic Acquirers; Market vs. FF Relatedness Analysis;  MM 
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Table-A 6.1 Market returns to Domestic Targets; MM firms; (MM, 165); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.51% 0.12% 0.51% 0.1961 1.3067 1.9377 0.1961 1.3067 1.9377 
-19 0.36% 0.14% 0.87% 0.1688 1.0229 2.1310 0.2581 1.2450 2.6761 
-18 0.38% -0.07% 1.25% 0.1221 1.2222 1.2898 0.2812 1.1537 3.1468 
-17 0.52% 0.13% 1.76% 0.1799 1.2214 1.9014 0.3335 1.3190 3.2642 
-16 0.18% 0.08% 1.95% -0.0125 1.0455 -0.1543 0.2927 1.2970 2.9135 
-15 0.40% 0.26% 2.35% 0.1264 1.1157 1.4626 0.3188 1.3340 3.0853 
-14 0.40% 0.21% 2.75% 0.1350 1.3779 1.2649 0.3462 1.3369 3.3430 
-13 0.37% -0.03% 3.12% 0.1056 1.3493 1.0100 0.3611 1.3467 3.4621 
-12 0.92% 0.20% 4.03% 0.2741 1.1675 3.0311 0.4318 1.3926 4.0036 
-11 0.37% 0.11% 4.41% 0.1026 1.3252 0.9995 0.4421 1.4057 4.0606 
-10 0.77% 0.31% 5.18% 0.2116 1.3689 1.9958 0.4854 1.4506 4.3197 
-9 0.92% 0.22% 6.10% 0.2446 1.3154 2.4006 0.5353 1.4528 4.7570 
-8 0.05% -0.03% 6.15% 0.0154 1.1190 0.1778 0.5186 1.4559 4.5986 
-7 0.44% 0.35% 6.58% 0.1390 1.2181 1.4729 0.5369 1.4186 4.8859 
-6 1.06% 0.50% 7.64% 0.3875 1.4383 3.4785 0.6187 1.4037 5.6904 
-5 1.25% 0.42% 8.89% 0.3420 1.3663 3.2317 0.6846 1.3902 6.3573 
-4 0.38% -0.04% 9.27% 0.1265 1.1833 1.3802 0.6948 1.3997 6.4087 
-3 0.81% 0.18% 10.08% 0.2347 1.2958 2.3385 0.7306 1.3889 6.7909 
-2 0.88% 0.39% 10.96% 0.2698 1.2426 2.8034 0.7730 1.3762 7.2512 
-1 1.62% 1.14% 12.58% 0.5161 1.6416 4.0588 0.8688 1.4512 7.7291 
0 1.99% 1.21% 14.57% 0.5345 1.9232 3.5881 0.9645 1.5025 8.2876 
1 1.16% 0.44% 15.73% 0.2347 2.3466 1.2912 0.9924 1.5558 8.2346 
2 0.30% -0.15% 16.03% 0.0489 1.5107 0.4179 0.9808 1.5877 7.9748 
3 -0.30% -0.05% 15.74% -0.0888 1.6775 -0.6830 0.9420 1.6418 7.4074 
4 -0.42% -0.19% 15.32% -0.0998 1.3216 -0.9753 0.9030 1.6082 7.2491 
5 -0.40% -0.23% 14.92% -0.0921 0.9656 -1.2308 0.8674 1.5947 7.0222 
6 0.16% -0.03% 15.08% 0.0704 1.0180 0.8924 0.8647 1.5954 6.9975 
7 0.10% 0.04% 15.18% 0.0850 1.1961 0.9173 0.8652 1.6163 6.9110 
8 0.04% -0.13% 15.22% 0.0530 1.2838 0.5332 0.8600 1.6249 6.8329 
9 0.35% 0.03% 15.57% 0.1649 1.2433 1.7122 0.8756 1.6534 6.8372 
10 0.26% 0.27% 15.83% 0.0857 0.9727 1.1369 0.8768 1.6721 6.7697 
11 0.55% 0.12% 16.38% 0.1623 1.1942 1.7541 0.8917 1.7037 6.7570 
12 -0.05% 0.11% 16.32% 0.0068 1.7182 0.0513 0.8792 1.7972 6.3161 
13 0.04% -0.02% 16.36% -0.0217 1.0559 -0.2659 0.8625 1.7621 6.3192 
14 0.13% 0.15% 16.49% 0.0575 0.9077 0.8179 0.8598 1.7584 6.3126 
15 0.51% 0.07% 17.00% 0.1009 1.0625 1.2265 0.8646 1.7356 6.4312 
16 -0.12% 0.04% 16.88% -0.0288 1.1440 -0.3248 0.8481 1.7515 6.2513 
17 0.24% 0.16% 17.12% 0.1087 1.0687 1.3130 0.8545 1.7571 6.2783 
18 0.36% 0.01% 17.47% 0.0473 1.0693 0.5712 0.8510 1.7382 6.3210 
19 -0.10% -0.05% 17.38% -0.0042 1.0532 -0.0513 0.8397 1.7432 6.2187 
20 0.65% 0.17% 18.03% 0.2204 0.9704 2.9322 0.8638 1.7358 6.4245 
21 -0.28% -0.15% 17.75% -0.0073 0.9174 -0.1027 0.8523 1.7310 6.3568 
22 -0.42% -0.31% 17.34% -0.1727 0.9143 -2.4390 0.8160 1.7381 6.0612 
23 0.02% -0.04% 17.36% 0.0012 0.9759 0.0158 0.8069 1.7400 5.9868 
24 0.65% 0.17% 18.01% 0.1831 1.0284 2.2983 0.8251 1.7125 6.2207 
25 0.08% -0.07% 18.08% 0.0075 0.9146 0.1052 0.8172 1.7128 6.1600 
26 -0.05% 0.04% 18.03% 0.0214 0.8118 0.3403 0.8116 1.6951 6.1814 
27 0.11% -0.03% 18.14% 0.0278 1.0037 0.3572 0.8071 1.6783 6.2087 
28 -0.13% -0.05% 18.02% -0.0390 0.9298 -0.5409 0.7933 1.6636 6.1560 
29 0.25% 0.12% 18.27% 0.0833 1.0111 1.0641 0.7971 1.6492 6.2395 
30 0.21% 0.28% 18.48% 0.0600 0.8001 0.9675 0.7976 1.6457 6.2574 
          
-1 to 1     4.77% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06139 0.7421 2.0223 4.7373 
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Table-A 6.2 Market returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 170); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% -0.07% 0.06% 0.0737 1.0850 0.9054 0.0737 1.0850 0.9054 
-19 0.09% 0.02% 0.15% 0.0460 0.8827 0.6951 0.0846 1.0155 1.1113 
-18 0.30% -0.28% 0.46% 0.0564 1.0355 0.7265 0.1017 0.9850 1.3764 
-17 0.19% -0.03% 0.64% 0.0907 1.0234 1.1818 0.1334 1.0731 1.6577 
-16 0.11% 0.02% 0.76% -0.0393 0.9410 -0.5570 0.1017 1.0620 1.2774 
-15 0.40% 0.08% 1.16% 0.0832 0.9932 1.1166 0.1268 1.1244 1.5041 
-14 0.47% 0.19% 1.62% 0.0965 1.1473 1.1212 0.1539 1.1190 1.8337 
-13 0.19% -0.22% 1.82% 0.0405 1.1405 0.4736 0.1583 1.1397 1.8516 
-12 0.86% 0.08% 2.68% 0.1891 1.0224 2.4659 0.2122 1.1661 2.4270 
-11 0.03% -0.01% 2.70% 0.0216 1.1123 0.2588 0.2082 1.1779 2.3566 
-10 0.56% 0.14% 3.27% 0.1485 1.1347 1.7458 0.2433 1.2164 2.6668 
-9 1.60% 0.08% 4.87% 0.2150 1.4806 1.9365 0.2950 1.2485 3.1506 
-8 -0.56% -0.28% 4.31% -0.0679 1.0446 -0.8669 0.2646 1.2355 2.8555 
-7 0.13% 0.00% 4.44% 0.0543 1.0752 0.6731 0.2694 1.2079 2.9748 
-6 0.94% 0.28% 5.38% 0.2408 1.0751 2.9872 0.3225 1.2022 3.5772 
-5 0.99% 0.30% 6.37% 0.2442 1.1414 2.8527 0.3733 1.1865 4.1953 
-4 0.07% -0.29% 6.44% 0.0581 1.0291 0.7522 0.3762 1.1905 4.2141 
-3 0.86% 0.03% 7.30% 0.1964 1.0992 2.3833 0.4119 1.1741 4.6787 
-2 0.78% 0.16% 8.08% 0.1917 1.0322 2.4771 0.4449 1.1595 5.1173 
-1 1.43% 0.73% 9.50% 0.3801 1.3810 3.6703 0.5187 1.1936 5.7945 
0 1.82% 0.99% 11.33% 0.4318 1.6250 3.5439 0.6004 1.2207 6.5591 
1 0.91% 0.10% 12.23% 0.1845 1.7881 1.3758 0.6259 1.2665 6.5902 
2 0.03% -0.35% 12.26% 0.0070 1.2950 0.0719 0.6136 1.2968 6.3099 
3 -0.55% -0.25% 11.71% -0.1196 1.4183 -1.1240 0.5763 1.3286 5.7845 
4 -0.51% -0.33% 11.20% -0.1412 1.0867 -1.7333 0.5364 1.3097 5.4615 
5 -0.71% -0.43% 10.49% -0.1388 0.8753 -2.1144 0.4988 1.2968 5.1290 
6 -0.06% -0.28% 10.43% 0.0046 0.8750 0.0699 0.4903 1.3049 5.0109 
7 -0.49% -0.11% 9.95% -0.0547 1.1660 -0.6261 0.4711 1.3333 4.7122 
8 -0.20% -0.21% 9.75% -0.0247 1.1058 -0.2982 0.4584 1.3341 4.5816 
9 0.09% -0.20% 9.83% 0.0682 1.0483 0.8676 0.4631 1.3569 4.5512 
10 0.76% 0.06% 10.60% 0.1221 1.2647 1.2872 0.4775 1.3713 4.6434 
11 0.24% 0.01% 10.84% 0.0408 1.0116 0.5383 0.4772 1.4045 4.5307 
12 -0.33% -0.08% 10.51% -0.0676 1.4494 -0.6222 0.4581 1.4716 4.1515 
13 -0.15% -0.11% 10.36% -0.0345 0.8797 -0.5227 0.4454 1.4367 4.1346 
14 0.07% 0.09% 10.43% 0.0288 0.7991 0.4809 0.4439 1.4279 4.1456 
15 0.25% -0.09% 10.68% 0.0127 0.8825 0.1915 0.4398 1.4029 4.1806 
16 -0.30% -0.15% 10.38% -0.0954 0.8826 -1.4411 0.4181 1.4185 3.9309 
17 -0.08% -0.17% 10.30% 0.0295 0.8702 0.4524 0.4174 1.4166 3.9291 
18 0.10% -0.08% 10.40% 0.0186 0.8311 0.2987 0.4150 1.4085 3.9289 
19 -0.27% -0.24% 10.13% -0.0619 0.8410 -0.9808 0.4000 1.4148 3.7700 
20 0.44% -0.04% 10.57% 0.1090 0.7629 1.9048 0.4121 1.4157 3.8819 
21 -0.39% -0.31% 10.18% -0.0727 0.7826 -1.2394 0.3959 1.4005 3.7701 
22 -0.53% -0.45% 9.65% -0.1782 0.7623 -3.1167 0.3641 1.3982 3.4729 
23 -0.63% -0.29% 9.02% -0.1228 1.1198 -1.4619 0.3415 1.4084 3.2330 
24 0.41% 0.09% 9.43% 0.0848 0.9060 1.2478 0.3503 1.3885 3.3643 
25 -0.25% -0.29% 9.18% -0.0794 0.8087 -1.3088 0.3348 1.3936 3.2033 
26 0.07% -0.15% 9.25% -0.0033 1.0420 -0.0418 0.3307 1.3772 3.2021 
27 -0.50% -0.17% 8.75% -0.0408 1.1146 -0.4878 0.3214 1.3630 3.1441 
28 -0.36% -0.17% 8.38% -0.0822 0.7798 -1.4050 0.3063 1.3520 3.0214 
29 0.08% 0.07% 8.47% 0.0227 0.8557 0.3539 0.3065 1.3451 3.0382 
30 0.01% 0.10% 8.48% 0.0052 0.7040 0.0978 0.3042 1.3408 3.0251 
          
-1 to 1     4.15% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06226 0.5753 1.6276 4.7135 
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Table-A 6.3 Market returns to Domestic Targets; MM firms; (OLS, 165); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.30% -0.06% 0.30% 0.1093 1.0180 1.3840 0.1093 1.0180 1.3840 
-19 0.15% 0.03% 0.45% 0.0627 0.8727 0.9260 0.1217 0.9775 1.6037 
-18 0.14% -0.34% 0.59% 0.0474 1.0346 0.5903 0.1267 0.9544 1.7106 
-17 0.31% -0.05% 0.90% 0.0907 1.0019 1.1660 0.1550 1.0685 1.8699 
-16 -0.02% 0.00% 0.88% -0.0669 0.9109 -0.9461 0.1088 1.0536 1.3303 
-15 0.18% 0.02% 1.05% 0.0571 0.9832 0.7483 0.1226 1.1160 1.4157 
-14 0.18% 0.10% 1.23% 0.0561 1.1241 0.6428 0.1347 1.0953 1.5847 
-13 0.19% -0.24% 1.42% 0.0309 1.1413 0.3489 0.1369 1.1119 1.5869 
-12 0.67% 0.03% 2.09% 0.1685 1.0153 2.1390 0.1853 1.1366 2.1004 
-11 0.16% -0.03% 2.25% 0.0315 1.1104 0.3659 0.1857 1.1542 2.0736 
-10 0.57% 0.11% 2.83% 0.1600 1.1392 1.8098 0.2253 1.2080 2.4038 
-9 0.71% 0.06% 3.54% 0.1478 1.0928 1.7433 0.2584 1.2150 2.7408 
-8 -0.17% -0.27% 3.37% -0.0304 0.9711 -0.4034 0.2398 1.2268 2.5194 
-7 0.24% 0.11% 3.61% 0.0723 1.0771 0.8648 0.2504 1.2071 2.6736 
-6 0.84% 0.22% 4.46% 0.2343 1.0866 2.7787 0.3024 1.2015 3.2437 
-5 1.06% 0.33% 5.52% 0.2612 1.1507 2.9254 0.3581 1.1892 3.8807 
-4 0.17% -0.29% 5.69% 0.0742 1.0325 0.9263 0.3655 1.1973 3.9331 
-3 0.59% -0.03% 6.29% 0.1599 1.0807 1.9068 0.3929 1.1776 4.2987 
-2 0.63% 0.14% 6.92% 0.1759 1.0235 2.2149 0.4227 1.1573 4.7069 
-1 1.42% 0.77% 8.34% 0.3957 1.3803 3.6936 0.5005 1.1933 5.4047 
0 1.80% 1.02% 10.14% 0.4479 1.6331 3.5337 0.5862 1.2236 6.1730 
1 0.97% 0.15% 11.10% 0.2031 1.8040 1.4506 0.6160 1.2710 6.2451 
2 0.10% -0.29% 11.20% 0.0142 1.3103 0.1398 0.6054 1.3045 5.9803 
3 -0.48% -0.23% 10.72% -0.1249 1.4262 -1.1282 0.5672 1.3398 5.4550 
4 -0.64% -0.32% 10.08% -0.1442 1.0805 -1.7194 0.5269 1.3175 5.1534 
5 -0.60% -0.42% 9.47% -0.1194 0.8498 -1.8111 0.4932 1.3030 4.8779 
6 -0.05% -0.25% 9.43% 0.0121 0.8794 0.1767 0.4863 1.3103 4.7827 
7 -0.12% -0.06% 9.31% -0.0046 0.9938 -0.0600 0.4767 1.3294 4.6205 
8 -0.17% -0.20% 9.14% -0.0103 1.0940 -0.1216 0.4665 1.3272 4.5292 
9 0.16% -0.20% 9.30% 0.0905 1.0382 1.1237 0.4752 1.3452 4.5518 
10 0.05% 0.07% 9.35% 0.0315 0.8129 0.4996 0.4731 1.3572 4.4920 
11 0.32% 0.04% 9.67% 0.0613 1.0059 0.7855 0.4765 1.3868 4.4276 
12 -0.27% 0.08% 9.40% -0.0593 1.4696 -0.5201 0.4589 1.4582 4.0552 
13 -0.15% -0.14% 9.26% -0.0438 0.8742 -0.6454 0.4446 1.4283 4.0109 
14 -0.12% 0.03% 9.13% -0.0020 0.7747 -0.0332 0.4378 1.4227 3.9658 
15 0.30% -0.12% 9.43% 0.0285 0.8713 0.4208 0.4365 1.3942 4.0340 
16 -0.31% -0.13% 9.12% -0.0869 0.8708 -1.2860 0.4162 1.4056 3.8161 
17 0.04% -0.10% 9.16% 0.0529 0.8616 0.7915 0.4193 1.4006 3.8578 
18 0.15% -0.09% 9.31% 0.0166 0.8300 0.2583 0.4166 1.3961 3.8451 
19 -0.32% -0.30% 8.99% -0.0719 0.8503 -1.0901 0.4000 1.4050 3.6682 
20 0.42% -0.08% 9.41% 0.1101 0.7735 1.8346 0.4122 1.4056 3.7793 
21 -0.48% -0.32% 8.93% -0.0953 0.7644 -1.6066 0.3926 1.3943 3.6285 
22 -0.63% -0.51% 8.30% -0.1953 0.7660 -3.2855 0.3582 1.3925 3.3150 
23 -0.18% -0.26% 8.12% -0.0573 0.8618 -0.8562 0.3455 1.3967 3.1877 
24 0.43% 0.09% 8.55% 0.0936 0.9107 1.3238 0.3556 1.3743 3.3342 
25 -0.16% -0.28% 8.39% -0.0701 0.8154 -1.1082 0.3414 1.3799 3.1878 
26 -0.28% -0.15% 8.11% -0.0432 0.6955 -0.8000 0.3314 1.3655 3.1274 
27 -0.10% -0.17% 8.01% 0.0024 0.8143 0.0380 0.3283 1.3504 3.1326 
28 -0.35% -0.16% 7.67% -0.0790 0.7904 -1.2883 0.3136 1.3386 3.0192 
29 0.05% 0.02% 7.72% 0.0280 0.8521 0.4235 0.3144 1.3298 3.0469 
30 0.01% 0.10% 7.72% -0.0080 0.6789 -0.1512 0.3102 1.3299 3.0060 
          
-1 to 1     4.18% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06175 0.6042 1.6116 4.8314 
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Table-A 6.4 FF returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 163); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.11% -0.13% 0.11% 0.0887 1.0565 1.1140 0.0887 1.0565 1.1140 
-19 0.14% 0.02% 0.25% 0.0685 0.8537 1.0607 0.1111 0.9610 1.5331 
-18 0.40% -0.17% 0.65% 0.0757 1.0315 0.9737 0.1350 0.9512 1.8827 
-17 0.09% -0.04% 0.74% 0.0756 1.0084 0.9939 0.1546 1.0507 1.9511 
-16 0.11% -0.23% 0.85% -0.0280 0.9233 -0.4020 0.1257 1.0141 1.6445 
-15 0.41% -0.09% 1.26% 0.0833 0.9968 1.1082 0.1488 1.0519 1.8760 
-14 0.48% 0.09% 1.74% 0.0849 1.1094 1.0157 0.1695 1.0551 2.1308 
-13 0.19% -0.24% 1.93% 0.0198 1.1896 0.2204 0.1656 1.0847 2.0249 
-12 0.94% 0.05% 2.87% 0.2089 1.0051 2.7567 0.2258 1.0930 2.7396 
-11 0.09% 0.19% 2.97% 0.0510 1.0919 0.6201 0.2304 1.1146 2.7414 
-10 0.54% 0.24% 3.50% 0.1440 1.1141 1.7149 0.2631 1.1415 3.0577 
-9 1.71% 0.16% 5.22% 0.2567 1.5060 2.2610 0.3260 1.1879 3.6405 
-8 -0.42% -0.11% 4.80% -0.0248 1.0315 -0.3183 0.3064 1.1677 3.4800 
-7 0.20% 0.17% 5.00% 0.0716 1.0528 0.8988 0.3140 1.1354 3.6685 
-6 1.04% 0.43% 6.04% 0.2582 1.0929 3.1332 0.3701 1.1379 4.3145 
-5 1.05% 0.09% 7.09% 0.2528 1.1796 2.8429 0.4215 1.1627 4.8089 
-4 0.24% -0.25% 7.33% 0.1021 1.0258 1.3201 0.4337 1.1857 4.8515 
-3 0.95% 0.39% 8.28% 0.2218 1.1015 2.6704 0.4737 1.1786 5.3317 
-2 0.70% 0.07% 8.98% 0.1737 1.0547 2.1840 0.5009 1.1720 5.6689 
-1 1.52% 1.19% 10.50% 0.4009 1.4401 3.6928 0.5777 1.2171 6.2953 
0 1.77% 1.12% 12.27% 0.4301 1.6174 3.5273 0.6576 1.2322 7.0786 
1 0.72% 0.54% 12.99% 0.1421 1.7058 1.1053 0.6728 1.2707 7.0231 
2 0.10% -0.37% 13.09% 0.0222 1.3053 0.2254 0.6627 1.3073 6.7235 
3 -0.63% -0.25% 12.46% -0.1407 1.4173 -1.3164 0.6197 1.3467 6.1031 
4 -0.62% -0.81% 11.83% -0.1789 1.0728 -2.2119 0.5714 1.3126 5.7737 
5 -0.65% -0.53% 11.18% -0.1321 0.8781 -1.9959 0.5344 1.3039 5.4363 
6 0.03% -0.17% 11.21% 0.0355 0.8644 0.5449 0.5313 1.3215 5.3323 
7 -0.62% -0.04% 10.60% -0.0896 1.1822 -1.0055 0.5046 1.3416 4.9890 
8 -0.20% -0.26% 10.40% -0.0377 1.1761 -0.4250 0.4889 1.3430 4.8284 
9 0.07% -0.09% 10.47% 0.0520 1.0630 0.6492 0.4902 1.3517 4.8103 
10 0.73% 0.20% 11.20% 0.1089 1.3374 1.0803 0.5018 1.3699 4.8586 
11 0.14% -0.30% 11.33% 0.0088 1.0574 0.1110 0.4955 1.4025 4.6861 
12 -0.43% -0.28% 10.90% -0.1131 1.4935 -1.0042 0.4680 1.4791 4.1968 
13 -0.12% -0.14% 10.78% -0.0297 0.9712 -0.4051 0.4560 1.4455 4.1846 
14 0.01% 0.17% 10.80% 0.0147 0.8321 0.2344 0.4519 1.4395 4.1642 
15 0.30% 0.05% 11.10% 0.0179 0.8869 0.2667 0.4486 1.4129 4.2114 
16 -0.21% -0.24% 10.89% -0.0888 0.9544 -1.2297 0.4280 1.4339 3.9587 
17 -0.07% 0.00% 10.82% 0.0364 0.8635 0.5570 0.4282 1.4312 3.9682 
18 0.20% -0.05% 11.02% 0.0442 0.8163 0.7151 0.4296 1.4255 3.9977 
19 -0.28% -0.23% 10.75% -0.0548 0.8030 -0.9018 0.4156 1.4335 3.8454 
20 0.34% 0.00% 11.09% 0.0831 0.7987 1.3759 0.4234 1.4264 3.9369 
21 -0.34% -0.35% 10.75% -0.0449 0.8268 -0.7182 0.4114 1.4121 3.8642 
22 -0.51% -0.35% 10.25% -0.1728 0.8026 -2.8464 0.3804 1.4098 3.5786 
23 -0.60% -0.14% 9.65% -0.1196 1.1225 -1.4037 0.3583 1.4172 3.3531 
24 0.42% 0.27% 10.07% 0.0846 0.9012 1.2367 0.3667 1.4032 3.4668 
25 -0.23% -0.52% 9.84% -0.0655 0.8213 -1.0511 0.3532 1.4044 3.3361 
26 -0.02% -0.33% 9.82% -0.0273 1.1113 -0.3234 0.3455 1.4008 3.2719 
27 -0.51% -0.21% 9.31% -0.0306 1.1439 -0.3529 0.3376 1.3813 3.2419 
28 -0.31% -0.30% 9.00% -0.0773 0.8321 -1.2240 0.3233 1.3709 3.1278 
29 0.18% 0.06% 9.18% 0.0431 0.8886 0.6394 0.3261 1.3632 3.1728 
30 0.19% 0.05% 9.36% 0.0467 0.7779 0.7916 0.3294 1.3607 3.2106 
          
-1 to 1     4.01% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05766 0.5619 1.6435 4.5346 
 
  
  
6-70 
 
Table-A 6.5 FF returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (MM, 158); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.55% 0.00% 0.55% 0.2175 1.2798 2.1723 0.2175 1.2798 2.1723 
-19 0.45% 0.18% 1.00% 0.2041 0.9981 2.6061 0.2972 1.2119 3.1353 
-18 0.48% 0.04% 1.48% 0.1558 1.1951 1.6667 0.3332 1.1278 3.7765 
-17 0.45% 0.15% 1.93% 0.1594 1.1775 1.7306 0.3682 1.3085 3.5972 
-16 0.19% -0.07% 2.12% 0.0144 1.0205 0.1799 0.3358 1.2711 3.3768 
-15 0.42% 0.05% 2.54% 0.1333 1.1261 1.5127 0.3609 1.2845 3.5916 
-14 0.36% 0.26% 2.90% 0.1210 1.3600 1.1378 0.3794 1.2996 3.7325 
-13 0.40% 0.17% 3.30% 0.1017 1.3829 0.9397 0.3910 1.3130 3.8065 
-12 0.92% 0.22% 4.22% 0.2860 1.1602 3.1512 0.4640 1.3406 4.4244 
-11 0.43% 0.32% 4.65% 0.1439 1.3158 1.3980 0.4857 1.3654 4.5477 
-10 0.74% 0.26% 5.39% 0.2102 1.3518 1.9875 0.5265 1.4036 4.7957 
-9 0.96% 0.28% 6.35% 0.2875 1.3220 2.7804 0.5871 1.4161 5.3005 
-8 0.22% 0.09% 6.57% 0.0777 1.1064 0.8975 0.5856 1.4151 5.2904 
-7 0.53% 0.30% 7.10% 0.1694 1.2010 1.7970 0.6089 1.3717 5.6749 
-6 1.08% 0.58% 8.18% 0.3955 1.4343 3.5250 0.6909 1.3562 6.5126 
-5 1.38% 0.46% 9.57% 0.3741 1.3776 3.4714 0.7624 1.3797 7.0644 
-4 0.54% -0.05% 10.11% 0.1802 1.1614 1.9832 0.7833 1.4056 7.1236 
-3 0.84% 0.30% 10.95% 0.2571 1.2721 2.5837 0.8217 1.4029 7.4878 
-2 0.79% 0.07% 11.73% 0.2431 1.2617 2.4634 0.8554 1.3888 7.8742 
-1 1.74% 1.30% 13.48% 0.5529 1.6987 4.1611 0.9571 1.4733 8.3051 
0 1.95% 1.31% 15.43% 0.5447 1.9133 3.6391 1.0529 1.5127 8.8978 
1 0.90% 0.75% 16.32% 0.1605 2.2209 0.9239 1.0629 1.5676 8.6679 
2 0.39% -0.22% 16.72% 0.0771 1.5305 0.6436 1.0557 1.6070 8.3979 
3 -0.40% -0.06% 16.32% -0.1274 1.6610 -0.9806 1.0070 1.6678 7.7193 
4 -0.55% -0.51% 15.77% -0.1376 1.2933 -1.3599 0.9593 1.6228 7.5572 
5 -0.34% -0.25% 15.43% -0.0729 0.9750 -0.9556 0.9264 1.6155 7.3307 
6 0.24% 0.07% 15.67% 0.1091 1.0126 1.3776 0.9301 1.6305 7.2924 
7 0.02% 0.07% 15.69% 0.0532 1.1992 0.5669 0.9233 1.6486 7.1595 
8 0.03% -0.04% 15.72% 0.0467 1.3747 0.4342 0.9159 1.6590 7.0580 
9 0.37% 0.10% 16.09% 0.1680 1.2683 1.6935 0.9313 1.6789 7.0911 
10 0.20% 0.41% 16.29% 0.0757 1.0276 0.9416 0.9298 1.6986 6.9975 
11 0.43% 0.09% 16.72% 0.1313 1.2557 1.3372 0.9384 1.7343 6.9169 
12 -0.14% -0.11% 16.58% -0.0372 1.7695 -0.2689 0.9173 1.8390 6.3763 
13 0.10% -0.07% 16.68% -0.0043 1.1467 -0.0475 0.9030 1.8035 6.4010 
14 0.10% 0.15% 16.78% 0.0480 0.9228 0.6653 0.8981 1.8032 6.3672 
15 0.62% 0.18% 17.39% 0.1209 1.0625 1.4496 0.9056 1.7746 6.5237 
16 -0.09% 0.04% 17.30% -0.0155 1.2024 -0.1640 0.8907 1.7955 6.3418 
17 0.23% 0.20% 17.53% 0.1270 1.0473 1.5448 0.8994 1.7989 6.3917 
18 0.51% 0.06% 18.05% 0.0892 1.0446 1.0885 0.9020 1.7792 6.4807 
19 -0.07% 0.02% 17.98% 0.0190 1.0117 0.2390 0.8936 1.7836 6.4046 
20 0.61% 0.06% 18.59% 0.2026 0.9841 2.6237 0.9140 1.7656 6.6182 
21 -0.18% -0.19% 18.40% 0.0348 0.9571 0.4632 0.9084 1.7621 6.5906 
22 -0.38% -0.35% 18.02% -0.1589 0.9454 -2.1415 0.8737 1.7710 6.3067 
23 0.08% 0.01% 18.10% 0.0219 0.9408 0.2961 0.8671 1.7765 6.2395 
24 0.62% 0.32% 18.72% 0.1903 0.9833 2.4582 0.8855 1.7543 6.4523 
25 0.11% -0.17% 18.83% 0.0258 0.9228 0.3548 0.8796 1.7510 6.4220 
26 -0.14% -0.20% 18.69% -0.0115 0.8555 -0.1705 0.8686 1.7390 6.3857 
27 0.17% -0.01% 18.86% 0.0662 0.9568 0.8787 0.8690 1.7265 6.4349 
28 -0.13% -0.02% 18.73% -0.0408 0.9792 -0.5296 0.8544 1.7118 6.3810 
29 0.39% 0.31% 19.12% 0.1204 1.0236 1.4939 0.8627 1.6939 6.5108 
30 0.44% 0.32% 19.56% 0.1213 0.8525 1.8063 0.8711 1.6907 6.5865 
          
-1 to 1     4.59% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0575 0.7264 2.0645 4.4978 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-71 
 
Table-A 6.6 Market returns to Domestic Targets; FF-firms; (OLS, 163); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% -0.07% 0.06% 0.0713 1.0665 0.8664 0.0713 1.0665 0.8664 
-19 0.15% 0.04% 0.22% 0.0630 0.8597 0.9493 0.0950 0.9689 1.2700 
-18 0.36% -0.27% 0.57% 0.0650 0.9987 0.8430 0.1151 0.9664 1.5427 
-17 0.04% -0.06% 0.62% 0.0492 0.9819 0.6496 0.1243 1.0440 1.5422 
-16 0.15% 0.00% 0.76% -0.0137 0.9058 -0.1956 0.1050 1.0332 1.3170 
-15 0.42% 0.09% 1.18% 0.0879 0.9762 1.1665 0.1318 1.0803 1.5803 
-14 0.41% 0.10% 1.59% 0.0694 1.1161 0.8051 0.1482 1.0546 1.8206 
-13 0.23% -0.20% 1.82% 0.0418 1.1469 0.4718 0.1534 1.1050 1.7986 
-12 0.77% 0.00% 2.60% 0.1650 1.0268 2.0824 0.1996 1.1368 2.2752 
-11 0.04% 0.02% 2.64% 0.0318 1.0939 0.3772 0.1995 1.1698 2.2091 
-10 0.47% 0.14% 3.11% 0.1198 1.0862 1.4293 0.2263 1.2006 2.4422 
-9 1.68% 0.06% 4.79% 0.2288 1.4936 1.9850 0.2827 1.2389 2.9568 
-8 -0.52% -0.27% 4.28% -0.0499 1.0502 -0.6153 0.2578 1.2342 2.7064 
-7 0.13% 0.00% 4.40% 0.0491 1.0562 0.6024 0.2616 1.2068 2.8080 
-6 0.94% 0.24% 5.35% 0.2341 1.0789 2.8116 0.3131 1.2093 3.3549 
-5 1.01% 0.28% 6.35% 0.2422 1.1524 2.7227 0.3637 1.1975 3.9353 
-4 0.13% -0.27% 6.49% 0.0786 1.0165 1.0021 0.3720 1.1995 4.0176 
-3 0.92% 0.03% 7.40% 0.2097 1.0952 2.4801 0.4109 1.1816 4.5054 
-2 0.77% 0.14% 8.17% 0.1910 1.0433 2.3724 0.4438 1.1688 4.9190 
-1 1.54% 0.96% 9.72% 0.4009 1.3918 3.7315 0.5222 1.2022 5.6273 
0 1.79% 0.93% 11.50% 0.4106 1.5953 3.3348 0.5992 1.2261 6.3315 
1 0.57% 0.03% 12.07% 0.1027 1.6957 0.7843 0.6073 1.2741 6.1753 
2 0.07% -0.29% 12.14% 0.0198 1.3129 0.1954 0.5981 1.3036 5.9438 
3 -0.71% -0.32% 11.43% -0.1566 1.4062 -1.4432 0.5535 1.3330 5.3797 
4 -0.49% -0.32% 10.94% -0.1431 1.0988 -1.6870 0.5137 1.3173 5.0522 
5 -0.75% -0.47% 10.20% -0.1475 0.8913 -2.1438 0.4748 1.3039 4.7177 
6 -0.11% -0.30% 10.08% -0.0083 0.8727 -0.1232 0.4643 1.3109 4.5892 
7 -0.48% -0.07% 9.61% -0.0503 1.1837 -0.5502 0.4465 1.3394 4.3187 
8 -0.20% -0.22% 9.40% -0.0277 1.1256 -0.3183 0.4336 1.3398 4.1927 
9 0.15% -0.20% 9.55% 0.0756 1.0473 0.9357 0.4401 1.3625 4.1848 
10 0.83% 0.07% 10.38% 0.1376 1.2874 1.3850 0.4576 1.3791 4.2993 
11 0.24% 0.04% 10.62% 0.0381 1.0231 0.4826 0.4572 1.4148 4.1866 
12 -0.40% -0.08% 10.22% -0.0863 1.4663 -0.7625 0.4352 1.4801 3.8094 
13 -0.14% -0.09% 10.09% -0.0272 0.8918 -0.3946 0.4241 1.4459 3.7997 
14 0.03% 0.08% 10.12% 0.0227 0.7824 0.3757 0.4218 1.4380 3.8002 
15 0.26% -0.13% 10.38% 0.0081 0.8734 0.1199 0.4173 1.4095 3.8353 
16 -0.27% -0.11% 10.11% -0.0892 0.8993 -1.2854 0.3969 1.4273 3.6027 
17 -0.12% -0.18% 9.99% 0.0212 0.8773 0.3125 0.3951 1.4261 3.5892 
18 0.16% -0.07% 10.15% 0.0373 0.8243 0.5867 0.3960 1.4229 3.6054 
19 -0.25% -0.22% 9.90% -0.0503 0.8514 -0.7661 0.3830 1.4302 3.4696 
20 0.41% -0.08% 10.31% 0.0999 0.7688 1.6830 0.3939 1.4291 3.5711 
21 -0.40% -0.32% 9.91% -0.0683 0.7863 -1.1259 0.3787 1.4140 3.4694 
22 -0.60% -0.51% 9.31% -0.1978 0.7672 -3.3398 0.3441 1.4115 3.1581 
23 -0.60% -0.26% 8.71% -0.1166 1.1274 -1.3401 0.3226 1.4249 2.9328 
24 0.45% 0.10% 9.15% 0.0984 0.9046 1.4086 0.3336 1.4060 3.0741 
25 -0.34% -0.37% 8.81% -0.1034 0.8052 -1.6644 0.3147 1.4095 2.8929 
26 0.02% -0.17% 8.83% -0.0219 1.0548 -0.2688 0.3082 1.3930 2.8662 
27 -0.44% -0.17% 8.39% -0.0244 1.1147 -0.2833 0.3014 1.3816 2.8266 
28 -0.35% -0.18% 8.04% -0.0766 0.7893 -1.2567 0.2874 1.3714 2.7149 
29 0.12% 0.14% 8.16% 0.0333 0.8618 0.5007 0.2892 1.3636 2.7477 
30 0.04% 0.13% 8.20% 0.0132 0.6999 0.2450 0.2882 1.3586 2.7485 
          
-1 to 1     3.90% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05981 0.5278 1.6293 4.1967 
 
 
 
  
  
6-72 
 
Table-A 6.7 Market returns to Domestic Targets; FF-firms; (MM, 158); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.54% 0.16% 0.54% 0.2010 1.2948 1.9516 0.2010 1.2948 1.9516 
-19 0.42% 0.14% 0.95% 0.1901 1.0003 2.3898 0.2766 1.2072 2.8803 
-18 0.43% -0.07% 1.38% 0.1296 1.1806 1.3801 0.3007 1.1317 3.3397 
-17 0.38% 0.10% 1.76% 0.1263 1.1581 1.3713 0.3235 1.2860 3.1628 
-16 0.22% 0.08% 1.98% 0.0145 1.0101 0.1799 0.2958 1.2665 2.9367 
-15 0.42% 0.28% 2.39% 0.1299 1.0969 1.4892 0.3231 1.2837 3.1642 
-14 0.34% 0.16% 2.74% 0.1069 1.3524 0.9940 0.3396 1.2689 3.3643 
-13 0.42% -0.03% 3.16% 0.1128 1.3471 1.0532 0.3575 1.3125 3.4246 
-12 0.81% 0.12% 3.97% 0.2421 1.1695 2.6025 0.4178 1.3661 3.8447 
-11 0.40% 0.24% 4.37% 0.1165 1.3067 1.1206 0.4332 1.4021 3.8839 
-10 0.68% 0.30% 5.05% 0.1797 1.3222 1.7090 0.4672 1.4446 4.0660 
-9 0.96% 0.21% 6.01% 0.2600 1.3142 2.4875 0.5224 1.4506 4.5271 
-8 0.12% -0.02% 6.13% 0.0368 1.1240 0.4121 0.5121 1.4620 4.4035 
-7 0.45% 0.43% 6.58% 0.1329 1.2008 1.3916 0.5290 1.4247 4.6680 
-6 1.05% 0.50% 7.63% 0.3822 1.4484 3.3171 0.6097 1.4168 5.4104 
-5 1.30% 0.43% 8.93% 0.3457 1.3742 3.1630 0.6768 1.4049 6.0563 
-4 0.45% 0.02% 9.38% 0.1560 1.1647 1.6841 0.6944 1.4110 6.1872 
-3 0.86% 0.18% 10.25% 0.2520 1.2814 2.4722 0.7343 1.3985 6.6006 
-2 0.87% 0.34% 11.11% 0.2662 1.2562 2.6638 0.7758 1.3865 7.0340 
-1 1.75% 1.23% 12.86% 0.5469 1.6472 4.1740 0.8784 1.4584 7.5721 
0 1.95% 1.14% 14.81% 0.5129 1.8761 3.4369 0.9691 1.5053 8.0938 
1 0.83% 0.39% 15.64% 0.1204 2.1868 0.6924 0.9725 1.5642 7.8163 
2 0.35% -0.14% 16.00% 0.0644 1.5312 0.5288 0.9646 1.5939 7.6080 
3 -0.45% -0.13% 15.54% -0.1400 1.6493 -1.0674 0.9157 1.6465 6.9917 
4 -0.40% -0.16% 15.14% -0.1002 1.3389 -0.9410 0.8772 1.6157 6.8250 
5 -0.43% -0.24% 14.71% -0.1013 0.9836 -1.2948 0.8403 1.6016 6.5954 
6 0.11% -0.03% 14.82% 0.0535 1.0097 0.6658 0.8348 1.5996 6.5614 
7 0.13% 0.10% 14.96% 0.0975 1.2123 1.0112 0.8382 1.6211 6.5006 
8 0.06% -0.13% 15.01% 0.0534 1.3061 0.5137 0.8336 1.6290 6.4328 
9 0.42% 0.03% 15.43% 0.1791 1.2387 1.8177 0.8522 1.6567 6.4673 
10 0.31% 0.33% 15.74% 0.1015 0.9873 1.2927 0.8566 1.6781 6.4174 
11 0.55% 0.17% 16.29% 0.1590 1.2057 1.6582 0.8712 1.7119 6.3982 
12 -0.11% 0.10% 16.18% -0.0150 1.7379 -0.1084 0.8553 1.8042 5.9599 
13 0.05% -0.01% 16.23% -0.0139 1.0724 -0.1630 0.8403 1.7696 5.9697 
14 0.08% 0.15% 16.31% 0.0433 0.8826 0.6172 0.8355 1.7660 5.9478 
15 0.53% 0.05% 16.84% 0.0986 1.0587 1.1714 0.8403 1.7391 6.0740 
16 -0.10% 0.07% 16.74% -0.0211 1.1669 -0.2272 0.8254 1.7579 5.9025 
17 0.22% 0.06% 16.96% 0.1056 1.0758 1.2339 0.8316 1.7658 5.9202 
18 0.44% 0.02% 17.40% 0.0743 1.0548 0.8850 0.8327 1.7528 5.9725 
19 -0.07% -0.02% 17.33% 0.0099 1.0689 0.1164 0.8238 1.7589 5.8882 
20 0.61% 0.14% 17.94% 0.2077 0.9767 2.6732 0.8461 1.7490 6.0818 
21 -0.29% -0.17% 17.65% -0.0020 0.9232 -0.0272 0.8357 1.7443 6.0230 
22 -0.48% -0.35% 17.17% -0.1952 0.9241 -2.6551 0.7962 1.7523 5.7119 
23 0.08% -0.04% 17.26% 0.0166 0.9612 0.2166 0.7896 1.7576 5.6474 
24 0.70% 0.18% 17.95% 0.2063 1.0130 2.5605 0.8115 1.7324 5.8887 
25 0.00% -0.15% 17.95% -0.0203 0.9121 -0.2800 0.7996 1.7314 5.8061 
26 -0.11% -0.11% 17.85% -0.0014 0.8144 -0.0209 0.7909 1.7138 5.8017 
27 0.21% -0.01% 18.05% 0.0586 0.9522 0.7736 0.7910 1.7000 5.8499 
28 -0.11% -0.05% 17.95% -0.0308 0.9369 -0.4127 0.7785 1.6864 5.8039 
29 0.29% 0.26% 18.24% 0.0998 1.0153 1.2359 0.7848 1.6698 5.9091 
30 0.25% 0.29% 18.49% 0.0727 0.7893 1.1582 0.7873 1.6645 5.9461 
          
-1 to 1     4.53% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05943 0.6814 2.0221 4.2364 
 
 
 
  
  
6-73 
 
Table-A 6.8 SW-1 returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 170); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.08% -0.04% 0.08% 0.0811 1.0715 1.0109 0.0811 1.0715 1.0109 
-19 0.07% 0.09% 0.15% 0.0398 0.8822 0.6023 0.0855 1.0054 1.1355 
-18 0.29% -0.18% 0.45% 0.0517 1.0459 0.6600 0.0996 0.9862 1.3492 
-17 0.17% 0.03% 0.62% 0.0794 1.0108 1.0497 0.1260 1.0720 1.5699 
-16 0.14% 0.07% 0.76% -0.0354 0.9236 -0.5121 0.0968 1.0485 1.2338 
-15 0.39% 0.08% 1.15% 0.0801 0.9984 1.0723 0.1211 1.1100 1.4577 
-14 0.42% 0.16% 1.57% 0.0829 1.1469 0.9660 0.1435 1.0980 1.7457 
-13 0.14% -0.21% 1.72% 0.0288 1.1350 0.3396 0.1444 1.1174 1.7265 
-12 0.92% 0.14% 2.63% 0.1990 1.0223 2.6003 0.2025 1.1377 2.3776 
-11 0.00% 0.05% 2.63% 0.0110 1.1212 0.1311 0.1956 1.1536 2.2648 
-10 0.54% 0.17% 3.17% 0.1404 1.1241 1.6690 0.2288 1.1979 2.5517 
-9 1.57% 0.11% 4.74% 0.2041 1.4733 1.8509 0.2780 1.2231 3.0364 
-8 -0.59% -0.34% 4.16% -0.0783 1.0598 -0.9873 0.2454 1.2088 2.7118 
-7 0.14% 0.02% 4.29% 0.0557 1.0737 0.6926 0.2513 1.1820 2.8405 
-6 0.95% 0.34% 5.24% 0.2414 1.0731 3.0054 0.3051 1.1786 3.4586 
-5 1.00% 0.25% 6.24% 0.2396 1.1405 2.8069 0.3553 1.1617 4.0865 
-4 0.08% -0.24% 6.33% 0.0561 1.0220 0.7326 0.3583 1.1651 4.1087 
-3 0.88% 0.06% 7.20% 0.2006 1.1003 2.4359 0.3955 1.1512 4.5900 
-2 0.73% 0.09% 7.93% 0.1763 1.0381 2.2682 0.4254 1.1327 5.0173 
-1 1.43% 0.83% 9.37% 0.3799 1.3713 3.7008 0.4996 1.1665 5.7216 
0 1.77% 0.86% 11.13% 0.4193 1.6309 3.4345 0.5790 1.1973 6.4607 
1 0.95% 0.09% 12.09% 0.1960 1.7817 1.4700 0.6075 1.2404 6.5433 
2 0.11% -0.28% 12.19% 0.0266 1.2962 0.2737 0.5997 1.2730 6.2937 
3 -0.57% -0.36% 11.62% -0.1267 1.4174 -1.1944 0.5612 1.2964 5.7833 
4 -0.53% -0.33% 11.09% -0.1413 1.0727 -1.7600 0.5216 1.2751 5.4648 
5 -0.71% -0.47% 10.38% -0.1418 0.8786 -2.1560 0.4837 1.2631 5.1156 
6 -0.05% -0.29% 10.33% 0.0103 0.8776 0.1571 0.4766 1.2708 5.0103 
7 -0.47% -0.12% 9.86% -0.0482 1.1693 -0.5512 0.4589 1.3001 4.7155 
8 -0.22% -0.28% 9.63% -0.0288 1.1136 -0.3453 0.4456 1.3001 4.5787 
9 0.09% -0.14% 9.72% 0.0718 1.0456 0.9171 0.4512 1.3219 4.5598 
10 0.77% 0.13% 10.50% 0.1220 1.2704 1.2829 0.4658 1.3362 4.6568 
11 0.25% -0.04% 10.75% 0.0450 1.0124 0.5938 0.4664 1.3698 4.5485 
12 -0.35% -0.16% 10.40% -0.0731 1.4431 -0.6767 0.4466 1.4322 4.1654 
13 -0.12% -0.07% 10.28% -0.0327 0.8667 -0.5034 0.4343 1.4038 4.1335 
14 0.00% 0.09% 10.28% 0.0119 0.7944 0.1994 0.4301 1.3980 4.1098 
15 0.21% -0.15% 10.49% 0.0013 0.8797 0.0203 0.4243 1.3713 4.1336 
16 -0.30% -0.10% 10.19% -0.0973 0.8807 -1.4755 0.4025 1.3865 3.8784 
17 -0.04% -0.17% 10.14% 0.0416 0.8631 0.6438 0.4040 1.3864 3.8924 
18 0.16% 0.03% 10.30% 0.0269 0.8279 0.4339 0.4030 1.3808 3.8994 
19 -0.23% -0.19% 10.07% -0.0561 0.8397 -0.8926 0.3891 1.3864 3.7494 
20 0.46% -0.01% 10.53% 0.1098 0.7562 1.9398 0.4015 1.3884 3.8630 
21 -0.40% -0.34% 10.13% -0.0780 0.7782 -1.3387 0.3846 1.3750 3.7371 
22 -0.56% -0.44% 9.57% -0.1846 0.7741 -3.1863 0.3520 1.3720 3.4272 
23 -0.63% -0.29% 8.94% -0.1216 1.1269 -1.4417 0.3296 1.3816 3.1872 
24 0.37% 0.03% 9.30% 0.0700 0.8834 1.0594 0.3364 1.3605 3.3031 
25 -0.19% -0.30% 9.12% -0.0645 0.8026 -1.0729 0.3232 1.3662 3.1604 
26 0.08% -0.12% 9.19% 0.0003 1.0455 0.0039 0.3198 1.3477 3.1698 
27 -0.43% -0.19% 8.77% -0.0267 1.1068 -0.3227 0.3126 1.3341 3.1301 
28 -0.35% -0.20% 8.42% -0.0813 0.7882 -1.3786 0.2978 1.3223 3.0082 
29 0.05% 0.11% 8.47% 0.0152 0.8616 0.2361 0.2969 1.3128 3.0216 
30 0.05% 0.03% 8.52% 0.0133 0.6930 0.2570 0.2959 1.3093 3.0187 
          
-1 to 1     4.15% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06424 0.5746 1.6136 4.7571 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6-74 
 
Table-A 6.9 SW-2 returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (OLS, 170); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.05% -0.07% 0.05% 0.0821 1.0604 1.0422 0.0821 1.0604 1.0422 
-19 0.12% 0.09% 0.18% 0.0480 0.8873 0.7290 0.0920 1.0060 1.2314 
-18 0.32% -0.21% 0.50% 0.0487 1.0438 0.6288 0.1033 0.9840 1.4131 
-17 0.23% -0.03% 0.73% 0.0917 1.0037 1.2304 0.1353 1.0652 1.7102 
-16 0.20% 0.01% 0.93% -0.0254 0.9131 -0.3748 0.1096 1.0416 1.4173 
-15 0.41% 0.08% 1.35% 0.0858 1.0053 1.1489 0.1351 1.1020 1.6507 
-14 0.35% 0.13% 1.69% 0.0692 1.1389 0.8185 0.1512 1.0846 1.8777 
-13 0.11% -0.17% 1.80% 0.0217 1.1203 0.2606 0.1491 1.1045 1.8182 
-12 0.92% 0.22% 2.72% 0.2006 1.0230 2.6399 0.2075 1.1242 2.4850 
-11 -0.10% -0.03% 2.62% -0.0091 1.1226 -0.1092 0.1940 1.1394 2.2919 
-10 0.51% 0.18% 3.13% 0.1333 1.1180 1.6048 0.2251 1.1806 2.5673 
-9 1.54% -0.02% 4.67% 0.1922 1.4651 1.7662 0.2710 1.2043 3.0298 
-8 -0.62% -0.40% 4.06% -0.0877 1.0670 -1.1073 0.2360 1.1893 2.6723 
-7 0.15% -0.02% 4.21% 0.0641 1.0728 0.8045 0.2446 1.1627 2.8324 
-6 0.95% 0.42% 5.16% 0.2409 1.0694 3.0324 0.2985 1.1624 3.4573 
-5 0.99% 0.21% 6.15% 0.2325 1.1452 2.7332 0.3471 1.1510 4.0604 
-4 0.09% -0.14% 6.24% 0.0554 1.0172 0.7336 0.3502 1.1557 4.0798 
-3 0.83% -0.01% 7.07% 0.1876 1.0869 2.3237 0.3845 1.1443 4.5247 
-2 0.69% 0.07% 7.76% 0.1607 1.0437 2.0736 0.4112 1.1214 4.9367 
-1 1.44% 0.85% 9.20% 0.3816 1.3637 3.7679 0.4861 1.1539 5.6717 
0 1.80% 1.03% 11.00% 0.4216 1.6094 3.5267 0.5663 1.1892 6.4123 
1 0.94% 0.02% 11.94% 0.1932 1.7766 1.4642 0.5945 1.2325 6.4950 
2 0.14% -0.18% 12.08% 0.0286 1.3025 0.2960 0.5874 1.2646 6.2543 
3 -0.55% -0.30% 11.53% -0.1210 1.4178 -1.1488 0.5504 1.2895 5.7468 
4 -0.52% -0.37% 11.01% -0.1386 1.0752 -1.7353 0.5115 1.2692 5.4265 
5 -0.75% -0.44% 10.26% -0.1478 0.8913 -2.2326 0.4726 1.2581 5.0580 
6 -0.09% -0.25% 10.17% 0.0008 0.8771 0.0129 0.4639 1.2663 4.9329 
7 -0.53% -0.10% 9.64% -0.0564 1.1712 -0.6487 0.4449 1.2962 4.6216 
8 -0.30% -0.22% 9.34% -0.0427 1.1176 -0.5141 0.4292 1.2999 4.4463 
9 0.08% -0.10% 9.42% 0.0699 1.0534 0.8931 0.4348 1.3248 4.4188 
10 0.70% 0.03% 10.12% 0.1117 1.2589 1.1951 0.4478 1.3391 4.5025 
11 0.24% 0.00% 10.36% 0.0438 1.0193 0.5785 0.4485 1.3738 4.3955 
12 -0.36% -0.12% 10.00% -0.0747 1.4428 -0.6972 0.4286 1.4378 4.0138 
13 -0.14% -0.12% 9.86% -0.0366 0.8749 -0.5626 0.4160 1.4131 3.9638 
14 -0.03% 0.07% 9.83% 0.0093 0.7950 0.1573 0.4116 1.4104 3.9291 
15 0.17% -0.04% 9.99% -0.0042 0.8825 -0.0647 0.4051 1.3814 3.9489 
16 -0.29% -0.07% 9.71% -0.0941 0.8760 -1.4462 0.3841 1.3947 3.7084 
17 -0.06% -0.07% 9.65% 0.0416 0.8598 0.6520 0.3858 1.3935 3.7279 
18 0.11% 0.02% 9.75% 0.0127 0.8521 0.2000 0.3829 1.3889 3.7116 
19 -0.26% -0.22% 9.49% -0.0585 0.8421 -0.9360 0.3688 1.3943 3.5612 
20 0.39% 0.01% 9.88% 0.0993 0.7638 1.7505 0.3798 1.3939 3.6684 
21 -0.35% -0.27% 9.53% -0.0744 0.7794 -1.2857 0.3637 1.3803 3.5481 
22 -0.57% -0.51% 8.95% -0.1845 0.7717 -3.2183 0.3314 1.3758 3.2428 
23 -0.63% -0.27% 8.32% -0.1282 1.1397 -1.5141 0.3082 1.3859 2.9947 
24 0.35% 0.09% 8.68% 0.0660 0.8711 1.0199 0.3146 1.3640 3.1060 
25 -0.22% -0.32% 8.46% -0.0736 0.7956 -1.2463 0.3003 1.3663 2.9597 
26 0.05% -0.09% 8.51% -0.0010 1.0414 -0.0133 0.2970 1.3447 2.9737 
27 -0.45% -0.22% 8.06% -0.0360 1.1111 -0.4364 0.2887 1.3312 2.9197 
28 -0.33% -0.34% 7.73% -0.0772 0.7985 -1.3011 0.2747 1.3229 2.7957 
29 0.06% 0.00% 7.79% 0.0142 0.8600 0.2217 0.2739 1.3108 2.8137 
30 0.03% -0.04% 7.82% 0.0062 0.6900 0.1203 0.2721 1.3075 2.8019 
          
-1 to 1     4.19% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06382 0.5752 1.5995 4.8423 
 
 
 
  
  
6-75 
 
Table-A 6.10 SW-3 returns to Domestic Targets; All-firms; (SW-3, 170); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.08% -0.09% 0.08% 0.0867 1.0403 1.1316 0.0867 1.0403 1.1316 
-19 0.12% 0.08% 0.21% 0.0441 0.8814 0.6802 0.0925 0.9876 1.2721 
-18 0.30% -0.18% 0.51% 0.0456 1.0317 0.5997 0.1018 0.9689 1.4275 
-17 0.23% -0.10% 0.74% 0.0919 0.9995 1.2492 0.1342 1.0494 1.7362 
-16 0.22% 0.07% 0.97% -0.0242 0.9004 -0.3657 0.1092 1.0254 1.4458 
-15 0.44% -0.07% 1.41% 0.0888 1.0123 1.1908 0.1359 1.0858 1.6996 
-14 0.34% 0.05% 1.75% 0.0690 1.1327 0.8270 0.1519 1.0717 1.9246 
-13 0.05% -0.26% 1.80% 0.0082 1.1285 0.0982 0.1450 1.0945 1.7985 
-12 0.98% 0.26% 2.78% 0.2110 1.0212 2.8057 0.2070 1.1089 2.5349 
-11 -0.10% -0.15% 2.68% -0.0139 1.1293 -0.1667 0.1920 1.1287 2.3100 
-10 0.51% 0.15% 3.19% 0.1331 1.1104 1.6279 0.2232 1.1715 2.5872 
-9 1.54% -0.09% 4.74% 0.1918 1.4613 1.7827 0.2691 1.1973 3.0518 
-8 -0.63% -0.43% 4.11% -0.0904 1.0710 -1.1466 0.2334 1.1841 2.6770 
-7 0.16% 0.05% 4.27% 0.0643 1.0731 0.8131 0.2421 1.1597 2.8351 
-6 0.97% 0.45% 5.24% 0.2377 1.0721 3.0105 0.2953 1.1598 3.4572 
-5 0.96% 0.25% 6.20% 0.2241 1.1422 2.6641 0.3419 1.1482 4.0439 
-4 0.13% -0.11% 6.33% 0.0604 1.0037 0.8171 0.3464 1.1544 4.0742 
-3 0.82% 0.09% 7.15% 0.1844 1.0779 2.3229 0.3801 1.1411 4.5228 
-2 0.65% 0.02% 7.80% 0.1448 1.0505 1.8715 0.4031 1.1200 4.8877 
-1 1.46% 0.92% 9.26% 0.3812 1.3551 3.8201 0.4782 1.1526 5.6334 
0 1.85% 1.23% 11.11% 0.4350 1.5887 3.7183 0.5616 1.1852 6.4340 
1 0.97% 0.04% 12.09% 0.1963 1.7636 1.5116 0.5905 1.2263 6.5391 
2 0.16% -0.25% 12.25% 0.0275 1.2968 0.2877 0.5833 1.2557 6.3073 
3 -0.58% -0.25% 11.66% -0.1246 1.4247 -1.1874 0.5455 1.2818 5.7795 
4 -0.53% -0.39% 11.14% -0.1368 1.0625 -1.7479 0.5072 1.2592 5.4693 
5 -0.76% -0.49% 10.38% -0.1514 0.8933 -2.3020 0.4676 1.2467 5.0934 
6 -0.11% -0.35% 10.26% -0.0040 0.8806 -0.0617 0.4581 1.2540 4.9611 
7 -0.56% -0.16% 9.71% -0.0633 1.1564 -0.7434 0.4379 1.2837 4.6322 
8 -0.34% -0.26% 9.37% -0.0458 1.1305 -0.5503 0.4218 1.2890 4.4433 
9 0.11% 0.01% 9.48% 0.0788 1.0417 1.0274 0.4291 1.3105 4.4462 
10 0.72% 0.00% 10.20% 0.1159 1.2633 1.2457 0.4429 1.3266 4.5337 
11 0.23% -0.02% 10.43% 0.0495 1.0281 0.6543 0.4447 1.3640 4.4272 
12 -0.44% -0.15% 9.99% -0.0912 1.4563 -0.8501 0.4220 1.4286 4.0115 
13 -0.16% -0.25% 9.83% -0.0447 0.8690 -0.6978 0.4081 1.4047 3.9454 
14 -0.07% -0.01% 9.76% -0.0008 0.7954 -0.0129 0.4021 1.4050 3.8864 
15 0.17% -0.19% 9.93% 0.0007 0.8684 0.0105 0.3966 1.3760 3.9141 
16 -0.28% -0.08% 9.65% -0.0930 0.8642 -1.4617 0.3759 1.3865 3.6818 
17 -0.08% -0.13% 9.58% 0.0374 0.8606 0.5897 0.3770 1.3833 3.7010 
18 0.11% 0.07% 9.68% 0.0083 0.8552 0.1317 0.3735 1.3763 3.6850 
19 -0.24% -0.29% 9.44% -0.0572 0.8355 -0.9292 0.3597 1.3829 3.5323 
20 0.39% 0.01% 9.83% 0.0980 0.7583 1.7540 0.3706 1.3824 3.6406 
21 -0.34% -0.27% 9.48% -0.0770 0.7786 -1.3426 0.3543 1.3693 3.5136 
22 -0.59% -0.50% 8.89% -0.1891 0.7761 -3.3083 0.3213 1.3626 3.2023 
23 -0.57% -0.30% 8.32% -0.1133 1.1336 -1.3567 0.3006 1.3682 2.9831 
24 0.31% 0.15% 8.63% 0.0518 0.8624 0.8154 0.3049 1.3448 3.0791 
25 -0.20% -0.33% 8.43% -0.0691 0.7939 -1.1824 0.2914 1.3452 2.9417 
26 0.05% -0.16% 8.48% 0.0008 1.0328 0.0110 0.2884 1.3241 2.9577 
27 -0.37% -0.19% 8.10% -0.0271 1.1012 -0.3344 0.2815 1.3071 2.9242 
28 -0.31% -0.23% 7.80% -0.0710 0.7862 -1.2271 0.2684 1.3003 2.8035 
29 0.03% -0.06% 7.83% 0.0115 0.8543 0.1823 0.2674 1.2880 2.8188 
30 0.05% -0.01% 7.88% 0.0083 0.6917 0.1637 0.2659 1.2859 2.8079 
          
-1 to 1     4.28% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06325 0.5846 1.5765 5.0353 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-76 
 
Table-A 6.11 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Non-BGrp; (MM, 100); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.52% 0.34% 0.52% 0.2388 1.4232 1.6807 0.2388 1.4232 1.6807 
-19 0.39% 0.32% 0.91% 0.1751 0.9255 1.8946 0.2927 1.2930 2.2670 
-18 0.19% -0.10% 1.10% 0.0883 1.3549 0.6526 0.2900 1.2776 2.2729 
-17 0.44% 0.32% 1.54% 0.1999 1.2518 1.5992 0.3511 1.4664 2.3976 
-16 0.20% 0.06% 1.73% 0.0244 0.9031 0.2701 0.3249 1.4294 2.2762 
-15 0.21% 0.20% 1.94% 0.0948 1.1201 0.8475 0.3353 1.4223 2.3608 
-14 0.39% 0.52% 2.34% 0.1290 1.4057 0.9189 0.3592 1.3786 2.6091 
-13 0.32% -0.22% 2.65% 0.0490 1.3527 0.3627 0.3533 1.4009 2.5255 
-12 0.97% 0.34% 3.62% 0.3189 1.2080 2.6439 0.4394 1.4896 2.9540 
-11 0.29% 0.27% 3.91% 0.0562 1.1943 0.4716 0.4346 1.4892 2.9227 
-10 0.66% 0.50% 4.57% 0.1727 1.1745 1.4725 0.4665 1.4715 3.1746 
-9 1.38% 0.32% 5.95% 0.3518 1.4099 2.4987 0.5481 1.4958 3.6700 
-8 -0.05% -0.13% 5.89% -0.0097 1.0985 -0.0880 0.5240 1.4872 3.5283 
-7 0.51% 0.58% 6.41% 0.1660 1.2250 1.3570 0.5493 1.4663 3.7516 
-6 1.01% 0.42% 7.41% 0.3370 1.3359 2.5261 0.6176 1.4271 4.3344 
-5 1.39% 0.55% 8.80% 0.3460 1.4887 2.3277 0.6845 1.4082 4.8681 
-4 0.36% -0.08% 9.16% 0.1833 1.1827 1.5518 0.7085 1.4331 4.9514 
-3 1.33% 0.31% 10.49% 0.4168 1.2381 3.3711 0.7868 1.4068 5.6011 
-2 1.07% 0.57% 11.56% 0.3691 1.2219 3.0255 0.8505 1.4008 6.0806 
-1 2.11% 1.32% 13.67% 0.6566 1.7519 3.7533 0.9758 1.4651 6.6701 
0 2.37% 1.14% 16.04% 0.6324 1.9566 3.2369 1.0903 1.5026 7.2667 
1 0.94% 0.08% 16.99% 0.1449 1.7306 0.8386 1.0961 1.5483 7.0898 
2 -0.21% -0.35% 16.78% -0.0915 1.1681 -0.7844 1.0529 1.5227 6.9253 
3 -0.79% -0.27% 15.99% -0.1792 1.7852 -1.0054 0.9942 1.6131 6.1723 
4 -0.72% -0.81% 15.27% -0.1812 1.4171 -1.2805 0.9379 1.5908 5.9044 
5 -0.63% -0.29% 14.64% -0.1087 1.0301 -1.0569 0.8983 1.5860 5.6724 
6 0.00% -0.02% 14.64% 0.0419 1.0704 0.3918 0.8896 1.5863 5.6163 
7 -0.11% -0.09% 14.53% 0.0230 1.3691 0.1682 0.8779 1.6540 5.3158 
8 -0.13% -0.46% 14.40% 0.0264 1.4705 0.1800 0.8675 1.6812 5.1681 
9 0.00% -0.05% 14.40% 0.0838 1.2969 0.6474 0.8683 1.7392 4.9996 
10 -0.21% 0.19% 14.19% -0.0208 0.9207 -0.2257 0.8504 1.7659 4.8229 
11 0.16% 0.05% 14.35% 0.1066 1.2073 0.8839 0.8559 1.8073 4.7426 
12 -0.32% 0.30% 14.03% -0.0680 2.0553 -0.3315 0.8310 1.9342 4.3025 
13 0.12% -0.28% 14.15% -0.0243 1.0574 -0.2302 0.8145 1.8794 4.3400 
14 0.05% 0.16% 14.20% 0.0363 0.7754 0.4685 0.8089 1.8692 4.3338 
15 0.70% -0.03% 14.90% 0.1347 1.1944 1.1292 0.8200 1.8298 4.4882 
16 -0.50% -0.02% 14.40% -0.1238 1.3130 -0.9444 0.7885 1.8615 4.2422 
17 0.28% 0.09% 14.68% 0.1159 1.0652 1.0895 0.7969 1.8543 4.3038 
18 0.65% 0.06% 15.33% 0.1120 1.1440 0.9801 0.8045 1.8391 4.3810 
19 0.44% 0.14% 15.78% 0.1783 1.1040 1.6172 0.8226 1.8443 4.4668 
20 0.72% 0.23% 16.50% 0.2149 1.0140 2.1222 0.8460 1.8296 4.6310 
21 -0.53% -0.20% 15.97% -0.0718 0.8901 -0.8078 0.8248 1.8361 4.4989 
22 -0.24% -0.28% 15.73% -0.1221 0.8753 -1.3974 0.7966 1.8407 4.3340 
23 0.20% -0.01% 15.92% 0.0589 1.0080 0.5851 0.7963 1.8545 4.3004 
24 0.99% 0.35% 16.91% 0.2756 1.1514 2.3977 0.8285 1.8355 4.5207 
25 -0.02% -0.01% 16.89% -0.0246 0.9343 -0.2632 0.8158 1.8443 4.4302 
26 0.11% -0.11% 17.00% 0.0144 0.8486 0.1695 0.8092 1.8188 4.4559 
27 0.30% 0.09% 17.30% 0.0650 1.0825 0.6011 0.8101 1.8023 4.5017 
28 0.04% 0.04% 17.34% -0.0255 0.9365 -0.2726 0.7982 1.7925 4.4595 
29 0.43% 0.24% 17.77% 0.1186 1.0889 1.0908 0.8069 1.7698 4.5663 
30 0.31% 0.40% 18.08% 0.0840 0.8126 1.0356 0.8107 1.7572 4.6205 
          
-1 to 1     5.43% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05995 0.8278 1.9442 4.2644 
 
 
 
  
  
6-77 
 
Table-A 6.12 Market returns to Domestic Targets; BGrp; (MM, 65); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.51% -0.27% 0.51% 0.1304 1.1113 0.9381 0.1304 1.1113 0.9381 
-19 0.32% -0.13% 0.82% 0.1593 1.1646 1.0931 0.2048 1.1752 1.3932 
-18 0.66% -0.06% 1.48% 0.1741 0.9916 1.4036 0.2678 0.9412 2.2743 
-17 0.63% -0.16% 2.12% 0.1491 1.1822 1.0084 0.3065 1.0633 2.3040 
-16 0.15% 0.15% 2.27% -0.0692 1.2385 -0.4465 0.2432 1.0704 1.8161 
-15 0.70% 0.34% 2.97% 0.1750 1.1159 1.2540 0.2934 1.1957 1.9619 
-14 0.41% 0.10% 3.38% 0.1442 1.3447 0.8575 0.3262 1.2803 2.0368 
-13 0.45% 0.28% 3.83% 0.1926 1.3497 1.1406 0.3732 1.2693 2.3505 
-12 0.83% 0.10% 4.66% 0.2051 1.1078 1.4803 0.4203 1.2396 2.7102 
-11 0.50% 0.09% 5.16% 0.1739 1.5118 0.9197 0.4537 1.2777 2.8384 
-10 0.96% 0.17% 6.12% 0.2715 1.6317 1.3303 0.5144 1.4286 2.8785 
-9 0.21% -0.04% 6.33% 0.0797 1.1460 0.5560 0.5155 1.3952 2.9539 
-8 0.20% 0.04% 6.53% 0.0540 1.1575 0.3727 0.5103 1.4177 2.8774 
-7 0.32% -0.14% 6.86% 0.0974 1.2157 0.6405 0.5178 1.3529 3.0594 
-6 1.14% 1.00% 7.99% 0.4653 1.5907 2.3385 0.6204 1.3779 3.5989 
-5 1.03% 0.41% 9.02% 0.3359 1.1644 2.3061 0.6846 1.3729 3.9864 
-4 0.42% 0.07% 9.44% 0.0392 1.1882 0.2638 0.6737 1.3574 3.9675 
-3 0.02% -0.13% 9.46% -0.0454 1.3416 -0.2703 0.6440 1.3671 3.7658 
-2 0.59% 0.28% 10.05% 0.1171 1.2681 0.7379 0.6537 1.3395 3.9013 
-1 0.86% 0.40% 10.91% 0.3000 1.4422 1.6630 0.7042 1.4251 3.9503 
0 1.39% 1.24% 12.30% 0.3839 1.8755 1.6362 0.7710 1.4932 4.1278 
1 1.50% 0.75% 13.80% 0.3728 3.0734 0.9697 0.8328 1.5658 4.2516 
2 1.08% 0.38% 14.88% 0.2649 1.9130 1.1069 0.8697 1.6889 4.1165 
3 0.46% 0.38% 15.34% 0.0504 1.4994 0.2689 0.8617 1.6944 4.0653 
4 0.05% 0.15% 15.39% 0.0253 1.1590 0.1745 0.8493 1.6456 4.1259 
5 -0.04% -0.17% 15.35% -0.0665 0.8642 -0.6147 0.8198 1.6191 4.0476 
6 0.40% -0.04% 15.76% 0.1142 0.9381 0.9731 0.8265 1.6209 4.0759 
7 0.42% 0.22% 16.17% 0.1803 0.8666 1.6636 0.8457 1.5690 4.3086 
8 0.30% 0.23% 16.47% 0.0939 0.9359 0.8024 0.8484 1.5471 4.3837 
9 0.90% 0.37% 17.37% 0.2896 1.1548 2.0047 0.8870 1.5251 4.6494 
10 0.99% 0.43% 18.36% 0.2494 1.0336 1.9286 0.9174 1.5290 4.7961 
11 1.13% 0.32% 19.49% 0.2480 1.1779 1.6828 0.9468 1.5426 4.9062 
12 0.36% 0.05% 19.85% 0.1220 1.0044 0.9710 0.9535 1.5749 4.8399 
13 -0.09% 0.26% 19.77% -0.0178 1.0617 -0.1341 0.9364 1.5758 4.7500 
14 0.25% 0.15% 20.02% 0.0902 1.0860 0.6637 0.9381 1.5837 4.7352 
15 0.22% 0.07% 20.24% 0.0491 0.8257 0.4750 0.9332 1.5913 4.6879 
16 0.46% 0.13% 20.71% 0.1174 0.8069 1.1633 0.9398 1.5770 4.7639 
17 0.16% 0.21% 20.87% 0.0976 1.0824 0.7210 0.9432 1.6062 4.6941 
18 -0.10% -0.07% 20.77% -0.0521 0.9428 -0.4422 0.9227 1.5817 4.6631 
19 -0.92% -0.36% 19.84% -0.2849 0.9081 -2.5077 0.8660 1.5888 4.3574 
20 0.54% 0.02% 20.39% 0.2289 0.9069 2.0177 0.8911 1.5943 4.4682 
21 0.11% -0.02% 20.50% 0.0919 0.9563 0.7684 0.8946 1.5685 4.5596 
22 -0.69% -0.34% 19.81% -0.2506 0.9731 -2.0586 0.8460 1.5808 4.2780 
23 -0.24% -0.14% 19.57% -0.0876 0.9248 -0.7570 0.8231 1.5612 4.2145 
24 0.13% 0.15% 19.70% 0.0407 0.7910 0.4111 0.8200 1.5177 4.3189 
25 0.23% -0.27% 19.92% 0.0567 0.8883 0.5101 0.8194 1.5018 4.3612 
26 -0.29% 0.15% 19.63% 0.0322 0.7579 0.3400 0.8153 1.4987 4.3488 
27 -0.18% -0.15% 19.45% -0.0295 0.8737 -0.2696 0.8025 1.4810 4.3317 
28 -0.39% -0.19% 19.06% -0.0597 0.9263 -0.5150 0.7857 1.4567 4.3119 
29 -0.02% -0.03% 19.03% 0.0291 0.8834 0.2631 0.7820 1.4577 4.2883 
30 0.06% -0.05% 19.09% 0.0229 0.7853 0.2335 0.7775 1.4705 4.2263 
          
-1 to 1     3.75% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06354 0.6101 2.1456 2.2730 
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Table-A 6.13 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Non-BGrp (OLS, 104); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.12% 0.13% -0.12% 0.0753 1.1580 0.6808 0.0753 1.1580 0.6808 
-19 0.05% 0.09% -0.07% 0.0340 0.8022 0.4436 0.0773 1.0070 0.8034 
-18 0.20% -0.40% 0.13% 0.0358 1.1340 0.3306 0.0838 1.0778 0.8137 
-17 0.00% 0.03% 0.13% 0.0914 1.0530 0.9083 0.1183 1.1599 1.0671 
-16 -0.05% -0.14% 0.08% -0.0456 0.8087 -0.5902 0.0854 1.1372 0.7858 
-15 0.26% 0.00% 0.34% 0.0576 1.0180 0.5920 0.1015 1.1672 0.9097 
-14 0.44% 0.39% 0.79% 0.0932 1.1966 0.8153 0.1292 1.1167 1.2105 
-13 0.14% -0.33% 0.92% -0.0145 1.2019 -0.1263 0.1157 1.1699 1.0350 
-12 0.99% 0.17% 1.91% 0.2263 1.0631 2.2273 0.1845 1.2305 1.5692 
-11 -0.21% -0.11% 1.70% -0.0279 1.0217 -0.2853 0.1663 1.2358 1.4077 
-10 0.39% 0.14% 2.10% 0.0927 0.9797 0.9905 0.1865 1.2116 1.6105 
-9 2.43% 0.21% 4.53% 0.3201 1.7035 1.9662 0.2710 1.2698 2.2326 
-8 -0.93% -0.30% 3.60% -0.0948 1.0667 -0.9298 0.2340 1.2415 1.9723 
-7 0.13% 0.23% 3.73% 0.0645 1.0889 0.6202 0.2428 1.2252 2.0732 
-6 0.90% 0.15% 4.63% 0.2057 1.1123 1.9350 0.2877 1.1967 2.5150 
-5 1.10% 0.22% 5.73% 0.2438 1.2405 2.0565 0.3395 1.1891 2.9871 
-4 -0.08% -0.41% 5.64% 0.0694 1.0323 0.7037 0.3462 1.2035 3.0097 
-3 1.36% 0.22% 7.01% 0.3219 1.0962 3.0724 0.4123 1.1751 3.6711 
-2 1.00% 0.15% 8.01% 0.2505 1.0398 2.5204 0.4588 1.1620 4.1307 
-1 1.75% 1.08% 9.76% 0.4765 1.4853 3.3563 0.5537 1.1855 4.8867 
0 2.22% 0.99% 11.98% 0.4997 1.6575 3.1544 0.6494 1.2173 5.5816 
1 0.61% -0.17% 12.59% 0.0788 1.4745 0.5592 0.6513 1.2634 5.3933 
2 -0.52% -0.75% 12.07% -0.1293 1.0149 -1.3327 0.6100 1.2388 5.1520 
3 -1.08% -0.55% 10.99% -0.1992 1.5218 -1.3694 0.5565 1.2923 4.5055 
4 -0.74% -1.14% 10.25% -0.1917 1.1817 -1.6973 0.5069 1.2856 4.1255 
5 -1.04% -0.75% 9.21% -0.1780 0.9374 -1.9869 0.4622 1.2791 3.7804 
6 -0.25% -0.34% 8.96% -0.0244 0.9215 -0.2773 0.4488 1.2921 3.6344 
7 -0.96% -0.34% 8.01% -0.1374 1.3867 -1.0363 0.4148 1.3601 3.1908 
8 -0.38% -0.62% 7.62% -0.0658 1.2792 -0.5381 0.3953 1.3800 2.9974 
9 -0.34% -0.30% 7.28% -0.0086 1.0891 -0.0827 0.3871 1.4193 2.8538 
10 0.06% -0.10% 7.34% 0.0117 1.2194 0.1000 0.3829 1.4172 2.8270 
11 -0.18% -0.35% 7.16% -0.0053 1.0393 -0.0537 0.3760 1.4571 2.6995 
12 -0.62% -0.09% 6.54% -0.1541 1.7222 -0.9363 0.3434 1.5478 2.3212 
13 -0.06% -0.48% 6.48% -0.0428 0.8668 -0.5164 0.3310 1.4981 2.3114 
14 0.00% 0.05% 6.48% 0.0051 0.7425 0.0714 0.3271 1.4849 2.3045 
15 0.42% -0.17% 6.90% 0.0345 0.9652 0.3736 0.3282 1.4442 2.3779 
16 -0.67% -0.19% 6.23% -0.1773 0.9770 -1.8984 0.2946 1.4724 2.0936 
17 -0.12% -0.21% 6.11% 0.0074 0.8735 0.0891 0.2919 1.4573 2.0959 
18 0.30% -0.09% 6.40% 0.0747 0.8720 0.8965 0.3001 1.4549 2.1583 
19 0.26% -0.04% 6.66% 0.0838 0.8495 1.0323 0.3096 1.4676 2.2073 
20 0.46% 0.11% 7.13% 0.1047 0.7970 1.3747 0.3222 1.4668 2.2980 
21 -0.67% -0.40% 6.46% -0.1472 0.7551 -2.0402 0.2956 1.4557 2.1245 
22 -0.40% -0.38% 6.05% -0.1437 0.7215 -2.0844 0.2702 1.4489 1.9512 
23 -0.74% -0.29% 5.31% -0.1072 1.2938 -0.8665 0.2510 1.4716 1.7843 
24 0.67% 0.10% 5.98% 0.1373 1.0274 1.3986 0.2686 1.4619 1.9225 
25 -0.44% -0.29% 5.54% -0.1162 0.8455 -1.4377 0.2486 1.4752 1.7629 
26 0.45% -0.17% 5.99% 0.0251 1.2335 0.2130 0.2496 1.4575 1.7915 
27 -0.70% -0.18% 5.29% -0.0397 1.3287 -0.3123 0.2412 1.4420 1.7503 
28 -0.24% -0.11% 5.05% -0.0769 0.8050 -0.9993 0.2278 1.4370 1.6583 
29 0.29% 0.15% 5.34% 0.0500 0.9169 0.5710 0.2326 1.4257 1.7066 
30 0.00% 0.16% 5.34% 0.0167 0.7321 0.2384 0.2326 1.4125 1.7230 
          
-1 to 1     4.58% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06139 0.6091 1.6398 3.8863 
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Table-A 6.14 Market returns to Domestic Targets; BGroup; (OLS, 66); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.33% -0.48% 0.33% 0.0710 0.9674 0.6128 0.0710 0.9674 0.6128 
-19 0.16% -0.07% 0.50% 0.0649 1.0028 0.5405 0.0961 1.0364 0.7743 
-18 0.47% -0.20% 0.97% 0.0888 0.8651 0.8574 0.1298 0.8249 1.3134 
-17 0.48% -0.20% 1.45% 0.0896 0.9829 0.7607 0.1572 0.9280 1.4139 
-16 0.37% 0.15% 1.82% -0.0294 1.1251 -0.2178 0.1275 0.9391 1.1330 
-15 0.62% 0.20% 2.44% 0.1234 0.9590 1.0746 0.1667 1.0609 1.3121 
-14 0.50% -0.04% 2.95% 0.1015 1.0740 0.7892 0.1927 1.1300 1.4240 
-13 0.28% -0.10% 3.23% 0.1272 1.0393 1.0216 0.2253 1.0960 1.7158 
-12 0.66% -0.03% 3.89% 0.1304 0.9598 1.1338 0.2558 1.0644 2.0066 
-11 0.40% 0.20% 4.28% 0.0995 1.2460 0.6665 0.2742 1.0864 2.1067 
-10 0.83% 0.09% 5.11% 0.2365 1.3468 1.4658 0.3327 1.2279 2.2619 
-9 0.30% -0.29% 5.41% 0.0494 1.0275 0.4010 0.3328 1.2228 2.2720 
-8 0.02% -0.18% 5.42% -0.0255 1.0155 -0.2100 0.3127 1.2338 2.1153 
-7 0.13% -0.59% 5.55% 0.0381 1.0614 0.2995 0.3115 1.1881 2.1884 
-6 1.00% 0.86% 6.55% 0.2962 1.0196 2.4247 0.3774 1.2179 2.5866 
-5 0.82% 0.33% 7.38% 0.2447 0.9741 2.0971 0.4266 1.1896 2.9933 
-4 0.32% -0.05% 7.69% 0.0401 1.0318 0.3247 0.4236 1.1774 3.0029 
-3 0.06% -0.31% 7.75% -0.0012 1.0827 -0.0096 0.4113 1.1815 2.9063 
-2 0.43% 0.16% 8.18% 0.0992 1.0212 0.8109 0.4231 1.1639 3.0346 
-1 0.92% 0.41% 9.10% 0.2282 1.1935 1.5964 0.4634 1.2133 3.1886 
0 1.20% 1.10% 10.30% 0.3249 1.5789 1.7178 0.5232 1.2312 3.5472 
1 1.37% 0.39% 11.66% 0.3510 2.1958 1.3344 0.5860 1.2801 3.8213 
2 0.89% 0.05% 12.55% 0.2217 1.6284 1.1364 0.6193 1.3931 3.7112 
3 0.29% 0.00% 12.84% 0.0059 1.2387 0.0400 0.6075 1.3932 3.6400 
4 -0.14% -0.20% 12.70% -0.0618 0.9204 -0.5601 0.5829 1.3555 3.5896 
5 -0.19% -0.27% 12.52% -0.0770 0.7702 -0.8343 0.5564 1.3320 3.4875 
6 0.24% -0.19% 12.76% 0.0503 0.8009 0.5243 0.5557 1.3321 3.4826 
7 0.25% 0.13% 13.01% 0.0754 0.6780 0.9285 0.5600 1.2952 3.6090 
8 0.08% 0.14% 13.09% 0.0400 0.7614 0.4382 0.5576 1.2622 3.6880 
9 0.77% 0.25% 13.86% 0.1893 0.9766 1.6178 0.5828 1.2535 3.8814 
10 1.87% 0.26% 15.73% 0.2961 1.3237 1.8672 0.6265 1.2922 4.0474 
11 0.91% 0.30% 16.63% 0.1136 0.9698 0.9777 0.6367 1.3123 4.0503 
12 0.13% 0.01% 16.77% 0.0687 0.8552 0.6704 0.6390 1.3342 3.9980 
13 -0.28% 0.22% 16.48% -0.0214 0.9062 -0.1971 0.6258 1.3251 3.9425 
14 0.18% 0.10% 16.66% 0.0662 0.8856 0.6244 0.6280 1.3233 3.9620 
15 -0.03% -0.02% 16.64% -0.0217 0.7393 -0.2447 0.6156 1.3269 3.8731 
16 0.30% -0.13% 16.93% 0.0336 0.6968 0.4030 0.6128 1.3166 3.8853 
17 -0.02% -0.09% 16.91% 0.0643 0.8704 0.6168 0.6151 1.3369 3.8409 
18 -0.22% -0.06% 16.68% -0.0698 0.7603 -0.7662 0.5960 1.3228 3.7610 
19 -1.09% -0.57% 15.59% -0.2914 0.7798 -3.1192 0.5424 1.3259 3.4150 
20 0.41% -0.19% 16.01% 0.1157 0.7117 1.3568 0.5538 1.3297 3.4770 
21 0.05% -0.02% 16.06% 0.0447 0.8160 0.4571 0.5541 1.3040 3.5472 
22 -0.74% -0.49% 15.32% -0.2324 0.8253 -2.3508 0.5122 1.3116 3.2599 
23 -0.46% -0.20% 14.85% -0.1474 0.7789 -1.5793 0.4841 1.3010 3.1063 
24 0.02% 0.05% 14.87% 0.0020 0.6712 0.0246 0.4790 1.2642 3.1629 
25 0.04% -0.33% 14.91% -0.0214 0.7497 -0.2379 0.4706 1.2533 3.1346 
26 -0.54% -0.08% 14.37% -0.0480 0.6392 -0.6267 0.4586 1.2403 3.0863 
27 -0.19% -0.17% 14.19% -0.0425 0.6577 -0.5398 0.4476 1.2283 3.0422 
28 -0.55% -0.34% 13.64% -0.0905 0.7444 -1.0147 0.4301 1.2061 2.9770 
29 -0.24% -0.10% 13.39% -0.0204 0.7539 -0.2254 0.4229 1.2085 2.9213 
30 0.04% -0.08% 13.43% -0.0130 0.6625 -0.1636 0.4169 1.2214 2.8496 
          
-1 to 1     3.48% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06358 0.5220 1.6192 2.6912 
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Table-A 6.15 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Unrelated; (MM, 112); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.68% 0.26% 0.68% 0.2514 1.4136 1.8313 0.2514 1.4136 1.8313 
-19 0.51% 0.16% 1.19% 0.2076 1.0061 2.1245 0.3245 1.3254 2.5213 
-18 0.59% -0.10% 1.78% 0.1683 1.3169 1.3157 0.3621 1.2184 3.0604 
-17 0.67% 0.10% 2.46% 0.2492 1.2354 2.0774 0.4382 1.4120 3.1960 
-16 0.49% 0.22% 2.94% 0.0525 1.1320 0.4773 0.4154 1.4022 3.0508 
-15 0.89% 0.76% 3.84% 0.2745 1.1398 2.4800 0.4913 1.4133 3.5796 
-14 0.53% 0.46% 4.36% 0.1895 1.5310 1.2748 0.5265 1.4260 3.8018 
-13 0.80% 0.06% 5.16% 0.2430 1.4704 1.7017 0.5784 1.4272 4.1732 
-12 0.89% 0.27% 6.05% 0.2878 1.2127 2.4438 0.6413 1.4876 4.4387 
-11 0.03% -0.02% 6.09% 0.0205 1.4665 0.1439 0.6149 1.5371 4.1188 
-10 1.10% 0.43% 7.18% 0.2894 1.4166 2.1035 0.6735 1.6066 4.3164 
-9 1.08% 0.23% 8.26% 0.2541 1.2374 2.1145 0.7182 1.5627 4.7321 
-8 0.31% 0.44% 8.58% 0.0650 1.1043 0.6061 0.7080 1.5530 4.6946 
-7 0.06% 0.31% 8.64% 0.0582 1.1808 0.5077 0.6978 1.5046 4.7756 
-6 1.25% 0.54% 9.89% 0.4443 1.5662 2.9213 0.7889 1.4645 5.5469 
-5 1.27% 0.49% 11.16% 0.3580 1.3390 2.7532 0.8534 1.4197 6.1892 
-4 0.63% -0.07% 11.79% 0.1926 1.0940 1.8126 0.8746 1.4143 6.3673 
-3 0.91% 0.20% 12.70% 0.2637 1.3212 2.0556 0.9121 1.3848 6.7822 
-2 0.92% 0.38% 13.62% 0.2720 1.3142 2.1313 0.9502 1.3708 7.1373 
-1 1.82% 1.32% 15.44% 0.6092 1.7486 3.5874 1.0624 1.4948 7.3180 
0 2.12% 1.80% 17.56% 0.5892 1.7705 3.4268 1.1653 1.5884 7.5543 
1 0.39% 0.37% 17.95% -0.0301 2.3063 -0.1342 1.1321 1.6814 6.9331 
2 0.45% -0.07% 18.40% 0.0983 1.4866 0.6812 1.1277 1.7403 6.6728 
3 -0.44% -0.17% 17.96% -0.1274 1.6741 -0.7836 1.0780 1.7892 6.2038 
4 -0.62% -0.27% 17.34% -0.1524 1.3039 -1.2033 1.0257 1.7438 6.0570 
5 -0.09% -0.20% 17.26% 0.0184 0.9353 0.2024 1.0094 1.7306 6.0062 
6 0.41% 0.01% 17.67% 0.1522 1.0120 1.5490 1.0199 1.7417 6.0294 
7 -0.12% -0.09% 17.54% 0.0496 1.3641 0.3743 1.0109 1.7831 5.8375 
8 0.19% -0.13% 17.73% 0.1521 1.2095 1.2950 1.0215 1.7878 5.8834 
9 0.66% -0.04% 18.38% 0.2549 1.2961 2.0247 1.0509 1.8223 5.9379 
10 0.10% 0.24% 18.49% 0.0650 0.9622 0.6953 1.0455 1.8485 5.8235 
11 0.70% 0.41% 19.18% 0.2347 1.2527 1.9293 1.0705 1.8824 5.8555 
12 -0.22% -0.03% 18.96% -0.0253 1.9767 -0.1316 1.0497 1.9955 5.4167 
13 0.38% -0.16% 19.35% 0.0634 1.1659 0.5596 1.0451 1.9533 5.5090 
14 0.15% 0.39% 19.49% 0.0501 0.8985 0.5747 1.0385 1.9590 5.4585 
15 0.44% 0.15% 19.93% 0.0784 1.0581 0.7632 1.0370 1.9330 5.5242 
16 0.08% 0.19% 20.01% 0.0203 0.9411 0.2224 1.0263 1.9340 5.4640 
17 0.32% 0.39% 20.33% 0.1841 1.0060 1.8842 1.0425 1.9390 5.5363 
18 0.36% -0.02% 20.69% 0.0668 1.0932 0.6297 1.0398 1.9126 5.5981 
19 -0.10% -0.26% 20.59% -0.0012 1.0531 -0.0116 1.0265 1.9323 5.4704 
20 0.70% 0.08% 21.30% 0.2214 1.0837 2.1039 1.0485 1.9231 5.6142 
21 -0.42% -0.32% 20.88% -0.0650 0.8843 -0.7572 1.0259 1.9232 5.4927 
22 -0.48% -0.52% 20.40% -0.1854 0.8883 -2.1490 0.9857 1.9273 5.2661 
23 -0.02% -0.20% 20.38% -0.0030 1.0257 -0.0297 0.9739 1.9276 5.2026 
24 0.90% 0.17% 21.28% 0.2258 1.1442 2.0317 0.9967 1.8964 5.4120 
25 -0.10% -0.10% 21.18% -0.0456 0.9121 -0.5144 0.9791 1.9009 5.3038 
26 0.22% 0.19% 21.40% 0.1020 0.8439 1.2448 0.9835 1.8831 5.3779 
27 0.40% -0.06% 21.80% 0.0939 0.9328 1.0367 0.9868 1.8624 5.4559 
28 -0.20% -0.18% 21.60% -0.0725 0.8598 -0.8678 0.9663 1.8539 5.3671 
29 0.34% 0.36% 21.94% 0.1002 0.9963 1.0358 0.9708 1.8296 5.4635 
30 0.48% 0.56% 22.43% 0.1417 0.7982 1.8275 0.9810 1.8269 5.5292 
          
-1 to 1     4.33% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05982 0.6746 2.0783 3.3421 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-81 
 
Table-A 6.16 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Related; (MM, 53); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.15% -0.05% 0.15% 0.0793 1.0485 0.6067 0.0793 1.0485 0.6067 
-19 0.05% -0.07% 0.20% 0.0870 1.0628 0.6566 0.1176 1.0531 0.8956 
-18 -0.08% -0.06% 0.12% 0.0245 0.9972 0.1973 0.1102 0.9925 0.8904 
-17 0.18% 0.23% 0.30% 0.0334 1.1896 0.2248 0.1121 1.0759 0.8356 
-16 -0.47% -0.20% -0.16% -0.1498 0.8266 -1.4530 0.0333 1.0036 0.2660 
-15 -0.63% -0.53% -0.79% -0.1866 1.0027 -1.4927 -0.0458 1.0718 -0.3427 
-14 0.13% 0.06% -0.67% 0.0197 0.9822 0.1612 -0.0349 1.0381 -0.2699 
-13 -0.53% -0.19% -1.20% -0.1849 0.9997 -1.4832 -0.0981 1.0272 -0.7656 
-12 0.97% 0.10% -0.23% 0.2451 1.0762 1.8266 -0.0107 1.0478 -0.0822 
-11 1.08% 0.50% 0.85% 0.2761 0.9503 2.3301 0.0771 0.9941 0.6222 
-10 0.10% 0.28% 0.95% 0.0473 1.2594 0.3012 0.0878 0.9429 0.7468 
-9 0.57% 0.22% 1.52% 0.2245 1.4791 1.2171 0.1489 1.1041 1.0812 
-8 -0.51% -0.25% 1.01% -0.0894 1.1531 -0.6217 0.1182 1.1385 0.8328 
-7 1.23% 0.66% 2.24% 0.3096 1.2884 1.9271 0.1967 1.1576 1.3625 
-6 0.66% 0.40% 2.90% 0.2675 1.1253 1.9062 0.2591 1.2009 1.7300 
-5 1.20% 0.41% 4.09% 0.3082 1.4348 1.7226 0.3279 1.2656 2.0777 
-4 -0.14% 0.04% 3.95% -0.0131 1.3536 -0.0777 0.3149 1.3008 1.9415 
-3 0.61% 0.18% 4.56% 0.1734 1.2507 1.1118 0.3469 1.3301 2.0916 
-2 0.79% 0.39% 5.35% 0.2652 1.0878 1.9554 0.3985 1.3234 2.4148 
-1 1.19% 0.40% 6.54% 0.3194 1.3836 1.8511 0.4598 1.2733 2.8962 
0 1.70% 0.72% 8.24% 0.4189 2.2256 1.5093 0.5401 1.2098 3.5804 
1 2.80% 0.53% 11.04% 0.7941 2.3543 2.7051 0.6970 1.2117 4.6132 
2 -0.01% -0.22% 11.03% -0.0556 1.5698 -0.2839 0.6701 1.1579 4.6414 
3 0.00% 0.13% 11.03% -0.0071 1.6977 -0.0334 0.6546 1.2422 4.2258 
4 0.00% 0.17% 11.03% 0.0111 1.3642 0.0655 0.6436 1.2509 4.1261 
5 -1.05% -0.27% 9.99% -0.3255 0.9959 -2.6209 0.5673 1.2216 3.7239 
6 -0.38% -0.41% 9.60% -0.1027 1.0185 -0.8083 0.5369 1.1792 3.6513 
7 0.57% 0.22% 10.17% 0.1598 0.7287 1.7583 0.5574 1.1444 3.9061 
8 -0.26% -0.12% 9.91% -0.1564 1.4176 -0.8847 0.5187 1.1529 3.6079 
9 -0.29% 0.19% 9.62% -0.0252 1.1113 -0.1820 0.5054 1.1521 3.5178 
10 0.60% 0.30% 10.22% 0.1294 1.0023 1.0351 0.5204 1.1545 3.6147 
11 0.23% -0.59% 10.44% 0.0092 1.0550 0.0697 0.5138 1.1727 3.5137 
12 0.31% 0.51% 10.75% 0.0746 0.9813 0.6098 0.5189 1.2212 3.4079 
13 -0.70% 0.07% 10.05% -0.2016 0.7524 -2.1489 0.4767 1.1935 3.2030 
14 0.10% -0.10% 10.15% 0.0730 0.9351 0.6264 0.4822 1.1599 3.3338 
15 0.67% 0.03% 10.82% 0.1485 1.0803 1.1026 0.5002 1.1510 3.4851 
16 -0.54% -0.08% 10.28% -0.1326 1.4902 -0.7133 0.4716 1.2157 3.1108 
17 0.06% -0.35% 10.34% -0.0506 1.1848 -0.3428 0.4571 1.2144 3.0188 
18 0.34% 0.11% 10.68% 0.0060 1.0261 0.0470 0.4522 1.2173 2.9790 
19 -0.09% 0.16% 10.59% -0.0105 1.0634 -0.0792 0.4448 1.1747 3.0370 
20 0.54% 0.20% 11.13% 0.2183 0.6807 2.5715 0.4735 1.1746 3.2326 
21 0.02% 0.25% 11.15% 0.1147 0.9811 0.9376 0.4855 1.1630 3.3478 
22 -0.29% -0.21% 10.86% -0.1460 0.9753 -1.2005 0.4575 1.1857 3.0948 
23 0.12% 0.05% 10.98% 0.0100 0.8705 0.0918 0.4538 1.1956 3.0440 
24 0.12% 0.27% 11.10% 0.0929 0.7271 1.0243 0.4626 1.1726 3.1638 
25 0.44% -0.01% 11.54% 0.1195 0.9184 1.0433 0.4752 1.1676 3.2636 
26 -0.62% -0.46% 10.92% -0.1490 0.7172 -1.6657 0.4483 1.1377 3.1603 
27 -0.50% 0.06% 10.42% -0.1120 1.1358 -0.7909 0.4275 1.1241 3.0499 
28 0.02% 0.08% 10.44% 0.0318 1.0682 0.2391 0.4276 1.0917 3.1415 
29 0.05% -0.16% 10.49% 0.0476 1.0504 0.3638 0.4301 1.1095 3.1086 
30 -0.36% -0.35% 10.14% -0.1127 0.7838 -1.1528 0.4101 1.0913 3.0134 
          
-1 to 1     5.69% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06506 0.8847 1.9098 3.7151 
 
 
 
  
  
6-82 
 
Table-A 6.17 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Unrelated; (OLS, 116); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.08% -0.07% 0.08% 0.0928 1.1660 0.8420 0.0928 1.1660 0.8420 
-19 0.20% 0.07% 0.28% 0.0632 0.8831 0.7566 0.1103 1.0657 1.0947 
-18 0.57% -0.31% 0.85% 0.1084 1.1072 1.0355 0.1526 1.0461 1.5433 
-17 0.27% -0.06% 1.12% 0.1565 1.0423 1.5881 0.2104 1.1432 1.9470 
-16 0.27% 0.12% 1.39% 0.0088 0.9890 0.0941 0.1921 1.1357 1.7896 
-15 0.93% 0.64% 2.32% 0.2227 1.0185 2.3127 0.2663 1.1850 2.3772 
-14 0.55% 0.27% 2.87% 0.1449 1.2427 1.2332 0.3013 1.1773 2.7073 
-13 0.60% -0.18% 3.47% 0.1473 1.2510 1.2453 0.3339 1.1947 2.9566 
-12 0.89% 0.08% 4.35% 0.2031 1.0631 2.0213 0.3825 1.2345 3.2778 
-11 -0.41% -0.14% 3.94% -0.0650 1.2168 -0.5652 0.3423 1.2694 2.8526 
-10 0.83% 0.12% 4.77% 0.2188 1.1694 1.9788 0.3924 1.3323 3.1152 
-9 2.04% 0.07% 6.81% 0.2472 1.5752 1.6599 0.4470 1.3313 3.5518 
-8 -0.50% 0.02% 6.31% -0.0493 1.0691 -0.4882 0.4158 1.3106 3.3561 
-7 -0.29% -0.16% 6.02% -0.0083 1.0511 -0.0837 0.3985 1.2757 3.3038 
-6 1.14% 0.26% 7.16% 0.2645 1.1317 2.4726 0.4533 1.2520 3.8295 
-5 0.96% 0.25% 8.11% 0.2376 1.1313 2.2215 0.4983 1.2135 4.3433 
-4 0.23% -0.31% 8.35% 0.1031 0.9799 1.1129 0.5084 1.2094 4.4464 
-3 0.95% 0.08% 9.29% 0.2346 1.1347 2.1867 0.5493 1.1772 4.9360 
-2 0.87% 0.05% 10.17% 0.2203 1.0907 2.1366 0.5852 1.1600 5.3365 
-1 1.50% 1.05% 11.66% 0.4314 1.4452 3.1576 0.6669 1.2191 5.7864 
0 1.98% 1.36% 13.65% 0.4680 1.5020 3.2960 0.7529 1.2713 6.2646 
1 0.11% 0.02% 13.75% -0.0196 1.7182 -0.1210 0.7314 1.3447 5.7536 
2 0.12% -0.27% 13.87% 0.0349 1.2441 0.2964 0.7226 1.3923 5.4901 
3 -0.70% -0.31% 13.17% -0.1383 1.4405 -1.0159 0.6792 1.4172 5.0692 
4 -0.66% -0.37% 12.51% -0.1985 1.0241 -2.0500 0.6258 1.3959 4.7420 
5 -0.49% -0.40% 12.01% -0.0562 0.8564 -0.6943 0.6026 1.3824 4.6108 
6 0.17% -0.12% 12.18% 0.0755 0.8765 0.9111 0.6059 1.3995 4.5792 
7 -0.90% -0.28% 11.28% -0.1146 1.3486 -0.8990 0.5733 1.4483 4.1868 
8 -0.10% -0.40% 11.18% 0.0254 1.0449 0.2576 0.5680 1.4461 4.1549 
9 0.29% -0.27% 11.47% 0.1179 1.0968 1.1373 0.5800 1.4753 4.1586 
10 0.33% 0.03% 11.81% 0.0850 1.1908 0.7548 0.5858 1.4764 4.1974 
11 0.36% 0.22% 12.17% 0.0769 1.0534 0.7721 0.5902 1.5143 4.1226 
12 -0.50% -0.26% 11.67% -0.1030 1.6596 -0.6565 0.5633 1.5979 3.7286 
13 0.20% -0.30% 11.87% 0.0569 0.9585 0.6284 0.5647 1.5547 3.8419 
14 0.09% 0.18% 11.95% 0.0437 0.7910 0.5841 0.5639 1.5498 3.8490 
15 0.21% -0.12% 12.16% 0.0045 0.8902 0.0536 0.5568 1.5221 3.8694 
16 -0.12% -0.08% 12.04% -0.0647 0.8339 -0.8201 0.5386 1.5372 3.7062 
17 -0.09% 0.11% 11.95% 0.0752 0.8561 0.9298 0.5437 1.5403 3.7337 
18 0.02% -0.10% 11.97% 0.0142 0.8750 0.1720 0.5389 1.5319 3.7214 
19 -0.26% -0.34% 11.71% -0.0638 0.8375 -0.8055 0.5221 1.5463 3.5714 
20 0.48% -0.19% 12.19% 0.1062 0.8439 1.3310 0.5323 1.5471 3.6391 
21 -0.56% -0.52% 11.63% -0.1193 0.7600 -1.6610 0.5075 1.5301 3.5080 
22 -0.62% -0.55% 11.01% -0.1988 0.7371 -2.8530 0.4712 1.5175 3.2846 
23 -0.86% -0.49% 10.15% -0.1585 1.2566 -1.3343 0.4419 1.5311 3.0531 
24 0.59% 0.08% 10.75% 0.1067 1.0324 1.0932 0.4529 1.5088 3.1751 
25 -0.52% -0.26% 10.23% -0.1402 0.8258 -1.7961 0.4273 1.5173 2.9786 
26 0.50% -0.13% 10.73% 0.0809 1.1844 0.7226 0.4345 1.5032 3.0575 
27 -0.51% -0.18% 10.22% -0.0258 1.2379 -0.2204 0.4262 1.4897 3.0264 
28 -0.45% -0.31% 9.77% -0.1011 0.7313 -1.4629 0.4074 1.4861 2.9000 
29 0.24% 0.20% 10.01% 0.0416 0.8490 0.5179 0.4092 1.4725 2.9394 
30 0.18% 0.31% 10.19% 0.0649 0.7082 0.9699 0.4143 1.4680 2.9849 
          
-1 to 1     3.59% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06057 0.5079 1.6444 3.2673 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-83 
 
Table-A 6.18 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Related; (OLS, 54); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% -0.10% 0.01% 0.0325 0.8953 0.2956 0.0325 0.8953 0.2956 
-19 -0.13% -0.18% -0.12% 0.0092 0.8891 0.0839 0.0295 0.9053 0.2650 
-18 -0.27% -0.24% -0.39% -0.0552 0.8605 -0.5221 -0.0078 0.8375 -0.0758 
-17 0.01% 0.17% -0.38% -0.0506 0.9760 -0.4220 -0.0321 0.8917 -0.2926 
-16 -0.22% -0.27% -0.60% -0.1426 0.8279 -1.4013 -0.0925 0.8611 -0.8735 
-15 -0.73% -0.53% -1.33% -0.2165 0.8721 -2.0195 -0.1728 0.9221 -1.5243 
-14 0.28% -0.05% -1.05% -0.0075 0.9113 -0.0673 -0.1628 0.9141 -1.4490 
-13 -0.68% -0.26% -1.73% -0.1889 0.8204 -1.8726 -0.2191 0.9125 -1.9530 
-12 0.81% 0.04% -0.92% 0.1588 0.9379 1.3772 -0.1536 0.9107 -1.3722 
-11 0.96% 0.41% 0.04% 0.2076 0.8251 2.0466 -0.0801 0.8964 -0.7268 
-10 0.00% 0.16% 0.04% -0.0023 1.0507 -0.0179 -0.0771 0.8445 -0.7423 
-9 0.67% 0.12% 0.71% 0.1459 1.2645 0.9382 -0.0317 0.9825 -0.2623 
-8 -0.69% -0.41% 0.02% -0.1078 0.9987 -0.8779 -0.0603 0.9915 -0.4950 
-7 1.02% 0.49% 1.04% 0.1887 1.1235 1.3662 -0.0077 1.0030 -0.0625 
-6 0.52% 0.30% 1.56% 0.1899 0.9502 1.6255 0.0416 1.0439 0.3240 
-5 1.06% 0.35% 2.61% 0.2583 1.1734 1.7903 0.1048 1.0893 0.7828 
-4 -0.27% -0.26% 2.34% -0.0387 1.1312 -0.2782 0.0923 1.1070 0.6783 
-3 0.66% -0.01% 3.01% 0.1145 1.0241 0.9096 0.1167 1.1217 0.8463 
-2 0.58% 0.20% 3.59% 0.1304 0.9004 1.1777 0.1435 1.1096 1.0520 
-1 1.27% 0.38% 4.86% 0.2699 1.2376 1.7738 0.2002 1.0802 1.5076 
0 1.48% 0.65% 6.34% 0.3541 1.8750 1.5362 0.2727 1.0410 2.1305 
1 2.62% 0.22% 8.96% 0.6230 1.8714 2.7076 0.3992 1.0558 3.0756 
2 -0.17% -0.42% 8.79% -0.0529 1.4084 -0.3056 0.3794 1.0366 2.9771 
3 -0.22% -0.18% 8.57% -0.0792 1.3820 -0.4660 0.3553 1.0942 2.6409 
4 -0.18% 0.11% 8.39% -0.0183 1.2115 -0.1231 0.3444 1.0894 2.5714 
5 -1.16% -0.63% 7.23% -0.3162 0.8970 -2.8669 0.2757 1.0683 2.0993 
6 -0.55% -0.72% 6.68% -0.1477 0.8600 -1.3971 0.2421 1.0430 1.8884 
7 0.39% 0.08% 7.07% 0.0739 0.6037 0.9951 0.2517 1.0223 2.0029 
8 -0.41% -0.15% 6.66% -0.1325 1.2299 -0.8763 0.2228 1.0270 1.7642 
9 -0.35% 0.03% 6.31% -0.0386 0.9366 -0.3352 0.2120 1.0268 1.6791 
10 1.68% 0.15% 7.99% 0.2018 1.4192 1.1564 0.2448 1.0891 1.8279 
11 -0.01% -0.72% 7.98% -0.0366 0.9201 -0.3237 0.2344 1.1075 1.7217 
12 0.03% 0.35% 8.01% 0.0084 0.8451 0.0807 0.2323 1.1353 1.6643 
13 -0.88% -0.02% 7.13% -0.2309 0.6454 -2.9092 0.1893 1.1129 1.3833 
14 0.04% -0.18% 7.16% -0.0031 0.8227 -0.0307 0.1860 1.0912 1.3867 
15 0.34% -0.05% 7.51% 0.0302 0.8737 0.2812 0.1885 1.0742 1.4270 
16 -0.67% -0.22% 6.83% -0.1614 0.9843 -1.3337 0.1594 1.0903 1.1889 
17 -0.07% -0.47% 6.76% -0.0687 0.9000 -0.6210 0.1461 1.0683 1.1124 
18 0.26% 0.07% 7.02% 0.0280 0.7357 0.3100 0.1487 1.0623 1.1386 
19 -0.29% -0.10% 6.73% -0.0577 0.8565 -0.5481 0.1377 1.0451 1.0717 
20 0.37% 0.11% 7.11% 0.1150 0.5573 1.6778 0.1540 1.0476 1.1955 
21 -0.02% 0.00% 7.08% 0.0274 0.8273 0.2693 0.1564 1.0432 1.2191 
22 -0.36% -0.17% 6.72% -0.1339 0.8194 -1.3287 0.1341 1.0762 1.0136 
23 -0.15% -0.02% 6.57% -0.0460 0.7505 -0.4982 0.1257 1.0813 0.9452 
24 0.03% 0.17% 6.60% 0.0377 0.5491 0.5582 0.1299 1.0654 0.9915 
25 0.33% -0.38% 6.93% 0.0513 0.7619 0.5481 0.1360 1.0670 1.0369 
26 -0.87% -0.55% 6.06% -0.1841 0.6078 -2.4638 0.1077 1.0349 0.8465 
27 -0.47% -0.16% 5.58% -0.0729 0.7965 -0.7449 0.0961 1.0159 0.7690 
28 -0.18% 0.04% 5.41% -0.0414 0.8810 -0.3822 0.0892 0.9830 0.7377 
29 -0.24% -0.37% 5.16% -0.0178 0.8766 -0.1652 0.0857 0.9957 0.7004 
30 -0.34% -0.56% 4.82% -0.1232 0.6838 -1.4659 0.0676 0.9862 0.5578 
          
-1 to 1     5.37% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06621 0.7200 1.5964 3.6682 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6-84 
 
Table-A 6.19 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 191); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.21% 0.00% 0.21% 0.2950 3.3006 1.2823 0.2950 3.3006 1.2823 
-19 0.17% -0.01% 0.39% 0.0134 1.1983 0.1604 0.2181 2.4309 1.2871 
-18 -0.11% -0.18% 0.28% -0.1004 1.4110 -1.0206 0.1201 1.8166 0.9486 
-17 0.47% 0.21% 0.75% 0.2170 1.5848 1.9647 0.2125 1.7794 1.7136 
-16 0.05% -0.29% 0.79% 0.0650 1.4871 0.6271 0.2191 1.7381 1.8090 
-15 -0.19% -0.18% 0.61% -0.0268 1.3870 -0.2768 0.1891 1.7513 1.5494 
-14 -0.03% -0.15% 0.58% -0.0153 1.3427 -0.1636 0.1693 1.5875 1.5302 
-13 0.40% 0.13% 0.98% 0.1944 1.3400 2.0814 0.2271 1.5858 2.0547 
-12 -0.16% -0.31% 0.81% -0.0568 1.2717 -0.6409 0.1952 1.5000 1.8669 
-11 -0.16% -0.18% 0.66% -0.0705 1.1138 -0.9078 0.1629 1.4421 1.6205 
-10 0.00% -0.14% 0.66% 0.0378 1.5413 0.3516 0.1667 1.5393 1.5537 
-9 0.70% 0.14% 1.36% 0.1951 1.5367 1.8213 0.2159 1.4156 2.1883 
-8 0.03% -0.08% 1.39% 0.0100 1.7743 0.0807 0.2102 1.5552 1.9393 
-7 0.46% 0.08% 1.85% 0.1337 1.7371 1.1046 0.2383 1.4048 2.4338 
-6 0.18% 0.10% 2.03% 0.1267 1.2548 1.4487 0.2629 1.3834 2.7269 
-5 0.19% 0.02% 2.22% 0.0647 1.3221 0.7023 0.2708 1.3311 2.9185 
-4 -0.04% -0.06% 2.18% -0.1834 2.7416 -0.9598 0.2182 1.2530 2.4985 
-3 -0.09% -0.14% 2.09% 0.0480 1.6273 0.4230 0.2233 1.2798 2.5041 
-2 0.30% 0.13% 2.39% 0.0251 1.6157 0.2231 0.2232 1.2766 2.5082 
-1 0.84% 0.27% 3.23% 0.4121 2.2853 2.5874 0.3097 1.3935 3.1884 
0 0.24% 0.11% 3.46% 0.0593 2.1055 0.4044 0.3151 1.4129 3.2004 
1 0.50% 0.06% 3.96% 0.2202 2.2407 1.4099 0.3548 1.3835 3.6799 
2 0.76% 0.17% 4.73% 0.3798 2.5050 2.1756 0.4262 1.5281 4.0021 
3 0.16% 0.02% 4.89% 0.1111 2.0011 0.7965 0.4399 1.4132 4.4668 
4 0.30% 0.02% 5.19% 0.0568 1.1530 0.7068 0.4424 1.3914 4.5622 
5 0.05% -0.14% 5.24% 0.1180 1.6035 1.0557 0.4570 1.4158 4.6310 
6 -0.18% 0.00% 5.05% -0.0070 1.6683 -0.0604 0.4471 1.4671 4.3723 
7 0.37% 0.07% 5.43% 0.1620 2.4170 0.9615 0.4696 1.5412 4.3721 
8 0.21% -0.09% 5.64% 0.1135 1.4707 1.1069 0.4825 1.6167 4.2823 
9 0.02% -0.14% 5.66% -0.0228 1.4132 -0.2317 0.4702 1.5419 4.3757 
10 0.04% -0.09% 5.70% 0.0908 1.7092 0.7619 0.4789 1.5328 4.4828 
11 -0.10% -0.10% 5.60% -0.0388 1.3556 -0.4104 0.4645 1.4853 4.4871 
12 0.31% -0.01% 5.91% 0.1348 1.2208 1.5844 0.4809 1.5126 4.5615 
13 0.69% 0.16% 6.60% 0.2373 1.2233 2.7836 0.5144 1.5030 4.9112 
14 0.18% 0.26% 6.78% 0.0609 1.1327 0.7715 0.5173 1.5196 4.8847 
15 -0.06% -0.12% 6.72% -0.1523 1.6203 -1.3484 0.4847 1.4819 4.6932 
16 0.07% -0.11% 6.79% 0.0618 1.3866 0.6392 0.4883 1.5207 4.6071 
17 -0.15% -0.15% 6.64% -0.0125 1.3234 -0.1361 0.4798 1.5561 4.4240 
18 -0.06% 0.17% 6.58% 0.0338 1.5230 0.3185 0.4790 1.6140 4.2584 
19 -0.20% 0.02% 6.38% -0.1719 1.7108 -1.4415 0.4458 1.5672 4.0816 
20 0.03% 0.06% 6.41% 0.0819 1.4725 0.7976 0.4531 1.5972 4.0704 
21 -0.07% 0.10% 6.34% -0.0036 2.0781 -0.0252 0.4471 1.6630 3.8579 
22 -0.09% 0.10% 6.25% 0.0980 1.7233 0.8160 0.4568 1.7142 3.8240 
23 0.40% 0.06% 6.65% 0.1480 1.3816 1.5367 0.4739 1.6406 4.1449 
24 -0.02% -0.10% 6.63% 0.1179 1.8967 0.8916 0.4862 1.7258 4.0423 
25 0.06% -0.12% 6.69% 0.0219 1.3847 0.2269 0.4841 1.6745 4.1482 
26 0.31% -0.05% 7.00% 0.0938 1.2201 1.1034 0.4926 1.6416 4.3059 
27 0.33% 0.03% 7.33% 0.1500 1.3065 1.6470 0.5091 1.6435 4.4447 
28 0.08% -0.01% 7.41% 0.1055 1.3594 1.1132 0.5190 1.7018 4.3756 
29 0.07% -0.09% 7.48% -0.0143 1.4361 -0.1433 0.5117 1.6572 4.4306 
30 0.57% 0.27% 8.05% 0.2593 1.2007 3.0989 0.5430 1.6868 4.6189 
          
-1 to 1     1.58% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04298 0.3993 1.9412 2.9514 
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Table-A 6.20 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 195); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.01% -0.13% -0.01% 0.0327 0.9695 0.4946 0.0327 0.9695 0.4946 
-19 0.08% -0.17% 0.07% -0.0008 0.9733 -0.0125 0.0226 0.9522 0.3471 
-18 -0.22% -0.42% -0.15% -0.0669 1.0361 -0.9456 -0.0202 0.9906 -0.2986 
-17 0.34% 0.09% 0.19% 0.1082 1.1483 1.3804 0.0366 0.9904 0.5416 
-16 -0.12% -0.43% 0.07% -0.0163 1.0304 -0.2313 0.0255 1.0675 0.3496 
-15 -0.35% -0.36% -0.28% -0.1066 1.1239 -1.3892 -0.0203 1.0828 -0.2740 
-14 -0.22% -0.19% -0.50% -0.0135 1.0763 -0.1841 -0.0239 1.0191 -0.3430 
-13 0.35% 0.07% -0.15% 0.1346 1.1493 1.7153 0.0253 1.0861 0.3406 
-12 -0.29% -0.50% -0.44% -0.0988 0.9225 -1.5695 -0.0091 1.0432 -0.1283 
-11 -0.27% -0.35% -0.70% -0.0817 0.9486 -1.2621 -0.0345 1.0317 -0.4900 
-10 -0.08% -0.31% -0.79% -0.0239 1.0427 -0.3363 -0.0401 1.0357 -0.5675 
-9 0.47% 0.05% -0.32% 0.1361 1.1351 1.7568 0.0009 1.0644 0.0122 
-8 -0.12% -0.16% -0.44% -0.0547 1.0907 -0.7353 -0.0143 1.0830 -0.1939 
-7 0.31% -0.11% -0.13% 0.1070 0.9044 1.7328 0.0148 1.0854 0.1994 
-6 0.16% 0.02% 0.03% 0.0722 1.0470 1.0097 0.0329 1.1019 0.4375 
-5 -0.08% -0.16% -0.05% -0.0222 1.0854 -0.2991 0.0263 1.0652 0.3620 
-4 -0.22% -0.27% -0.27% -0.0885 1.0126 -1.2801 0.0041 1.0154 0.0588 
-3 -0.18% -0.24% -0.45% -0.0504 0.9928 -0.7432 -0.0079 1.0438 -0.1110 
-2 0.18% -0.03% -0.27% 0.0310 0.9217 0.4928 -0.0006 1.0259 -0.0083 
-1 0.66% 0.21% 0.39% 0.1941 1.0674 2.6641 0.0428 1.0670 0.5882 
0 0.11% -0.04% 0.50% 0.0783 1.4769 0.7770 0.0589 1.1065 0.7798 
1 0.39% -0.05% 0.89% 0.1308 1.5535 1.2337 0.0854 1.1201 1.1174 
2 0.63% 0.09% 1.52% 0.2198 1.3838 2.3267 0.1294 1.1487 1.6501 
3 0.01% -0.12% 1.52% 0.0211 1.1650 0.2657 0.1310 1.1480 1.6714 
4 0.15% -0.08% 1.67% 0.0233 0.9433 0.3621 0.1330 1.1433 1.7041 
5 -0.12% -0.27% 1.55% -0.0238 0.9232 -0.3776 0.1257 1.1331 1.6256 
6 -0.38% -0.14% 1.17% -0.1104 1.1019 -1.4686 0.1021 1.1426 1.3095 
7 0.37% 0.00% 1.53% 0.1102 0.9641 1.6743 0.1211 1.1589 1.5311 
8 0.03% -0.16% 1.56% -0.0255 1.0202 -0.3657 0.1143 1.1557 1.4487 
9 -0.13% -0.46% 1.43% -0.0154 1.0062 -0.2246 0.1095 1.1586 1.3851 
10 -0.06% -0.28% 1.37% 0.0053 0.9943 0.0774 0.1087 1.1854 1.3435 
11 -0.22% -0.24% 1.15% -0.0312 0.9237 -0.4955 0.1015 1.2189 1.2196 
12 0.14% -0.18% 1.30% 0.0410 0.9441 0.6369 0.1071 1.2253 1.2801 
13 0.48% 0.10% 1.77% 0.1316 0.9475 2.0343 0.1280 1.2296 1.5255 
14 0.01% 0.13% 1.79% -0.0125 0.8942 -0.2050 0.1241 1.2141 1.4973 
15 -0.14% -0.26% 1.65% -0.0734 0.9515 -1.1300 0.1101 1.2328 1.3086 
16 -0.15% -0.24% 1.50% -0.0774 1.0220 -1.1090 0.0959 1.2068 1.1642 
17 -0.33% -0.26% 1.16% -0.1120 0.9061 -1.8106 0.0765 1.1902 0.9412 
18 -0.22% -0.02% 0.95% -0.0479 1.1225 -0.6254 0.0678 1.1776 0.8436 
19 -0.36% -0.16% 0.59% -0.0961 0.9991 -1.4087 0.0518 1.1422 0.6639 
20 -0.22% -0.26% 0.37% -0.0479 1.0870 -0.6456 0.0436 1.1315 0.5651 
21 -0.25% -0.08% 0.12% -0.0741 1.0506 -1.0331 0.0317 1.1321 0.4101 
22 -0.41% -0.11% -0.28% -0.1120 0.8561 -1.9172 0.0142 1.1135 0.1873 
23 0.28% -0.14% 0.00% 0.0795 0.9254 1.2589 0.0261 1.1052 0.3455 
24 -0.17% -0.19% -0.17% -0.0205 1.1426 -0.2624 0.0227 1.1264 0.2955 
25 -0.20% -0.28% -0.37% -0.0614 1.0933 -0.8224 0.0134 1.1105 0.1771 
26 0.08% -0.21% -0.29% 0.0106 0.9677 0.1606 0.0148 1.0949 0.1984 
27 0.14% -0.01% -0.16% 0.0642 1.0155 0.9267 0.0239 1.0802 0.3247 
28 -0.13% -0.16% -0.29% -0.0109 0.8628 -0.1859 0.0221 1.0870 0.2983 
29 -0.16% -0.28% -0.45% -0.0258 0.9055 -0.4181 0.0183 1.0788 0.2479 
30 0.42% 0.07% -0.03% 0.1339 1.0152 1.9320 0.0368 1.0713 0.5036 
          
-1 to 1     1.16% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04308 0.2328 1.4996 2.2745 
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Table-A 6.21 Market returns to Acquirers Targets; MM firms; (OLS, 191); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.03% -0.13% 0.03% 0.0422 0.9698 0.6275 0.0422 0.9698 0.6275 
-19 0.02% -0.17% 0.05% -0.0184 0.9582 -0.2778 0.0168 0.9545 0.2536 
-18 -0.27% -0.42% -0.22% -0.0831 1.0202 -1.1755 -0.0343 0.9736 -0.5081 
-17 0.31% 0.08% 0.10% 0.1021 1.1562 1.2746 0.0214 0.9789 0.3151 
-16 -0.14% -0.44% -0.04% -0.0178 1.0400 -0.2464 0.0112 1.0645 0.1515 
-15 -0.36% -0.36% -0.40% -0.0983 1.1041 -1.2845 -0.0299 1.0800 -0.3998 
-14 -0.21% -0.19% -0.61% -0.0233 1.0477 -0.3214 -0.0365 1.0192 -0.5171 
-13 0.23% 0.05% -0.38% 0.0990 1.0479 1.3640 0.0009 1.0527 0.0118 
-12 -0.31% -0.50% -0.69% -0.0997 0.9186 -1.5671 -0.0324 1.0121 -0.4625 
-11 -0.32% -0.36% -1.01% -0.0973 0.9409 -1.4926 -0.0615 0.9865 -0.9004 
-10 -0.13% -0.35% -1.15% -0.0393 1.0336 -0.5491 -0.0705 0.9740 -1.0452 
-9 0.53% 0.05% -0.62% 0.1450 1.1365 1.8416 -0.0257 1.0071 -0.3678 
-8 -0.13% -0.20% -0.76% -0.0571 1.1015 -0.7487 -0.0405 1.0337 -0.5656 
-7 0.32% -0.05% -0.43% 0.1118 0.9128 1.7680 -0.0091 1.0438 -0.1265 
-6 0.08% 0.00% -0.35% 0.0514 1.0307 0.7203 0.0044 1.0458 0.0613 
-5 0.02% -0.12% -0.34% 0.0122 1.0449 0.1689 0.0074 1.0278 0.1034 
-4 -0.20% -0.27% -0.54% -0.0853 0.9878 -1.2461 -0.0135 0.9944 -0.1966 
-3 -0.21% -0.24% -0.75% -0.0615 0.9926 -0.8950 -0.0277 1.0172 -0.3926 
-2 0.13% -0.04% -0.63% 0.0154 0.9088 0.2444 -0.0234 0.9866 -0.3423 
-1 0.63% 0.22% 0.00% 0.1829 1.0603 2.4905 0.0181 1.0184 0.2565 
0 0.09% -0.04% 0.09% 0.0739 1.4907 0.7158 0.0338 1.0584 0.4609 
1 0.36% -0.05% 0.46% 0.1264 1.5658 1.1648 0.0600 1.0768 0.8037 
2 0.60% 0.09% 1.05% 0.2098 1.3839 2.1885 0.1024 1.0961 1.3483 
3 -0.04% -0.13% 1.01% 0.0059 1.1528 0.0734 0.1014 1.0806 1.3548 
4 0.13% -0.10% 1.14% 0.0174 0.9352 0.2691 0.1029 1.0724 1.3846 
5 -0.12% -0.42% 1.02% -0.0280 0.9125 -0.4424 0.0954 1.0519 1.3088 
6 -0.32% -0.14% 0.70% -0.1043 1.0725 -1.4043 0.0735 1.0514 1.0093 
7 0.24% -0.06% 0.93% 0.0706 0.9161 1.1128 0.0855 1.0598 1.1651 
8 0.03% -0.23% 0.96% -0.0259 1.0304 -0.3633 0.0792 1.0623 1.0766 
9 -0.14% -0.45% 0.82% -0.0227 1.0081 -0.3257 0.0738 1.0690 0.9959 
10 -0.12% -0.28% 0.70% -0.0148 0.9795 -0.2179 0.0699 1.0856 0.9294 
11 -0.28% -0.28% 0.42% -0.0492 0.9054 -0.7849 0.0601 1.1081 0.7828 
12 0.09% -0.22% 0.51% 0.0158 0.8941 0.2555 0.0619 1.1108 0.8048 
13 0.53% 0.10% 1.04% 0.1427 0.9471 2.1748 0.0855 1.1188 1.1029 
14 0.02% 0.13% 1.06% -0.0122 0.9034 -0.1951 0.0822 1.1053 1.0734 
15 -0.21% -0.27% 0.85% -0.0996 0.9235 -1.5564 0.0644 1.1084 0.8392 
16 -0.06% -0.22% 0.79% -0.0412 0.9619 -0.6185 0.0568 1.1063 0.7410 
17 -0.33% -0.27% 0.46% -0.1077 0.9103 -1.7080 0.0386 1.0923 0.5096 
18 -0.21% -0.01% 0.26% -0.0582 1.0739 -0.7826 0.0287 1.0783 0.3848 
19 -0.37% -0.16% -0.11% -0.0935 0.9788 -1.3784 0.0136 1.0562 0.1859 
20 -0.13% -0.23% -0.24% -0.0180 1.0601 -0.2445 0.0106 1.0632 0.1443 
21 -0.27% -0.08% -0.51% -0.0779 1.0229 -1.0999 -0.0015 1.0758 -0.0204 
22 -0.28% -0.05% -0.79% -0.0750 0.8120 -1.3339 -0.0129 1.0697 -0.1747 
23 0.26% -0.14% -0.54% 0.0750 0.9282 1.1656 -0.0015 1.0629 -0.0204 
24 -0.13% -0.18% -0.66% -0.0030 1.1327 -0.0378 -0.0019 1.0896 -0.0255 
25 -0.11% -0.28% -0.78% -0.0298 1.0598 -0.4061 -0.0063 1.0837 -0.0839 
26 0.14% -0.21% -0.64% 0.0290 0.9447 0.4436 -0.0020 1.0772 -0.0268 
27 0.15% 0.03% -0.49% 0.0759 1.0050 1.0899 0.0090 1.0668 0.1215 
28 -0.06% -0.16% -0.55% 0.0087 0.8489 0.1473 0.0101 1.0733 0.1361 
29 -0.14% -0.28% -0.69% -0.0172 0.9048 -0.2741 0.0076 1.0653 0.1028 
30 0.46% 0.08% -0.23% 0.1370 0.9367 2.1103 0.0267 1.0663 0.3613 
          
-1 to 1     1.08% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04346 0.2213 1.5075 2.1184 
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Table-A 6.22 FF returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 177); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.02% -0.10% -0.02% 0.0131 0.9544 0.1874 0.0131 0.9544 0.1874 
-19 0.17% -0.14% 0.14% 0.0137 0.9902 0.1896 0.0190 0.9489 0.2732 
-18 -0.09% -0.25% 0.05% -0.0231 1.0287 -0.3067 0.0022 1.0102 0.0292 
-17 0.36% 0.01% 0.41% 0.1069 1.2126 1.2045 0.0553 1.0302 0.7336 
-16 -0.10% -0.20% 0.30% -0.0110 1.0147 -0.1481 0.0445 1.0885 0.5593 
-15 -0.35% -0.37% -0.05% -0.1035 1.1372 -1.2444 -0.0016 1.1039 -0.0199 
-14 -0.18% -0.12% -0.22% 0.0055 1.1395 0.0654 0.0006 1.0687 0.0073 
-13 0.35% 0.11% 0.13% 0.1142 1.1378 1.3719 0.0409 1.1253 0.4969 
-12 -0.31% -0.51% -0.18% -0.1240 0.8975 -1.8879 -0.0027 1.0808 -0.0347 
-11 -0.19% -0.20% -0.37% -0.0699 0.9671 -0.9874 -0.0247 1.0423 -0.3239 
-10 -0.06% -0.41% -0.43% -0.0182 1.0037 -0.2477 -0.0290 1.0291 -0.3856 
-9 0.33% 0.05% -0.10% 0.0821 1.1654 0.9598 -0.0039 1.0464 -0.0515 
-8 0.01% -0.10% -0.09% -0.0178 1.1093 -0.2198 -0.0087 1.0671 -0.1113 
-7 0.38% -0.13% 0.28% 0.1127 0.9425 1.6344 0.0217 1.0575 0.2809 
-6 0.14% -0.14% 0.42% 0.0432 1.0197 0.5793 0.0321 1.0605 0.4142 
-5 0.02% 0.05% 0.44% 0.0236 1.1325 0.2850 0.0370 1.0605 0.4766 
-4 -0.08% -0.06% 0.36% -0.0525 1.0253 -0.6996 0.0232 1.0122 0.3137 
-3 -0.12% -0.39% 0.24% -0.0395 0.9050 -0.5967 0.0133 1.0362 0.1750 
-2 0.11% -0.16% 0.35% 0.0275 0.9720 0.3873 0.0192 1.0236 0.2567 
-1 0.65% 0.20% 1.00% 0.1896 1.1491 2.2550 0.0611 1.0733 0.7779 
0 0.23% -0.01% 1.24% 0.1178 1.3772 1.1687 0.0853 1.0953 1.0643 
1 0.26% -0.03% 1.50% 0.0800 1.2878 0.8489 0.1003 1.1136 1.2312 
2 0.71% 0.21% 2.21% 0.2247 1.4617 2.1014 0.1450 1.1359 1.7443 
3 0.04% -0.14% 2.24% 0.0124 1.1396 0.1491 0.1445 1.1378 1.7353 
4 0.17% -0.20% 2.41% 0.0204 0.9290 0.3008 0.1456 1.1280 1.7642 
5 -0.12% -0.25% 2.29% -0.0107 0.9509 -0.1532 0.1407 1.1398 1.6870 
6 -0.30% -0.14% 2.00% -0.0904 1.1233 -1.1005 0.1206 1.1551 1.4276 
7 0.28% -0.09% 2.28% 0.0783 0.9805 1.0912 0.1333 1.1639 1.5651 
8 0.00% -0.23% 2.28% -0.0226 1.0548 -0.2928 0.1267 1.1590 1.4947 
9 -0.33% -0.68% 1.94% -0.0887 1.0188 -1.1905 0.1084 1.1675 1.2691 
10 -0.04% -0.14% 1.91% 0.0202 1.0427 0.2653 0.1103 1.1979 1.2583 
11 -0.32% -0.23% 1.59% -0.0671 0.9161 -1.0005 0.0967 1.2207 1.0825 
12 0.10% 0.06% 1.69% 0.0340 0.9209 0.5048 0.1011 1.2253 1.1280 
13 0.39% 0.04% 2.08% 0.1116 0.9984 1.5272 0.1188 1.2430 1.3058 
14 0.01% 0.01% 2.09% -0.0050 0.9515 -0.0720 0.1162 1.2293 1.2920 
15 -0.21% -0.28% 1.87% -0.1150 0.9776 -1.6030 0.0955 1.2419 1.0509 
16 -0.30% -0.55% 1.57% -0.1422 1.0232 -1.8940 0.0709 1.2103 0.8009 
17 -0.36% -0.30% 1.22% -0.1265 0.8744 -1.9717 0.0496 1.2002 0.5643 
18 -0.18% -0.27% 1.03% -0.0215 1.1387 -0.2577 0.0455 1.1946 0.5200 
19 -0.33% -0.17% 0.71% -0.0741 1.0306 -0.9803 0.0332 1.1541 0.3932 
20 -0.18% -0.29% 0.53% -0.0356 0.9846 -0.4928 0.0272 1.1391 0.3268 
21 -0.40% -0.13% 0.13% -0.1459 1.0332 -1.9250 0.0045 1.1392 0.0539 
22 -0.31% -0.16% -0.18% -0.0637 0.8710 -0.9965 -0.0052 1.1255 -0.0637 
23 0.41% -0.04% 0.23% 0.1125 0.9324 1.6392 0.0116 1.1313 0.1400 
24 -0.32% -0.49% -0.09% -0.0858 1.1830 -0.9858 -0.0012 1.1612 -0.0140 
25 -0.33% -0.47% -0.43% -0.1256 1.1685 -1.4604 -0.0195 1.1387 -0.2339 
26 0.07% 0.02% -0.35% 0.0018 0.9197 0.0270 -0.0190 1.1171 -0.2326 
27 0.14% -0.02% -0.22% 0.0769 0.9587 1.0895 -0.0078 1.1037 -0.0971 
28 -0.18% -0.09% -0.40% -0.0498 0.8839 -0.7652 -0.0148 1.1083 -0.1825 
29 -0.10% -0.20% -0.51% -0.0446 0.9222 -0.6571 -0.0209 1.1021 -0.2590 
30 0.51% 0.19% 0.00% 0.1732 1.0592 2.2216 0.0033 1.1015 0.0409 
          
-1 to 1     1.15% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0386 0.2236 1.5243 2.0051 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-88 
 
Table-A 6.23 FF returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 173); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.14% 0.09% 0.14% 0.2558 3.2806 1.0465 0.2558 3.2806 1.0465 
-19 0.22% -0.08% 0.35% 0.0229 1.2329 0.2496 0.1971 2.4244 1.0910 
-18 0.01% -0.16% 0.37% -0.0540 1.3988 -0.5186 0.1297 1.8248 0.9540 
-17 0.48% 0.14% 0.85% 0.2130 1.6227 1.7623 0.2188 1.7958 1.6357 
-16 0.05% -0.18% 0.90% 0.0550 1.4653 0.5037 0.2203 1.7341 1.7055 
-15 -0.20% -0.28% 0.70% -0.0298 1.3811 -0.2899 0.1890 1.7247 1.4706 
-14 -0.01% -0.10% 0.69% -0.0065 1.3819 -0.0627 0.1725 1.5905 1.4558 
-13 0.41% 0.19% 1.11% 0.1980 1.3167 2.0182 0.2313 1.5965 1.9452 
-12 -0.19% -0.35% 0.92% -0.0829 1.2195 -0.9129 0.1905 1.5040 1.6999 
-11 -0.07% -0.16% 0.85% -0.0581 1.1421 -0.6830 0.1623 1.4262 1.5277 
-10 0.01% -0.12% 0.86% 0.0420 1.4959 0.3770 0.1674 1.5105 1.4879 
-9 0.59% 0.16% 1.45% 0.1371 1.5485 1.1849 0.2000 1.3799 1.9455 
-8 0.13% -0.05% 1.57% 0.0377 1.7943 0.2822 0.2027 1.5286 1.7799 
-7 0.55% 0.14% 2.13% 0.1406 1.7541 1.0759 0.2329 1.3626 2.2939 
-6 0.20% 0.07% 2.33% 0.1115 1.2320 1.2147 0.2537 1.3320 2.5570 
-5 0.27% 0.10% 2.60% 0.1191 1.3417 1.1913 0.2754 1.3152 2.8107 
-4 0.10% -0.01% 2.70% -0.1365 2.7402 -0.6687 0.2342 1.2324 2.5508 
-3 -0.02% -0.13% 2.68% 0.0835 1.6020 0.6995 0.2472 1.2638 2.6261 
-2 0.24% 0.03% 2.92% 0.0141 1.6465 0.1148 0.2439 1.2599 2.5981 
-1 0.79% 0.40% 3.72% 0.3998 2.3262 2.3070 0.3270 1.3799 3.1813 
0 0.41% 0.02% 4.12% 0.1115 1.9814 0.7552 0.3434 1.3790 3.3432 
1 0.37% 0.14% 4.49% 0.1429 1.9188 0.9994 0.3659 1.3540 3.6276 
2 0.82% 0.24% 5.31% 0.3715 2.5296 1.9716 0.4353 1.4885 3.9257 
3 0.17% 0.03% 5.48% 0.0940 1.9619 0.6428 0.4454 1.3704 4.3621 
4 0.33% 0.07% 5.81% 0.0581 1.1078 0.7036 0.4479 1.3466 4.4651 
5 0.09% -0.11% 5.90% 0.1446 1.6055 1.2086 0.4676 1.3951 4.4991 
6 -0.12% -0.01% 5.78% 0.0065 1.6828 0.0521 0.4601 1.4511 4.2560 
7 0.32% 0.06% 6.09% 0.1275 2.4193 0.7074 0.4759 1.5192 4.2052 
8 0.16% -0.01% 6.26% 0.1184 1.4880 1.0681 0.4896 1.5951 4.1202 
9 -0.15% -0.47% 6.10% -0.0981 1.4146 -0.9310 0.4635 1.5257 4.0775 
10 0.07% 0.00% 6.17% 0.1081 1.7437 0.8320 0.4753 1.5186 4.2015 
11 -0.22% -0.14% 5.95% -0.0888 1.3555 -0.8797 0.4521 1.4637 4.1463 
12 0.29% 0.15% 6.24% 0.1215 1.2112 1.3466 0.4664 1.4913 4.1979 
13 0.65% 0.10% 6.89% 0.2251 1.2511 2.4148 0.4981 1.4978 4.4637 
14 0.15% 0.19% 7.04% 0.0638 1.1921 0.7189 0.5017 1.5242 4.4183 
15 -0.16% -0.27% 6.88% -0.2005 1.6201 -1.6566 0.4614 1.4844 4.1726 
16 -0.10% -0.25% 6.78% -0.0029 1.3610 -0.0281 0.4546 1.5159 4.0257 
17 -0.24% -0.18% 6.54% -0.0416 1.2740 -0.4373 0.4419 1.5602 3.8018 
18 -0.02% 0.02% 6.52% 0.0778 1.4968 0.6953 0.4485 1.6311 3.6912 
19 -0.15% 0.05% 6.37% -0.1447 1.7267 -1.1213 0.4201 1.5773 3.5752 
20 0.04% -0.06% 6.40% 0.0958 1.3503 0.9494 0.4298 1.6042 3.5964 
21 -0.23% -0.05% 6.18% -0.0738 1.9654 -0.5026 0.4133 1.6583 3.3454 
22 -0.01% 0.07% 6.17% 0.1490 1.7205 1.1590 0.4310 1.7128 3.3780 
23 0.52% 0.10% 6.69% 0.1700 1.3936 1.6274 0.4515 1.6493 3.6745 
24 -0.12% -0.21% 6.57% 0.0650 1.9186 0.4522 0.4561 1.7441 3.5102 
25 -0.06% -0.25% 6.52% -0.0455 1.4142 -0.4290 0.4445 1.6828 3.5459 
26 0.28% 0.00% 6.80% 0.0870 1.1918 0.9745 0.4524 1.6461 3.6890 
27 0.33% 0.13% 7.13% 0.1650 1.2087 1.8216 0.4713 1.6535 3.8257 
28 -0.01% -0.08% 7.12% 0.0544 1.3549 0.5353 0.4741 1.7086 3.7250 
29 0.07% -0.15% 7.19% -0.0393 1.4411 -0.3639 0.4639 1.6623 3.7463 
30 0.67% 0.23% 7.86% 0.3089 1.2364 3.3329 0.5022 1.6950 3.9769 
          
-1 to 1     1.57% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03872 0.3777 1.9467 2.6041 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6-89 
 
Table-A 6.24 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; FF-firms; (OLS, 177); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.07% -0.27% -0.07% 0.0110 0.9902 0.1529 0.0110 0.9902 0.1529 
-19 0.07% -0.17% 0.00% -0.0158 0.9519 -0.2277 -0.0034 0.9331 -0.0495 
-18 -0.21% -0.36% -0.20% -0.0705 1.0593 -0.9138 -0.0434 0.9820 -0.6076 
-17 0.28% -0.02% 0.08% 0.0729 1.1614 0.8623 -0.0012 0.9816 -0.0163 
-16 -0.20% -0.44% -0.12% -0.0445 1.0233 -0.5967 -0.0209 1.0551 -0.2723 
-15 -0.34% -0.50% -0.46% -0.1052 1.1198 -1.2907 -0.0621 1.0542 -0.8085 
-14 -0.19% -0.25% -0.65% -0.0021 1.0927 -0.0265 -0.0583 1.0011 -0.7992 
-13 0.50% 0.13% -0.15% 0.1772 1.1750 2.0706 0.0081 1.0712 0.1043 
-12 -0.29% -0.50% -0.44% -0.0983 0.9066 -1.4893 -0.0251 1.0412 -0.3311 
-11 -0.22% -0.35% -0.66% -0.0627 0.9772 -0.8817 -0.0437 1.0364 -0.5784 
-10 -0.07% -0.30% -0.74% -0.0255 1.0328 -0.3391 -0.0493 1.0412 -0.6503 
-9 0.46% 0.04% -0.28% 0.1200 1.1443 1.4402 -0.0126 1.0612 -0.1626 
-8 -0.08% -0.20% -0.36% -0.0418 1.1254 -0.5099 -0.0237 1.0782 -0.3014 
-7 0.34% -0.11% -0.02% 0.0981 0.9067 1.4862 0.0034 1.0672 0.0441 
-6 0.13% -0.04% 0.11% 0.0527 1.0418 0.6940 0.0169 1.0801 0.2149 
-5 -0.04% -0.11% 0.07% -0.0039 1.1229 -0.0482 0.0154 1.0409 0.2029 
-4 -0.19% -0.22% -0.13% -0.0755 1.0240 -1.0120 -0.0034 0.9901 -0.0469 
-3 -0.09% -0.21% -0.22% -0.0342 0.9194 -0.5112 -0.0114 1.0264 -0.1519 
-2 0.17% -0.04% -0.06% 0.0312 0.9251 0.4630 -0.0039 1.0189 -0.0525 
-1 0.65% 0.03% 0.59% 0.1893 1.0994 2.3646 0.0385 1.0685 0.4953 
0 0.21% -0.04% 0.81% 0.0949 1.3367 0.9746 0.0583 1.0824 0.7398 
1 0.23% -0.04% 1.03% 0.0739 1.2628 0.8039 0.0727 1.1054 0.9035 
2 0.71% 0.07% 1.74% 0.2306 1.4228 2.2253 0.1192 1.1346 1.4429 
3 -0.07% -0.23% 1.67% -0.0111 1.0979 -0.1388 0.1144 1.1350 1.3845 
4 0.16% -0.08% 1.83% 0.0227 0.9531 0.3264 0.1167 1.1350 1.4114 
5 -0.14% -0.26% 1.69% -0.0202 0.9157 -0.3031 0.1104 1.1300 1.3419 
6 -0.38% -0.11% 1.32% -0.1061 1.1155 -1.3058 0.0879 1.1435 1.0561 
7 0.33% -0.06% 1.64% 0.0896 0.9778 1.2580 0.1033 1.1588 1.2241 
8 0.05% -0.23% 1.70% -0.0116 1.0565 -0.1508 0.0993 1.1578 1.1782 
9 -0.25% -0.51% 1.44% -0.0485 1.0035 -0.6633 0.0888 1.1674 1.0448 
10 -0.04% -0.26% 1.41% 0.0266 0.9919 0.3687 0.0922 1.1966 1.0576 
11 -0.29% -0.27% 1.11% -0.0470 0.9316 -0.6926 0.0824 1.2330 0.9178 
12 0.19% -0.13% 1.30% 0.0608 0.9606 0.8688 0.0917 1.2433 1.0131 
13 0.54% 0.11% 1.85% 0.1595 0.9565 2.2894 0.1177 1.2517 1.2914 
14 -0.02% 0.13% 1.83% -0.0238 0.9058 -0.3609 0.1120 1.2380 1.2423 
15 -0.06% -0.17% 1.77% -0.0512 0.9649 -0.7293 0.1019 1.2554 1.1145 
16 -0.28% -0.38% 1.49% -0.1250 0.9666 -1.7762 0.0799 1.2208 0.8993 
17 -0.36% -0.30% 1.13% -0.1211 0.9227 -1.8029 0.0592 1.2035 0.6759 
18 -0.07% 0.00% 1.06% 0.0212 1.1065 0.2633 0.0619 1.1970 0.7098 
19 -0.35% -0.12% 0.71% -0.0884 1.0274 -1.1812 0.0471 1.1603 0.5576 
20 -0.18% -0.26% 0.53% -0.0428 1.0739 -0.5473 0.0399 1.1453 0.4779 
21 -0.37% -0.14% 0.16% -0.1210 1.0575 -1.5709 0.0207 1.1427 0.2489 
22 -0.32% 0.00% -0.16% -0.0755 0.8677 -1.1941 0.0090 1.1220 0.1097 
23 0.35% -0.03% 0.18% 0.1076 0.9520 1.5524 0.0251 1.1151 0.3089 
24 -0.16% -0.19% 0.03% -0.0288 1.1752 -0.3369 0.0205 1.1376 0.2475 
25 -0.26% -0.28% -0.24% -0.1022 1.0583 -1.3261 0.0052 1.1160 0.0642 
26 0.08% -0.28% -0.16% 0.0012 0.9607 0.0174 0.0053 1.0997 0.0666 
27 0.16% -0.03% -0.01% 0.0767 0.9661 1.0897 0.0163 1.0849 0.2069 
28 -0.23% -0.19% -0.24% -0.0520 0.8367 -0.8543 0.0087 1.0934 0.1098 
29 -0.20% -0.27% -0.44% -0.0533 0.8796 -0.8323 0.0011 1.0845 0.0141 
30 0.50% 0.13% 0.06% 0.1647 1.0159 2.2257 0.0242 1.0749 0.3087 
          
-1 to 1     1.09% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0386 0.2067 1.5168 1.8718 
 
 
 
  
  
6-90 
 
Table-A 6.25 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; FF-firms; (MM, 173); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.15% -0.06% 0.15% 0.2908 3.4594 1.1332 0.2908 3.4594 1.1332 
-19 0.15% -0.01% 0.31% -0.0115 1.1844 -0.1305 0.1975 2.5219 1.0558 
-18 -0.10% -0.17% 0.21% -0.1118 1.4533 -1.0373 0.0967 1.8666 0.6984 
-17 0.43% 0.08% 0.64% 0.1873 1.6129 1.5656 0.1774 1.8278 1.3084 
-16 -0.03% -0.30% 0.61% 0.0338 1.5107 0.3018 0.1738 1.7757 1.3195 
-15 -0.17% -0.18% 0.44% -0.0205 1.3935 -0.1986 0.1503 1.7764 1.1404 
-14 0.00% -0.21% 0.44% -0.0109 1.3689 -0.1077 0.1350 1.6110 1.1296 
-13 0.53% 0.22% 0.97% 0.2469 1.3704 2.4282 0.2136 1.6039 1.7948 
-12 -0.15% -0.31% 0.82% -0.0514 1.2738 -0.5440 0.1842 1.5222 1.6312 
-11 -0.12% -0.18% 0.69% -0.0545 1.1512 -0.6386 0.1575 1.4676 1.4468 
-10 0.01% -0.14% 0.70% 0.0374 1.5704 0.3209 0.1615 1.5745 1.3822 
-9 0.69% 0.13% 1.39% 0.1683 1.5584 1.4559 0.2032 1.4288 1.9168 
-8 0.06% -0.08% 1.44% 0.0221 1.8494 0.1609 0.2013 1.5786 1.7191 
-7 0.49% 0.08% 1.93% 0.1210 1.7988 0.9067 0.2264 1.4015 2.1770 
-6 0.14% 0.05% 2.08% 0.1040 1.2548 1.1173 0.2455 1.3694 2.4168 
-5 0.24% 0.07% 2.32% 0.0861 1.3687 0.8476 0.2593 1.3124 2.6626 
-4 -0.01% -0.04% 2.31% -0.1823 2.8628 -0.8582 0.2073 1.2312 2.2695 
-3 -0.01% -0.14% 2.29% 0.0767 1.6228 0.6371 0.2195 1.2646 2.3400 
-2 0.28% 0.02% 2.57% 0.0118 1.6648 0.0954 0.2164 1.2741 2.2892 
-1 0.81% 0.18% 3.39% 0.4120 2.3858 2.3273 0.3030 1.4075 2.9019 
0 0.34% 0.10% 3.72% 0.0752 1.9999 0.5070 0.3121 1.3977 3.0101 
1 0.33% 0.09% 4.06% 0.1419 1.9366 0.9878 0.3352 1.3693 3.2999 
2 0.85% 0.13% 4.90% 0.4004 2.6071 2.0699 0.4113 1.5250 3.6356 
3 0.08% -0.07% 4.99% 0.0709 2.0031 0.4770 0.4171 1.3979 4.0222 
4 0.32% 0.03% 5.31% 0.0509 1.1668 0.5876 0.4189 1.3780 4.0974 
5 0.03% -0.07% 5.34% 0.1279 1.6476 1.0464 0.4358 1.4113 4.1626 
6 -0.17% 0.01% 5.17% 0.0059 1.7145 0.0460 0.4288 1.4687 3.9354 
7 0.32% 0.03% 5.49% 0.1312 2.5174 0.7027 0.4459 1.5448 3.8904 
8 0.24% -0.10% 5.73% 0.1370 1.5284 1.2082 0.4636 1.6315 3.8299 
9 -0.10% -0.21% 5.62% -0.0709 1.4273 -0.6696 0.4428 1.5582 3.8307 
10 0.07% -0.08% 5.69% 0.1149 1.7563 0.8819 0.4563 1.5479 3.9732 
11 -0.18% -0.10% 5.51% -0.0675 1.3861 -0.6563 0.4372 1.4950 3.9414 
12 0.35% 0.00% 5.86% 0.1562 1.2502 1.6843 0.4577 1.5301 4.0316 
13 0.77% 0.20% 6.63% 0.2726 1.2443 2.9531 0.4977 1.5253 4.3977 
14 0.14% 0.24% 6.76% 0.0469 1.1573 0.5462 0.4984 1.5487 4.3378 
15 0.01% -0.06% 6.77% -0.1376 1.6764 -1.1065 0.4685 1.5048 4.1966 
16 -0.05% -0.12% 6.73% 0.0179 1.3585 0.1779 0.4651 1.5400 4.0707 
17 -0.17% -0.17% 6.56% -0.0162 1.3584 -0.1610 0.4563 1.5810 3.8902 
18 0.09% 0.21% 6.64% 0.1185 1.5205 1.0505 0.4694 1.6530 3.8273 
19 -0.18% 0.04% 6.46% -0.1754 1.7799 -1.3281 0.4358 1.6027 3.6646 
20 0.08% 0.06% 6.54% 0.0958 1.4639 0.8818 0.4454 1.6306 3.6813 
21 -0.19% 0.08% 6.35% -0.0614 2.1483 -0.3850 0.4306 1.6982 3.4174 
22 0.01% 0.19% 6.36% 0.1597 1.7835 1.2065 0.4499 1.7530 3.4590 
23 0.46% 0.15% 6.82% 0.1780 1.4316 1.6760 0.4716 1.6749 3.7949 
24 0.00% -0.16% 6.82% 0.1198 1.9719 0.8189 0.4842 1.7656 3.6960 
25 0.00% -0.15% 6.82% -0.0247 1.3556 -0.2459 0.4752 1.7047 3.7574 
26 0.31% -0.08% 7.13% 0.0840 1.2209 0.9277 0.4824 1.6715 3.8898 
27 0.37% 0.02% 7.50% 0.1747 1.2469 1.8889 0.5026 1.6788 4.0350 
28 -0.01% -0.08% 7.49% 0.0591 1.3616 0.5847 0.5058 1.7428 3.9121 
29 0.04% -0.04% 7.52% -0.0480 1.4503 -0.4464 0.4940 1.6944 3.9293 
30 0.66% 0.35% 8.18% 0.3009 1.2062 3.3621 0.5312 1.7256 4.1494 
          
-1 to 1     1.48% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03895 0.3632 1.9729 2.4814 
 
 
 
  
  
6-91 
 
Table-A 6.26 SW-1 returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 195); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% -0.15% 0.01% 0.0416 0.9630 0.6381 0.0416 0.9630 0.6381 
-19 0.07% -0.14% 0.09% -0.0038 0.9714 -0.0574 0.0267 0.9392 0.4206 
-18 -0.30% -0.47% -0.21% -0.0848 1.0222 -1.2267 -0.0271 0.9786 -0.4102 
-17 0.35% 0.08% 0.13% 0.1076 1.1567 1.3753 0.0303 0.9879 0.4533 
-16 -0.14% -0.42% 0.00% -0.0199 1.0448 -0.2814 0.0182 1.0706 0.2513 
-15 -0.35% -0.38% -0.35% -0.1046 1.1253 -1.3738 -0.0261 1.0850 -0.3553 
-14 -0.18% -0.22% -0.53% -0.0035 1.0811 -0.0479 -0.0255 1.0271 -0.3666 
-13 0.40% 0.08% -0.13% 0.1464 1.1443 1.8920 0.0279 1.0889 0.3795 
-12 -0.28% -0.45% -0.41% -0.0921 0.9186 -1.4825 -0.0044 1.0424 -0.0617 
-11 -0.29% -0.41% -0.70% -0.0871 0.9307 -1.3833 -0.0317 1.0316 -0.4538 
-10 -0.10% -0.31% -0.80% -0.0270 1.0337 -0.3855 -0.0383 1.0312 -0.5494 
-9 0.44% 0.08% -0.36% 0.1273 1.1261 1.6708 0.0000 1.0592 0.0007 
-8 -0.15% -0.17% -0.51% -0.0656 1.0825 -0.8966 -0.0182 1.0803 -0.2486 
-7 0.33% -0.06% -0.18% 0.1111 0.9149 1.7960 0.0122 1.0812 0.1668 
-6 0.17% 0.08% -0.01% 0.0735 1.0335 1.0516 0.0308 1.0960 0.4150 
-5 -0.06% -0.10% -0.07% -0.0180 1.0999 -0.2424 0.0253 1.0549 0.3543 
-4 -0.21% -0.31% -0.28% -0.0873 1.0217 -1.2633 0.0034 1.0076 0.0492 
-3 -0.15% -0.36% -0.43% -0.0435 0.9770 -0.6579 -0.0070 1.0312 -0.1002 
-2 0.16% 0.10% -0.27% 0.0284 0.9101 0.4619 -0.0003 1.0141 -0.0041 
-1 0.64% 0.16% 0.36% 0.1868 1.0645 2.5952 0.0415 1.0568 0.5807 
0 0.14% 0.00% 0.50% 0.0799 1.4849 0.7957 0.0579 1.0995 0.7792 
1 0.42% 0.01% 0.92% 0.1376 1.5552 1.3082 0.0859 1.1130 1.1418 
2 0.66% 0.10% 1.58% 0.2202 1.3828 2.3544 0.1300 1.1363 1.6911 
3 0.01% -0.01% 1.59% 0.0206 1.1679 0.2608 0.1314 1.1333 1.7149 
4 0.11% -0.15% 1.70% 0.0121 0.9343 0.1916 0.1312 1.1283 1.7194 
5 -0.14% -0.40% 1.56% -0.0326 0.9199 -0.5232 0.1223 1.1163 1.6195 
6 -0.34% -0.14% 1.22% -0.0964 1.0823 -1.3173 0.1014 1.1224 1.3361 
7 0.39% -0.08% 1.62% 0.1183 0.9834 1.7791 0.1220 1.1416 1.5796 
8 0.05% -0.23% 1.66% -0.0231 1.0274 -0.3329 0.1156 1.1395 1.4993 
9 -0.12% -0.21% 1.54% -0.0100 1.0131 -0.1455 0.1118 1.1417 1.4477 
10 -0.07% -0.39% 1.47% 0.0058 0.9886 0.0862 0.1110 1.1714 1.4011 
11 -0.23% -0.27% 1.25% -0.0357 0.9296 -0.5672 0.1030 1.2014 1.2671 
12 0.10% -0.26% 1.34% 0.0283 0.9604 0.4352 0.1063 1.2109 1.2980 
13 0.45% 0.03% 1.79% 0.1249 0.9286 1.9887 0.1261 1.2193 1.5297 
14 0.00% 0.16% 1.79% -0.0155 0.8715 -0.2622 0.1217 1.2028 1.4963 
15 -0.14% -0.30% 1.65% -0.0739 0.9570 -1.1420 0.1077 1.2196 1.3057 
16 -0.17% -0.22% 1.47% -0.0859 0.9977 -1.2723 0.0921 1.1933 1.1414 
17 -0.36% -0.25% 1.12% -0.1220 0.9113 -1.9790 0.0711 1.1766 0.8936 
18 -0.19% -0.04% 0.93% -0.0454 1.1167 -0.6013 0.0629 1.1639 0.7993 
19 -0.36% -0.21% 0.57% -0.0987 1.0066 -1.4494 0.0465 1.1283 0.6097 
20 -0.24% -0.24% 0.32% -0.0572 1.1044 -0.7655 0.0370 1.1165 0.4903 
21 -0.21% -0.13% 0.11% -0.0644 1.0683 -0.8906 0.0267 1.1175 0.3526 
22 -0.43% -0.15% -0.32% -0.1179 0.8583 -2.0304 0.0084 1.1007 0.1124 
23 0.26% -0.18% -0.06% 0.0762 0.9424 1.1953 0.0198 1.0924 0.2674 
24 -0.18% -0.23% -0.24% -0.0229 1.1439 -0.2958 0.0161 1.1086 0.2150 
25 -0.20% -0.28% -0.43% -0.0602 1.0734 -0.8286 0.0071 1.0950 0.0956 
26 0.11% -0.21% -0.33% 0.0223 0.9797 0.3369 0.0103 1.0782 0.1407 
27 0.15% -0.07% -0.18% 0.0657 1.0196 0.9533 0.0196 1.0617 0.2735 
28 -0.13% -0.20% -0.31% -0.0095 0.8664 -0.1629 0.0181 1.0692 0.2499 
29 -0.18% -0.32% -0.49% -0.0277 0.9092 -0.4508 0.0140 1.0599 0.1949 
30 0.43% 0.16% -0.06% 0.1354 1.0227 1.9580 0.0328 1.0553 0.4595 
          
-1 to 1     1.20% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04373 0.2335 1.4941 2.3102 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-92 
 
Table-A 6.27 SW-2 returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 195); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.00% -0.13% 0.00% 0.0414 0.9563 0.6353 0.0414 0.9563 0.6353 
-19 0.04% -0.18% 0.04% -0.0115 0.9763 -0.1724 0.0212 0.9356 0.3320 
-18 -0.27% -0.42% -0.23% -0.0788 1.0323 -1.1204 -0.0282 0.9841 -0.4208 
-17 0.37% 0.16% 0.14% 0.1155 1.1509 1.4733 0.0333 0.9866 0.4958 
-16 -0.17% -0.44% -0.03% -0.0297 1.0352 -0.4208 0.0165 1.0654 0.2278 
-15 -0.35% -0.36% -0.38% -0.1041 1.1352 -1.3456 -0.0274 1.0757 -0.3737 
-14 -0.24% -0.26% -0.62% -0.0186 1.0848 -0.2523 -0.0324 1.0232 -0.4649 
-13 0.36% -0.02% -0.26% 0.1344 1.1473 1.7202 0.0172 1.0812 0.2338 
-12 -0.28% -0.38% -0.54% -0.0931 0.9190 -1.4869 -0.0148 1.0324 -0.2103 
-11 -0.31% -0.38% -0.85% -0.0913 0.9287 -1.4423 -0.0429 1.0182 -0.6183 
-10 -0.14% -0.37% -0.99% -0.0411 1.0397 -0.5807 -0.0533 1.0202 -0.7668 
-9 0.43% 0.08% -0.56% 0.1254 1.1313 1.6267 -0.0148 1.0485 -0.2077 
-8 -0.17% -0.11% -0.73% -0.0679 1.0802 -0.9231 -0.0331 1.0710 -0.4536 
-7 0.35% -0.04% -0.38% 0.1174 0.9151 1.8829 -0.0005 1.0691 -0.0072 
-6 0.17% 0.04% -0.21% 0.0748 1.0436 1.0521 0.0188 1.0888 0.2536 
-5 -0.04% -0.07% -0.25% -0.0129 1.0934 -0.1732 0.0150 1.0546 0.2086 
-4 -0.21% -0.29% -0.45% -0.0866 1.0265 -1.2380 -0.0065 1.0115 -0.0937 
-3 -0.17% -0.34% -0.62% -0.0489 0.9799 -0.7327 -0.0178 1.0370 -0.2521 
-2 0.18% 0.02% -0.44% 0.0379 0.9199 0.6050 -0.0086 1.0160 -0.1247 
-1 0.63% 0.20% 0.19% 0.1813 1.0586 2.5146 0.0321 1.0581 0.4458 
0 0.16% 0.00% 0.35% 0.0920 1.4798 0.9122 0.0514 1.1005 0.6859 
1 0.44% -0.01% 0.79% 0.1407 1.5575 1.3256 0.0802 1.1097 1.0613 
2 0.69% 0.13% 1.48% 0.2285 1.3834 2.4244 0.1261 1.1338 1.6326 
3 0.06% -0.10% 1.55% 0.0331 1.1743 0.4132 0.1302 1.1321 1.6881 
4 0.12% -0.12% 1.67% 0.0123 0.9370 0.1921 0.1300 1.1307 1.6880 
5 -0.13% -0.37% 1.53% -0.0267 0.9275 -0.4232 0.1223 1.1222 1.5992 
6 -0.31% -0.14% 1.22% -0.0911 1.0887 -1.2277 0.1024 1.1270 1.3344 
7 0.37% -0.11% 1.59% 0.1144 0.9765 1.7193 0.1222 1.1479 1.5628 
8 0.02% -0.21% 1.61% -0.0320 1.0325 -0.4554 0.1141 1.1442 1.4643 
9 -0.12% -0.25% 1.50% -0.0082 1.0195 -0.1185 0.1107 1.1455 1.4187 
10 -0.10% -0.38% 1.39% 0.0020 1.0042 0.0298 0.1093 1.1742 1.3662 
11 -0.19% -0.22% 1.21% -0.0238 0.9264 -0.3779 0.1033 1.2010 1.2632 
12 0.10% -0.24% 1.30% 0.0284 0.9590 0.4340 0.1067 1.2115 1.2928 
13 0.47% -0.02% 1.77% 0.1308 0.9442 2.0335 0.1276 1.2209 1.5336 
14 -0.01% 0.12% 1.76% -0.0197 0.8770 -0.3296 0.1224 1.2092 1.4858 
15 -0.14% -0.28% 1.62% -0.0733 0.9687 -1.1099 0.1085 1.2228 1.3021 
16 -0.15% -0.19% 1.47% -0.0735 1.0035 -1.0753 0.0949 1.1952 1.1656 
17 -0.38% -0.24% 1.09% -0.1241 0.9084 -2.0047 0.0735 1.1785 0.9159 
18 -0.20% -0.11% 0.89% -0.0493 1.1284 -0.6419 0.0647 1.1674 0.8133 
19 -0.37% -0.26% 0.52% -0.0983 1.0114 -1.4262 0.0483 1.1335 0.6258 
20 -0.26% -0.21% 0.26% -0.0614 1.1218 -0.8034 0.0381 1.1213 0.4994 
21 -0.20% -0.10% 0.07% -0.0581 1.0705 -0.7971 0.0287 1.1219 0.3757 
22 -0.46% -0.22% -0.39% -0.1207 0.8659 -2.0462 0.0100 1.1054 0.1325 
23 0.26% -0.16% -0.13% 0.0746 0.9395 1.1661 0.0211 1.0981 0.2822 
24 -0.17% -0.15% -0.31% -0.0216 1.1560 -0.2741 0.0177 1.1144 0.2326 
25 -0.26% -0.32% -0.56% -0.0769 1.0913 -1.0345 0.0061 1.0984 0.0819 
26 0.09% -0.22% -0.47% 0.0157 0.9835 0.2344 0.0084 1.0782 0.1137 
27 0.15% 0.00% -0.33% 0.0629 1.0259 0.8994 0.0173 1.0588 0.2404 
28 -0.12% -0.11% -0.45% -0.0073 0.8684 -0.1228 0.0161 1.0667 0.2218 
29 -0.16% -0.30% -0.60% -0.0231 0.9058 -0.3740 0.0127 1.0561 0.1765 
30 0.43% 0.16% -0.17% 0.1375 1.0391 1.9419 0.0318 1.0481 0.4456 
          
-1 to 1     1.23% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04376 0.2390 1.4835 2.3648 
 
 
 
  
  
6-93 
 
Table-A 6.28 SW-3 returns to Domestic Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 195); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.02% -0.13% 0.02% 0.0451 0.9407 0.7041 0.0451 0.9407 0.7041 
-19 0.06% -0.16% 0.09% -0.0011 0.9721 -0.0159 0.0312 0.9224 0.4959 
-18 -0.24% -0.42% -0.15% -0.0724 1.0338 -1.0283 -0.0164 0.9736 -0.2468 
-17 0.34% 0.11% 0.19% 0.1030 1.1442 1.3213 0.0373 0.9732 0.5629 
-16 -0.19% -0.39% -0.01% -0.0380 1.0129 -0.5504 0.0164 1.0383 0.2318 
-15 -0.35% -0.31% -0.36% -0.1050 1.1361 -1.3572 -0.0279 1.0566 -0.3878 
-14 -0.23% -0.22% -0.58% -0.0125 1.0791 -0.1700 -0.0306 1.0122 -0.4433 
-13 0.35% 0.10% -0.23% 0.1333 1.1575 1.6906 0.0185 1.0736 0.2535 
-12 -0.31% -0.42% -0.55% -0.0990 0.9287 -1.5646 -0.0155 1.0317 -0.2208 
-11 -0.32% -0.36% -0.87% -0.0953 0.9267 -1.5090 -0.0448 1.0187 -0.6462 
-10 -0.15% -0.47% -1.01% -0.0467 1.0286 -0.6662 -0.0568 1.0173 -0.8201 
-9 0.41% 0.02% -0.60% 0.1137 1.1339 1.4724 -0.0216 1.0422 -0.3040 
-8 -0.15% -0.18% -0.75% -0.0648 1.0735 -0.8859 -0.0387 1.0632 -0.5344 
-7 0.35% -0.06% -0.39% 0.1193 0.9238 1.8953 -0.0054 1.0609 -0.0750 
-6 0.19% 0.12% -0.20% 0.0784 1.0491 1.0977 0.0150 1.0818 0.2038 
-5 0.02% -0.05% -0.18% 0.0020 1.1036 0.0266 0.0150 1.0514 0.2100 
-4 -0.20% -0.39% -0.39% -0.0847 1.0300 -1.2071 -0.0059 1.0086 -0.0866 
-3 -0.15% -0.30% -0.54% -0.0441 0.9714 -0.6670 -0.0162 1.0325 -0.2301 
-2 0.18% 0.08% -0.36% 0.0319 0.9092 0.5153 -0.0084 1.0102 -0.1225 
-1 0.67% 0.22% 0.31% 0.1909 1.0660 2.6287 0.0345 1.0539 0.4801 
0 0.12% -0.08% 0.43% 0.0804 1.5006 0.7869 0.0512 1.1035 0.6810 
1 0.40% -0.01% 0.83% 0.1243 1.5525 1.1754 0.0765 1.1149 1.0075 
2 0.71% 0.16% 1.54% 0.2299 1.3719 2.4599 0.1228 1.1360 1.5864 
3 0.05% -0.10% 1.59% 0.0246 1.1804 0.3060 0.1252 1.1302 1.6263 
4 0.15% -0.11% 1.74% 0.0173 0.9394 0.2707 0.1261 1.1262 1.6442 
5 -0.14% -0.43% 1.60% -0.0307 0.9348 -0.4819 0.1177 1.1157 1.5483 
6 -0.31% -0.13% 1.29% -0.0909 1.0760 -1.2397 0.0980 1.1207 1.2835 
7 0.39% -0.10% 1.68% 0.1202 0.9725 1.8153 0.1189 1.1390 1.5331 
8 0.02% -0.22% 1.69% -0.0366 1.0425 -0.5155 0.1101 1.1364 1.4220 
9 -0.13% -0.26% 1.56% -0.0100 1.0317 -0.1417 0.1064 1.1381 1.3726 
10 -0.13% -0.39% 1.43% -0.0054 1.0121 -0.0787 0.1037 1.1663 1.3053 
11 -0.20% -0.26% 1.23% -0.0263 0.9366 -0.4123 0.0974 1.1913 1.2005 
12 0.12% -0.26% 1.35% 0.0286 0.9718 0.4314 0.1009 1.2026 1.2318 
13 0.48% 0.05% 1.83% 0.1229 0.9364 1.9270 0.1205 1.2151 1.4556 
14 0.00% 0.12% 1.83% -0.0192 0.8764 -0.3216 0.1155 1.2037 1.4088 
15 -0.15% -0.21% 1.68% -0.0750 0.9737 -1.1310 0.1014 1.2154 1.2247 
16 -0.14% -0.18% 1.54% -0.0742 0.9861 -1.1042 0.0878 1.1875 1.0856 
17 -0.40% -0.26% 1.14% -0.1283 0.9054 -2.0807 0.0658 1.1685 0.8272 
18 -0.21% -0.18% 0.92% -0.0554 1.1339 -0.7178 0.0561 1.1594 0.7105 
19 -0.36% -0.24% 0.56% -0.0961 1.0155 -1.3897 0.0402 1.1273 0.5236 
20 -0.23% -0.10% 0.33% -0.0544 1.1095 -0.7196 0.0312 1.1143 0.4113 
21 -0.17% -0.14% 0.16% -0.0531 1.0722 -0.7266 0.0227 1.1170 0.2978 
22 -0.43% -0.21% -0.27% -0.1160 0.8646 -1.9700 0.0047 1.0961 0.0629 
23 0.24% -0.13% -0.03% 0.0689 0.9590 1.0554 0.0150 1.0876 0.2030 
24 -0.20% -0.17% -0.23% -0.0324 1.1584 -0.4112 0.0100 1.1027 0.1336 
25 -0.24% -0.33% -0.47% -0.0712 1.0891 -0.9596 -0.0006 1.0867 -0.0077 
26 0.07% -0.32% -0.39% 0.0103 0.9874 0.1538 0.0009 1.0654 0.0130 
27 0.20% -0.08% -0.19% 0.0713 1.0288 1.0181 0.0112 1.0458 0.1577 
28 -0.13% -0.17% -0.32% -0.0077 0.8743 -0.1285 0.0100 1.0539 0.1396 
29 -0.17% -0.27% -0.48% -0.0242 0.9079 -0.3918 0.0065 1.0436 0.0914 
30 0.48% 0.16% 0.00% 0.1527 1.0447 2.1460 0.0278 1.0346 0.3947 
          
-1 to 1     1.19% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04531 0.2284 1.4913 2.2486 
 
 
  
  
6-94 
 
Table-A 6.29 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; Non-BGrp; (MM, 127); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.13% -0.09% 0.13% 0.0430 1.1504 0.4130 0.0430 1.1504 0.4130 
-19 0.19% 0.00% 0.31% 0.0021 1.1937 0.0193 0.0319 1.1570 0.3045 
-18 -0.23% -0.22% 0.09% -0.0958 1.3594 -0.7790 -0.0293 1.3039 -0.2483 
-17 0.63% 0.25% 0.72% 0.2699 1.6872 1.7675 0.1096 1.3814 0.8765 
-16 0.00% -0.37% 0.72% 0.0718 1.6351 0.4849 0.1301 1.6375 0.8779 
-15 -0.26% -0.08% 0.46% -0.0355 1.4790 -0.2653 0.1043 1.6629 0.6928 
-14 0.05% -0.05% 0.51% 0.0027 1.3930 0.0211 0.0975 1.5149 0.7114 
-13 0.25% 0.13% 0.76% 0.0900 1.1683 0.8509 0.1230 1.4096 0.9645 
-12 -0.10% -0.36% 0.65% -0.0193 1.2247 -0.1746 0.1095 1.3892 0.8714 
-11 -0.16% -0.18% 0.49% -0.0598 1.2093 -0.5463 0.0850 1.3812 0.6802 
-10 0.15% -0.05% 0.64% 0.0231 1.1756 0.2175 0.0880 1.3495 0.7209 
-9 0.83% 0.22% 1.48% 0.2522 1.5483 1.8000 0.1571 1.3426 1.2930 
-8 0.03% -0.11% 1.50% -0.0492 1.7984 -0.3023 0.1373 1.4092 1.0765 
-7 0.46% 0.21% 1.96% 0.2237 1.2013 2.0575 0.1921 1.4266 1.4878 
-6 0.11% 0.12% 2.07% 0.0875 1.1828 0.8179 0.2082 1.3905 1.6542 
-5 0.38% 0.02% 2.45% 0.1141 1.3010 0.9694 0.2301 1.3231 1.9216 
-4 -0.16% -0.08% 2.29% -0.0513 1.0028 -0.5657 0.2108 1.2926 1.8018 
-3 -0.09% -0.08% 2.20% 0.0603 1.7689 0.3767 0.2190 1.3371 1.8102 
-2 0.28% -0.20% 2.49% 0.0593 1.4542 0.4505 0.2268 1.2959 1.9340 
-1 0.80% 0.16% 3.29% 0.3474 2.2456 1.7094 0.2987 1.5187 2.1736 
0 0.56% 0.24% 3.85% 0.2551 1.7723 1.5908 0.3472 1.5018 2.5547 
1 0.39% -0.03% 4.24% 0.0463 1.8118 0.2821 0.3491 1.4933 2.5831 
2 0.80% 0.17% 5.04% 0.5181 2.6144 2.1898 0.4494 1.6581 2.9952 
3 -0.08% -0.22% 4.96% -0.0798 1.7344 -0.5083 0.4237 1.5417 3.0369 
4 0.36% -0.08% 5.32% 0.0634 1.2915 0.5428 0.4278 1.5319 3.0860 
5 0.10% -0.07% 5.42% 0.0662 1.2635 0.5793 0.4325 1.5553 3.0729 
6 -0.27% 0.08% 5.15% -0.0796 1.4574 -0.6035 0.4091 1.5852 2.8518 
7 0.31% 0.03% 5.46% 0.2844 2.0817 1.5097 0.4555 1.7340 2.9026 
8 0.24% -0.12% 5.70% 0.1167 1.5123 0.8525 0.4692 1.8190 2.8505 
9 -0.32% -0.17% 5.37% -0.1234 1.3854 -0.9845 0.4388 1.7149 2.8275 
10 -0.21% -0.25% 5.16% -0.0806 1.3980 -0.6372 0.4172 1.6662 2.7667 
11 -0.24% -0.04% 4.92% -0.0930 1.4351 -0.7163 0.3942 1.5957 2.7297 
12 0.38% 0.06% 5.30% 0.1282 1.1918 1.1887 0.4105 1.6183 2.8028 
13 0.55% -0.01% 5.85% 0.1248 1.2116 1.1382 0.4258 1.5984 2.9437 
14 0.06% 0.25% 5.91% 0.0316 1.1064 0.3160 0.4250 1.6279 2.8849 
15 0.18% -0.09% 6.09% 0.0205 1.0745 0.2105 0.4225 1.6146 2.8913 
16 0.20% -0.11% 6.29% 0.1029 1.4398 0.7897 0.4336 1.6545 2.8963 
17 -0.18% -0.17% 6.11% -0.0323 1.4814 -0.2408 0.4227 1.7141 2.7247 
18 -0.06% 0.21% 6.05% 0.0719 1.6818 0.4725 0.4287 1.7939 2.6409 
19 -0.14% 0.04% 5.91% -0.0688 1.3455 -0.5650 0.4124 1.7655 2.5815 
20 0.10% 0.00% 6.02% 0.0826 1.1783 0.7742 0.4203 1.8048 2.5734 
21 0.09% 0.10% 6.11% -0.0641 1.5780 -0.4491 0.4053 1.8362 2.4395 
22 -0.02% 0.23% 6.09% 0.0569 1.0027 0.6271 0.4093 1.8381 2.4606 
23 0.54% 0.15% 6.63% 0.2545 1.4219 1.9782 0.4430 1.7805 2.7493 
24 -0.11% -0.06% 6.52% 0.0266 1.5548 0.1890 0.4420 1.8148 2.6914 
25 0.22% -0.05% 6.74% 0.0712 1.5339 0.5133 0.4477 1.7322 2.8560 
26 0.47% -0.05% 7.21% 0.1337 1.1867 1.2453 0.4624 1.6821 3.0377 
27 0.15% -0.06% 7.36% 0.0192 1.3614 0.1563 0.4603 1.6495 3.0838 
28 0.16% 0.03% 7.52% 0.0795 1.0896 0.8061 0.4670 1.6531 3.1215 
29 -0.08% -0.09% 7.44% -0.0049 1.2495 -0.0436 0.4616 1.6679 3.0581 
30 0.58% 0.05% 8.02% 0.2330 1.2360 2.0828 0.4896 1.6946 3.1930 
          
-1 to 1     1.75% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04125 0.3745 1.9792 2.0912 
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Table-A 6.30 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; BGrp; (MM, 64); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.37% 0.21% 0.37% 0.7950 5.4614 1.2693 0.7950 5.4614 1.2693 
-19 0.15% -0.11% 0.53% 0.0358 1.2164 0.2569 0.5875 3.8647 1.3255 
-18 0.12% -0.16% 0.65% -0.1094 1.5195 -0.6277 0.4166 2.5332 1.4337 
-17 0.15% -0.05% 0.80% 0.1121 1.3653 0.7158 0.4168 2.3809 1.5263 
-16 0.15% -0.01% 0.95% 0.0516 1.1498 0.3911 0.3959 1.9236 1.7943 
-15 -0.05% -0.55% 0.90% -0.0094 1.1946 -0.0686 0.3575 1.9174 1.6258 
-14 -0.17% -0.40% 0.73% -0.0510 1.2469 -0.3564 0.3117 1.7261 1.5747 
-13 0.69% 0.13% 1.42% 0.4016 1.6186 2.1634 0.4336 1.8830 2.0078 
-12 -0.28% -0.26% 1.13% -0.1311 1.3672 -0.8362 0.3651 1.6977 1.8751 
-11 -0.15% -0.21% 0.98% -0.0917 0.9031 -0.8850 0.3174 1.5557 1.7788 
-10 -0.29% -0.62% 0.69% 0.0668 2.0973 0.2778 0.3227 1.8620 1.5113 
-9 0.44% 0.03% 1.13% 0.0817 1.5192 0.4689 0.3326 1.5549 1.8650 
-8 0.02% 0.23% 1.16% 0.1274 1.7335 0.6410 0.3549 1.8140 1.7058 
-7 0.46% -0.14% 1.62% -0.0447 2.4831 -0.1571 0.3300 1.3669 2.1051 
-6 0.33% 0.07% 1.95% 0.2044 1.3933 1.2790 0.3716 1.3736 2.3588 
-5 -0.18% -0.02% 1.77% -0.0334 1.3679 -0.2126 0.3515 1.3536 2.2639 
-4 0.19% -0.06% 1.96% -0.4454 4.5335 -0.8567 0.2329 1.1803 1.7208 
-3 -0.10% -0.28% 1.86% 0.0235 1.3140 0.1561 0.2319 1.1677 1.7316 
-2 0.33% 0.49% 2.19% -0.0426 1.9071 -0.1950 0.2159 1.2474 1.5094 
-1 0.90% 0.29% 3.09% 0.5406 2.3749 1.9847 0.3314 1.1148 2.5917 
0 -0.40% -0.48% 2.70% -0.3292 2.6185 -1.0961 0.2515 1.2262 1.7887 
1 0.73% 0.16% 3.42% 0.5653 2.8973 1.7012 0.3663 1.1456 2.7877 
2 0.68% 0.18% 4.10% 0.1055 2.2669 0.4057 0.3802 1.2413 2.6708 
3 0.63% 0.60% 4.73% 0.4898 2.4168 1.7671 0.4722 1.1260 3.6565 
4 0.20% 0.11% 4.93% 0.0436 0.8204 0.4638 0.4714 1.0695 3.8430 
5 -0.05% -0.24% 4.87% 0.2207 2.1319 0.9024 0.5055 1.0971 4.0174 
6 -0.01% -0.10% 4.86% 0.1370 2.0283 0.5889 0.5224 1.2071 3.7736 
7 0.49% 0.26% 5.36% -0.0810 2.9766 -0.2373 0.4977 1.0718 4.0487 
8 0.16% 0.04% 5.52% 0.1071 1.3961 0.6690 0.5089 1.1245 3.9462 
9 0.71% -0.09% 6.23% 0.1768 1.4573 1.0579 0.5327 1.1326 4.1005 
10 0.55% 0.08% 6.77% 0.4308 2.1738 1.7280 0.6014 1.2290 4.2665 
11 0.18% -0.15% 6.95% 0.0689 1.1853 0.5068 0.6041 1.2375 4.2562 
12 0.18% -0.03% 7.13% 0.1479 1.2860 1.0028 0.6206 1.2776 4.2353 
13 0.97% 1.01% 8.10% 0.4606 1.2252 3.2781 0.6904 1.2868 4.6780 
14 0.42% 0.39% 8.52% 0.1190 1.1899 0.8718 0.7006 1.2700 4.8100 
15 -0.55% -0.24% 7.97% -0.4950 2.3300 -1.8525 0.6083 1.1772 4.5054 
16 -0.20% -0.12% 7.78% -0.0198 1.2816 -0.1349 0.5967 1.2173 4.2742 
17 -0.08% -0.10% 7.69% 0.0266 0.9438 0.2457 0.5932 1.1859 4.3612 
18 -0.07% -0.02% 7.62% -0.0418 1.1531 -0.3160 0.5788 1.1852 4.2581 
19 -0.31% -0.07% 7.31% -0.3764 2.2676 -1.4475 0.5120 1.0799 4.1338 
20 -0.11% 0.07% 7.20% 0.0805 1.9397 0.3617 0.5183 1.0832 4.1719 
21 -0.40% 0.12% 6.80% 0.1164 2.8323 0.3583 0.5300 1.2596 3.6691 
22 -0.24% -0.04% 6.57% 0.1796 2.6336 0.5946 0.5512 1.4461 3.3237 
23 0.11% -0.28% 6.68% -0.0635 1.2823 -0.4318 0.5354 1.3308 3.5076 
24 0.18% -0.31% 6.86% 0.2990 2.4423 1.0673 0.5739 1.5440 3.2410 
25 -0.26% -0.22% 6.60% -0.0760 1.0309 -0.6430 0.5565 1.5646 3.1009 
26 -0.01% -0.08% 6.58% 0.0147 1.2898 0.0992 0.5526 1.5693 3.0705 
27 0.69% 0.45% 7.27% 0.4094 1.1570 3.0851 0.6059 1.6402 3.2212 
28 -0.06% -0.22% 7.21% 0.1570 1.7873 0.7661 0.6222 1.8034 3.0081 
29 0.36% -0.02% 7.57% -0.0330 1.7600 -0.1636 0.6112 1.6442 3.2415 
30 0.55% 0.50% 8.12% 0.3116 1.1350 2.3938 0.6489 1.6794 3.3688 
          
-1 to 1     1.23% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04588 0.4484 1.8779 2.0821 
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Table-A 6.31 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; Non-BGrp (OLS, 130); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.17% -0.05% 0.0017 0.9223 0.0204 0.0017 0.9223 0.0204 
-19 0.05% -0.17% 0.01% -0.0147 0.9374 -0.1767 -0.0092 0.9336 -0.1112 
-18 -0.32% -0.50% -0.31% -0.0952 1.1322 -0.9451 -0.0625 1.0403 -0.6753 
-17 0.50% 0.16% 0.18% 0.1552 1.1626 1.5009 0.0235 1.0632 0.2484 
-16 -0.21% -0.56% -0.02% -0.0444 1.1329 -0.4407 0.0011 1.1842 0.0109 
-15 -0.50% -0.30% -0.52% -0.1257 1.1947 -1.1832 -0.0503 1.1820 -0.4783 
-14 -0.16% -0.12% -0.68% 0.0204 1.0846 0.2110 -0.0389 1.1040 -0.3957 
-13 0.28% 0.07% -0.41% 0.0930 1.0416 1.0037 -0.0035 1.1446 -0.0341 
-12 -0.22% -0.54% -0.62% -0.0911 0.9155 -1.1187 -0.0336 1.0607 -0.3565 
-11 -0.26% -0.32% -0.88% -0.0773 1.0286 -0.8447 -0.0563 1.0679 -0.5932 
-10 0.10% -0.20% -0.78% 0.0306 1.0242 0.3362 -0.0445 1.0853 -0.4609 
-9 0.57% 0.21% -0.21% 0.1555 1.2366 1.4142 0.0023 1.1438 0.0226 
-8 -0.11% -0.23% -0.32% -0.0492 1.1405 -0.4847 -0.0114 1.1596 -0.1108 
-7 0.32% 0.13% 0.00% 0.1171 0.9283 1.4187 0.0203 1.1632 0.1962 
-6 0.15% 0.08% 0.15% 0.0540 0.9715 0.6249 0.0336 1.1792 0.3199 
-5 0.06% -0.13% 0.20% 0.0010 1.0547 0.0103 0.0327 1.1151 0.3300 
-4 -0.35% -0.18% -0.14% -0.1118 0.9080 -1.3848 0.0046 1.0589 0.0491 
-3 -0.16% -0.18% -0.31% -0.0339 1.0232 -0.3725 -0.0035 1.0852 -0.0362 
-2 0.18% -0.24% -0.13% 0.0110 1.0205 0.1211 -0.0009 1.0723 -0.0092 
-1 0.66% 0.07% 0.53% 0.1920 1.1150 1.9356 0.0421 1.1252 0.4204 
0 0.44% 0.18% 0.96% 0.2001 1.3710 1.6408 0.0847 1.1778 0.8087 
1 0.24% -0.13% 1.20% 0.0676 1.3018 0.5837 0.0972 1.2010 0.9097 
2 0.69% 0.14% 1.89% 0.2177 1.5082 1.6226 0.1404 1.2494 1.2637 
3 -0.22% -0.37% 1.68% -0.0594 1.2070 -0.5530 0.1253 1.2495 1.1279 
4 0.25% -0.17% 1.93% 0.0471 1.0208 0.5186 0.1322 1.2595 1.1804 
5 -0.07% -0.24% 1.86% -0.0142 0.9114 -0.1748 0.1269 1.2483 1.1429 
6 -0.35% -0.11% 1.51% -0.0867 1.1851 -0.8226 0.1078 1.2678 0.9562 
7 0.31% -0.03% 1.82% 0.0938 0.9214 1.1441 0.1236 1.2868 1.0800 
8 0.03% -0.41% 1.86% -0.0145 0.9952 -0.1641 0.1188 1.2720 1.0497 
9 -0.46% -0.50% 1.40% -0.1014 0.9053 -1.2597 0.0982 1.2604 0.8764 
10 -0.28% -0.29% 1.11% -0.0534 0.9828 -0.6111 0.0871 1.2913 0.7580 
11 -0.33% -0.18% 0.79% -0.0713 0.9134 -0.8771 0.0731 1.3205 0.6223 
12 0.22% -0.11% 1.01% 0.0410 0.9038 0.5100 0.0791 1.3171 0.6753 
13 0.31% -0.15% 1.32% 0.0600 0.9644 0.7000 0.0882 1.3308 0.7454 
14 -0.09% -0.04% 1.22% -0.0456 0.8391 -0.6110 0.0793 1.3244 0.6728 
15 0.13% -0.17% 1.35% 0.0169 0.9456 0.2005 0.0810 1.3544 0.6720 
16 -0.05% -0.16% 1.30% -0.0707 0.9896 -0.8034 0.0682 1.3097 0.5857 
17 -0.39% -0.24% 0.91% -0.1293 1.0009 -1.4521 0.0464 1.3024 0.4002 
18 -0.12% -0.01% 0.79% 0.0126 1.1938 0.1186 0.0478 1.2864 0.4175 
19 -0.39% -0.09% 0.40% -0.0663 0.9736 -0.7661 0.0367 1.2610 0.3271 
20 -0.21% -0.37% 0.19% -0.0308 0.9846 -0.3515 0.0314 1.2537 0.2818 
21 -0.17% -0.11% 0.03% -0.0327 0.9167 -0.4014 0.0260 1.2387 0.2360 
22 -0.35% 0.02% -0.32% -0.0867 0.8693 -1.1212 0.0125 1.2192 0.1150 
23 0.38% -0.04% 0.07% 0.1147 0.9925 1.2991 0.0296 1.2172 0.2736 
24 -0.27% -0.08% -0.21% -0.0416 1.1936 -0.3921 0.0231 1.2421 0.2090 
25 -0.10% -0.24% -0.31% -0.0365 1.1848 -0.3466 0.0174 1.2058 0.1627 
26 0.21% -0.24% -0.10% 0.0401 0.9037 0.4991 0.0231 1.1802 0.2202 
27 -0.14% -0.36% -0.23% -0.0307 1.0968 -0.3145 0.0184 1.1605 0.1787 
28 -0.11% -0.15% -0.35% 0.0175 0.9373 0.2099 0.0208 1.1690 0.1996 
29 -0.32% -0.33% -0.67% -0.0606 0.9207 -0.7405 0.0120 1.1530 0.1167 
30 0.43% -0.01% -0.24% 0.1087 1.0679 1.1447 0.0271 1.1457 0.2657 
          
-1 to 1     1.33% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.041 0.2654 1.5907 1.8756 
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Table-A 6.32 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; BGrp (OLS, 65); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.0948 1.0625 0.7842 0.0948 1.0625 0.7842 
-19 0.13% -0.17% 0.19% 0.0270 1.0484 0.2261 0.0861 0.9925 0.7625 
-18 -0.02% -0.20% 0.17% -0.0103 0.8157 -0.1106 0.0644 0.8843 0.6398 
-17 0.04% -0.25% 0.21% 0.0142 1.1221 0.1110 0.0629 0.8331 0.6629 
-16 0.05% -0.02% 0.26% 0.0400 0.7915 0.4442 0.0741 0.7898 0.8245 
-15 -0.07% -0.68% 0.19% -0.0683 0.9746 -0.6153 0.0398 0.8560 0.4085 
-14 -0.33% -0.41% -0.14% -0.0813 1.0647 -0.6707 0.0061 0.8307 0.0648 
-13 0.51% 0.01% 0.37% 0.2177 1.3440 1.4229 0.0827 0.9644 0.7533 
-12 -0.43% -0.49% -0.06% -0.1143 0.9434 -1.0643 0.0399 1.0135 0.3456 
-11 -0.29% -0.38% -0.35% -0.0906 0.7715 -1.0315 0.0092 0.9616 0.0838 
-10 -0.45% -0.77% -0.80% -0.1331 1.0785 -1.0838 -0.0314 0.9365 -0.2943 
-9 0.28% -0.04% -0.53% 0.0973 0.9062 0.9430 -0.0020 0.8926 -0.0193 
-8 -0.14% 0.12% -0.67% -0.0659 0.9920 -0.5835 -0.0202 0.9191 -0.1926 
-7 0.28% -0.17% -0.39% 0.0866 0.8612 0.8837 0.0037 0.9186 0.0357 
-6 0.19% -0.07% -0.21% 0.1085 1.1911 0.8000 0.0316 0.9366 0.2965 
-5 -0.35% -0.24% -0.56% -0.0684 1.1513 -0.5219 0.0135 0.9660 0.1228 
-4 0.03% -0.36% -0.53% -0.0417 1.2012 -0.3053 0.0030 0.9302 0.0282 
-3 -0.21% -0.34% -0.74% -0.0833 0.9358 -0.7818 -0.0167 0.9639 -0.1525 
-2 0.18% 0.24% -0.56% 0.0710 0.6880 0.9069 0.0000 0.9341 0.0001 
-1 0.67% 0.22% 0.11% 0.1984 0.9736 1.7902 0.0444 0.9482 0.4111 
0 -0.54% -0.65% -0.43% -0.1652 1.6532 -0.8777 0.0073 0.9546 0.0668 
1 0.68% 0.02% 0.25% 0.2573 1.9686 1.1482 0.0619 0.9460 0.5752 
2 0.51% 0.07% 0.76% 0.2239 1.1041 1.7818 0.1073 0.9232 1.0208 
3 0.45% 0.47% 1.21% 0.1821 1.0670 1.4995 0.1422 0.9207 1.3567 
4 -0.07% 0.00% 1.14% -0.0242 0.7701 -0.2764 0.1345 0.8745 1.3509 
5 -0.23% -0.49% 0.92% -0.0430 0.9532 -0.3967 0.1234 0.8669 1.2508 
6 -0.44% -0.17% 0.48% -0.1579 0.9198 -1.5084 0.0907 0.8469 0.9411 
7 0.48% 0.08% 0.96% 0.1430 1.0511 1.1955 0.1161 0.8564 1.1911 
8 0.02% -0.12% 0.98% -0.0473 1.0760 -0.3865 0.1053 0.8872 1.0427 
9 0.53% -0.22% 1.51% 0.1566 1.1713 1.1744 0.1321 0.9309 1.2469 
10 0.37% -0.02% 1.88% 0.1226 1.0145 1.0617 0.1520 0.9463 1.4110 
11 0.00% -0.27% 1.88% 0.0488 0.9461 0.4530 0.1582 0.9921 1.4011 
12 -0.01% -0.22% 1.87% 0.0411 1.0275 0.3518 0.1630 1.0246 1.3973 
13 0.81% 0.86% 2.68% 0.2746 0.9030 2.6715 0.2076 1.0020 1.8206 
14 0.23% 0.30% 2.92% 0.0537 0.9990 0.4720 0.2137 0.9594 1.9572 
15 -0.67% -0.37% 2.24% -0.2539 0.9446 -2.3613 0.1684 0.9509 1.5561 
16 -0.35% -0.38% 1.89% -0.0907 1.0918 -0.7295 0.1512 0.9758 1.3615 
17 -0.21% -0.32% 1.68% -0.0774 0.6839 -0.9943 0.1367 0.9325 1.2876 
18 -0.40% -0.19% 1.27% -0.1689 0.9614 -1.5435 0.1079 0.9302 1.0186 
19 -0.31% -0.20% 0.97% -0.1555 1.0535 -1.2968 0.0819 0.8650 0.8319 
20 -0.24% -0.19% 0.73% -0.0821 1.2749 -0.5660 0.0681 0.8438 0.7089 
21 -0.41% -0.08% 0.32% -0.1568 1.2811 -1.0753 0.0431 0.8898 0.4253 
22 -0.54% -0.49% -0.21% -0.1627 0.8336 -1.7151 0.0178 0.8732 0.1786 
23 0.07% -0.31% -0.14% 0.0092 0.7765 0.1041 0.0189 0.8463 0.1966 
24 0.05% -0.22% -0.09% 0.0219 1.0408 0.1845 0.0220 0.8581 0.2251 
25 -0.40% -0.35% -0.49% -0.1111 0.8886 -1.0980 0.0054 0.8986 0.0525 
26 -0.20% -0.21% -0.69% -0.0484 1.0894 -0.3904 -0.0018 0.9088 -0.0169 
27 0.68% 0.38% -0.01% 0.2541 0.8041 2.7758 0.0349 0.9067 0.3385 
28 -0.18% -0.22% -0.19% -0.0678 0.6933 -0.8596 0.0249 0.9097 0.2404 
29 0.18% -0.18% -0.01% 0.0438 0.8771 0.4382 0.0308 0.9209 0.2941 
30 0.42% 0.40% 0.41% 0.1842 0.9066 1.7849 0.0563 0.9123 0.5423 
          
-1 to 1     0.82% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04662 0.1677 1.3077 1.1267 
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Table-A 6.33 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; Related; (MM, 53); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.73% 0.64% 0.73% 1.0248 5.9717 1.3139 1.0248 5.9717 1.3139 
-19 -0.12% -0.07% 0.61% -0.0525 1.0191 -0.3946 0.6875 4.2227 1.2465 
-18 -0.16% -0.36% 0.45% -0.2397 1.5108 -1.2147 0.4230 2.7652 1.1711 
-17 0.30% 0.25% 0.75% 0.2481 1.3973 1.3596 0.4904 2.6182 1.4339 
-16 -0.07% -0.28% 0.68% -0.0888 1.0329 -0.6579 0.3989 2.1531 1.4184 
-15 -0.67% -0.01% 0.01% -0.1734 1.2259 -1.0832 0.2933 2.1336 1.0526 
-14 0.37% -0.19% 0.38% 0.0578 1.0699 0.4136 0.2934 1.8742 1.1986 
-13 0.26% 0.08% 0.63% 0.1981 1.1619 1.3052 0.3445 1.9655 1.3420 
-12 -0.37% -0.31% 0.26% -0.2042 1.3567 -1.1526 0.2567 1.6393 1.1989 
-11 0.34% -0.02% 0.60% 0.0403 0.9001 0.3429 0.2563 1.4984 1.3096 
-10 0.05% -0.49% 0.65% 0.2390 2.1152 0.8652 0.3164 1.9433 1.2467 
-9 1.54% 0.52% 2.19% 0.3522 1.6306 1.6535 0.4046 1.6575 1.8690 
-8 0.73% 0.45% 2.92% 0.3467 1.8121 1.4647 0.4849 1.9720 1.8826 
-7 0.51% 0.19% 3.43% -0.0554 2.6537 -0.1599 0.4524 1.4605 2.3718 
-6 0.58% 0.13% 4.00% 0.2997 1.4633 1.5679 0.5145 1.4848 2.6528 
-5 0.18% -0.04% 4.19% 0.0453 1.5820 0.2193 0.5095 1.4346 2.7188 
-4 -0.18% 0.04% 4.01% -0.7055 4.8948 -1.1035 0.3231 1.2144 2.0372 
-3 -0.31% -0.29% 3.70% 0.0807 1.4250 0.4338 0.3331 1.1502 2.2171 
-2 0.33% 0.34% 4.03% -0.1705 2.1334 -0.6120 0.2851 1.2420 1.7572 
-1 0.59% 0.09% 4.62% 0.4447 2.5567 1.3316 0.3773 1.1101 2.6019 
0 -0.25% -0.32% 4.36% -0.3678 2.8121 -1.0014 0.2879 1.2720 1.7330 
1 2.00% 0.72% 6.36% 0.8884 3.0868 2.2034 0.4707 1.1710 3.0774 
2 0.58% -0.18% 6.94% 0.0358 2.7794 0.0987 0.4678 1.3425 2.6680 
3 0.19% -0.07% 7.13% 0.5404 2.7122 1.5256 0.5683 1.2584 3.4574 
4 0.81% -0.01% 7.94% 0.2509 1.1570 1.6603 0.6070 1.2876 3.6091 
5 -0.22% -0.34% 7.72% 0.1922 2.3437 0.6279 0.6329 1.3300 3.6433 
6 0.63% 0.01% 8.34% 0.4334 2.1831 1.5200 0.7045 1.4881 3.6243 
7 0.45% -0.01% 8.79% -0.2664 3.1497 -0.6475 0.6414 1.3683 3.5892 
8 -0.08% -0.09% 8.71% 0.0302 1.4356 0.1610 0.6359 1.3553 3.5923 
9 0.06% -0.36% 8.77% -0.1011 1.2434 -0.6223 0.6067 1.3239 3.5087 
10 0.76% 0.38% 9.53% 0.4781 2.4200 1.5127 0.6828 1.3963 3.7437 
11 0.25% 0.13% 9.79% 0.0494 1.1709 0.3228 0.6807 1.3593 3.8343 
12 0.79% 0.48% 10.58% 0.3500 1.2274 2.1829 0.7313 1.3926 4.0203 
13 0.21% -0.12% 10.79% 0.1583 1.2761 0.9497 0.7476 1.4165 4.0407 
14 -0.24% -0.28% 10.55% -0.1411 1.1640 -0.9279 0.7130 1.4402 3.7903 
15 0.09% -0.12% 10.64% -0.3527 2.5652 -1.0526 0.6442 1.3574 3.6336 
16 -0.19% -0.13% 10.45% -0.0509 1.1210 -0.3474 0.6271 1.3940 3.4441 
17 0.17% 0.15% 10.62% 0.1027 1.2261 0.6412 0.6354 1.3257 3.6698 
18 0.21% 0.37% 10.82% 0.0992 1.5298 0.4962 0.6431 1.3088 3.7621 
19 -0.09% 0.10% 10.74% -0.2649 2.5326 -0.8008 0.5931 1.2335 3.6817 
20 0.03% 0.06% 10.77% 0.2191 2.1088 0.7954 0.6201 1.2496 3.7992 
21 -0.10% 0.45% 10.67% 0.3024 3.1048 0.7458 0.6593 1.4575 3.4634 
22 0.12% 0.03% 10.79% 0.4105 2.8740 1.0935 0.7142 1.6556 3.3027 
23 0.16% -0.23% 10.94% -0.0339 1.3999 -0.1855 0.7009 1.5561 3.4486 
24 0.63% -0.06% 11.57% 0.5022 2.6241 1.4651 0.7680 1.7770 3.3088 
25 0.05% -0.28% 11.62% 0.0271 1.0390 0.1996 0.7636 1.7796 3.2850 
26 0.02% -0.17% 11.64% 0.0330 1.0184 0.2484 0.7602 1.7676 3.2928 
27 0.32% 0.05% 11.96% 0.1719 1.4960 0.8796 0.7771 1.8154 3.2772 
28 0.35% 0.02% 12.31% 0.4353 1.9611 1.6995 0.8313 1.9826 3.2101 
29 -0.22% -0.29% 12.09% -0.2373 1.7878 -1.0164 0.7894 1.7964 3.3642 
30 0.52% 0.37% 12.61% 0.2573 1.1416 1.7256 0.8176 1.8407 3.4008 
          
-1 to 1     2.33% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05173 0.5573 1.9773 2.1577 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-99 
 
Table-A 6.34 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; Unrelated; (MM, 138); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% -0.07% 0.01% 0.0147 1.1349 0.1611 0.0147 1.1349 0.1611 
-19 0.29% 0.00% 0.30% 0.0387 1.2629 0.3814 0.0378 1.1442 0.4106 
-18 -0.09% -0.10% 0.21% -0.0469 1.3728 -0.4247 0.0038 1.2748 0.0369 
-17 0.53% 0.18% 0.74% 0.2050 1.6557 1.5406 0.1058 1.3221 0.9955 
-16 0.09% -0.29% 0.84% 0.1240 1.6277 0.9480 0.1501 1.5533 1.2021 
-15 0.00% -0.29% 0.84% 0.0296 1.4444 0.2548 0.1491 1.5874 1.1684 
-14 -0.18% -0.15% 0.66% -0.0434 1.4363 -0.3758 0.1216 1.4675 1.0312 
-13 0.45% 0.24% 1.11% 0.1930 1.4064 1.7069 0.1820 1.4192 1.5954 
-12 -0.08% -0.35% 1.03% -0.0002 1.2380 -0.0017 0.1715 1.4486 1.4732 
-11 -0.35% -0.22% 0.68% -0.1130 1.1859 -1.1855 0.1270 1.4239 1.1096 
-10 -0.01% -0.13% 0.66% -0.0395 1.2548 -0.3918 0.1092 1.3568 1.0010 
-9 0.38% 0.02% 1.04% 0.1347 1.5009 1.1168 0.1434 1.3105 1.3614 
-8 -0.24% -0.17% 0.80% -0.1193 1.7490 -0.8487 0.1047 1.3557 0.9607 
-7 0.44% 0.04% 1.24% 0.2064 1.2219 2.1012 0.1560 1.3794 1.4073 
-6 0.03% 0.09% 1.27% 0.0603 1.1640 0.6440 0.1663 1.3355 1.5492 
-5 0.20% 0.04% 1.47% 0.0722 1.2141 0.7395 0.1791 1.2828 1.7366 
-4 0.01% -0.10% 1.48% 0.0171 1.0881 0.1958 0.1779 1.2695 1.7431 
-3 -0.01% -0.10% 1.47% 0.0354 1.7032 0.2585 0.1812 1.3277 1.6979 
-2 0.29% 0.06% 1.76% 0.1003 1.3684 0.9116 0.1994 1.2932 1.9180 
-1 0.93% 0.64% 2.69% 0.3996 2.1820 2.2782 0.2837 1.4909 2.3671 
0 0.43% 0.16% 3.12% 0.2234 1.7460 1.5917 0.3256 1.4677 2.7599 
1 -0.08% -0.03% 3.04% -0.0364 1.7628 -0.2572 0.3103 1.4584 2.6472 
2 0.83% 0.21% 3.88% 0.5120 2.3889 2.6660 0.4103 1.5980 3.1939 
3 0.15% 0.03% 4.02% -0.0538 1.6318 -0.4103 0.3906 1.4696 3.3068 
4 0.11% 0.02% 4.13% -0.0177 1.1469 -0.1925 0.3792 1.4287 3.3019 
5 0.15% -0.07% 4.28% 0.0895 1.2157 0.9155 0.3894 1.4464 3.3492 
6 -0.49% 0.00% 3.79% -0.1762 1.3953 -1.5707 0.3482 1.4523 2.9828 
7 0.34% 0.20% 4.13% 0.3265 2.0586 1.9728 0.4036 1.6024 3.1335 
8 0.32% -0.10% 4.46% 0.1454 1.4879 1.2161 0.4236 1.7074 3.0865 
9 0.01% -0.12% 4.47% 0.0072 1.4764 0.0609 0.4178 1.6193 3.2099 
10 -0.24% -0.27% 4.23% -0.0580 1.3223 -0.5457 0.4006 1.5799 3.1543 
11 -0.24% -0.11% 3.99% -0.0726 1.4226 -0.6351 0.3815 1.5275 3.1066 
12 0.12% -0.05% 4.12% 0.0522 1.2125 0.5352 0.3847 1.5503 3.0872 
13 0.88% 0.21% 5.00% 0.2677 1.2059 2.7616 0.4249 1.5304 3.4540 
14 0.34% 0.27% 5.34% 0.1385 1.1150 1.5450 0.4422 1.5475 3.5548 
15 -0.12% -0.15% 5.22% -0.0753 1.0591 -0.8844 0.4235 1.5273 3.4493 
16 0.17% -0.11% 5.39% 0.1050 1.4774 0.8844 0.4350 1.5683 3.4505 
17 -0.27% -0.23% 5.12% -0.0568 1.3606 -0.5194 0.4200 1.6365 3.1929 
18 -0.17% -0.02% 4.95% 0.0087 1.5252 0.0711 0.4160 1.7170 3.0140 
19 -0.24% -0.04% 4.71% -0.1361 1.2727 -1.3308 0.3892 1.6784 2.8849 
20 0.03% 0.05% 4.74% 0.0292 1.1442 0.3170 0.3890 1.7119 2.8268 
21 -0.06% -0.06% 4.68% -0.1212 1.5100 -0.9985 0.3656 1.7335 2.6240 
22 -0.17% 0.15% 4.51% -0.0220 0.9651 -0.2835 0.3580 1.7319 2.5716 
23 0.49% 0.17% 5.00% 0.2178 1.3732 1.9734 0.3868 1.6691 2.8825 
24 -0.26% -0.13% 4.73% -0.0297 1.5155 -0.2441 0.3780 1.6999 2.7663 
25 0.06% -0.08% 4.80% 0.0199 1.4998 0.1651 0.3768 1.6264 2.8822 
26 0.42% 0.01% 5.21% 0.1172 1.2918 1.1284 0.3899 1.5852 3.0595 
27 0.34% 0.01% 5.55% 0.1416 1.2319 1.4296 0.4062 1.5674 3.2240 
28 -0.02% -0.03% 5.53% -0.0212 1.0222 -0.2582 0.3990 1.5723 3.1571 
29 0.18% -0.04% 5.71% 0.0713 1.2730 0.6967 0.4051 1.5945 3.1605 
30 0.59% 0.13% 6.31% 0.2601 1.2267 2.6377 0.4375 1.6185 3.3629 
          
-1 to 1     1.28% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03915 0.3386 1.9310 2.1817 
 
 
 
  
  
6-100 
 
Table-A 6.35 Market returns to Domestic Acquirers; Related; (OLS, 54); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.54% 0.33% 0.54% 0.2268 1.0495 1.6605 0.2268 1.0495 1.6605 
-19 -0.10% -0.18% 0.44% -0.0057 0.9232 -0.0472 0.1563 1.0381 1.1573 
-18 -0.16% -0.58% 0.29% -0.0631 0.7761 -0.6252 0.0912 1.0074 0.6957 
-17 0.16% 0.16% 0.45% 0.1216 1.1163 0.8371 0.1398 1.0010 1.0732 
-16 -0.26% -0.49% 0.19% -0.0766 0.7329 -0.8031 0.0908 0.9923 0.7030 
-15 -0.84% -0.33% -0.66% -0.2213 1.0866 -1.5654 -0.0075 1.0600 -0.0544 
-14 0.19% -0.10% -0.47% 0.0164 0.9211 0.1364 -0.0008 0.9711 -0.0061 
-13 0.53% 0.01% 0.06% 0.1880 1.3147 1.0989 0.0658 1.1279 0.4480 
-12 -0.56% -0.48% -0.50% -0.1423 0.9475 -1.1544 0.0145 1.0782 0.1037 
-11 0.31% -0.32% -0.19% 0.0374 0.8517 0.3374 0.0256 1.0640 0.1851 
-10 0.06% -0.41% -0.13% 0.0219 1.0074 0.1671 0.0310 1.1579 0.2060 
-9 1.40% 0.32% 1.27% 0.3740 0.8861 3.2435 0.1377 1.1957 0.8848 
-8 0.55% 0.25% 1.82% 0.0780 0.9740 0.6158 0.1539 1.2149 0.9736 
-7 0.30% -0.15% 2.12% 0.1569 0.8543 1.4111 0.1902 1.1819 1.2370 
-6 0.58% 0.09% 2.70% 0.2216 1.3058 1.3041 0.2410 1.2488 1.4831 
-5 -0.15% -0.16% 2.54% -0.0615 1.3958 -0.3387 0.2180 1.2006 1.3952 
-4 -0.53% -0.23% 2.01% -0.2201 1.2012 -1.4083 0.1581 1.0911 1.1135 
-3 -0.33% -0.34% 1.68% -0.0252 1.0788 -0.1797 0.1477 1.1114 1.0212 
-2 0.32% 0.20% 1.99% 0.0407 0.9420 0.3320 0.1531 1.1013 1.0682 
-1 0.55% -0.08% 2.55% 0.1313 1.0003 1.0089 0.1786 1.1688 1.1740 
0 -0.36% -0.58% 2.19% -0.1392 1.7253 -0.6202 0.1439 1.2160 0.9093 
1 1.75% 0.34% 3.94% 0.4654 2.0429 1.7506 0.2398 1.1861 1.5536 
2 0.60% -0.21% 4.53% 0.2518 1.5924 1.2150 0.2870 1.2363 1.7840 
3 0.22% -0.24% 4.75% 0.2175 1.3493 1.2387 0.3254 1.2948 1.9310 
4 0.72% 0.07% 5.47% 0.1776 0.9660 1.4132 0.3543 1.3066 2.0839 
5 -0.28% -0.64% 5.19% -0.0863 1.0408 -0.6374 0.3305 1.3322 1.9066 
6 0.58% -0.09% 5.76% 0.1433 0.8872 1.2409 0.3519 1.3753 1.9664 
7 0.39% -0.17% 6.16% 0.0412 0.9074 0.3487 0.3533 1.4108 1.9247 
8 -0.23% -0.22% 5.93% -0.1100 1.0868 -0.7776 0.3268 1.3763 1.8247 
9 -0.09% -0.50% 5.84% -0.0720 0.9213 -0.6008 0.3081 1.3607 1.7402 
10 0.73% 0.14% 6.57% 0.1928 1.2632 1.1727 0.3377 1.3909 1.8661 
11 0.25% -0.07% 6.83% 0.0978 0.9846 0.7630 0.3497 1.4266 1.8838 
12 0.62% 0.42% 7.45% 0.1943 0.9823 1.5200 0.3782 1.4285 2.0346 
13 0.15% -0.13% 7.59% 0.0491 0.9375 0.4028 0.3810 1.4160 2.0679 
14 -0.43% -0.29% 7.17% -0.1667 0.9539 -1.3429 0.3474 1.4114 1.8913 
15 0.09% -0.21% 7.25% -0.0571 1.0896 -0.4024 0.3330 1.4531 1.7610 
16 -0.49% -0.19% 6.76% -0.1623 0.9920 -1.2573 0.3018 1.4098 1.6450 
17 0.03% -0.03% 6.80% 0.0050 0.9493 0.0406 0.2986 1.3572 1.6907 
18 0.04% 0.24% 6.83% -0.0088 1.2115 -0.0556 0.2933 1.3296 1.6954 
19 -0.44% 0.01% 6.40% -0.1250 1.2120 -0.7926 0.2699 1.2513 1.6574 
20 -0.28% -0.19% 6.12% -0.0445 1.4254 -0.2398 0.2596 1.1948 1.6698 
21 -0.43% 0.22% 5.69% -0.1278 1.4424 -0.6808 0.2368 1.2127 1.5005 
22 -0.18% -0.08% 5.50% -0.0389 0.9401 -0.3180 0.2281 1.1664 1.5027 
23 0.00% -0.34% 5.50% 0.0197 0.8187 0.1847 0.2285 1.1558 1.5190 
24 0.41% -0.18% 5.91% 0.1410 1.0905 0.9934 0.2469 1.1761 1.6133 
25 -0.25% -0.32% 5.66% -0.0676 0.9843 -0.5275 0.2343 1.1626 1.5484 
26 -0.37% -0.51% 5.29% -0.0911 0.9846 -0.7108 0.2185 1.1246 1.4928 
27 0.03% 0.04% 5.32% -0.0021 1.0375 -0.0159 0.2159 1.0941 1.5162 
28 0.18% -0.08% 5.50% 0.1380 0.8145 1.3016 0.2334 1.0894 1.6461 
29 -0.42% -0.42% 5.09% -0.1018 0.7521 -1.0404 0.2166 1.0783 1.5438 
30 0.12% 0.15% 5.21% 0.0503 1.0493 0.3685 0.2215 1.0536 1.6157 
          
-1 to 1     1.94% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0529 0.2641 1.3401 1.5144 
 
 
 
 
  
  
6-101 
 
Table-A 6.36 Market returns to Domestic Targets; Unrelated; (OLS, 141); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.22% -0.29% -0.22% -0.0416 0.9303 -0.5614 -0.0416 0.9303 -0.5614 
-19 0.15% -0.13% -0.07% 0.0010 0.9950 0.0130 -0.0287 0.9159 -0.3933 
-18 -0.25% -0.29% -0.32% -0.0683 1.1223 -0.7642 -0.0628 0.9844 -0.8018 
-17 0.42% 0.08% 0.10% 0.1031 1.1642 1.1116 -0.0029 0.9871 -0.0369 
-16 -0.07% -0.42% 0.03% 0.0068 1.1252 0.0763 0.0005 1.0973 0.0053 
-15 -0.17% -0.36% -0.14% -0.0626 1.1386 -0.6905 -0.0251 1.0951 -0.2882 
-14 -0.37% -0.25% -0.51% -0.0250 1.1330 -0.2767 -0.0327 1.0402 -0.3949 
-13 0.29% 0.15% -0.23% 0.1141 1.0837 1.3220 0.0097 1.0734 0.1139 
-12 -0.18% -0.57% -0.41% -0.0822 0.9156 -1.1268 -0.0182 1.0332 -0.2212 
-11 -0.49% -0.36% -0.90% -0.1273 0.9823 -1.6279 -0.0575 1.0220 -0.7070 
-10 -0.14% -0.30% -1.04% -0.0415 1.0589 -0.4920 -0.0674 0.9880 -0.8563 
-9 0.12% -0.17% -0.92% 0.0450 1.2075 0.4681 -0.0515 1.0092 -0.6409 
-8 -0.38% -0.25% -1.30% -0.1056 1.1313 -1.1721 -0.0788 1.0253 -0.9648 
-7 0.31% -0.05% -0.99% 0.0879 0.9251 1.1926 -0.0524 1.0428 -0.6314 
-6 0.00% -0.03% -0.99% 0.0149 0.9283 0.2018 -0.0468 1.0339 -0.5684 
-5 -0.05% -0.16% -1.04% -0.0071 0.9456 -0.0940 -0.0471 1.0036 -0.5891 
-4 -0.10% -0.30% -1.15% -0.0381 0.9303 -0.5137 -0.0549 0.9825 -0.7017 
-3 -0.12% -0.15% -1.27% -0.0600 0.9616 -0.7833 -0.0675 1.0146 -0.8354 
-2 0.13% -0.03% -1.14% 0.0273 0.9172 0.3736 -0.0594 0.9933 -0.7514 
-1 0.70% 0.24% -0.44% 0.2181 1.0945 2.5028 -0.0091 1.0249 -0.1121 
0 0.29% 0.11% -0.15% 0.1617 1.3677 1.4843 0.0263 1.0644 0.3108 
1 -0.13% -0.17% -0.28% 0.0027 1.3056 0.0258 0.0263 1.0924 0.3025 
2 0.64% 0.17% 0.36% 0.2075 1.3011 2.0027 0.0690 1.1120 0.7793 
3 -0.08% 0.02% 0.29% -0.0541 1.0821 -0.6275 0.0565 1.0823 0.6557 
4 -0.07% -0.24% 0.21% -0.0358 0.9311 -0.4827 0.0482 1.0672 0.5673 
5 -0.06% -0.18% 0.15% 0.0002 0.8769 0.0022 0.0473 1.0417 0.5703 
6 -0.74% -0.15% -0.59% -0.2076 1.1620 -2.2437 0.0065 1.0294 0.0789 
7 0.36% 0.08% -0.24% 0.1366 0.9868 1.7383 0.0322 1.0387 0.3889 
8 0.13% -0.16% -0.11% 0.0069 0.9956 0.0870 0.0329 1.0534 0.3920 
9 -0.14% -0.34% -0.25% 0.0062 1.0392 0.0755 0.0335 1.0669 0.3940 
10 -0.37% -0.42% -0.62% -0.0666 0.8644 -0.9669 0.0210 1.0894 0.2418 
11 -0.40% -0.30% -1.02% -0.0806 0.8981 -1.1276 0.0064 1.1205 0.0716 
12 -0.04% -0.28% -1.06% -0.0177 0.9260 -0.2394 0.0032 1.1264 0.0359 
13 0.60% 0.11% -0.46% 0.1631 0.9527 2.1502 0.0311 1.1411 0.3428 
14 0.18% 0.14% -0.27% 0.0465 0.8666 0.6744 0.0386 1.1233 0.4312 
15 -0.22% -0.27% -0.50% -0.0796 0.8972 -1.1147 0.0248 1.1314 0.2748 
16 -0.02% -0.26% -0.52% -0.0448 1.0349 -0.5440 0.0170 1.1149 0.1920 
17 -0.47% -0.36% -0.99% -0.1568 0.8884 -2.2162 -0.0086 1.1132 -0.0972 
18 -0.31% -0.14% -1.31% -0.0629 1.0906 -0.7243 -0.0186 1.1069 -0.2107 
19 -0.33% -0.20% -1.63% -0.0850 0.9092 -1.1737 -0.0318 1.0908 -0.3658 
20 -0.20% -0.33% -1.83% -0.0492 0.9316 -0.6633 -0.0391 1.0995 -0.4463 
21 -0.17% -0.25% -2.01% -0.0535 0.8603 -0.7811 -0.0469 1.0939 -0.5379 
22 -0.49% -0.11% -2.50% -0.1400 0.8236 -2.1353 -0.0677 1.0857 -0.7827 
23 0.39% 0.04% -2.11% 0.1024 0.9649 1.3331 -0.0515 1.0794 -0.5986 
24 -0.39% -0.19% -2.50% -0.0823 1.1598 -0.8910 -0.0631 1.0989 -0.7216 
25 -0.18% -0.27% -2.68% -0.0590 1.1355 -0.6524 -0.0712 1.0822 -0.8257 
26 0.25% -0.09% -2.43% 0.0495 0.9618 0.6469 -0.0632 1.0771 -0.7364 
27 0.18% -0.23% -2.26% 0.0897 1.0096 1.1152 -0.0496 1.0696 -0.5819 
28 -0.26% -0.25% -2.51% -0.0680 0.8767 -0.9737 -0.0588 1.0790 -0.6839 
29 -0.06% -0.21% -2.57% 0.0033 0.9586 0.0427 -0.0577 1.0731 -0.6754 
30 0.54% 0.05% -2.03% 0.1659 1.0039 2.0750 -0.0339 1.0732 -0.3969 
          
-1 to 1     0.86% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03874 0.2208 1.5607 1.7768 
 
 
 
 
  
6-102 
 
Cross-Sectional – Analysis 
 
Table-A 6.37 Post-event Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs - Targets 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [0,+15]   [0,+10]   [0,+7]   [0,+5]   [0,+2]   
 Cash 0.0115  0.0082  0.0039  0.0098  0.0261   
(0.3342) (0.2267) (0.1504) (0.4032) (1.0936) 
 Pct50 0.0618 * 0.0576 ** 0.0758 *** 0.0642 *** 0.0310 *  
(1.9107) 
 
(2.0037)  (2.9726) 
 
(3.0819) 
 
(1.7107) 
 
 PctToe -0.1204 * -0.1045 * -0.0615  -0.0128  0.0296   
(-1.9010) 
 
(-1.7839)  (-1.0977) (-0.2710) (0.6805) 
 BGroup 0.0952 *** 0.0817 *** 0.0434 * 0.0286  0.0059   
(2.6913) 
 
(2.8214)  (1.7565) 
 
(1.2675) (0.2993) 
 Related 0.0186 
 0.0346  0.0309  0.0218  0.0160   
(0.5312) 
 
(1.1255) (1.0925) (0.8433) (0.8336) 
 Conglomerate 0.0148 
 0.0233  0.0188  0.0104  0.0050   
(0.4310) 
 
(0.7674) (0.7107) (0.4546) (0.2801) 
 Intercept -0.0315 
 -0.0399  -0.0378  -0.0269  0.0001   
(-0.9793) 
 
(-1.2821) (-1.3602) (-1.2099) (0.0034) 
  Observations 165   165   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 2.6787  2.8508  2.5898  2.3404  1.0874  
 p-value 0.0167 ** 0.0116 ** 0.0202 ** 0.0342 ** 0.3723  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0475   0.0534   0.0406   0.0234   0.0019   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.38 Post-event Regression Analysis; MM CAARs - Targets 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [0,+15]   [0,+10]   [0,+7]   [0,+5]   [0,+2]   
 Cash -0.0029  -0.0110  0.0051  0.0157  0.0299   
(-0.0929) (-0.3409) (0.1949) (0.6384) (1.2268) 
 Pct50 0.0641 * 0.0608 ** 0.0575 ** 0.0526 ** 0.0254   
(1.8953) 
 
(2.1016) 
 
(2.3032) 
 
(2.5963) 
 
(1.3814) 
 PctToe -0.0955  -0.0826  -0.0752  -0.0211  0.0221   
(-1.5442) (-1.4630) (-1.3958) (-0.4530) (0.5068) 
 BGroup 0.0728 ** 0.0626 ** 0.0325  0.0243  0.0038   
(2.0536) 
 
(2.1823) 
 
(1.3252) (1.0816) (0.1921) 
 Related -0.0016  0.0132  0.0238  0.0205  0.0163   
(-0.0454) (0.4516) (0.8426) (0.7860) (0.8640) 
 Conglomerate 0.0160  0.0240  0.0068  0.0070  0.0023   
(0.4683) (0.8071) (0.2665) (0.3108) (0.1319) 
 Intercept 0.0131  -0.0057  0.0012  -0.0074  0.0103   
(0.4014) (-0.1873) (0.0454) (-0.3392) (0.6521) 
  Observations 160   160   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 1.8541  2.0527  1.7973  1.7779  0.9034  
 p-value 0.0922 * 0.0620 * 0.1031  0.1071  0.4942  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0239   0.0312   0.0179   0.0093   -0.0041   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.39 Regression OLS CAARS - Targets and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.1008  0.0780  0.0860  0.0435  0.0265    
(1.3307) (1.1946) (1.5917) (1.4032) (1.2341) 
 Pct50 0.1427 ** 0.1097 * 0.0883 * 0.0890 ** 0.0297   
(2.1081) 
 
(1.7790) 
 
(1.7009) 
 
(2.1767) 
 
(1.1706) 
 PctToe -0.3145 *** -0.2552 ** -0.2436 *** -0.0227  -0.0010   
(-2.6955) 
 
(-2.5142) 
 
(-3.2606) 
 
(-0.4160) (-0.0286) 
 BGroup 0.0800 
 0.0536  0.0431  -0.0113  -0.0211   
(1.3237) 
 
(1.0161) (0.9697) (-0.3760) (-1.0221) 
 Related -0.0309 
 -0.0028  0.0324  0.0147  0.0210   
(-0.5884) 
 
(-0.0593) (0.8519) (0.5583) (1.1413) 
 BGroup50 0.0130 
 0.0499  0.0080  0.0387  0.0049   
(0.1072) 
 
(0.4297) (0.0909) (0.6264) (0.1277) 
 Conglomerate -0.0728 
 -0.0532  -0.0329  -0.0262  -0.0182   
(-1.2998) 
 
(-1.0364) (-0.7829) (-0.9607) (-1.1507) 
 Intercept 0.1173 ** 0.1018 * 0.0671  0.0341  0.0390 **  
(2.0123) 
 
(1.8655) 
 
(1.3262) (1.1972) (2.5516) 
 
  Observations 165   165   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 3.5109  2.8225  3.0368  2.4688  1.1395  
 p-value 0.0016 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0198 ** 0.3412  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0820   0.0600   0.0534   0.0577   0.0114   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.40 Regression MM CAARS - Targets and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0702  0.0596  0.0641  0.0428  0.0245    
(1.0672) (1.0413) (1.3975) (1.3463) (1.0972) 
 Pct50 0.1089 * 0.0801  0.0804  0.0606  0.0205   
(1.7201) 
 
(1.4890) (1.6193) (1.6043) (0.7915) 
 PctToe -0.2459 ** -0.2012 ** -0.1972 *** -0.0227  -0.0044   
(-2.2711) 
 
(-2.1430) 
 
(-2.8743) 
 
(-0.4190) (-0.1218) 
 BGroup 0.0139 
 0.0066  0.0081  -0.0316  -0.0287   
(0.2392) 
 
(0.1353) (0.2005) (-1.0274) (-1.3740) 
 Related -0.0727 
 -0.0286  0.0058  0.0086  0.0184   
(-1.4591) 
 
(-0.6463) (0.1662) (0.3208) (1.0072) 
 BGroup50 0.0782 
 0.1090  0.0385  0.0728  0.0155   
(0.6408) 
 
(0.9404) (0.4326) (1.1841) (0.3969) 
 Conglomerate -0.0574 
 -0.0300  -0.0200  -0.0265  -0.0210   
(-1.0502) 
 
(-0.6088) (-0.5115) (-0.9672) (-1.3147) 
 Intercept 0.2197 *** 0.1644 *** 0.1142 ** 0.0684 ** 0.0521 ***  
(3.9726) 
 
(3.2223) 
 
(2.5153) 
 
(2.3498) 
 
(3.4425) 
 
  Observations 160   160   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 3.3338  2.6216  2.6610  2.1970  1.0499  
 p-value 0.0025 *** 0.0139 ** 0.0126 ** 0.0375 ** 0.3989  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0703   0.0515   0.0437   0.0501   0.0099   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.41 Regression OLS CAARS - Targets and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.1085  0.0810  0.0905  0.0506  0.0306    
(1.3837) (1.1949) (1.6197) (1.6121) (1.4000) 
 Pct50 0.1526 ** 0.1323 ** 0.0942 ** 0.1092 *** 0.0341 *  
(2.5725) 
 
(2.3567) 
 
(2.1883) 
 
(3.5881) 
 
(1.8279) 
 
 PctToe -0.3180 *** -0.2545 ** -0.2457 *** -0.0247  -0.0030   
(-2.6836) 
 
(-2.5025) 
 
(-3.2344) 
 
(-0.4556) (-0.0850) 
 BGroup 0.0602  0.0688  0.0319  -0.0156  -0.0326   
(0.8246) (1.0191) (0.6175) (-0.4460) (-1.3729) 
 Related -0.0601  -0.0034  0.0156  -0.0055  0.0050   
(-0.9255) (-0.0557) (0.3211) (-0.1630) (0.1983) 
 RelBGroup 0.0629  -0.0057  0.0360  0.0393  0.0347   
(0.5410) (-0.0540) (0.4310) (0.7587) (0.9649) 
 Conglomerate -0.0749  -0.0521  -0.0340  -0.0270  -0.0194   
(-1.2960) (-0.9950) (-0.8022) (-0.9825) (-1.2102) 
 Intercept 0.1226 ** 0.0966 * 0.0701  0.0346  0.0421 ***  
(2.0262) 
 
(1.7518) 
 
(1.3862) (1.2013) (2.7408) 
 
  Observations 165   165   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 3.4472  2.7120  2.9285  2.6121  1.2494  
 p-value 0.0018 *** 0.0111 ** 0.0066 *** 0.0141 ** 0.2792  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0835   0.0589   0.0543   0.0581   0.0173   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.42 Regression MM CAARS - Targets and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0799  0.0631  0.0686  0.0541 * 0.0302    
(1.2003) (1.0915) (1.4628) (1.6568) 
 
(1.3119) 
 Pct50 0.1476 ** 0.1291 ** 0.0993 ** 0.0977 *** 0.0300   
(2.4709) 
 
(2.3026) 
 
(2.2942) 
 
(3.2226) 
 
(1.5692) 
 PctToe -0.2472 ** -0.1969 ** -0.1977 *** -0.0252  -0.0069   
(-2.2883) 
 
(-2.1394) 
 
(-2.8902) 
 
(-0.4694) (-0.1913) 
 BGroup 0.0226  0.0502  0.0132  -0.0304  -0.0388   
(0.3005) (0.7461) (0.2570) (-0.8395) (-1.5966) 
 Related -0.0917  -0.0170  -0.0026  -0.0176  0.0003   
(-1.3245) (-0.2740) (-0.0545) (-0.5337) (0.0103) 
 RelBGroup 0.0320  -0.0410  0.0134  0.0486  0.0386   
(0.2994) (-0.4304) (0.1830) (0.9235) (1.0548) 
 Conglomerate -0.0575  -0.0261  -0.0199  -0.0274  -0.0224   
(-1.0206) (-0.5248) (-0.5102) (-0.9965) (-1.3849) 
 Intercept 0.2158 *** 0.1494 *** 0.1120 ** 0.0669 ** 0.0549 ***  
(3.7728) 
 
(2.9506) 
 
(2.4990) 
 
(2.2862) 
 
(3.5735) 
 
  Observations 160   160   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 3.2275  2.4847  2.5228  2.3378  1.1173  
 p-value 0.0032 *** 0.0192 ** 0.0175 ** 0.0271 ** 0.3551  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0684   0.0466   0.0428   0.0462   0.0163   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.43 Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs – Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0401  0.0213  0.0106  0.0136  0.0006   
(0.8813) (0.4993) (0.2982) (0.4185) (0.0408) 
 Pct50 0.0533  0.0804 * 0.0455  0.0139  0.0099   
(1.1243) (1.7417) 
 
(1.3100) (0.6138) (0.7522) 
 PctToe -0.0009  -0.0200  -0.0696  0.0127  0.0068   
(-0.0121) (-0.2911) (-1.2226) (0.2910) (0.2671) 
 BGroup -0.0176  -0.0127  -0.0082  -0.0118  -0.0081   
(-0.5199) (-0.3914) (-0.3096) (-0.6196) (-0.7490) 
 Related 0.0831 * 0.0863 * 0.0857 ** 0.0108  0.0092   
(1.7419) 
 
(1.8449) 
 
(2.5791) 
 
(0.5171) (0.7625) 
 Conglomerate 0.0438  0.0417  0.0228  0.0195  0.0099   
(1.0604) (1.0695) (0.7621) (1.0120) (0.9121) 
 Intercept -0.0453  -0.0377  -0.0106  0.0023  0.0049   
(-1.3197) (-1.2088) (-0.4055) (0.1465) (0.5168) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.8497  0.8746  1.1952  0.2708  0.3958  
 p-value 0.5332  0.5147  0.3107  0.9500  0.8811  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0054   0.0202   0.0151   -0.0212   -0.0212   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.44 Regression Analysis; MM CAARs – Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0248  0.0118  0.0028  0.0096  0.0004   
(0.5909) (0.2919) (0.0785) (0.2923) (0.0223) 
 Pct50 0.0362  0.0597 * 0.0340  0.0073  0.0094   
(0.9307) (1.6795) 
 
(1.0866) (0.3487) (0.7082) 
 PctToe 0.0281  0.0127  -0.0466  0.0201  0.0110   
(0.4014) (0.2050) (-0.8262) (0.4670) (0.4384) 
 BGroup -0.0084  0.0003  0.0017  -0.0089  -0.0085   
(-0.2511) (0.0100) (0.0630) (-0.4665) (-0.7749) 
 Related 0.0569  0.0575 * 0.0691 ** 0.0024  0.0084   
(1.5419) (1.7477) 
 
(2.4090) 
 
(0.1326) (0.7019) 
 Conglomerate 0.0317  0.0275  0.0161  0.0151  0.0097   
(0.8219) (0.8063) (0.5553) (0.8078) (0.8633) 
 Intercept 0.0261  0.0163  0.0236  0.0231  0.0090   
(0.7171) (0.5093) (0.8412) (1.4603) (0.9023) 
  Observations 187   187   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.7215  0.9034  1.1327  0.1645  0.3914  
 p-value 0.6328  0.4937  0.3451  0.9858  0.8839  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0127   -0.0031   -0.0047   -0.0274   -0.0226   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.45 Regression OLS CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0375  0.0197  0.0055  0.0096  0.0001   
(0.8172) (0.4577) (0.1555) (0.2971) (0.0083) 
 Pct50 0.0425  0.0734  0.0238  -0.0031  0.0078   
(0.6405) (1.1840) (0.5168) (-0.0984) (0.4216) 
 PctToe -0.0013  -0.0202  -0.0703  0.0122  0.0067   
(-0.0165) (-0.2933) (-1.2287) (0.2762) (0.2627) 
 BGroup -0.0258  -0.0180  -0.0247  -0.0247  -0.0098   
(-0.6485) (-0.4913) (-0.8236) (-1.1598) (-0.7838) 
 Related 0.0845 * 0.0872 * 0.0885 *** 0.0130  0.0095   
(1.7841) 
 
(1.8822) 
 
(2.6475) 
 
(0.6243) (0.7704) 
 BGroup50 0.0314  0.0202  0.0629  0.0492  0.0063   
(0.4304) (0.2848) (1.0863) (1.3531) (0.2701) 
 Conglomerate 0.0441  0.0418  0.0233  0.0198  0.0100   
(1.0646) (1.0728) (0.7767) (1.0314) (0.9149) 
 Intercept -0.0427  -0.0361  -0.0055  0.0063  0.0054   
(-1.1895) (-1.0966) (-0.2013) (0.3893) (0.5471) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 1.0236  1.0119  1.3504  0.7480  0.3798  
 p-value 0.4161  0.4243  0.2291  0.6316  0.9133  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0007   0.0152   0.0147   -0.0197   -0.0265   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.46 Regression OLS CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0379  0.0215  0.0023  0.0137  0.0042   
(0.8538) (0.5193) (0.0669) (0.4353) (0.2647) 
 Pct50 0.0345  0.0704  0.0286  -0.0054  0.0036   
(0.5274) (1.1571) (0.6313) (-0.1797) (0.2027) 
 BGroup -0.0249  -0.0186  -0.0263  -0.0250  -0.0108   
(-0.6387) (-0.5171) (-0.9028) (-1.2432) (-0.8820) 
 Related 0.0862 ** 0.0852 ** 0.0735 ** 0.0177  0.0130   
(2.1374) 
 
(2.1167) 
 
(2.4129) 
 
(0.8772) (1.2375) 
 BGroup50 0.0402  0.0237  0.0596  0.0509  0.0098   
(0.5586) (0.3390) (1.0344) (1.4292) (0.4265) 
 Conglomerate 0.0473  0.0451  0.0293  0.0193  0.0097   
(1.1480) (1.1410) (0.9903) (1.0064) (0.8980) 
 Intercept -0.0461  -0.0404  -0.0141  0.0067  0.0058   
(-1.3248) (-1.2620) (-0.5457) (0.4322) (0.6111) 
  Observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 F-Statistics 1.3036  1.2483  1.3436  0.9155  0.5066  
 p-value 0.2575  0.2836  0.2398  0.4849  0.8029  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0082   0.0226   0.0153   -0.0117   -0.0190   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Note: Interactive dummy equations without the PctToe variable. 
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Table-A 6.47 Regression MM CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0206  0.0083  -0.0030  0.0052  -0.0004   
(0.4829) (0.2005) (-0.0844) (0.1604) (-0.0245) 
 Pct50 0.0176  0.0441  0.0080  -0.0122  0.0061   
(0.3249) (0.9514) (0.1985) (-0.4314) (0.3251) 
 PctToe 0.0277  0.0124  -0.0471  0.0197  0.0110   
(0.3949) (0.1985) (-0.8345) (0.4542) (0.4330) 
 BGroup -0.0224  -0.0115  -0.0179  -0.0236  -0.0110   
(-0.5399) (-0.3083) (-0.5749) (-1.0891) (-0.8742) 
 Related 0.0590  0.0592 * 0.0721 ** 0.0046  0.0088   
(1.5946) (1.7797) 
 
(2.4849) 
 
(0.2524) (0.7216) 
 BGroup50 0.0530  0.0448  0.0742  0.0558  0.0096   
(0.7713) (0.6799) (1.2898) (1.5376) (0.4078) 
 Conglomerate 0.0319  0.0277  0.0164  0.0153  0.0097   
(0.8258) (0.8085) (0.5647) (0.8213) (0.8651) 
 Intercept 0.0306  0.0201  0.0298  0.0278 * 0.0098   
(0.8084) (0.6040) (1.0260) (1.6937) 
 
(0.9391) 
  Observations 187   187   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.8205  0.8815  1.2099  0.5576  0.4026  
 p-value 0.5714  0.5223  0.2995  0.7896  0.8998  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0162   -0.0067   -0.0032   -0.0238   -0.0275   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.48 Regression MM CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - BGroup50 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0209  0.0103  -0.0060  0.0092  0.0035   
(0.5031) (0.2580) (-0.1757) (0.2889) (0.2236) 
 Pct50 0.0030  0.0364  0.0095  -0.0158  0.0015   
(0.0547) (0.8029) (0.2420) (-0.5773) (0.0829) 
 BGroup -0.0209  -0.0112  -0.0186  -0.0238  -0.0119   
(-0.5179) (-0.3077) (-0.6190) (-1.1652) (-0.9647) 
 Related 0.0663 ** 0.0636 ** 0.0615 ** 0.0108  0.0131   
(1.9789) 
 
(2.0405) 
 
(2.1935) 
 
(0.5736) (1.2433) 
 BGroup50 0.0681  0.0525  0.0739  0.0588  0.0136   
(0.9879) (0.8043) (1.2960) (1.6469) (0.5799) 
 Conglomerate 0.0330  0.0285  0.0206  0.0142  0.0091   
(0.8895) (0.8588) (0.7408) (0.7784) (0.8243) 
 Intercept 0.0311  0.0198  0.0240  0.0293 * 0.0108   
(0.8864) (0.6409) (0.9011) (1.8864) 
 
(1.0868) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 1.0399  1.0711  1.1727  0.6891  0.5219  
 p-value 0.4009  0.3815  0.3228  0.6586  0.7913  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0092   0.0000   0.0005   -0.0165   -0.0204   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Note: Interactive dummy equations without the PctToe variable. 
  
  
6-114 
 
Table-A 6.49 Regression OLS CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0315  0.0140  0.0031  0.0099  -0.0034   
(0.6885) (0.3281) (0.0902) (0.3196) (-0.2195) 
 Pct50 0.0516  0.0789 * 0.0440  0.0132  0.0091   
(1.1053) (1.7366) 
 
(1.2786) (0.5811) (0.6879) 
 PctToe 0.0000  -0.0192  -0.0687  0.0131  0.0072   
(0.0005) (-0.2819) (-1.2213) (0.3006) (0.2878) 
 BGroup 0.0058  0.0073  0.0124  -0.0018  0.0030   
(0.1398) (0.1966) (0.4058) (-0.0879) (0.2199) 
 Related 0.1118 * 0.1108 * 0.1110 ** 0.0231  0.0228   
(1.7097) 
 
(1.7599) 
 
(2.5209) 
 
(0.8090) (1.4704) 
 RelBGroup -0.0727  -0.0621  -0.0641  -0.0312  -0.0346 *  
(-1.0131) (-0.8760) (-1.1794) (-0.8561) (-1.6585) 
 
 Conglomerate 0.0433  0.0412  0.0224  0.0192  0.0097   
(1.0539) (1.0651) (0.7500) (1.0009) (0.8890) 
 Intercept -0.0507  -0.0424  -0.0154  -0.0001  0.0023   
(-1.4051) (-1.2867) (-0.5656) (-0.0058) (0.2337) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.7399  0.7624  1.0659  0.2849  0.7340  
 p-value 0.6384  0.6196  0.3872  0.9592  0.6434  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0040   0.0184   0.0152   -0.0237   -0.0162   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
  
  
6-115 
 
Table-A 6.50 Regression OLS CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0317  0.0153  -0.0008  0.0137  0.0003   
(0.7104) (0.3681) (-0.0237) (0.4521) (0.0171) 
 Pct50 0.0465  0.0770 * 0.0474  0.0111  0.0062   
(1.0016) (1.7108) 
 
(1.3901) (0.4975) (0.4752) 
 BGroup 0.0102  0.0088  0.0101  -0.0006  0.0040   
(0.2516) (0.2398) (0.3412) (-0.0308) (0.2976) 
 Related 0.1142 * 0.1098 * 0.0961 ** 0.0289  0.0273 *  
(1.9468) 
 
(1.9179) 
 
(2.3166) 
 
(1.0051) (1.9068) 
 
 RelBGroup -0.0756  -0.0652  -0.0639  -0.0340  -0.0375 *  
(-1.0648) (-0.9295) (-1.1826) (-0.9562) (-1.8112) 
 
 Conglomerate 0.0463  0.0443  0.0283  0.0186  0.0093   
(1.1331) (1.1310) (0.9623) (0.9702) (0.8643) 
 Intercept -0.0548  -0.0470  -0.0235  0.0002  0.0023   
(-1.5711) (-1.4749) (-0.9138) (0.0129) (0.2442) 
  Observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 F-Statistics 0.9240  0.9551  1.0355  0.3768  0.9762  
 p-value 0.4789  0.4571  0.4037  0.8932  0.4426  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0114   0.0260   0.0163   -0.0157   -0.0076   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Note: Interactive dummy equations without the PctToe variable. 
 
  
  
6-116 
 
Table-A 6.51 Regression MM CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0164  0.0061  -0.0044  0.0071  -0.0035   
(0.3977) (0.1582) (-0.1311) (0.2260) (-0.2195) 
 Pct50 0.0351  0.0590 * 0.0330  0.0070  0.0089   
(0.9085) (1.6569) 
 
(1.0564) (0.3301) (0.6660) 
 PctToe 0.0286  0.0131  -0.0461  0.0202  0.0113   
(0.4110) (0.2113) (-0.8242) (0.4696) (0.4505) 
 BGroup 0.0140  0.0153  0.0208  -0.0022  0.0016   
(0.3327) (0.4118) (0.6682) (-0.1054) (0.1189) 
 Related 0.0847 * 0.0761 * 0.0928 ** 0.0108  0.0210   
(1.7864) 
 
(1.9562) 
 
(2.5497) 
 
(0.4335) (1.3437) 
 RelBGroup -0.0690  -0.0462  -0.0589  -0.0208  -0.0313   
(-1.0196) (-0.7316) (-1.1065) (-0.5826) (-1.4664) 
 Conglomerate 0.0314  0.0273  0.0160  0.0150  0.0096   
(0.8167) (0.8013) (0.5487) (0.8025) (0.8535) 
 Intercept 0.0207  0.0127  0.0190  0.0215  0.0066   
(0.5489) (0.3857) (0.6571) (1.2986) (0.6328) 
  Observations 187   187   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.7014  0.9181  1.1590  0.1742  0.6124  
 p-value 0.6709  0.4937  0.3287  0.9902  0.7452  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0145   -0.0065   -0.0056   -0.0318   -0.0198   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
  
6-117 
 
Table-A 6.52 Regression MM CAARS - Acquirers and Interactive Dummy - RelBGroup 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0171  0.0081  -0.0076  0.0109  0.0002   
(0.4242) (0.2175) (-0.2367) (0.3576) (0.0128) 
 Pct50 0.0253  0.0537  0.0340  0.0040  0.0057   
(0.6531) (1.5344) (1.1113) (0.1916) (0.4320) 
 BGroup 0.0205  0.0187  0.0198  -0.0006  0.0028   
(0.4915) (0.5083) (0.6547) (-0.0277) (0.2059) 
 Related 0.0923 ** 0.0812 ** 0.0819 ** 0.0180  0.0262   
(2.0473) 
 
(2.1165) 
 
(2.2719) 
 
(0.6804) (1.7977) 
 RelBGroup -0.0718  -0.0491  -0.0582  -0.0236  -0.0341   
(-1.0717) (-0.7872) (-1.1009) (-0.6789) (-1.6134) 
 Conglomerate 0.0323  0.0280  0.0200  0.0139  0.0089   
(0.8726) (0.8464) (0.7189) (0.7539) (0.8066) 
 Intercept 0.0201  0.0117  0.0136  0.0227  0.0071   
(0.5758) (0.3875) (0.5157) (1.4815) (0.7148) 
  Observations 191   191   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.8560  1.1054  1.0919  0.2240  0.8208  
 p-value 0.5285  0.3609  0.3688  0.9686  0.5551  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0086   -0.0002   -0.0020   -0.0252   -0.0120   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Note: Interactive dummy equations without the PctToe variable. 
  
6-118 
 
Table-A 6.53 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0289                0.0269  0.0306  0.0265   
(1.4794) (1.2595) (1.4000) (1.2341) 
 Pct50   0.0293              0.0320 * 0.0341 * 0.0297   
(1.5992) (1.7414) 
 
(1.8279) 
 
(1.1706) 
 PctToe     0.1079            -0.0010  -0.0030  -0.0010   
(0.5329) (-0.0279) (-0.0850) (-0.0286) 
 BGroup       -0.0110          -0.0198  -0.0326  -0.0211   
(-0.6747) (-1.1356) (-1.3729) (-1.0221) 
 Related         0.0178        0.0207  0.0050  0.0210   
(1.1357) (1.1621) (0.1983) (1.1413) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0279 *     -0.0182  -0.0194  -0.0182   
(-1.7458) 
 
(-1.1494) (-1.2102) (-1.1507) 
 RelBGroup             0.0095      0.0347     
(0.5580) (0.9649) 
 BGroup50               0.0156      0.0049   
(0.6482) (0.1277) 
 Intercept 0.0359 *** 0.0346 *** 0.0394 *** 0.0458 *** 0.0359 *** 0.0532 *** 0.0399 *** 0.0396 *** 0.0386 ** 0.0421 *** 0.0390 **  
(4.0745) 
 
(3.8319) 
 
(3.9885) 
 
(4.5431) 
 
(3.5412) 
 
(5.2383) 
 
(4.4006) 
 
(4.6895) 
 
(2.5972) 
 
(2.7408) 
 
(2.5516) 
 
  Observations 170   170   165   170   170   170   170   170   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 2.1885  2.5573  0.2840  0.4552  1.2899  3.0477  0.3114  0.4201  1.3281  1.2494  1.1395  
 p-value 0.1409  0.1117  0.5948  0.5008  0.2577  0.0827 * 0.5776  0.5178  0.2477  0.2792  0.3412  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0066   0.0088   -0.0045   -0.0032   0.0006   0.0121   -0.0047   -0.0034   0.0176   0.0173   0.0114   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-119 
 
Table-A 6.54 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash 0.0560 *               0.0463  0.0506  0.0435   
(1.7432) 
 
(1.4941) (1.6121) (1.4032) 
 Pct50   0.1057 ***             0.1068 *** 0.1092 *** 0.0890 **  
(3.2565) 
 
(3.5202) 
 
(3.5881) 
 
(2.1767) 
 
 PctToe     -0.0002            -0.0225  -0.0247  -0.0227   
(-0.0033) (-0.4160) (-0.4556) (-0.4160) 
 BGroup       0.0138          -0.0012  -0.0156  -0.0113   
(0.4776) (-0.0440) (-0.4460) (-0.3760) 
 Related         0.0082        0.0122  -0.0055  0.0147   
(0.3015) (0.4662) (-0.1630) (0.5583) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0502 *     -0.0255  -0.0270  -0.0262   
(-1.7224) 
 
(-0.9352) (-0.9825) (-0.9607) 
 RelBGroup             0.0093      0.0393     
(0.2788) (0.7587) 
 BGroup50               0.1013 **     0.0387   
(2.2125) 
 
(0.6264) 
 Intercept 0.0403 ** 0.0263  0.0538 *** 0.0458 ** 0.0486 ** 0.0721 *** 0.0496 *** 0.0387 ** 0.0305  0.0346  0.0341   
(2.4700) 
 
(1.6508) (3.0070) 
 
(2.4492) 
 
(2.5654) 
 
(4.0194) 
 
(3.0658) 
 
(2.6032) 
 
(1.1088) (1.2013) (1.1972) 
  Observations 170   170   165   170   170   170   170   170   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 3.0386  10.6048  0.0000  0.2281  0.0909  2.9667  0.0777  4.8951  2.8002  2.6121  2.4688  
 p-value 0.0831 * 0.0014 *** 0.9974  0.6335  0.7634  0.0868 * 0.7807  0.0283 ** 0.0129 ** 0.0141 ** 0.0198 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0084   0.0529   -0.0061   -0.0046   -0.0055   0.0120   -0.0056   0.0265   0.0615   0.0581   0.0577   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-120 
 
Table-A 6.55 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-10,+10] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 Cash 0.0910 *               0.0866  0.0905  0.0860   
(1.7506) 
 
(1.6544) (1.6197) (1.5917) 
 Pct50   0.1036 **             0.0919 ** 0.0942 ** 0.0883 *  
(2.2679) 
 
(2.0845) 
 
(2.1883) 
 
(1.7009) 
 
 PctToe     -0.1951 **           -0.2436 *** -0.2457 *** -0.2436 ***  
(-2.5751) 
 
(-3.2737) 
 
(-3.2344) 
 
(-3.2606) 
 
 BGroup       0.0581          0.0452  0.0319  0.0431   
(1.3762) (1.2038) (0.6175) (0.9697) 
 Related         0.0008        0.0319  0.0156  0.0324   
(0.0200) (0.8196) (0.3211) (0.8519) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0552      -0.0327  -0.0340  -0.0329   
(-1.3169) (-0.7839) (-0.8022) (-0.7829) 
 RelBGroup             0.0225      0.0360     
(0.4269) (0.4310) 
 BGroup50               0.1196 *     0.0080   
(1.7785) 
 
(0.0909) 
 Intercept 0.0612 *** 0.0545 ** 0.1111 *** 0.0564 ** 0.0786 *** 0.1020 *** 0.0751 *** 0.0641 *** 0.0664  0.0701  0.0671   
(2.6060) 
 
(2.2167) 
 
(4.0101) 
 
(2.0195) 
 
(2.8531) 
 
(3.5390) 
 
(3.1841) 
 
(2.8962) 
 
(1.3781) (1.3862) (1.3262) 
  Observations 170   170   165   170   170   170   170   170   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 3.0645  5.1436  6.6310  1.8941  0.0004  1.7342  0.1822  3.1631  3.4476  2.9285  3.0368  
 p-value 0.0818 * 0.0246 ** 0.0109 ** 0.1706  0.9841  0.1897  0.6700  0.0771 * 0.0032 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0051 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0114   0.0199   0.0222   0.0048   -0.0060   0.0040   -0.0050   0.0148   0.0594   0.0543   0.0534   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-121 
 
Table-A 6.56 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-15,+15] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
 Cash 0.0959                0.0816  0.0810  0.0780   
(1.5904) (1.3127) (1.1949) (1.1946) 
 Pct50   0.1522 **             0.1327 ** 0.1323 ** 0.1097 *  
(2.5428) 
 
(2.2854) 
 
(2.3567) 
 
(1.7790) 
 
 PctToe     -0.2226 **           -0.2549 ** -0.2545 ** -0.2552 **  
(-2.2538) 
 
(-2.5275) 
 
(-2.5025) 
 
(-2.5142) 
 
 BGroup       0.0799          0.0667  0.0688  0.0536   
(1.5172) (1.4061) (1.0191) (1.0161) 
 Related         -0.0266        -0.0060  -0.0034  -0.0028   
(-0.5350) (-0.1239) (-0.0557) (-0.0593) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0795      -0.0523  -0.0521  -0.0532   
(-1.4904) (-1.0160) (-0.9950) (-1.0364) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0041      -0.0057     
(-0.0661) (-0.0540) 
 BGroup50               0.1819 *     0.0499   
(1.9639) 
 
(0.4297) 
 Intercept 0.0806 *** 0.0634 ** 0.1412 *** 0.0682 ** 0.1077 *** 0.1325 *** 0.0999 *** 0.0768 *** 0.0971 * 0.0966 * 0.1018 *  
(2.7417) 
 
(2.1720) 
 
(4.2023) 
 
(2.0510) 
 
(3.1550) 
 
(4.1401) 
 
(3.4257) 
 
(2.9146) 
 
(1.8597) 
 
(1.7518) 
 
(1.8655) 
 
  Observations 170   170   165   170   170   170   170   170   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 2.5293  6.4656  5.0796  2.3019  0.2862  2.2212  0.0044  3.8568  3.1778  2.7120  2.8225  
 p-value 0.1136  0.0119 ** 0.0255 ** 0.1311  0.5934  0.1380  0.9474  0.0512 * 0.0057 *** 0.0111 ** 0.0085 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0068   0.0311   0.0189   0.0075   -0.0046   0.0077   -0.0059   0.0258   0.0649   0.0589   0.0600   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-122 
 
Table-A 6.57 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-20,+20] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
 Cash 0.1211 *               0.1017  0.1085  0.1008   
(1.6562) 
 
(1.3965) (1.3837) (1.3307) 
 Pct50   0.1716 ***             0.1487 ** 0.1526 ** 0.1427 **  
(2.6479) 
 
(2.4215) 
 
(2.5725) 
 
(2.1081) 
 
 PctToe     -0.2890 **           -0.3144 *** -0.3180 *** -0.3145 ***  
(-2.5734) 
 
(-2.7048) 
 
(-2.6836) 
 
(-2.6955) 
 
 BGroup       0.0888          0.0834  0.0602  0.0800   
(1.5046) (1.6052) (0.8246) (1.3237) 
 Related         -0.0508        -0.0317  -0.0601  -0.0309   
(-0.9045) (-0.5893) (-0.9255) (-0.5884) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0985 *     -0.0726  -0.0749  -0.0728   
(-1.6629) 
 
(-1.2921) (-1.2960) (-1.2998) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0013      0.0629     
(-0.0177) (0.5410) 
 BGroup50               0.1897 *     0.0130   
(1.9332) 
 
(0.1072) 
 Intercept 0.0822 ** 0.0654 ** 0.1587 *** 0.0713 * 0.1219 *** 0.1469 *** 0.1060 *** 0.0823 *** 0.1161 ** 0.1226 ** 0.1173 **  
(2.5823) 
 
(1.9896) 
 
(4.2635) 
 
(1.9466) 
 
(3.2484) 
 
(4.1127) 
 
(3.2994) 
 
(2.7688) 
 
(2.0657) 
 
(2.0262) 
 
(2.0123) 
 
  Observations 170   170   165   170   170   170   170   170   165   165   165   
 F-Statistics 2.7431  7.0113  6.6225  2.2637  0.8180  2.7654  0.0003  3.7371  3.9802  3.4472  3.5109  
 p-value 0.0995 * 0.0089 *** 0.0110 ** 0.1343  0.3670  0.0982 * 0.9859  0.0549 * 0.0010 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0016 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0105   0.0320   0.0278   0.0075   -0.0019   0.0109   -0.0060   0.0220   0.0878   0.0835   0.0820   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
6-123 
 
Table-A 6.58 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0280                0.0257  0.0302  0.0245   
(1.4082) (1.1573) (1.3119) (1.0972) 
 Pct50   0.0257              0.0277  0.0300  0.0205   
(1.3826) (1.4736) (1.5692) (0.7915) 
 PctToe     0.0121            -0.0042  -0.0069  -0.0044   
(0.3520) (-0.1170) (-0.1913) (-0.1218) 
 BGroup       -0.0168          -0.0246  -0.0388  -0.0287   
(-1.0151) (-1.3951) (-1.5966) (-1.3740) 
 Related         0.0136        0.0175  0.0003  0.0184   
(0.8577) (0.9863) (0.0103) (1.0072) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0291 *     -0.0207  -0.0224  -0.0210   
(-1.8046) 
 
(-1.3024) (-1.3849) (-1.3147) 
 RelBGroup             0.0039      0.0386     
(0.2217) (1.0548) 
 BGroup50               0.0147      0.0155   
(0.6054) (0.3969) 
 Intercept 0.0423 *** 0.0416 *** 0.0463 *** 0.0543 *** 0.0433 *** 0.0602 *** 0.0470 *** 0.0458 *** 0.0506 *** 0.0549 *** 0.0521 ***  
(4.7468) 
 
(4.5510) 
 
(4.6546) 
 
(5.4079) 
 
(4.2049) 
 
(5.8890) 
 
(5.1524) 
 
(5.3629) 
 
(3.4312) 
 
(3.5735) 
 
(3.4425) 
 
  Observations 165   165   160   165   165   165   165   165   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 1.9829  1.9116  0.1239  1.0304  0.7357  3.2564  0.0491  0.3666  1.2053  1.1173  1.0499  
 p-value 0.1610  0.1687  0.7253  0.3116  0.3923  0.0730 * 0.8249  0.5457  0.3065  0.3551  0.3989  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0057   0.0054   -0.0055   0.0003   -0.0023   0.0139   -0.0059   -0.0038   0.0153   0.0163   0.0099   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
6-124 
 
Table-A 6.59 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash 0.0584 *               0.0484  0.0541 * 0.0428   
(1.8408) 
 
(1.5229) (1.6568) 
 
(1.3463) 
 Pct50   0.0961 ***             0.0949 *** 0.0977 *** 0.0606   
(2.9942) 
 
(3.1341) 
 
(3.2226) 
 
(1.6043) 
 PctToe     -0.0086            -0.0218  -0.0252  -0.0227   
(-0.1622) (-0.4082) (-0.4694) (-0.4190) 
 BGroup       0.0014          -0.0125  -0.0304  -0.0316   
(0.0468) (-0.4677) (-0.8395) (-1.0274) 
 Related         -0.0028        0.0041  -0.0176  0.0086   
(-0.1039) (0.1531) (-0.5337) (0.3208) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0483 *     -0.0252  -0.0274  -0.0265   
(-1.6558) 
 
(-0.9212) (-0.9965) (-0.9672) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0034      0.0486     
(-0.1016) (0.9235) 
 BGroup50               0.1021 **     0.0728   
(2.2283) 
 
(1.1841) 
 Intercept 0.0615 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0764 *** 0.0722 *** 0.0737 *** 0.0936 *** 0.0734 *** 0.0598 *** 0.0614 ** 0.0669 ** 0.0684 **  
(3.7555) 
 
(3.1029) 
 
(4.2505) 
 
(3.9076) 
 
(3.8617) 
 
(5.2687) 
 
(4.5307) 
 
(4.0317) 
 
(2.1980) 
 
(2.2862) 
 
(2.3498) 
 
  Observations 165   165   160   165   165   165   165   165   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 3.3886  8.9655  0.0263  0.0022  0.0108  2.7416  0.0103  4.9651  2.4003  2.3378  2.1970  
 p-value 0.0675 * 0.0032 *** 0.8713  0.9628  0.9174  0.0997 * 0.9192  0.0272 ** 0.0303 ** 0.0271 ** 0.0375 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0099   0.0440   -0.0062   -0.0061   -0.0061   0.0111   -0.0061   0.0287   0.0484   0.0462   0.0501   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-125 
 
Table-A 6.60 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-10,+10] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 Cash 0.0759 *               0.0670  0.0686  0.0641   
(1.7407) 
 
(1.4974) (1.4628) (1.3975) 
 Pct50   0.1108 **             0.0985 ** 0.0993 ** 0.0804   
(2.4044) 
 
(2.2482) 
 
(2.2942) 
 
(1.6193) 
 PctToe     -0.1789 **           -0.1967 *** -0.1977 *** -0.1972 ***  
(-2.5529) 
 
(-2.8896) 
 
(-2.8902) 
 
(-2.8743) 
 
 BGroup       0.0292          0.0181  0.0132  0.0081   
(0.7376) (0.5014) (0.2570) (0.2005) 
 Related         -0.0304        0.0034  -0.0026  0.0058   
(-0.8382) (0.0975) (-0.0545) (0.1662) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0416      -0.0193  -0.0199  -0.0200   
(-1.0411) (-0.4976) (-0.5102) (-0.5115) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0238      0.0134     
(-0.5829) (0.1830) 
 BGroup50               0.1243 *     0.0385   
(1.7905) 
 
(0.4326) 
 Intercept 0.0996 *** 0.0881 *** 0.1436 *** 0.1028 *** 0.1240 *** 0.1322 *** 0.1183 *** 0.0984 *** 0.1105 ** 0.1120 ** 0.1142 **  
(4.3832) 
 
(3.9624) 
 
(5.6202) 
 
(3.8901) 
 
(4.6331) 
 
(5.0883) 
 
(5.1833) 
 
(4.8739) 
 
(2.5692) 
 
(2.4990) 
 
(2.5153) 
 
  Observations 165   165   160   165   165   165   165   165   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 3.0301  5.7811  6.5174  0.5440  0.7026  1.0838  0.3397  3.2058  2.8895  2.5228  2.6610  
 p-value 0.0836 * 0.0173 ** 0.0116 ** 0.4618  0.4031  0.2994  0.5608  0.0752 * 0.0107 ** 0.0175 ** 0.0126 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0080   0.0287   0.0232   -0.0029   -0.0030   0.0005   -0.0049   0.0208   0.0489   0.0428   0.0437   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
6-126 
 
Table-A 6.61 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-15,+15] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
 Cash 0.0863 *               0.0679  0.0631  0.0596   
(1.6903) 
 
(1.2575) (1.0915) (1.0413) 
 Pct50   0.1522 **             0.1314 ** 0.1291 ** 0.0801   
(2.5375) 
 
(2.2743) 
 
(2.3026) 
 
(1.4890) 
 PctToe     -0.2025 **           -0.1998 ** -0.1969 ** -0.2012 **  
(-2.1975) 
 
(-2.1504) 
 
(-2.1394) 
 
(-2.1430) 
 
 BGroup       0.0481          0.0351  0.0502  0.0066   
(0.9525) (0.7609) (0.7461) (0.1353) 
 Related         -0.0600        -0.0353  -0.0170  -0.0286   
(-1.3347) (-0.7874) (-0.2740) (-0.6463) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0553      -0.0280  -0.0261  -0.0300   
(-1.0688) (-0.5680) (-0.5248) (-0.6088) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0579      -0.0410     
(-1.1951) (-0.4304) 
 BGroup50               0.1916 **     0.1090   
(2.0171) 
 
(0.9404) 
 Intercept 0.1338 *** 0.1146 *** 0.1889 *** 0.1316 *** 0.1698 *** 0.1744 *** 0.1604 *** 0.1262 *** 0.1540 *** 0.1494 *** 0.1644 ***  
(4.6164) 
 
(4.1973) 
 
(5.8556) 
 
(4.0792) 
 
(5.0365) 
 
(5.9789) 
 
(5.5627) 
 
(5.1446) 
 
(3.1802) 
 
(2.9506) 
 
(3.2223) 
 
  Observations 165   165   160   165   165   165   165   165   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 2.8571  6.4389  4.8289  0.9073  1.7813  1.1423  1.4284  4.0686  2.8741  2.4847  2.6216  
 p-value 0.0929 * 0.0121 ** 0.0294 ** 0.3422  0.1839  0.2867  0.2338  0.0453 ** 0.0111 ** 0.0192 ** 0.0139 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0055   0.0355   0.0181   -0.0006   0.0017   0.0013   -0.0014   0.0345   0.0519   0.0466   0.0515   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
6-127 
 
Table-A 6.62 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-20,+20] - Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
 Cash 0.1036 *               0.0761  0.0799  0.0702   
(1.6952) 
 
(1.2091) (1.2003) (1.0672) 
 Pct50   0.1710 ***             0.1458 ** 0.1476 ** 0.1089 *  
(2.6615) 
 
(2.3812) 
 
(2.4709) 
 
(1.7201) 
 
 PctToe     -0.2673 **           -0.2449 ** -0.2472 ** -0.2459 **  
(-2.5507) 
 
(-2.2792) 
 
(-2.2883) 
 
(-2.2711) 
 
 BGroup       0.0389          0.0344  0.0226  0.0139   
(0.6887) (0.6632) (0.3005) (0.2392) 
 Related         -0.1016 **       -0.0775  -0.0917  -0.0727   
(-2.0089) 
 
(-1.5407) (-1.3245) (-1.4591) 
 Conglomerate           -0.0789      -0.0560  -0.0575  -0.0574   
(-1.3562) (-1.0236) (-1.0206) (-1.0502) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0768      0.0320     
(-1.3790) (0.2994) 
 BGroup50               0.1932 *     0.0782   
(1.9740) 
 
(0.6408) 
 Intercept 0.1602 *** 0.1399 *** 0.2291 *** 0.1650 *** 0.2130 *** 0.2143 *** 0.1933 *** 0.1557 *** 0.2122 *** 0.2158 *** 0.2197 ***  
(4.9954) 
 
(4.4654) 
 
(6.3582) 
 
(4.5191) 
 
(5.6811) 
 
(6.6759) 
 
(5.9993) 
 
(5.4895) 
 
(4.0018) 
 
(3.7728) 
 
(3.9726) 
 
  Observations 165   165   160   165   165   165   165   165   160   160   160   
 F-Statistics 2.8737  7.0835  6.5061  0.4743  4.0357  1.8393  1.9016  3.8969  3.7484  3.2275  3.3338  
 p-value 0.0919 * 0.0086 *** 0.0117 ** 0.4920  0.0462 ** 0.1769  0.1698  0.0501 * 0.0017 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0025 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0071   0.0356   0.0269   -0.0033   0.0117   0.0059   0.0004   0.0267   0.0740   0.0684   0.0703   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
6-128 
 
Table-A 6.63 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0056                0.0006  -0.0034  0.0001   
(0.3692) (0.0408) (-0.2195) (0.0083) 
 Pct50   0.0049              0.0099  0.0091  0.0078   
(0.3944) (0.7522) (0.6879) (0.4216) 
 PctToe     0.0080            0.0068  0.0072  0.0067   
(0.3780) (0.2671) (0.2878) (0.2627) 
 BGroup       -0.0052          -0.0081  0.0030  -0.0098   
(-0.5204) (-0.7490) (0.2199) (-0.7838) 
 Related         0.0108        0.0092  0.0228  0.0095   
(1.0281) (0.7625) (1.4704) (0.7704) 
 Conglomerate           0.0072      0.0099  0.0097  0.0100   
(0.6766) (0.9121) (0.8890) (0.9149) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0127      -0.0346 *    
(-1.0504) (-1.6585) 
 
 BGroup50               0.0045      0.0063   
(0.3892) (0.2701) 
 Intercept 0.0108 * 0.0104 * 0.0106 * 0.0133 * 0.0086  0.0091  0.0131 ** 0.0112 * 0.0049  0.0023  0.0054   
(1.9100) 
 
(1.7278) 
 
(1.8020) 
 
(1.8923) 
 
(1.3227) (1.3661) (2.2718) 
 
(1.9678) 
 
(0.5168) (0.2337) (0.5471) 
  Observations 195   195   191   195   195   195   195   195   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.1363  0.1555  0.1429  0.2708  1.0570  0.4578  1.1034  0.1515  0.3958  0.7340  0.3798  
 p-value 0.7124  0.6937  0.7058  0.6034  0.3052  0.4994  0.2948  0.6976  0.8811  0.6434  0.9133  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0045   -0.0043   -0.0046   -0.0041   -0.0007   -0.0029   -0.0020   -0.0049   -0.0212   -0.0162   -0.0265   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
  
6-129 
 
Table-A 6.64 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash 0.0184                0.0136  0.0099  0.0096   
(0.6040) (0.4185) (0.3196) (0.2971) 
 Pct50   0.0094              0.0139  0.0132  -0.0031   
(0.4593) (0.6138) (0.5811) (-0.0984) 
 PctToe     0.0124            0.0127  0.0131  0.0122   
(0.2868) (0.2910) (0.3006) (0.2762) 
 BGroup       -0.0059          -0.0118  -0.0018  -0.0247   
(-0.3705) (-0.6196) (-0.0879) (-1.1598) 
 Related         0.0135        0.0108  0.0231  0.0130   
(0.6562) (0.5171) (0.8090) (0.6243) 
 Conglomerate           0.0150      0.0195  0.0192  0.0198   
(0.8090) (1.0120) (1.0009) (1.0314) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0119      -0.0312     
(-0.5855) (-0.8561) 
 BGroup50               0.0294      0.0492   
(1.5460) (1.3531) 
 Intercept 0.0125  0.0128  0.0136  0.0171  0.0114  0.0100  0.0166 * 0.0125  0.0023  -0.0001  0.0063   
(1.3910) (1.2642) (1.3171) (1.4151) (1.1434) (0.9281) (1.7148) 
 
(1.3106) (0.1465) (-0.0058) (0.3893) 
  Observations 195   195   191   195   195   195   195   195   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.3648  0.2110  0.0823  0.1373  0.4305  0.6545  0.3428  2.3900  0.2708  0.2849  0.7480  
 p-value 0.5466  0.6465  0.7746  0.7114  0.5125  0.4195  0.5589  0.1238  0.9500  0.9592  0.6316  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0024   -0.0040   -0.0047   -0.0047   -0.0027   -0.0018   -0.0042   -0.0003   -0.0212   -0.0237   -0.0197   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
6-130 
 
Table-A 6.65 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-10,+10] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 Cash 0.0207                0.0106  0.0031  0.0055   
(0.6375) (0.2982) (0.0902) (0.1555) 
 Pct50   0.0397              0.0455  0.0440  0.0238   
(1.2274) (1.3100) (1.2786) (0.5168) 
 PctToe     -0.0117            -0.0696  -0.0687  -0.0703   
(-0.2290) (-1.2226) (-1.2213) (-1.2287) 
 BGroup       0.0024          -0.0082  0.0124  -0.0247   
(0.0943) (-0.3096) (0.4058) (-0.8236) 
 Related         0.0648 **       0.0857 ** 0.1110 ** 0.0885 ***  
(2.2081) 
 
(2.5791) 
 
(2.5209) 
 
(2.6475) 
 
 Conglomerate           0.0178      0.0228  0.0224  0.0233   
(0.6330) (0.7621) (0.7500) (0.7767) 
 RelBGroup             0.0182      -0.0641     
(0.5383) (-1.1794) 
 BGroup50               0.0579      0.0629   
(1.6262) (1.0863) 
 Intercept 0.0178  0.0106  0.0234  0.0200  0.0028  0.0146  0.0186  0.0154  -0.0106  -0.0154  -0.0055   
(1.2035) (0.7127) (1.4002) (1.1077) (0.1805) (0.8943) (1.2796) (1.0822) (-0.4055) (-0.5656) (-0.2013) 
  Observations 195   195   191   195   195   195   195   195   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 0.4064  1.5066  0.0524  0.0089  4.8756  0.4007  0.2898  2.6445  1.1952  1.0659  1.3504  
 p-value 0.5246  0.2212  0.8191  0.9250  0.0284 ** 0.5275  0.5910  0.1055  0.3107  0.3872  0.2291  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0036   0.0036   -0.0051   -0.0051   0.0195   -0.0031   -0.0042   0.0030   0.0151   0.0152   0.0147   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
6-131 
 
Table-A 6.66 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-15,+15] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
 Cash 0.0420                0.0213  0.0140  0.0197   
(1.0722) (0.4993) (0.3281) (0.4577) 
 Pct50   0.0676              0.0804 * 0.0789 * 0.0734   
(1.6512) (1.7417) 
 
(1.7366) 
 
(1.1840) 
 PctToe     0.0298            -0.0200  -0.0192  -0.0202   
(0.5132) (-0.2911) (-0.2819) (-0.2933) 
 BGroup       0.0061          -0.0127  0.0073  -0.0180   
(0.2003) (-0.3914) (0.1966) (-0.4913) 
 Related         0.0759 **       0.0863 * 0.1108 * 0.0872 *  
(2.0125) 
 
(1.8449) 
 
(1.7599) 
 
(1.8822) 
 
 Conglomerate           0.0288      0.0417  0.0412  0.0418   
(0.7891) (1.0695) (1.0651) (1.0728) 
 RelBGroup             0.0242      -0.0621     
(0.6189) (-0.8760) 
 BGroup50               0.0651 *     0.0202   
(1.8662) 
 
(0.2848) 
 Intercept 0.0098  -0.0015  0.0131  0.0138  -0.0052  0.0059  0.0129  0.0098  -0.0377  -0.0424  -0.0361   
(0.5408) (-0.0877) (0.6306) (0.6241) (-0.2841) (0.3187) (0.7246) (0.5555) (-1.2088) (-1.2867) (-1.0966) 
  Observations 195   195   191   195   195   195   195   195   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 1.1497  2.7264  0.2634  0.0401  4.0501  0.6227  0.3830  3.4829  0.8746  0.7624  1.0119  
 p-value 0.2850  0.1003  0.6084  0.8414  0.0456 ** 0.4310  0.5367  0.0635 * 0.5147  0.6196  0.4243  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0009   0.0119   -0.0044   -0.0050   0.0174   -0.0015   -0.0040   0.0018   0.0202   0.0184   0.0152   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
6-132 
 
Table-A 6.67 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-20,+20] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
 Cash 0.0544                0.0401  0.0315  0.0375   
(1.3085) (0.8813) (0.6885) (0.8172) 
 Pct50   0.0388              0.0533  0.0516  0.0425   
(0.8885) (1.1243) (1.1053) (0.6405) 
 PctToe     0.0483            -0.0009  0.0000  -0.0013   
(0.7820) (-0.0121) (0.0005) (-0.0165) 
 BGroup       0.0054          -0.0176  0.0058  -0.0258   
(0.1654) (-0.5199) (0.1398) (-0.6485) 
 Related         0.0795 **       0.0831 * 0.1118 * 0.0845 *  
(2.0961) 
 
(1.7419) 
 
(1.7097) 
 
(1.7841) 
 
 Conglomerate           0.0337      0.0438  0.0433  0.0441   
(0.8596) (1.0604) (1.0539) (1.0646) 
 RelBGroup             0.0211      -0.0727     
(0.5968) (-1.0131) 
 BGroup50               0.0518 *     0.0314   
(1.9186) 
 
(0.4304) 
 Intercept -0.0041  -0.0062  -0.0004  0.0019  -0.0183  -0.0079  0.0012  -0.0011  -0.0453  -0.0507  -0.0427   
(-0.2069) (-0.3149) (-0.0196) (0.0783) (-0.8630) (-0.3786) (0.0617) (-0.0551) (-1.3197) (-1.4051) (-1.1895) 
  Observations 195   195   191   195   195   195   195   195   191   191   191   
 F-Statistics 1.7123  0.7894  0.6116  0.0274  4.3936  0.7390  0.3562  3.6811  0.8497  0.7399  1.0236  
 p-value 0.1922  0.3754  0.4352  0.8688  0.0374 ** 0.3911  0.5513  0.0565 * 0.5332  0.6384  0.4161  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0008   -0.0005   -0.0032   -0.0051   0.0156   -0.0010   -0.0044   -0.0015   0.0054   0.0040   0.0007   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.68 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0051                0.0004  -0.0035  -0.0004   
(0.3348) (0.0223) (-0.2195) (-0.0245) 
 Pct50   0.0036              0.0094  0.0089  0.0061   
(0.2869) (0.7082) (0.6660) (0.3251) 
 PctToe     0.0118            0.0110  0.0113  0.0110   
(0.5511) (0.4384) (0.4505) (0.4330) 
 BGroup       -0.0052          -0.0085  0.0016  -0.0110   
(-0.5177) (-0.7749) (0.1189) (-0.8742) 
 Related         0.0105        0.0084  0.0210  0.0088   
(0.9811) (0.7019) (1.3437) (0.7216) 
 Conglomerate           0.0063      0.0097  0.0096  0.0097   
(0.5808) (0.8633) (0.8535) (0.8651) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0110      -0.0313     
(-0.8718) (-1.4664) 
 BGroup50               0.0055      0.0096   
(0.4632) (0.4078) 
 Intercept 0.0150 ** 0.0148 ** 0.0142 ** 0.0175 ** 0.0128 * 0.0136 * 0.0171 *** 0.0152 *** 0.0090  0.0066  0.0098   
(2.5822) 
 
(2.3943) 
 
(2.3278) 
 
(2.4122) 
 
(1.9194) 
 
(1.9722) 
 
(2.8920) 
 
(2.6127) 
 
(0.9023) (0.6328) (0.9391) 
  Observations 191   191   187   191   191   191   191   191   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.1121  0.0823  0.3037  0.2680  0.9625  0.3373  0.7601  0.2145  0.3914  0.6124  0.4026  
 p-value 0.7381  0.7745  0.5822  0.6053  0.3278  0.5621  0.3844  0.6438  0.8839  0.7452  0.8998  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0047   -0.0048   -0.0040   -0.0042   -0.0012   -0.0036   -0.0029   -0.0048   -0.0226   -0.0198   -0.0275   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.69 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash 0.0132                0.0096  0.0071  0.0052   
(0.4287) (0.2923) (0.2260) (0.1604) 
 Pct50   0.0023              0.0073  0.0070  -0.0122   
(0.1183) (0.3487) (0.3301) (-0.4314) 
 PctToe     0.0154            0.0201  0.0202  0.0197   
(0.3497) (0.4670) (0.4696) (0.4542) 
 BGroup       -0.0042          -0.0089  -0.0022  -0.0236   
(-0.2614) (-0.4665) (-0.1054) (-1.0891) 
 Related         0.0071        0.0024  0.0108  0.0046   
(0.3528) (0.1326) (0.4335) (0.2524) 
 Conglomerate           0.0114      0.0151  0.0150  0.0153   
(0.6308) (0.8078) (0.8025) (0.8213) 
 RelBGroup             -0.0098      -0.0208     
(-0.4614) (-0.5826) 
 BGroup50               0.0290      0.0558   
(1.3673) (1.5376) 
 Intercept 0.0301 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0300 *** 0.0335 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0281 ** 0.0332 *** 0.0293 *** 0.0231  0.0215  0.0278 *  
(3.3489) 
 
(3.0113) 
 
(2.9270) 
 
(2.7651) 
 
(2.9345) 
 
(2.5247) 
 
(3.4319) 
 
(3.0845) 
 
(1.4603) (1.2986) (1.6937) 
 
  Observations 191   191   187   191   191   191   191   191   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.1838  0.0140  0.1223  0.0683  0.1244  0.3980  0.2129  1.8694  0.1645  0.1742  0.5576  
 p-value 0.6686  0.9059  0.7269  0.7941  0.7247  0.5289  0.6450  0.1732  0.9858  0.9902  0.7896  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0038   -0.0052   -0.0045   -0.0050   -0.0046   -0.0033   -0.0046   -0.0004   -0.0274   -0.0318   -0.0238   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.70 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-10,+10] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 Cash 0.0123                0.0028  -0.0044  -0.0030   
(0.3670) (0.0785) (-0.1311) (-0.0844) 
 Pct50   0.0257              0.0340  0.0330  0.0080   
(0.8791) (1.0866) (1.0564) (0.1985) 
 PctToe     0.0033            -0.0466  -0.0461  -0.0471   
(0.0629) (-0.8262) (-0.8242) (-0.8345) 
 BGroup       0.0113          0.0017  0.0208  -0.0179   
(0.4415) (0.0630) (0.6682) (-0.5749) 
 Related         0.0538 *       0.0691 ** 0.0928 ** 0.0721 **  
(1.9238) 
 
(2.4090) 
 
(2.5497) 
 
(2.4849) 
 
 Conglomerate           0.0111      0.0161  0.0160  0.0164   
(0.4091) (0.5553) (0.5487) (0.5647) 
 RelBGroup             0.0211      -0.0589     
(0.5739) (-1.1065) 
 BGroup50               0.0610      0.0742   
(1.5838) (1.2898) 
 Intercept 0.0487 *** 0.0439 *** 0.0510 *** 0.0467 ** 0.0355 ** 0.0466 *** 0.0479 *** 0.0447 *** 0.0236  0.0190  0.0298   
(3.2763) 
 
(2.7593) 
 
(3.0487) 
 
(2.5978) 
 
(2.1937) 
 
(2.6908) 
 
(3.2989) 
 
(3.1336) 
 
(0.8412) (0.6571) (1.0260) 
  Observations 191   191   187   191   191   191   191   191   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.1347  0.7728  0.0040  0.1949  3.7010  0.1674  0.3293  2.5085  1.1327  1.1590  1.2099  
 p-value 0.7140  0.3805  0.9499  0.6594  0.0559 * 0.6829  0.5667  0.1149  0.3451  0.3287  0.2995  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0047   -0.0016   -0.0054   -0.0045   0.0119   -0.0045   -0.0039   0.0041   -0.0047   -0.0056   -0.0032   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.71 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-15,+15] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   [-15,+15]   
 Cash 0.0301                0.0118  0.0061  0.0083   
(0.7811) (0.2919) (0.1582) (0.2005) 
 Pct50   0.0453              0.0597 * 0.0590 * 0.0441   
(1.3814) (1.6795) 
 
(1.6569) 
 
(0.9514) 
 PctToe     0.0482            0.0127  0.0131  0.0124   
(0.8352) (0.2050) (0.2113) (0.1985) 
 BGroup       0.0165          0.0003  0.0153  -0.0115   
(0.5470) (0.0100) (0.4118) (-0.3083) 
 Related         0.0557 *       0.0575 * 0.0761 * 0.0592 *  
(1.7610) 
 
(1.7477) 
 
(1.9562) 
 
(1.7797) 
 
 Conglomerate           0.0157      0.0275  0.0273  0.0277   
(0.4884) (0.8063) (0.8013) (0.8085) 
 RelBGroup             0.0267      -0.0462     
(0.6077) (-0.7316) 
 BGroup50               0.0709 *     0.0448   
(1.8375) 
 
(0.6799) 
 Intercept 0.0549 *** 0.0477 ** 0.0541 *** 0.0538 *** 0.0438 ** 0.0539 *** 0.0561 *** 0.0526 *** 0.0163  0.0127  0.0201   
(3.1929) 
 
(2.5630) 
 
(2.7721) 
 
(2.6191) 
 
(2.3047) 
 
(2.7653) 
 
(3.3479) 
 
(3.1538) 
 
(0.5093) (0.3857) (0.6040) 
  Observations 191   191   187   191   191   191   191   191   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.6102  1.9083  0.6975  0.2992  3.1012  0.2386  0.3693  3.3764  0.9034  0.9181  0.8815  
 p-value 0.4357  0.1688  0.4047  0.5850  0.0799 * 0.6258  0.5441  0.0677 * 0.4937  0.4937  0.5223  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0028   0.0033   -0.0026   -0.0040   0.0084   -0.0041   -0.0036   0.0042   -0.0031   -0.0065   -0.0067   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 6.72 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-20,+20] - Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
  [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   [-20,+20]   
 Cash 0.0364                0.0248  0.0164  0.0206   
(0.8968) (0.5909) (0.3977) (0.4829) 
 Pct50   0.0174              0.0362  0.0351  0.0176   
(0.4610) (0.9307) (0.9085) (0.3249) 
 PctToe     0.0625            0.0281  0.0286  0.0277   
(1.0249) (0.4014) (0.4110) (0.3949) 
 BGroup       0.0118          -0.0084  0.0140  -0.0224   
(0.3583) (-0.2511) (0.3327) (-0.5399) 
 Related         0.0603 *       0.0569  0.0847 * 0.0590   
(1.7709) 
 
(1.5419) (1.7864) 
 
(1.5946) 
 Conglomerate           0.0228      0.0317  0.0314  0.0319   
(0.6212) (0.8219) (0.8167) (0.8258) 
 RelBGroup             0.0170      -0.0690     
(0.4039) (-1.0196) 
 BGroup50               0.0543 *     0.0530   
(1.7281) 
 
(0.7713) 
 Intercept 0.0588 *** 0.0597 *** 0.0582 *** 0.0602 ** 0.0474 ** 0.0562 ** 0.0621 *** 0.0590 *** 0.0261  0.0207  0.0306   
(2.9794) 
 
(2.8216) 
 
(2.6291) 
 
(2.5104) 
 
(2.1395) 
 
(2.5574) 
 
(3.1999) 
 
(3.0620) 
 
(0.7171) (0.5489) (0.8084) 
  Observations 191   191   187   191   191   191   191   191   187   187   187   
 F-Statistics 0.8042  0.2125  1.0504  0.1284  3.1360  0.3859  0.1632  2.9864  0.7215  0.7014  0.8205  
 p-value 0.3710  0.6453  0.3068  0.7205  0.0782 * 0.5352  0.6867  0.0856 * 0.6328  0.6709  0.5714  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0025   -0.0043   -0.0017   -0.0048   0.0071   -0.0033   -0.0048   -0.0010   -0.0127   -0.0145   -0.0162   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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The secondary graphs and detailed statistical findings are tabulated in Appendix 
Chapter 7 . These tables are labelled to provide the name of the financial model; type of 
firm; the type of sample set; the regression technique and the number of observations (in 
parenthesis) and the index used. For each day in the entire event window - days [-20, +30], 
these tables provide average abnormal returns - AAR, median AARs, cumulative average 
abnormal returns - CAARs, averaged Standardized Abnormal Returns (SARa) along with 
their standard deviations and t-statistics, and averaged Standardized CAARs (SCARa) 
along with the respective standard deviations and the t-statistics. Finally, the tables also 
earmark the t-statistics significant at the 5% and 10% level for SARa and SCARa. While, 
the t-statistics, significant at the 10% level, is provided in bold and italic numbers, that at 
5% is further highlighted. Also, a 3-day analysis of the days [-1, +1] is provided. Other 
relevant graphs and various cross-sectional results are also presented here. 
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Returns to Indian Targets 
Overall Analysis 
 
Figure A 7.1 Market returns to Domestic Targets – M-firms (All regressions) 
 
 
Figure A 7.2 Fama-French returns to Domestic Targets – M-firms (All-regressions) 
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Corporate Governance Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.3 Indian Targets; Corporate Governance Analysis; Market vs. FF (MM Same-
firms) 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.4 Indian Targets; Anglo-Saxon; Market vs. FF (OLS Same-firms) 
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Figure A 7.5 Indian Targets; German/Japanese; Market vs. FF (OLS Same-firms) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.6 Indian Targets and Anglo-Saxon Analysis (Same-firms) 
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Figure A 7.7 Indian Targets and German/Japanese Analysis (Same-firms) 
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Culture Analysis – Market Model OLS (MM Firms) 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.8 Cultural Analysis - I;  MM firms (OLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.9 Cultural Analysis - II;  MM firms (OLS) 
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Culture Analysis – Fama-French Model – MM estimations 
 
 
Figure A 7.10 FF returns from Confucian, Nordic and Germanic Acquirers (MM) 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.11 FF returns from Anglo and LE Acquirers (MM) 
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Culture Analysis – Fama-French Model – OLS estimations 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.12 FF returns from Confucian, Nordic and Germanic Acquirers (OLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.13 FF returns from Anglo and LE Acquirers (OLS) 
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Commonwealth Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.14 Indian Targets and Common Wealth Analysis OLS vs. MM (MM firms) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.15 Indian Targets and Common Wealth Analysis OLS vs. MM (MM firms) 
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Figure A 7.16 FF returns to Targets from CW vs. NCW Acquirers (MM) 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.17 FF returns to Targets from CW vs. NCW Acquirers (OLS) 
 
  
10.92%
17.47%
9.62%
16.64%
-4.0%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
16.0%
20.0%
24.0%
28.0%
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
C
A
A
R
s
Event Days
NCW vs. CW (Market vs. FF)
(MM - Same firms)
NCW-FF
CW-FF
NCW-Market
CW-Market
6.73%
13.82%
5.00%
13.22%
-4.0%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
16.0%
20.0%
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
C
A
A
R
s
Event Days
NCW vs. CW (Market vs. FF) 
(OLS - Same firms)
NCW-FF
CW-FF
NCW-Market
CW-Market
  
7–148 
 
Returns to Indian Acquirers 
 
Overall Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.18 Market Returns to Indian Acquirers – M-firms (All Regressions) 38 Firms 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7.19 Fama-French Returns to CB Acquirers – M-firms (All-Regressions) 
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Table-A 7.1 Market Returns; Indian Targets; All-firms; (MM, 99) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.11% 0.01% -0.11% -0.0310 1.0448 -0.3057 -0.0310 1.0448 -0.3057 
-19 0.55% 0.25% 0.44% 0.2307 1.0688 2.2246 0.1412 1.0798 1.3478 
-18 -0.28% -0.11% 0.17% -0.0464 1.1466 -0.4174 0.0885 1.0852 0.8404 
-17 -0.42% -0.22% -0.26% -0.0778 1.3333 -0.6010 0.0378 1.1438 0.3402 
-16 0.17% -0.09% -0.09% 0.1358 1.2613 1.1093 0.0945 1.1925 0.8166 
-15 0.61% 0.11% 0.52% 0.1395 1.0468 1.3734 0.1432 1.1105 1.3290 
-14 0.61% 0.00% 1.13% 0.2177 1.2004 1.8691 0.2149 1.0896 2.0322 
-13 0.12% -0.13% 1.25% 0.0855 1.1574 0.7616 0.2312 1.1362 2.0974 
-12 0.40% 0.16% 1.65% 0.1301 1.1757 1.1407 0.2614 1.2556 2.1454 
-11 1.01% 0.72% 2.66% 0.3148 1.2256 2.6467 0.3475 1.2510 2.8627 
-10 0.23% 0.11% 2.89% 0.0340 1.2783 0.2739 0.3416 1.2682 2.7757 
-9 1.04% 0.42% 3.93% 0.3458 1.5007 2.3746 0.4269 1.2433 3.5382 
-8 -0.25% -0.06% 3.68% 0.0804 1.2420 0.6671 0.4324 1.2930 3.4464 
-7 1.06% 0.08% 4.73% 0.2547 1.3170 1.9932 0.4848 1.2877 3.8795 
-6 -0.40% -0.38% 4.34% -0.0806 1.2700 -0.6543 0.4475 1.3135 3.5109 
-5 -0.29% 0.05% 4.05% -0.0524 1.4608 -0.3696 0.4202 1.3131 3.2978 
-4 0.39% -0.16% 4.43% 0.0820 1.2734 0.6639 0.4276 1.2825 3.4355 
-3 0.39% 0.20% 4.82% 0.2098 1.4308 1.5108 0.4650 1.3088 3.6609 
-2 0.71% -0.09% 5.54% 0.2626 1.2955 2.0887 0.5128 1.3339 3.9618 
-1 1.95% 0.66% 7.49% 0.7308 1.9276 3.9070 0.6632 1.3747 4.9716 
0 3.47% 2.49% 10.95% 1.3077 2.8100 4.7958 0.9326 1.4792 6.4971 
1 2.45% 1.36% 13.40% 0.6233 1.7593 3.6510 1.0441 1.5092 7.1289 
2 1.00% 0.34% 14.40% 0.3258 1.3981 2.4011 1.0890 1.5834 7.0877 
3 0.44% 0.09% 14.84% 0.0941 1.1889 0.8160 1.0853 1.5876 7.0447 
4 0.38% -0.01% 15.21% 0.1169 1.2749 0.9451 1.0868 1.5611 7.1738 
5 0.21% 0.29% 15.43% 0.0830 1.0933 0.7823 1.0820 1.5171 7.3493 
6 -0.14% -0.10% 15.29% -0.0500 1.2310 -0.4184 1.0521 1.4794 7.3285 
7 0.19% -0.01% 15.48% 0.0170 0.9723 0.1802 1.0364 1.4339 7.4480 
8 -0.28% -0.20% 15.19% -0.0880 0.8656 -1.0476 1.0020 1.4211 7.2660 
9 0.54% 0.24% 15.73% 0.1767 1.0355 1.7582 1.0174 1.4406 7.2779 
10 0.26% 0.15% 15.99% 0.1032 0.9270 1.1471 1.0194 1.4248 7.3729 
11 0.28% 0.23% 16.27% 0.0453 1.0579 0.4414 1.0114 1.4101 7.3911 
12 0.47% 0.06% 16.74% 0.0929 1.0156 0.9425 1.0121 1.4149 7.3711 
13 0.12% 0.02% 16.87% 0.0474 1.1556 0.4229 1.0052 1.4188 7.3014 
14 0.03% -0.08% 16.90% -0.0226 0.9303 -0.2499 0.9869 1.4049 7.2392 
15 -0.35% -0.18% 16.55% -0.0423 0.9436 -0.4624 0.9661 1.4120 7.0506 
16 -0.41% -0.20% 16.14% -0.1751 1.0612 -1.7000 0.9242 1.4222 6.6961 
17 0.15% 0.05% 16.29% -0.0014 0.9952 -0.0147 0.9117 1.4298 6.5707 
18 0.15% -0.06% 16.44% 0.0192 1.3452 0.1468 0.9030 1.4316 6.5000 
19 0.80% 0.69% 17.23% 0.2233 1.0524 2.1864 0.9269 1.4002 6.8218 
20 0.29% 0.09% 17.52% 0.1017 1.0660 0.9832 0.9314 1.3829 6.9411 
21 -0.41% -0.35% 17.12% -0.1560 1.0785 -1.4901 0.8962 1.3739 6.7222 
22 -0.07% 0.23% 17.04% 0.0783 1.0013 0.8061 0.8977 1.3506 6.8491 
23 0.28% 0.13% 17.32% 0.0862 0.9785 0.9079 0.9004 1.3661 6.7924 
24 0.34% 0.24% 17.66% 0.1220 0.9638 1.3048 0.9086 1.3372 7.0019 
25 -0.15% 0.03% 17.51% 0.0404 1.0087 0.4127 0.9046 1.3304 7.0069 
26 -0.26% 0.03% 17.25% -0.0612 1.0231 -0.6163 0.8860 1.3315 6.8570 
27 0.09% 0.19% 17.33% 0.0418 1.0912 0.3945 0.8827 1.3404 6.7865 
28 0.64% 0.28% 17.97% 0.1504 1.0728 1.4444 0.8952 1.3456 6.8552 
29 0.06% -0.28% 18.04% 0.0718 1.2631 0.5860 0.8963 1.3573 6.8053 
30 0.37% 0.18% 18.40% 0.1183 1.0574 1.1525 0.9040 1.3531 6.8852 
          
-1 to 1     7.87% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06695 1.5368 2.3058 6.8682 
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Table-A 7.2 Market Returns to Indian Targets All-firms (OLS, 104) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.30% -0.15% -0.30% -0.0941 0.8997 -1.1288 -0.0941 0.8997 -1.1288 
-19 0.65% 0.09% 0.35% 0.1833 0.9905 1.9971 0.0631 0.9286 0.7328 
-18 -0.40% -0.08% -0.05% -0.0530 0.9249 -0.6184 0.0209 0.9140 0.2467 
-17 -0.62% -0.43% -0.67% -0.0899 1.0031 -0.9672 -0.0269 0.9079 -0.3192 
-16 -0.23% -0.28% -0.90% 0.0414 1.0664 0.4193 -0.0055 0.9350 -0.0633 
-15 0.54% 0.05% -0.35% 0.1017 0.9116 1.2038 0.0365 0.9166 0.4297 
-14 0.09% -0.03% -0.26% 0.0387 0.9751 0.4281 0.0484 0.8940 0.5844 
-13 -0.08% -0.25% -0.35% 0.0238 0.9839 0.2614 0.0537 0.9290 0.6240 
-12 0.18% -0.08% -0.17% 0.0575 0.9770 0.6350 0.0698 1.0348 0.7280 
-11 0.85% 0.60% 0.68% 0.2306 1.0245 2.4287 0.1392 1.0552 1.4230 
-10 0.14% -0.06% 0.82% -0.0365 1.0235 -0.3843 0.1217 1.0811 1.2146 
-9 0.83% 0.23% 1.65% 0.2451 1.2375 2.1366 0.1873 1.0418 1.9394 
-8 -0.39% -0.15% 1.26% 0.0363 1.0312 0.3796 0.1900 1.0854 1.8885 
-7 0.80% -0.05% 2.06% 0.1470 1.0608 1.4946 0.2224 1.0902 2.2005 
-6 -0.68% -0.43% 1.37% -0.0862 1.1434 -0.8137 0.1925 1.1159 1.8616 
-5 -0.45% -0.34% 0.92% -0.0469 1.2647 -0.3997 0.1747 1.1098 1.6985 
-4 0.18% -0.18% 1.11% -0.0066 1.0470 -0.0683 0.1679 1.1032 1.6420 
-3 0.14% -0.02% 1.25% 0.0928 1.1560 0.8662 0.1850 1.0955 1.8224 
-2 0.50% -0.16% 1.75% 0.1738 1.0963 1.7106 0.2200 1.1107 2.1368 
-1 1.67% 0.41% 3.41% 0.5420 1.5215 3.8435 0.3356 1.1164 3.2434 
0 3.16% 1.82% 6.57% 1.0404 2.3348 4.8075 0.5546 1.2014 4.9802 
1 2.18% 0.83% 8.76% 0.4248 1.4827 3.0913 0.6324 1.2418 5.4942 
2 0.75% 0.18% 9.50% 0.1853 1.1822 1.6915 0.6571 1.3092 5.4152 
3 0.44% -0.27% 9.94% 0.0065 1.2218 0.0574 0.6446 1.3224 5.2590 
4 0.24% -0.16% 10.18% 0.0240 1.2046 0.2152 0.6364 1.3356 5.1408 
5 0.08% -0.04% 10.26% 0.0528 0.9911 0.5743 0.6344 1.3114 5.2189 
6 -0.22% -0.34% 10.04% -0.0329 1.1404 -0.3117 0.6162 1.2783 5.2005 
7 -0.19% -0.20% 9.85% -0.1433 0.9122 -1.6952 0.5780 1.2514 4.9832 
8 -0.67% -0.43% 9.19% -0.1905 0.8464 -2.4285 0.5326 1.2578 4.5679 
9 0.29% 0.05% 9.48% 0.0889 0.8686 1.1037 0.5398 1.2723 4.5776 
10 -0.10% -0.13% 9.38% 0.0132 0.8098 0.1763 0.5334 1.2683 4.5378 
11 0.16% -0.08% 9.54% -0.0107 0.9263 -0.1241 0.5232 1.2509 4.5122 
12 0.31% 0.01% 9.84% 0.0306 0.8354 0.3951 0.5205 1.2484 4.4982 
13 -0.08% -0.18% 9.77% -0.0082 1.0219 -0.0871 0.5114 1.2559 4.3929 
14 -0.23% -0.41% 9.53% -0.0704 0.8086 -0.9390 0.4921 1.2446 4.2659 
15 -0.66% -0.45% 8.87% -0.1197 0.8156 -1.5839 0.4653 1.2648 3.9687 
16 -0.88% -0.60% 7.99% -0.2751 0.9643 -3.0783 0.4137 1.2793 3.4889 
17 -0.17% -0.15% 7.82% -0.1357 1.0248 -1.4283 0.3862 1.2982 3.2096 
18 0.40% 0.04% 8.22% 0.0836 1.2815 0.7042 0.3946 1.2800 3.3261 
19 0.49% 0.48% 8.71% 0.1134 0.9391 1.3027 0.4076 1.2553 3.5031 
20 0.08% -0.04% 8.79% -0.0065 0.8566 -0.0814 0.4016 1.2344 3.5097 
21 -0.59% -0.45% 8.20% -0.1688 1.0710 -1.7001 0.3707 1.2360 3.2361 
22 -0.46% 0.01% 7.73% -0.0688 1.0253 -0.7241 0.3559 1.2398 3.0971 
23 -0.07% -0.13% 7.66% -0.0366 0.9732 -0.4056 0.3463 1.2695 2.9433 
24 0.14% 0.02% 7.81% 0.0815 0.8498 1.0349 0.3546 1.2422 3.0798 
25 -0.29% -0.23% 7.52% 0.0080 0.9274 0.0928 0.3519 1.2222 3.1064 
26 -0.40% -0.10% 7.12% -0.0996 0.8607 -1.2480 0.3336 1.2110 2.9722 
27 -0.10% 0.06% 7.02% -0.0017 1.0380 -0.0180 0.3299 1.1875 2.9971 
28 0.38% 0.14% 7.40% 0.0653 0.8994 0.7829 0.3358 1.1877 3.0505 
29 -0.11% -0.34% 7.29% 0.0139 1.0912 0.1372 0.3344 1.1831 3.0495 
30 0.05% 0.09% 7.34% 0.0380 0.9250 0.4433 0.3364 1.1627 3.1218 
          
-1 to 1     7.01% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06614 1.1589 1.9323 6.4703 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7–151 
 
Table-A 7.3 Market Returns; Indian Targets; MM firms (OLS, 99); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.28% -0.16% -0.28% -0.0775 0.8885 -0.9048 -0.0775 0.8885 -0.9048 
-19 0.37% 0.08% 0.10% 0.1514 0.9056 1.7335 0.0522 0.9026 0.5999 
-18 -0.45% -0.17% -0.36% -0.0553 0.9423 -0.6086 0.0107 0.8928 0.1243 
-17 -0.64% -0.72% -1.00% -0.1096 1.0183 -1.1161 -0.0455 0.9075 -0.5202 
-16 -0.07% -0.26% -1.07% 0.0731 1.0696 0.7084 -0.0080 0.9507 -0.0878 
-15 0.40% 0.01% -0.66% 0.0729 0.8838 0.8560 0.0224 0.9163 0.2539 
-14 0.38% -0.04% -0.29% 0.0836 0.9310 0.9317 0.0524 0.9103 0.5968 
-13 -0.08% -0.28% -0.37% 0.0073 0.9943 0.0762 0.0516 0.9480 0.5643 
-12 0.19% -0.07% -0.18% 0.0583 0.9767 0.6187 0.0680 1.0498 0.6723 
-11 0.85% 0.61% 0.67% 0.2112 1.0168 2.1545 0.1314 1.0643 1.2801 
-10 0.07% -0.08% 0.74% -0.0300 1.0233 -0.3037 0.1162 1.0966 1.0990 
-9 0.89% 0.31% 1.63% 0.2730 1.2484 2.2678 0.1901 1.0600 1.8597 
-8 -0.42% -0.24% 1.22% 0.0346 1.0555 0.3397 0.1922 1.1066 1.8013 
-7 0.84% -0.08% 2.06% 0.1543 1.0829 1.4776 0.2264 1.1095 2.1166 
-6 -0.58% -0.53% 1.48% -0.1193 1.0586 -1.1690 0.1880 1.1334 1.7199 
-5 -0.47% -0.35% 1.01% -0.0414 1.2640 -0.3394 0.1716 1.1312 1.5737 
-4 0.19% -0.20% 1.20% -0.0121 1.0488 -0.1201 0.1636 1.1187 1.5165 
-3 0.16% -0.01% 1.36% 0.1011 1.1808 0.8876 0.1828 1.1137 1.7022 
-2 0.55% -0.17% 1.91% 0.1946 1.1153 1.8097 0.2226 1.1299 2.0428 
-1 1.72% 0.42% 3.62% 0.5516 1.5561 3.6765 0.3403 1.1337 3.1128 
0 3.28% 2.08% 6.91% 1.0753 2.3873 4.6715 0.5667 1.2207 4.8151 
1 2.31% 1.46% 9.21% 0.4571 1.5089 3.1416 0.6511 1.2621 5.3508 
2 0.80% 0.20% 10.02% 0.2039 1.2056 1.7540 0.6793 1.3325 5.2876 
3 0.21% -0.27% 10.22% 0.0270 1.0814 0.2593 0.6705 1.3459 5.1673 
4 0.24% -0.20% 10.47% 0.0641 1.1385 0.5835 0.6698 1.3486 5.1511 
5 0.03% -0.08% 10.49% 0.0243 0.9285 0.2709 0.6616 1.3272 5.1698 
6 -0.31% -0.34% 10.18% -0.0732 1.0237 -0.7414 0.6351 1.2965 5.0807 
7 -0.03% -0.08% 10.15% -0.0618 0.8255 -0.7763 0.6120 1.2580 5.0456 
8 -0.46% -0.37% 9.69% -0.1223 0.7385 -1.7169 0.5786 1.2489 4.8052 
9 0.35% 0.03% 10.04% 0.1015 0.8457 1.2446 0.5874 1.2654 4.8148 
10 0.04% -0.13% 10.08% 0.0380 0.7885 0.4997 0.5847 1.2563 4.8270 
11 0.07% -0.17% 10.15% -0.0304 0.9277 -0.3402 0.5701 1.2422 4.7601 
12 0.25% 0.01% 10.40% 0.0307 0.8409 0.3789 0.5668 1.2399 4.7407 
13 -0.06% -0.21% 10.34% -0.0130 1.0128 -0.1330 0.5561 1.2557 4.5933 
14 -0.24% -0.51% 10.11% -0.0733 0.8063 -0.9425 0.5358 1.2482 4.4515 
15 -0.55% -0.32% 9.56% -0.0782 0.7899 -1.0263 0.5152 1.2606 4.2389 
16 -0.59% -0.60% 8.97% -0.2101 0.8885 -2.4521 0.4737 1.2638 3.8872 
17 -0.01% -0.15% 8.96% -0.0578 0.8470 -0.7076 0.4580 1.2641 3.7581 
18 -0.05% -0.07% 8.91% -0.0161 1.0467 -0.1594 0.4496 1.2535 3.7196 
19 0.61% 0.49% 9.52% 0.1461 0.9307 1.6283 0.4670 1.2266 3.9486 
20 0.07% -0.01% 9.59% -0.0139 0.8690 -0.1661 0.4591 1.2050 3.9514 
21 -0.65% -0.53% 8.94% -0.1884 0.8998 -2.1719 0.4245 1.1872 3.7086 
22 -0.31% 0.03% 8.63% 0.0114 0.8488 0.1393 0.4213 1.1637 3.7546 
23 -0.01% -0.13% 8.62% 0.0148 0.7978 0.1928 0.4187 1.1689 3.7151 
24 0.14% 0.01% 8.76% 0.0690 0.8073 0.8860 0.4243 1.1453 3.8425 
25 -0.34% -0.27% 8.41% -0.0190 0.8848 -0.2224 0.4169 1.1402 3.7922 
26 -0.46% -0.13% 7.95% -0.1267 0.8495 -1.5466 0.3939 1.1437 3.5724 
27 -0.14% 0.04% 7.82% -0.0193 0.8790 -0.2280 0.3870 1.1440 3.5089 
28 0.44% 0.18% 8.26% 0.0684 0.8966 0.7911 0.3928 1.1416 3.5688 
29 -0.14% -0.43% 8.11% -0.0070 1.0537 -0.0685 0.3879 1.1527 3.4901 
30 0.15% 0.06% 8.26% 0.0450 0.9100 0.5125 0.3904 1.1381 3.5574 
          
-1 to 1     7.31% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06755 1.2032 1.9674 6.3427 
  
7–152 
 
Table-A 7.4 Fama-French Returns to Indian Targets All-firms (OLS, 93) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.0323 0.8939 -0.3613 -0.0323 0.8939 -0.3613 
-19 0.59% 0.06% 0.39% 0.1519 1.0003 1.5177 0.0846 0.9582 0.8819 
-18 -0.18% -0.01% 0.21% -0.0331 0.9326 -0.3553 0.0499 0.9091 0.5486 
-17 -0.43% -0.35% -0.22% -0.0366 0.9492 -0.3858 0.0249 0.8624 0.2886 
-16 -0.02% -0.19% -0.24% 0.1105 1.0844 1.0183 0.0717 0.8944 0.8010 
-15 0.47% -0.34% 0.22% 0.0705 0.9476 0.7437 0.0942 0.8893 1.0590 
-14 -0.15% -0.27% 0.08% -0.0335 0.9091 -0.3687 0.0746 0.8428 0.8841 
-13 -0.18% -0.34% -0.10% -0.0174 0.7852 -0.2209 0.0636 0.8129 0.7820 
-12 0.26% -0.07% 0.16% 0.0912 1.0239 0.8902 0.0904 0.9361 0.9648 
-11 1.00% 0.58% 1.17% 0.2789 0.9967 2.7810 0.1727 0.9577 1.8023 
-10 0.16% -0.31% 1.33% -0.0012 0.9439 -0.0129 0.1641 0.9845 1.6660 
-9 0.89% 0.15% 2.22% 0.2640 1.3026 2.0255 0.2334 1.0025 2.3270 
-8 -0.27% -0.29% 1.94% 0.0721 1.0660 0.6758 0.2443 1.0643 2.2941 
-7 1.19% 0.05% 3.13% 0.2418 1.1491 2.1032 0.3000 1.0874 2.7575 
-6 -0.56% -0.47% 2.57% -0.0803 1.1808 -0.6801 0.2691 1.0912 2.4648 
-5 -0.25% -0.71% 2.31% -0.0361 1.3286 -0.2713 0.2516 1.1158 2.2540 
-4 -0.01% -0.16% 2.30% -0.0310 1.0746 -0.2883 0.2366 1.1069 2.1366 
-3 0.13% 0.25% 2.44% 0.1373 1.2654 1.0848 0.2622 1.1022 2.3782 
-2 0.54% 0.03% 2.97% 0.2054 1.1281 1.8201 0.3024 1.1085 2.7264 
-1 1.72% 0.36% 4.69% 0.5326 1.6026 3.3215 0.4139 1.1207 3.6916 
0 3.03% 1.36% 7.72% 0.9670 2.1037 4.5943 0.6149 1.1937 5.1488 
1 2.26% 0.91% 9.98% 0.4589 1.5586 2.9429 0.6986 1.2501 5.5855 
2 0.72% 0.26% 10.69% 0.1767 1.2125 1.4563 0.7201 1.3011 5.5315 
3 0.22% -0.36% 10.91% -0.0438 1.2860 -0.3407 0.6960 1.3229 5.2581 
4 0.07% -0.22% 10.98% -0.0435 1.2359 -0.3521 0.6732 1.3474 4.9934 
5 0.06% 0.01% 11.04% 0.0279 0.9815 0.2837 0.6657 1.3303 5.0013 
6 -0.23% -0.54% 10.81% -0.0274 1.0805 -0.2535 0.6481 1.2960 4.9982 
7 -0.05% -0.12% 10.76% -0.0707 0.9199 -0.7683 0.6231 1.2844 4.8488 
8 -0.67% -0.43% 10.09% -0.2081 0.8217 -2.5314 0.5736 1.2941 4.4298 
9 0.25% -0.12% 10.35% 0.0909 0.8885 1.0231 0.5805 1.3016 4.4580 
10 -0.14% -0.23% 10.20% 0.0114 0.8449 0.1347 0.5732 1.2901 4.4405 
11 -0.02% -0.09% 10.18% -0.0478 0.9358 -0.5111 0.5557 1.2748 4.3567 
12 0.23% 0.02% 10.41% 0.0024 0.8813 0.0266 0.5475 1.2742 4.2942 
13 -0.08% -0.13% 10.34% -0.0067 1.0123 -0.0665 0.5382 1.2832 4.1919 
14 -0.27% -0.54% 10.06% -0.0462 0.8642 -0.5344 0.5226 1.2737 4.1009 
15 -0.51% -0.23% 9.55% -0.0817 0.7945 -1.0275 0.5017 1.2879 3.8937 
16 -0.93% -0.70% 8.62% -0.2795 1.0245 -2.7266 0.4490 1.3066 3.4342 
17 -0.15% -0.27% 8.48% -0.1310 0.9974 -1.3128 0.4218 1.3153 3.2050 
18 0.06% 0.05% 8.53% 0.0513 1.2724 0.4008 0.4244 1.3151 3.2257 
19 0.49% 0.45% 9.02% 0.1234 0.9268 1.3308 0.4386 1.2923 3.3922 
20 -0.02% -0.25% 9.00% -0.0401 0.8799 -0.4534 0.4270 1.2641 3.3765 
21 -0.76% -0.93% 8.24% -0.2600 1.0490 -2.4633 0.3823 1.2686 3.0117 
22 -0.32% -0.15% 7.91% -0.0549 1.0184 -0.5354 0.3695 1.2736 2.9000 
23 -0.30% -0.25% 7.61% -0.1064 0.9838 -1.0748 0.3495 1.3138 2.6586 
24 0.14% 0.13% 7.76% 0.0765 0.9246 0.8223 0.3569 1.2914 2.7622 
25 -0.44% -0.25% 7.31% -0.0142 0.9354 -0.1511 0.3509 1.2725 2.7565 
26 -0.21% 0.02% 7.10% -0.0614 0.9129 -0.6681 0.3384 1.2652 2.6731 
27 -0.26% -0.20% 6.84% -0.0335 1.1061 -0.3011 0.3301 1.2401 2.6602 
28 0.40% 0.15% 7.24% 0.0734 0.9178 0.7951 0.3371 1.2363 2.7250 
29 -0.05% -0.36% 7.19% 0.0502 1.0898 0.4580 0.3407 1.2354 2.7566 
30 0.11% -0.10% 7.29% 0.0417 0.9465 0.4377 0.3432 1.2209 2.8092 
          
-1 to 1     7.00% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06393 1.1307 1.8203 6.2085 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–153 
 
Table-A 7.5 Fama-French Returns to Indian Targets All-firms (MM, 90) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% 0.12% -0.05% 0.0321 1.0147 0.3108 0.0321 1.0147 0.3108 
-19 0.40% 0.07% 0.35% 0.1577 1.0220 1.5160 0.1342 1.0623 1.2412 
-18 -0.09% 0.00% 0.26% -0.0120 1.1267 -0.1049 0.1026 1.0570 0.9540 
-17 -0.16% -0.02% 0.10% 0.0245 1.1325 0.2128 0.1011 1.0220 0.9724 
-16 0.38% 0.02% 0.48% 0.2195 1.2552 1.7188 0.1886 1.0833 1.7112 
-15 0.51% -0.13% 0.99% 0.0881 1.0470 0.8269 0.2082 1.0325 1.9813 
-14 0.34% -0.02% 1.33% 0.1162 1.0720 1.0655 0.2366 0.9981 2.3299 
-13 0.03% -0.03% 1.36% 0.0451 0.8493 0.5223 0.2373 0.9484 2.4590 
-12 0.54% 0.14% 1.91% 0.1747 1.1770 1.4589 0.2820 1.0737 2.5811 
-11 1.12% 0.71% 3.03% 0.3622 1.1947 2.9619 0.3804 1.0933 3.4196 
-10 0.26% 0.08% 3.29% 0.0751 1.0545 0.7002 0.3852 1.1397 3.3209 
-9 1.12% 0.39% 4.40% 0.3935 1.5138 2.5543 0.4824 1.1828 4.0082 
-8 -0.20% -0.01% 4.20% 0.1181 1.2373 0.9381 0.4963 1.2575 3.8788 
-7 1.41% 0.33% 5.61% 0.3748 1.4004 2.6301 0.5784 1.2846 4.4247 
-6 -0.22% -0.26% 5.39% -0.0457 1.3345 -0.3363 0.5470 1.2857 4.1808 
-5 -0.01% -0.38% 5.39% 0.0188 1.4545 0.1267 0.5344 1.2992 4.0426 
-4 0.14% -0.21% 5.53% 0.0367 1.2531 0.2876 0.5274 1.2819 4.0434 
-3 0.41% 0.35% 5.94% 0.2608 1.5079 1.6998 0.5740 1.3098 4.3063 
-2 0.76% 0.16% 6.70% 0.3071 1.3159 2.2932 0.6291 1.3263 4.6616 
-1 1.88% 0.60% 8.58% 0.7058 2.0550 3.3753 0.7711 1.3806 5.4890 
0 3.29% 2.36% 11.87% 1.2206 2.5320 4.7372 1.0188 1.4920 6.7106 
1 2.40% 1.16% 14.27% 0.6148 1.8386 3.2860 1.1264 1.5220 7.2734 
2 0.93% 0.42% 15.20% 0.3070 1.4233 2.1195 1.1657 1.5774 7.2622 
3 0.27% -0.13% 15.47% 0.0474 1.2698 0.3668 1.1508 1.5901 7.1123 
4 0.20% -0.04% 15.67% 0.0747 1.2472 0.5887 1.1425 1.5657 7.1709 
5 0.24% 0.12% 15.91% 0.0808 1.1305 0.7024 1.1363 1.5302 7.2976 
6 -0.01% -0.19% 15.91% 0.0207 1.2769 0.1595 1.1192 1.4897 7.3833 
7 0.23% 0.08% 16.14% 0.0563 1.0070 0.5498 1.1097 1.4657 7.4405 
8 -0.32% -0.25% 15.82% -0.1106 0.8688 -1.2513 1.0699 1.4577 7.2128 
9 0.42% 0.07% 16.24% 0.1695 1.1026 1.5109 1.0828 1.4832 7.1747 
10 0.18% 0.05% 16.42% 0.0914 0.9689 0.9271 1.0817 1.4633 7.2644 
11 0.23% 0.35% 16.65% 0.0457 1.0697 0.4202 1.0727 1.4482 7.2792 
12 0.38% 0.10% 17.03% 0.0718 1.0342 0.6777 1.0685 1.4556 7.2142 
13 0.17% 0.12% 17.20% 0.0564 1.0895 0.5087 1.0624 1.4614 7.1441 
14 -0.11% -0.34% 17.09% -0.0274 0.9951 -0.2705 1.0424 1.4461 7.0839 
15 -0.28% 0.04% 16.81% -0.0099 0.9046 -0.1071 1.0262 1.4474 6.9677 
16 -0.44% -0.44% 16.36% -0.1765 1.1275 -1.5385 0.9833 1.4631 6.6044 
17 0.27% -0.01% 16.63% 0.0330 0.9826 0.3298 0.9756 1.4645 6.5462 
18 0.20% 0.07% 16.83% 0.0357 1.3717 0.2560 0.9687 1.4774 6.4434 
19 0.81% 0.62% 17.64% 0.2418 1.0521 2.2586 0.9948 1.4442 6.7690 
20 0.15% -0.13% 17.79% 0.0611 1.0963 0.5441 0.9920 1.4180 6.8751 
21 -0.47% -0.60% 17.32% -0.1700 1.1154 -1.4888 0.9542 1.4110 6.6459 
22 0.10% 0.08% 17.42% 0.1060 0.9828 1.0535 0.9591 1.3802 6.8291 
23 0.10% -0.06% 17.52% 0.0364 1.0032 0.3540 0.9536 1.4018 6.6852 
24 0.33% 0.31% 17.85% 0.1098 1.0282 1.0431 0.9592 1.3895 6.7841 
25 -0.25% -0.16% 17.60% 0.0230 1.0474 0.2145 0.9521 1.3834 6.7637 
26 -0.06% 0.13% 17.54% -0.0050 1.0400 -0.0468 0.9413 1.3867 6.6707 
27 -0.03% 0.03% 17.51% 0.0147 1.1454 0.1256 0.9336 1.3986 6.5594 
28 0.74% 0.24% 18.26% 0.1774 1.0761 1.6107 0.9491 1.3954 6.6842 
29 0.16% -0.25% 18.42% 0.1087 1.2580 0.8438 0.9548 1.4179 6.6174 
30 0.42% 0.14% 18.84% 0.1322 1.0562 1.2224 0.9637 1.4241 6.6503 
          
-1 to 1     7.57% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06354 1.4671 2.1864 6.5943 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–154 
 
Table-A 7.6 Market Returns to Indian Targets FF-firms (OLS, 93) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.39% -0.15% -0.39% -0.0918 0.9127 -1.0301 -0.0918 0.9127 -1.0301 
-19 0.64% 0.08% 0.25% 0.1716 0.9834 1.7875 0.0565 0.9300 0.6217 
-18 -0.26% -0.08% -0.01% -0.0372 0.9087 -0.4191 0.0246 0.9193 0.2743 
-17 -0.63% -0.72% -0.64% -0.1024 0.9876 -1.0623 -0.0299 0.9030 -0.3390 
-16 -0.21% -0.26% -0.85% 0.0514 1.1062 0.4760 -0.0037 0.9484 -0.0404 
-15 0.61% 0.08% -0.24% 0.1098 0.8751 1.2853 0.0414 0.9311 0.4556 
-14 -0.24% -0.38% -0.48% -0.0464 0.9523 -0.4993 0.0208 0.8918 0.2388 
-13 -0.34% -0.25% -0.81% -0.0546 0.8464 -0.6609 0.0001 0.8852 0.0017 
-12 0.31% 0.09% -0.50% 0.0847 0.9919 0.8749 0.0284 1.0047 0.2893 
-11 0.83% 0.63% 0.33% 0.2394 1.0705 2.2905 0.1026 1.0308 1.0197 
-10 0.02% -0.09% 0.34% -0.0478 0.9745 -0.5028 0.0834 1.0812 0.7903 
-9 0.91% 0.23% 1.26% 0.2490 1.2725 2.0041 0.1518 1.0409 1.4932 
-8 -0.49% -0.24% 0.77% 0.0381 1.0579 0.3686 0.1564 1.1045 1.4499 
-7 1.03% 0.07% 1.80% 0.2011 1.1026 1.8680 0.2044 1.1125 1.8820 
-6 -0.60% -0.32% 1.20% -0.0663 1.1870 -0.5723 0.1804 1.1442 1.6144 
-5 -0.26% -0.35% 0.94% -0.0327 1.2703 -0.2639 0.1665 1.1371 1.4992 
-4 -0.22% -0.31% 0.72% -0.0696 1.0343 -0.6890 0.1446 1.1375 1.3020 
-3 0.07% -0.01% 0.79% 0.0869 1.1982 0.7428 0.1610 1.1254 1.4654 
-2 0.53% -0.15% 1.32% 0.1905 1.1159 1.7488 0.2004 1.1329 1.8120 
-1 1.71% 0.41% 3.03% 0.5223 1.5381 3.4778 0.3122 1.1397 2.8051 
0 3.11% 2.08% 6.15% 0.9660 2.1096 4.6894 0.5154 1.1785 4.4793 
1 2.27% 0.85% 8.42% 0.4427 1.5021 3.0180 0.5979 1.2134 5.0470 
2 0.66% 0.11% 9.08% 0.1481 1.1778 1.2878 0.6157 1.2701 4.9647 
3 0.30% -0.32% 9.38% -0.0351 1.2606 -0.2855 0.5955 1.2811 4.7609 
4 0.17% -0.41% 9.55% 0.0059 1.2613 0.0478 0.5847 1.2990 4.6098 
5 0.12% -0.04% 9.66% 0.0359 0.9536 0.3859 0.5804 1.2740 4.6657 
6 -0.49% -0.41% 9.17% -0.1165 1.0387 -1.1490 0.5471 1.2370 4.5297 
7 -0.22% -0.15% 8.95% -0.1273 0.8920 -1.4613 0.5132 1.2099 4.3439 
8 -0.69% -0.42% 8.26% -0.2009 0.8346 -2.4650 0.4670 1.2048 3.9694 
9 0.29% 0.03% 8.55% 0.0976 0.8624 1.1587 0.4769 1.2195 4.0053 
10 -0.13% -0.13% 8.42% 0.0223 0.8130 0.2808 0.4732 1.2175 3.9802 
11 0.06% -0.21% 8.48% -0.0387 0.9416 -0.4211 0.4589 1.1982 3.9222 
12 0.30% -0.06% 8.78% 0.0227 0.8502 0.2734 0.4558 1.1938 3.9103 
13 -0.16% -0.21% 8.62% -0.0206 1.0381 -0.2035 0.4455 1.2018 3.7969 
14 -0.28% -0.54% 8.33% -0.0851 0.8362 -1.0423 0.4247 1.1870 3.6647 
15 -0.61% -0.47% 7.72% -0.1025 0.8248 -1.2730 0.4017 1.2050 3.4143 
16 -1.04% -0.88% 6.68% -0.3274 1.0016 -3.3476 0.3424 1.2170 2.8815 
17 -0.25% -0.37% 6.43% -0.1642 1.0665 -1.5771 0.3112 1.2423 2.5660 
18 0.48% 0.03% 6.91% 0.1009 1.3426 0.7694 0.3234 1.2262 2.7010 
19 0.58% 0.51% 7.49% 0.1355 0.9814 1.4136 0.3407 1.1993 2.9097 
20 0.00% -0.09% 7.49% -0.0233 0.8996 -0.2651 0.3329 1.1784 2.8933 
21 -0.70% -0.78% 6.78% -0.2284 1.0135 -2.3084 0.2937 1.1743 2.5613 
22 -0.25% 0.01% 6.53% -0.0284 1.0127 -0.2873 0.2859 1.1813 2.4788 
23 -0.27% -0.21% 6.27% -0.0726 0.9709 -0.7656 0.2717 1.2223 2.2765 
24 0.26% 0.03% 6.53% 0.1190 0.8704 1.4000 0.2864 1.1930 2.4587 
25 -0.41% -0.31% 6.12% -0.0172 0.9194 -0.1912 0.2807 1.1747 2.4476 
26 -0.38% -0.13% 5.74% -0.0966 0.8885 -1.1137 0.2636 1.1680 2.3116 
27 -0.12% 0.09% 5.62% -0.0019 1.0903 -0.0180 0.2606 1.1470 2.3269 
28 0.47% 0.21% 6.10% 0.0832 0.9358 0.9107 0.2698 1.1440 2.4155 
29 -0.12% -0.43% 5.98% 0.0225 1.1312 0.2039 0.2703 1.1392 2.4299 
30 -0.02% -0.15% 5.96% 0.0298 0.9678 0.3149 0.2718 1.1160 2.4943 
          
-1 to 1     7.10% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06461 1.1148 1.7948 6.3613 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7–155 
 
Table-A 7.7 Market Returns to Indian Targets FF-firms (MM, 90) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.18% 0.05% -0.18% -0.0203 1.0323 -0.1964 -0.0203 1.0323 -0.1964 
-19 0.47% 0.20% 0.29% 0.1884 1.0355 1.8127 0.1188 1.0564 1.1208 
-18 -0.12% 0.01% 0.18% -0.0151 1.1029 -0.1360 0.0883 1.0629 0.8280 
-17 -0.38% -0.22% -0.20% -0.0528 1.1966 -0.4395 0.0501 1.0788 0.4628 
-16 0.21% -0.08% 0.01% 0.1495 1.3001 1.1460 0.1117 1.1612 0.9584 
-15 0.63% 0.13% 0.63% 0.1275 0.9766 1.3005 0.1540 1.0852 1.4139 
-14 0.29% -0.09% 0.93% 0.1020 1.1267 0.9022 0.1811 1.0585 1.7050 
-13 -0.11% -0.11% 0.81% -0.0056 0.9395 -0.0597 0.1674 1.0394 1.6052 
-12 0.52% 0.19% 1.33% 0.1642 1.1596 1.4109 0.2126 1.1660 1.8168 
-11 0.99% 0.74% 2.32% 0.3060 1.2580 2.4240 0.2985 1.1744 2.5323 
-10 0.11% 0.12% 2.43% 0.0073 1.1004 0.0657 0.2868 1.2328 2.3178 
-9 1.14% 0.40% 3.58% 0.3666 1.5049 2.4271 0.3804 1.2052 3.1447 
-8 -0.34% -0.08% 3.24% 0.0751 1.2440 0.6016 0.3863 1.2842 2.9972 
-7 1.29% 0.30% 4.53% 0.3171 1.3601 2.3231 0.4570 1.2842 3.5457 
-6 -0.24% -0.24% 4.29% -0.0355 1.3004 -0.2719 0.4323 1.3117 3.2841 
-5 -0.03% 0.06% 4.26% 0.0094 1.4183 0.0658 0.4210 1.3033 3.2183 
-4 -0.06% -0.27% 4.20% -0.0244 1.2118 -0.2004 0.4025 1.2889 3.1113 
-3 0.33% 0.34% 4.53% 0.2064 1.4679 1.4008 0.4398 1.3123 3.3390 
-2 0.73% 0.03% 5.26% 0.2780 1.3032 2.1253 0.4918 1.3254 3.6973 
-1 1.98% 0.57% 7.24% 0.7048 1.9540 3.5940 0.6370 1.3693 4.6350 
0 3.39% 2.52% 10.63% 1.2232 2.5699 4.7426 0.8885 1.4205 6.2326 
1 2.49% 1.27% 13.12% 0.6178 1.7705 3.4771 0.9998 1.4321 6.9563 
2 0.90% 0.34% 14.02% 0.2863 1.3670 2.0871 1.0376 1.4893 6.9416 
3 0.27% -0.11% 14.29% 0.0363 1.2042 0.3004 1.0231 1.4862 6.8593 
4 0.33% -0.02% 14.62% 0.1088 1.3187 0.8219 1.0242 1.4604 6.9880 
5 0.23% 0.21% 14.85% 0.0753 1.1167 0.6721 1.0191 1.4170 7.1661 
6 -0.26% -0.13% 14.60% -0.0879 1.2712 -0.6887 0.9831 1.3700 7.1502 
7 0.09% -0.02% 14.69% -0.0067 0.9894 -0.0671 0.9642 1.3272 7.2387 
8 -0.35% -0.25% 14.34% -0.1162 0.8662 -1.3364 0.9258 1.2980 7.1068 
9 0.47% 0.19% 14.81% 0.1606 1.0699 1.4952 0.9396 1.3251 7.0648 
10 0.19% 0.12% 15.00% 0.0943 0.9384 1.0017 0.9412 1.3162 7.1253 
11 0.25% 0.26% 15.25% 0.0409 1.0904 0.3733 0.9336 1.2964 7.1759 
12 0.44% 0.01% 15.69% 0.0853 1.0150 0.8373 0.9342 1.3021 7.1487 
13 0.09% 0.04% 15.77% 0.0450 1.1297 0.3968 0.9281 1.3085 7.0674 
14 -0.03% -0.13% 15.75% -0.0460 0.9571 -0.4790 0.9070 1.2933 6.9874 
15 -0.31% -0.22% 15.43% -0.0215 0.9535 -0.2243 0.8907 1.2980 6.8374 
16 -0.52% -0.42% 14.91% -0.2155 1.0982 -1.9549 0.8432 1.3059 6.4331 
17 0.11% 0.05% 15.02% -0.0189 1.0118 -0.1861 0.8289 1.3198 6.2582 
18 0.22% -0.02% 15.24% 0.0449 1.3992 0.3200 0.8254 1.3252 6.2062 
19 0.87% 0.73% 16.11% 0.2419 1.0939 2.2036 0.8533 1.2916 6.5829 
20 0.21% -0.03% 16.33% 0.0813 1.1057 0.7330 0.8555 1.2770 6.6756 
21 -0.42% -0.37% 15.90% -0.1603 1.1094 -1.4396 0.8206 1.2603 6.4875 
22 0.14% 0.18% 16.04% 0.1156 0.9686 1.1887 0.8286 1.2277 6.7246 
23 0.16% 0.02% 16.20% 0.0621 1.0066 0.6145 0.8285 1.2524 6.5909 
24 0.41% 0.25% 16.61% 0.1482 0.9947 1.4842 0.8413 1.2223 6.8579 
25 -0.20% -0.05% 16.41% 0.0291 1.0356 0.2802 0.8364 1.2172 6.8465 
26 -0.20% 0.03% 16.21% -0.0436 1.0482 -0.4141 0.8211 1.2227 6.6912 
27 0.07% 0.34% 16.28% 0.0383 1.1301 0.3377 0.8180 1.2439 6.5527 
28 0.74% 0.31% 17.02% 0.1819 1.1019 1.6452 0.8356 1.2440 6.6928 
29 0.02% -0.35% 17.04% 0.0634 1.3108 0.4823 0.8362 1.2620 6.6021 
30 0.32% 0.09% 17.36% 0.1142 1.0904 1.0432 0.8440 1.2575 6.6873 
          
-1 to 1     7.86% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06483 1.4699 2.1492 6.8145 
 
  
7–156 
 
Table-A 7.8 SW-1 Returns to Indian Targets All-firms (OLS, 104) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.27% -0.13% -0.27% -0.0867 0.8992 -1.0458 -0.0867 0.8992 -1.0458 
-19 0.67% 0.19% 0.40% 0.1950 0.9939 2.1273 0.0766 0.9261 0.8964 
-18 -0.38% -0.07% 0.02% -0.0395 0.9267 -0.4619 0.0397 0.9137 0.4714 
-17 -0.63% -0.42% -0.60% -0.0910 1.0195 -0.9671 -0.0111 0.9108 -0.1318 
-16 -0.24% -0.33% -0.84% 0.0383 1.0612 0.3917 0.0072 0.9282 0.0847 
-15 0.49% 0.00% -0.36% 0.0843 0.9129 1.0016 0.0411 0.9180 0.4847 
-14 0.12% -0.01% -0.23% 0.0472 0.9739 0.5251 0.0558 0.8939 0.6771 
-13 -0.10% -0.29% -0.34% 0.0135 0.9876 0.1481 0.0570 0.9253 0.6678 
-12 0.16% -0.05% -0.18% 0.0531 0.9714 0.5929 0.0714 1.0328 0.7499 
-11 0.83% 0.65% 0.65% 0.2224 1.0486 2.2986 0.1381 1.0526 1.4222 
-10 0.15% -0.07% 0.80% -0.0322 1.0283 -0.3397 0.1220 1.0811 1.2228 
-9 0.89% 0.34% 1.69% 0.2607 1.2405 2.2786 0.1920 1.0382 2.0051 
-8 -0.39% -0.15% 1.30% 0.0382 1.0332 0.4009 0.1951 1.0905 1.9393 
-7 0.76% -0.03% 2.05% 0.1405 1.0687 1.4248 0.2255 1.0913 2.2404 
-6 -0.67% -0.37% 1.39% -0.0795 1.1369 -0.7585 0.1973 1.1162 1.9166 
-5 -0.43% -0.34% 0.95% -0.0358 1.2726 -0.3053 0.1821 1.1108 1.7773 
-4 0.13% -0.30% 1.09% -0.0128 1.0376 -0.1338 0.1736 1.1066 1.7003 
-3 0.11% -0.04% 1.19% 0.0868 1.1432 0.8230 0.1891 1.0930 1.8759 
-2 0.51% 0.06% 1.70% 0.1755 1.0876 1.7489 0.2244 1.1068 2.1974 
-1 1.74% 0.41% 3.44% 0.5503 1.5051 3.9634 0.3417 1.1070 3.3465 
0 3.21% 1.88% 6.64% 1.0449 2.3181 4.8864 0.5615 1.1920 5.1067 
1 2.24% 0.94% 8.89% 0.4352 1.4726 3.2040 0.6414 1.2272 5.6656 
2 0.73% 0.15% 9.62% 0.1809 1.1856 1.6541 0.6650 1.2937 5.5724 
3 0.41% -0.20% 10.03% 0.0017 1.2375 0.0149 0.6514 1.3110 5.3861 
4 0.25% -0.20% 10.28% 0.0273 1.2174 0.2428 0.6437 1.3301 5.2460 
5 0.10% -0.04% 10.38% 0.0582 0.9900 0.6372 0.6426 1.3080 5.3254 
6 -0.20% -0.34% 10.18% -0.0328 1.1414 -0.3115 0.6242 1.2740 5.3117 
7 -0.20% -0.35% 9.98% -0.1502 0.9258 -1.7591 0.5846 1.2466 5.0839 
8 -0.72% -0.42% 9.25% -0.2073 0.8410 -2.6725 0.5359 1.2558 4.6265 
9 0.30% 0.08% 9.56% 0.0945 0.8801 1.1646 0.5442 1.2684 4.6508 
10 -0.13% -0.25% 9.43% 0.0099 0.8162 0.1313 0.5371 1.2684 4.5904 
11 0.13% -0.19% 9.56% -0.0145 0.9450 -0.1664 0.5261 1.2517 4.5564 
12 0.31% -0.05% 9.87% 0.0250 0.8531 0.3172 0.5224 1.2508 4.5277 
13 -0.05% -0.16% 9.81% 0.0030 1.0174 0.0319 0.5152 1.2584 4.4379 
14 -0.27% -0.41% 9.54% -0.0767 0.8125 -1.0231 0.4948 1.2457 4.3058 
15 -0.69% -0.52% 8.85% -0.1290 0.8244 -1.6969 0.4664 1.2678 3.9877 
16 -0.85% -0.58% 8.00% -0.2694 0.9613 -3.0378 0.4157 1.2835 3.5114 
17 -0.17% -0.15% 7.84% -0.1338 1.0498 -1.3814 0.3885 1.3032 3.2320 
18 0.43% 0.01% 8.27% 0.0914 1.2767 0.7763 0.3982 1.2859 3.3565 
19 0.45% 0.46% 8.72% 0.1014 0.9184 1.1964 0.4092 1.2604 3.5194 
20 0.03% 0.00% 8.75% -0.0207 0.8518 -0.2635 0.4009 1.2378 3.5113 
21 -0.63% -0.42% 8.12% -0.1776 1.0603 -1.8162 0.3687 1.2375 3.2299 
22 -0.55% -0.10% 7.56% -0.0974 1.0273 -1.0280 0.3495 1.2378 3.0612 
23 -0.10% -0.24% 7.47% -0.0407 0.9955 -0.4428 0.3394 1.2676 2.9027 
24 0.11% 0.04% 7.58% 0.0724 0.8589 0.9133 0.3464 1.2391 3.0306 
25 -0.22% -0.17% 7.36% 0.0214 0.9608 0.2418 0.3458 1.2165 3.0814 
26 -0.40% -0.19% 6.95% -0.1010 0.8608 -1.2717 0.3274 1.2042 2.9470 
27 -0.15% 0.03% 6.80% -0.0265 1.0302 -0.2784 0.3201 1.1795 2.9421 
28 0.38% 0.15% 7.18% 0.0626 0.8822 0.7689 0.3258 1.1770 3.0004 
29 -0.16% -0.49% 7.03% 0.0056 1.0985 0.0553 0.3233 1.1692 2.9974 
30 0.02% 0.08% 7.04% 0.0349 0.9361 0.4039 0.3250 1.1505 3.0622 
          
-1 to 1     7.19% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06636 1.1723 1.9246 6.6029 
 
 
 
  
  
7–157 
 
Table-A 7.9 SW-2 Returns; Indian Targets; All-firms (OLS, 104); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.30% -0.24% -0.30% -0.0880 0.8895 -1.0700 -0.0880 0.8895 -1.0700 
-19 0.67% 0.16% 0.37% 0.1941 0.9973 2.1055 0.0750 0.9220 0.8805 
-18 -0.41% -0.05% -0.04% -0.0428 0.9173 -0.5045 0.0366 0.9072 0.4362 
-17 -0.66% -0.45% -0.70% -0.0919 1.0257 -0.9692 -0.0143 0.9104 -0.1696 
-16 -0.20% -0.17% -0.90% 0.0466 1.0724 0.4701 0.0081 0.9322 0.0937 
-15 0.45% 0.00% -0.45% 0.0785 0.9110 0.9317 0.0394 0.9162 0.4653 
-14 0.09% -0.02% -0.36% 0.0380 0.9602 0.4278 0.0508 0.8856 0.6210 
-13 -0.15% -0.32% -0.51% 0.0027 0.9837 0.0301 0.0485 0.9044 0.5804 
-12 0.18% -0.05% -0.33% 0.0558 0.9667 0.6244 0.0644 1.0107 0.6887 
-11 0.78% 0.46% 0.45% 0.2206 1.0522 2.2680 0.1308 1.0257 1.3795 
-10 0.12% -0.15% 0.57% -0.0397 1.0208 -0.4207 0.1128 1.0527 1.1586 
-9 0.92% 0.41% 1.49% 0.2600 1.2287 2.2893 0.1830 1.0165 1.9477 
-8 -0.37% -0.12% 1.11% 0.0511 1.0314 0.5362 0.1900 1.0728 1.9159 
-7 0.70% -0.02% 1.81% 0.1303 1.0607 1.3291 0.2179 1.0760 2.1910 
-6 -0.66% -0.39% 1.16% -0.0799 1.1787 -0.7336 0.1899 1.0958 1.8747 
-5 -0.46% -0.36% 0.69% -0.0448 1.2342 -0.3924 0.1727 1.0908 1.7124 
-4 0.07% -0.30% 0.77% -0.0184 1.0483 -0.1893 0.1631 1.0836 1.6280 
-3 0.13% 0.00% 0.90% 0.0928 1.1416 0.8795 0.1804 1.0688 1.8255 
-2 0.50% -0.05% 1.39% 0.1760 1.0805 1.7624 0.2159 1.0817 2.1595 
-1 1.80% 0.53% 3.19% 0.5444 1.5021 3.9202 0.3322 1.0847 3.3127 
0 3.21% 1.40% 6.40% 1.0371 2.3293 4.8161 0.5505 1.1709 5.0858 
1 2.26% 0.87% 8.66% 0.4335 1.4722 3.1853 0.6303 1.2009 5.6771 
2 0.72% 0.11% 9.38% 0.1780 1.1966 1.6092 0.6535 1.2719 5.5582 
3 0.36% -0.19% 9.75% -0.0046 1.2661 -0.0390 0.6388 1.2849 5.3780 
4 0.24% -0.19% 9.99% 0.0202 1.2206 0.1791 0.6300 1.3020 5.2338 
5 0.08% -0.02% 10.07% 0.0584 0.9957 0.6347 0.6292 1.2803 5.3159 
6 -0.23% -0.31% 9.84% -0.0388 1.1245 -0.3735 0.6100 1.2460 5.2955 
7 -0.22% -0.38% 9.61% -0.1548 0.9216 -1.8164 0.5697 1.2221 5.0427 
8 -0.72% -0.37% 8.90% -0.2014 0.8453 -2.5775 0.5224 1.2344 4.5780 
9 0.33% -0.01% 9.22% 0.0993 0.8868 1.2109 0.5318 1.2473 4.6116 
10 -0.16% -0.31% 9.06% 0.0024 0.8347 0.0311 0.5236 1.2501 4.5303 
11 0.10% -0.13% 9.16% -0.0159 0.9394 -0.1828 0.5125 1.2370 4.4814 
12 0.33% -0.03% 9.49% 0.0233 0.8586 0.2930 0.5087 1.2335 4.4611 
13 -0.05% -0.09% 9.44% 0.0054 1.0231 0.0572 0.5021 1.2401 4.3798 
14 -0.23% -0.25% 9.21% -0.0641 0.8169 -0.8492 0.4840 1.2227 4.2824 
15 -0.70% -0.48% 8.51% -0.1366 0.8194 -1.8031 0.4545 1.2448 3.9497 
16 -0.81% -0.57% 7.70% -0.2547 0.9552 -2.8844 0.4065 1.2627 3.4820 
17 -0.16% -0.07% 7.54% -0.1189 1.0245 -1.2555 0.3818 1.2830 3.2187 
18 0.42% 0.08% 7.96% 0.0902 1.2656 0.7711 0.3913 1.2646 3.3470 
19 0.37% 0.44% 8.33% 0.0852 0.9192 1.0029 0.3999 1.2391 3.4907 
20 0.03% 0.07% 8.36% -0.0233 0.8574 -0.2944 0.3913 1.2138 3.4872 
21 -0.60% -0.44% 7.76% -0.1696 1.0611 -1.7286 0.3605 1.2137 3.2126 
22 -0.53% -0.16% 7.23% -0.0972 1.0318 -1.0195 0.3414 1.2106 3.0506 
23 -0.05% -0.23% 7.18% -0.0379 1.0020 -0.4093 0.3318 1.2410 2.8921 
24 0.10% 0.05% 7.28% 0.0672 0.8542 0.8509 0.3381 1.2157 3.0083 
25 -0.25% -0.09% 7.03% 0.0137 0.9288 0.1596 0.3364 1.1898 3.0585 
26 -0.44% -0.19% 6.59% -0.1116 0.8593 -1.4049 0.3165 1.1784 2.9058 
27 -0.11% 0.09% 6.47% -0.0186 1.0453 -0.1923 0.3105 1.1528 2.9141 
28 0.38% 0.12% 6.85% 0.0603 0.8838 0.7384 0.3160 1.1520 2.9669 
29 -0.24% -0.33% 6.62% -0.0114 1.1076 -0.1111 0.3112 1.1458 2.9380 
30 0.02% 0.12% 6.64% 0.0371 0.9411 0.4270 0.3133 1.1294 3.0011 
          
-1 to 1     7.27% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06709 1.1634 1.9292 6.5228 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–158 
 
Table-A 7.10 SW-3 Returns to Indian Targets All-firms (OLS, 104) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.34% -0.11% -0.34% -0.1012 0.8961 -1.2163 -0.1012 0.8961 -1.2163 
-19 0.67% 0.05% 0.33% 0.1977 0.9889 2.1540 0.0683 0.9205 0.7990 
-18 -0.38% -0.12% -0.05% -0.0424 0.9129 -0.5002 0.0313 0.8950 0.3764 
-17 -0.61% -0.53% -0.66% -0.0877 1.0272 -0.9198 -0.0168 0.9056 -0.1995 
-16 -0.21% -0.19% -0.87% 0.0361 1.0790 0.3602 0.0011 0.9313 0.0131 
-15 0.46% -0.04% -0.41% 0.0780 0.8931 0.9406 0.0329 0.9178 0.3858 
-14 0.13% 0.08% -0.28% 0.0469 0.9561 0.5284 0.0481 0.8840 0.5869 
-13 -0.17% -0.29% -0.45% -0.0102 0.9822 -0.1116 0.0414 0.8973 0.4977 
-12 0.17% 0.02% -0.28% 0.0452 0.9688 0.5033 0.0542 1.0087 0.5785 
-11 0.80% 0.52% 0.52% 0.2205 1.0590 2.2435 0.1211 1.0281 1.2693 
-10 0.06% -0.06% 0.58% -0.0535 1.0207 -0.5653 0.0993 1.0613 1.0084 
-9 0.93% 0.42% 1.51% 0.2654 1.2435 2.2998 0.1717 1.0183 1.8170 
-8 -0.39% -0.27% 1.12% 0.0393 1.0268 0.4128 0.1759 1.0780 1.7581 
-7 0.67% -0.08% 1.79% 0.1145 1.0752 1.1479 0.2001 1.0818 1.9930 
-6 -0.65% -0.43% 1.15% -0.0771 1.1546 -0.7199 0.1734 1.1093 1.6843 
-5 -0.44% -0.25% 0.70% -0.0379 1.2583 -0.3244 0.1584 1.0971 1.5559 
-4 0.14% -0.31% 0.85% -0.0098 1.0401 -0.1016 0.1513 1.0879 1.4987 
-3 0.16% -0.03% 1.01% 0.0953 1.1362 0.9037 0.1695 1.0768 1.6961 
-2 0.52% -0.03% 1.53% 0.1744 1.0839 1.7337 0.2050 1.0890 2.0285 
-1 1.77% 0.44% 3.30% 0.5474 1.4981 3.9373 0.3222 1.0910 3.1823 
0 3.21% 1.45% 6.51% 1.0394 2.3181 4.8313 0.5413 1.1714 4.9789 
1 2.24% 0.87% 8.75% 0.4363 1.4778 3.1813 0.6219 1.2039 5.5658 
2 0.73% 0.19% 9.48% 0.1735 1.1925 1.5680 0.6444 1.2705 5.4647 
3 0.42% -0.28% 9.89% 0.0024 1.2391 0.0206 0.6313 1.2870 5.2851 
4 0.23% -0.10% 10.13% 0.0303 1.2018 0.2714 0.6246 1.3058 5.1537 
5 0.11% -0.11% 10.24% 0.0677 1.0025 0.7282 0.6257 1.2804 5.2657 
6 -0.20% -0.25% 10.04% -0.0311 1.1227 -0.2984 0.6081 1.2472 5.2531 
7 -0.22% -0.26% 9.83% -0.1505 0.9152 -1.7721 0.5687 1.2205 5.0201 
8 -0.67% -0.34% 9.15% -0.1945 0.8360 -2.5065 0.5227 1.2339 4.5641 
9 0.31% 0.03% 9.46% 0.0941 0.8879 1.1421 0.5311 1.2437 4.6009 
10 -0.18% -0.24% 9.28% -0.0065 0.8389 -0.0839 0.5212 1.2438 4.5156 
11 0.13% -0.16% 9.41% -0.0175 0.9514 -0.1976 0.5100 1.2319 4.4602 
12 0.34% -0.08% 9.75% 0.0320 0.8670 0.3980 0.5077 1.2296 4.4492 
13 -0.05% -0.04% 9.70% 0.0064 1.0024 0.0684 0.5013 1.2378 4.3639 
14 -0.18% -0.34% 9.52% -0.0554 0.8286 -0.7201 0.4847 1.2244 4.2656 
15 -0.68% -0.52% 8.85% -0.1299 0.8189 -1.7096 0.4563 1.2464 3.9447 
16 -0.80% -0.60% 8.04% -0.2467 0.9422 -2.8209 0.4095 1.2611 3.4991 
17 -0.08% -0.05% 7.96% -0.0950 0.9777 -1.0466 0.3887 1.2778 3.2778 
18 0.35% 0.02% 8.31% 0.0654 1.2364 0.5700 0.3942 1.2616 3.3663 
19 0.37% 0.34% 8.69% 0.0779 0.9187 0.9142 0.4015 1.2353 3.5023 
20 0.02% 0.08% 8.71% -0.0198 0.8497 -0.2512 0.3935 1.2111 3.5010 
21 -0.57% -0.44% 8.14% -0.1598 1.0610 -1.6230 0.3641 1.2074 3.2496 
22 -0.58% -0.17% 7.56% -0.1095 1.0123 -1.1660 0.3432 1.2010 3.0789 
23 -0.01% -0.26% 7.54% -0.0258 1.0039 -0.2772 0.3354 1.2294 2.9392 
24 0.10% 0.07% 7.64% 0.0651 0.8641 0.8123 0.3413 1.2088 3.0424 
25 -0.27% -0.22% 7.37% 0.0121 0.9502 0.1368 0.3394 1.1819 3.0938 
26 -0.46% -0.26% 6.90% -0.1171 0.8612 -1.4651 0.3187 1.1745 2.9235 
27 -0.15% 0.05% 6.75% -0.0243 1.0498 -0.2490 0.3118 1.1509 2.9194 
28 0.38% 0.13% 7.13% 0.0604 0.8763 0.7428 0.3172 1.1466 2.9812 
29 -0.20% -0.39% 6.93% -0.0096 1.1068 -0.0938 0.3127 1.1415 2.9516 
30 -0.01% 0.04% 6.92% 0.0338 0.9571 0.3803 0.3143 1.1255 3.0094 
          
-1 to 1     7.22% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06637 1.1681 1.9230 6.5449 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–159 
 
Table-A 7.11 Market Model; Indian Targets; German/Japanese (MM, 51); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.03% 0.23% -0.03% -0.0447 0.9483 -0.3271 -0.0447 0.9483 -0.3271 
-19 0.89% 0.25% 0.86% 0.3073 1.1058 1.9277 0.1857 1.0258 1.2556 
-18 -0.33% -0.19% 0.53% -0.0322 1.2197 -0.1829 0.1330 0.9933 0.9290 
-17 0.02% -0.05% 0.55% 0.0241 1.2988 0.1285 0.1272 1.1210 0.7873 
-16 -0.10% -0.45% 0.45% 0.0576 1.2440 0.3214 0.1396 1.1806 0.8201 
-15 0.49% 0.15% 0.94% 0.1051 0.9833 0.7415 0.1703 1.0943 1.0797 
-14 0.71% -0.08% 1.65% 0.1363 1.0647 0.8882 0.2092 1.0731 1.3524 
-13 -0.18% -0.29% 1.47% 0.0072 1.2506 0.0397 0.1983 1.1531 1.1925 
-12 0.19% 0.19% 1.66% 0.0194 1.0602 0.1267 0.1934 1.2223 1.0973 
-11 1.72% 0.89% 3.38% 0.4469 1.3240 2.3410 0.3248 1.2119 1.8587 
-10 0.16% 0.24% 3.54% -0.0011 1.3029 -0.0058 0.3093 1.2474 1.7199 
-9 0.65% 0.61% 4.19% 0.1861 1.0867 1.1881 0.3499 1.1518 2.1070 
-8 -1.06% -0.47% 3.13% -0.1416 1.0317 -0.9519 0.2969 1.1112 1.8532 
-7 1.47% 0.31% 4.60% 0.4252 1.4047 2.0996 0.3997 1.0510 2.6379 
-6 -0.47% -0.20% 4.13% -0.1073 1.0956 -0.6791 0.3585 1.0816 2.2988 
-5 0.31% 0.08% 4.44% 0.1758 1.6475 0.7402 0.3910 1.1212 2.4192 
-4 0.46% -0.16% 4.90% 0.0903 1.1644 0.5377 0.4013 1.1427 2.4356 
-3 0.20% -0.15% 5.10% 0.1213 1.6816 0.5003 0.4186 1.1596 2.5036 
-2 0.64% 0.06% 5.74% 0.2742 1.1798 1.6119 0.4703 1.1341 2.8762 
-1 2.48% 0.66% 8.22% 0.7917 1.6766 3.2751 0.6354 1.1980 3.6788 
0 4.88% 4.01% 13.10% 1.8095 2.8042 4.4756 1.0150 1.2572 5.5997 
1 2.97% 2.17% 16.07% 0.7972 2.0580 2.6867 1.1616 1.4233 5.6606 
2 1.26% 0.16% 17.33% 0.4092 1.5890 1.7861 1.2214 1.5432 5.4897 
3 0.82% 0.26% 18.15% 0.2170 1.3504 1.1148 1.2399 1.5809 5.4401 
4 -0.42% -0.02% 17.74% -0.1063 0.8796 -0.8380 1.1936 1.5698 5.2742 
5 0.32% 0.13% 18.05% 0.0990 1.0677 0.6432 1.1899 1.5155 5.4458 
6 -0.53% 0.49% 17.53% 0.0027 1.2489 0.0149 1.1682 1.5275 5.3043 
7 0.07% -0.25% 17.59% -0.0652 0.8966 -0.5045 1.1348 1.4910 5.2790 
8 -0.02% -0.14% 17.58% -0.0122 0.8339 -0.1018 1.1128 1.4698 5.2512 
9 0.93% 0.18% 18.51% 0.1466 0.8528 1.1922 1.1208 1.4583 5.3311 
10 0.16% 0.10% 18.67% 0.0610 0.9129 0.4635 1.1136 1.4250 5.4202 
11 -0.03% 0.29% 18.64% -0.0428 0.9040 -0.3286 1.0885 1.4172 5.3273 
12 0.65% 0.04% 19.28% 0.0842 0.8842 0.6603 1.0865 1.3960 5.3982 
13 0.05% 0.02% 19.34% 0.0711 1.0594 0.4658 1.0826 1.3894 5.4043 
14 -0.15% -0.24% 19.19% -0.0700 0.9044 -0.5366 1.0552 1.3775 5.3133 
15 -0.30% -0.17% 18.88% -0.0105 0.9699 -0.0753 1.0387 1.3871 5.1937 
16 -0.34% -0.20% 18.54% -0.2009 1.1247 -1.2388 0.9915 1.4101 4.8773 
17 0.00% 0.05% 18.55% -0.1231 0.9603 -0.8889 0.9584 1.4373 4.6251 
18 0.60% 0.08% 19.14% 0.1147 1.7387 0.4576 0.9644 1.4672 4.5594 
19 1.36% 0.69% 20.51% 0.3561 1.1351 2.1756 1.0086 1.4278 4.8997 
20 0.17% -0.11% 20.68% 0.1108 1.1206 0.6860 1.0135 1.3885 5.0630 
21 -0.30% -0.32% 20.38% -0.1053 1.2205 -0.5984 0.9851 1.3931 4.9047 
22 -0.07% 0.20% 20.31% 0.1235 1.0329 0.8290 0.9924 1.3516 5.0930 
23 0.74% 0.13% 21.04% 0.1782 0.9672 1.2777 1.0080 1.3671 5.1139 
24 0.20% 0.24% 21.24% 0.0428 0.8015 0.3703 1.0031 1.3533 5.1412 
25 -0.20% 0.05% 21.04% 0.0442 1.1635 0.2634 0.9986 1.3767 5.0312 
26 -0.10% 0.18% 20.95% -0.0273 0.6885 -0.2748 0.9840 1.3672 4.9918 
27 -0.01% 0.33% 20.93% 0.0687 0.9274 0.5137 0.9836 1.3691 4.9831 
28 0.72% 0.40% 21.65% 0.1025 1.1943 0.5951 0.9881 1.3807 4.9641 
29 -0.42% -0.66% 21.23% -0.1509 1.1616 -0.9012 0.9568 1.3913 4.7702 
30 0.36% 0.18% 21.59% 0.1822 0.9431 1.3401 0.9729 1.3946 4.8390 
          
-1 to 1     10.33% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06817 1.9620 2.4205 5.6223 
 
 
 
  
  
7–160 
 
Table-A 7.12 Market Model; Indian Targets; Anglo-Saxon (MM, 44); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% 0.05% 0.06% 0.0508 1.1612 0.3037 0.0508 1.1612 0.3037 
-19 0.37% 0.35% 0.43% 0.1615 1.0630 1.0542 0.1501 1.1687 0.8914 
-18 0.14% 0.14% 0.57% -0.0105 1.0896 -0.0668 0.1165 1.1829 0.6835 
-17 -0.57% -0.59% 0.01% -0.1238 1.4101 -0.6091 0.0390 1.1417 0.2372 
-16 0.69% -0.08% 0.70% 0.2500 1.3362 1.2982 0.1467 1.1876 0.8572 
-15 0.64% 0.09% 1.35% 0.1434 1.1315 0.8796 0.1925 1.1437 1.1678 
-14 0.38% 0.38% 1.72% 0.2410 1.1846 1.4117 0.2693 1.1329 1.6494 
-13 0.48% -0.11% 2.20% 0.1561 1.0675 1.0146 0.3071 1.1409 1.8677 
-12 0.69% 0.13% 2.90% 0.2290 1.3091 1.2139 0.3659 1.3108 1.9368 
-11 0.70% 0.64% 3.60% 0.2733 1.0879 1.7433 0.4335 1.3149 2.2877 
-10 0.38% 0.01% 3.98% 0.0972 1.3117 0.5144 0.4427 1.3175 2.3313 
-9 1.20% 0.18% 5.18% 0.5276 1.9154 1.9114 0.5761 1.3677 2.9230 
-8 1.05% 0.69% 6.23% 0.3724 1.4412 1.7928 0.6568 1.4800 3.0794 
-7 0.60% 0.01% 6.83% 0.1126 1.2230 0.6391 0.6630 1.5322 3.0026 
-6 -0.40% -0.57% 6.43% -0.0610 1.5067 -0.2808 0.6248 1.5622 2.7751 
-5 -1.12% -0.60% 5.31% -0.3489 1.2377 -1.9560 0.5177 1.5439 2.3269 
-4 0.32% -0.19% 5.63% 0.0883 1.4180 0.4319 0.5237 1.4635 2.4830 
-3 0.73% 0.52% 6.35% 0.3301 1.1578 1.9782 0.5867 1.4955 2.7224 
-2 0.83% -0.23% 7.18% 0.2755 1.4363 1.3310 0.6343 1.5592 2.8227 
-1 1.03% 0.24% 8.21% 0.6185 2.2559 1.9024 0.7565 1.5896 3.3024 
0 1.52% 0.44% 9.73% 0.7739 2.8523 1.8827 0.9072 1.7440 3.6094 
1 1.25% 0.53% 10.98% 0.3801 1.3882 1.9000 0.9674 1.6587 4.0468 
2 0.58% 0.41% 11.56% 0.2177 1.1959 1.2630 0.9915 1.6881 4.0756 
3 -0.14% -0.33% 11.42% -0.0446 0.9786 -0.3161 0.9615 1.6473 4.0500 
4 1.03% 0.06% 12.45% 0.3173 1.6158 1.3624 1.0055 1.6158 4.3183 
5 -0.14% 0.18% 12.31% -0.0055 1.1354 -0.0335 0.9849 1.5819 4.3203 
6 -0.68% -0.44% 11.63% -0.2994 0.9237 -2.2493 0.9089 1.4752 4.2752 
7 0.16% 0.12% 11.79% 0.0194 0.9341 0.1441 0.8962 1.3994 4.4436 
8 -0.53% -0.38% 11.27% -0.2061 0.8892 -1.6080 0.8423 1.3833 4.2254 
9 0.71% 0.26% 11.97% 0.2711 1.1695 1.6084 0.8777 1.4286 4.2628 
10 0.37% 0.16% 12.35% 0.0999 0.8796 0.7880 0.8813 1.4112 4.3335 
11 0.31% -0.28% 12.66% 0.0819 1.2277 0.4630 0.8819 1.3783 4.4398 
12 0.21% 0.42% 12.87% 0.0788 1.1882 0.4603 0.8822 1.4070 4.3507 
13 -0.16% -0.58% 12.71% -0.0644 1.2594 -0.3545 0.8581 1.4032 4.2432 
14 -0.07% -0.08% 12.64% -0.0117 0.9858 -0.0823 0.8438 1.3834 4.2320 
15 -0.40% -0.24% 12.24% -0.1053 0.9359 -0.7806 0.8144 1.3758 4.1075 
16 -0.62% -0.34% 11.62% -0.2179 0.9680 -1.5620 0.7675 1.3510 3.9420 
17 0.49% 0.10% 12.10% 0.1659 1.0612 1.0846 0.7843 1.3489 4.0342 
18 -0.15% -0.20% 11.95% -0.0595 0.7408 -0.5575 0.7646 1.3217 4.0140 
19 0.22% 0.70% 12.18% 0.0901 0.9840 0.6354 0.7692 1.2993 4.1080 
20 0.16% 0.20% 12.34% 0.0131 0.9341 0.0976 0.7619 1.3117 4.0303 
21 -0.48% -0.36% 11.85% -0.2122 0.8024 -1.8352 0.7200 1.2969 3.8520 
22 0.00% 0.24% 11.85% 0.0577 0.9975 0.4014 0.7204 1.2947 3.8608 
23 -0.28% 0.15% 11.57% -0.0323 1.0164 -0.2209 0.7072 1.3154 3.7307 
24 0.65% 0.34% 12.23% 0.2583 1.1298 1.5861 0.7378 1.2690 4.0344 
25 -0.14% -0.16% 12.09% 0.0228 0.8519 0.1856 0.7331 1.2177 4.1776 
26 -0.05% 0.03% 12.04% -0.0088 1.3079 -0.0469 0.7240 1.2452 4.0345 
27 0.09% 0.06% 12.13% -0.0278 1.2781 -0.1510 0.7124 1.2668 3.9021 
28 0.43% 0.18% 12.56% 0.1711 0.9637 1.2319 0.7296 1.2584 4.0227 
29 0.86% 0.18% 13.42% 0.3911 1.3297 2.0410 0.7775 1.2917 4.1769 
30 0.49% 0.16% 13.92% 0.0845 1.2014 0.4883 0.7817 1.2841 4.2241 
          
-1 to 1     3.80% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05706 1.0234 2.1857 3.2488 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–161 
 
Table-A 7.13 Market Model; Indian Targets; German/Japanese (OLS, 54); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.22% -0.08% -0.22% -0.0989 0.8177 -0.8808 -0.0989 0.8177 -0.8808 
-19 1.13% 0.09% 0.92% 0.2393 1.0677 1.6322 0.0993 0.9409 0.7685 
-18 -0.44% -0.14% 0.48% -0.0356 0.9590 -0.2702 0.0605 0.8935 0.4933 
-17 -0.24% -0.08% 0.23% -0.0569 1.0414 -0.3981 0.0239 0.9627 0.1812 
-16 -0.67% -0.67% -0.44% -0.0493 1.0599 -0.3390 -0.0006 0.9697 -0.0048 
-15 0.43% -0.05% -0.01% 0.0483 0.8575 0.4100 0.0191 0.9465 0.1471 
-14 -0.03% -0.05% -0.04% -0.0289 0.9678 -0.2175 0.0068 0.8828 0.0559 
-13 -0.49% -0.52% -0.53% -0.0589 1.0422 -0.4116 -0.0145 0.9373 -0.1125 
-12 -0.09% 0.00% -0.62% -0.0572 0.8743 -0.4766 -0.0327 1.0108 -0.2358 
-11 1.43% 0.86% 0.81% 0.2977 1.0606 2.0440 0.0631 1.0238 0.4487 
-10 0.21% 0.18% 1.02% 0.0039 1.1302 0.0254 0.0613 1.0727 0.4164 
-9 0.48% 0.53% 1.50% 0.1185 0.8897 0.9697 0.0929 0.9733 0.6953 
-8 -1.21% -0.63% 0.29% -0.1676 0.8759 -1.3937 0.0428 0.9574 0.3255 
-7 1.07% 0.08% 1.36% 0.2741 1.1719 1.7037 0.1145 0.9209 0.9055 
-6 -1.03% -0.27% 0.33% -0.1586 1.0021 -1.1525 0.0697 0.9461 0.5363 
-5 0.20% -0.06% 0.52% 0.1513 1.4579 0.7558 0.1053 0.9792 0.7830 
-4 0.20% -0.18% 0.72% -0.0031 0.9601 -0.0238 0.1014 1.0084 0.7321 
-3 -0.08% -0.33% 0.64% 0.0079 1.3779 0.0417 0.1004 0.9948 0.7349 
-2 0.39% -0.07% 1.03% 0.1978 1.0042 1.4348 0.1431 0.9839 1.0591 
-1 2.12% 0.27% 3.15% 0.5982 1.4046 3.1019 0.2732 1.0314 1.9294 
0 4.43% 3.69% 7.58% 1.4349 2.3317 4.4817 0.5798 1.1052 3.8202 
1 2.56% 1.76% 10.14% 0.5699 1.7763 2.3367 0.6879 1.2301 4.0731 
2 0.95% 0.02% 11.08% 0.2774 1.3751 1.4693 0.7307 1.3266 4.0113 
3 1.22% 0.19% 12.30% 0.1999 1.3363 1.0892 0.7561 1.3661 4.0307 
4 -0.35% -0.31% 11.95% -0.0978 0.8080 -0.8813 0.7212 1.3700 3.8341 
5 0.10% -0.21% 12.05% 0.0396 1.0524 0.2743 0.7150 1.3411 3.8829 
6 -0.57% -0.08% 11.47% 0.0383 1.2591 0.2218 0.7090 1.3434 3.8438 
7 -0.34% -0.48% 11.13% -0.2063 0.8426 -1.7832 0.6573 1.3140 3.6428 
8 -0.54% -0.40% 10.60% -0.1441 0.8045 -1.3043 0.6191 1.2952 3.4810 
9 0.52% -0.24% 11.12% 0.0183 0.7965 0.1675 0.6120 1.3103 3.4016 
10 -0.40% -0.14% 10.72% -0.0691 0.8014 -0.6276 0.5897 1.2962 3.3129 
11 -0.06% 0.11% 10.66% -0.0469 0.8098 -0.4220 0.5721 1.2825 3.2485 
12 0.52% -0.11% 11.18% 0.0239 0.7615 0.2285 0.5675 1.2694 3.2559 
13 -0.20% -0.19% 10.98% 0.0379 0.9537 0.2898 0.5656 1.2761 3.2280 
14 -0.46% -0.53% 10.51% -0.1337 0.7933 -1.2275 0.5349 1.2637 3.0823 
15 -0.70% -0.49% 9.81% -0.1053 0.8533 -0.8988 0.5098 1.2860 2.8873 
16 -0.96% -0.47% 8.85% -0.2606 0.9876 -1.9215 0.4601 1.3053 2.5668 
17 -0.22% -0.40% 8.63% -0.1449 0.7949 -1.3278 0.4304 1.3280 2.3606 
18 0.98% 0.13% 9.61% 0.1621 1.3920 0.8480 0.4508 1.3187 2.4900 
19 0.92% 0.39% 10.53% 0.2133 1.0041 1.5470 0.4789 1.2889 2.7060 
20 -0.08% -0.16% 10.45% 0.0079 0.9523 0.0604 0.4743 1.2528 2.7569 
21 -0.34% -0.33% 10.11% -0.0326 1.1605 -0.2045 0.4635 1.2369 2.7294 
22 -0.47% 0.02% 9.64% -0.0268 0.9498 -0.2055 0.4540 1.2001 2.7554 
23 0.55% 0.03% 10.19% 0.1237 0.8605 1.0473 0.4675 1.1963 2.8460 
24 -0.14% -0.12% 10.05% -0.0668 0.7144 -0.6806 0.4523 1.1948 2.7571 
25 -0.39% -0.29% 9.66% -0.0061 1.0899 -0.0406 0.4465 1.2066 2.6949 
26 -0.27% 0.03% 9.39% -0.0786 0.5691 -1.0059 0.4302 1.2022 2.6065 
27 -0.27% 0.01% 9.11% 0.0114 0.7774 0.1066 0.4274 1.2047 2.5837 
28 0.35% 0.04% 9.47% 0.0082 0.9741 0.0613 0.4242 1.2055 2.5625 
29 -0.74% -0.94% 8.73% -0.2154 0.9915 -1.5821 0.3895 1.2126 2.3391 
30 -0.07% 0.14% 8.66% 0.0683 0.8155 0.6103 0.3952 1.2072 2.3841 
          
-1 to 1     9.11% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06743 1.5029 2.0715 5.2836 
 
 
 
  
  
7–162 
 
Table-A 7.14 Market Model; Indian Targets; Anglo-Saxon (OLS, 46); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.14% -0.02% -0.14% -0.0493 1.0161 -0.3473 -0.0493 1.0161 -0.3473 
-19 0.32% 0.23% 0.17% 0.1360 0.9358 1.0410 0.0613 0.9513 0.4619 
-18 0.01% -0.05% 0.19% -0.0413 0.9215 -0.3210 0.0262 0.9610 0.1956 
-17 -0.68% -0.43% -0.49% -0.0824 0.9961 -0.5926 -0.0185 0.8485 -0.1560 
-16 0.49% -0.05% -0.01% 0.1632 1.1155 1.0479 0.0564 0.9025 0.4481 
-15 0.57% 0.15% 0.56% 0.1502 1.0019 1.0741 0.1129 0.9022 0.8962 
-14 0.10% 0.41% 0.67% 0.0849 0.9538 0.6377 0.1366 0.9252 1.0576 
-13 0.38% -0.12% 1.05% 0.1031 0.9376 0.7876 0.1642 0.9392 1.2524 
-12 0.55% -0.11% 1.60% 0.1693 1.0942 1.1082 0.2112 1.0770 1.4051 
-11 0.66% 0.56% 2.26% 0.2297 0.9874 1.6663 0.2730 1.1086 1.7643 
-10 0.10% -0.12% 2.36% -0.0692 0.9332 -0.5312 0.2395 1.1165 1.5365 
-9 0.93% 0.15% 3.29% 0.3917 1.5857 1.7697 0.3423 1.1374 2.1562 
-8 0.91% 0.64% 4.20% 0.3002 1.1760 1.8286 0.4122 1.2192 2.4218 
-7 0.47% -0.07% 4.67% 0.0318 0.9369 0.2430 0.4057 1.2742 2.2807 
-6 -0.35% -0.60% 4.32% -0.0076 1.3379 -0.0409 0.3899 1.3022 2.1453 
-5 -1.34% -0.72% 2.98% -0.3038 1.0111 -2.1527 0.3016 1.2773 1.6916 
-4 0.19% -0.11% 3.17% -0.0160 1.1680 -0.0979 0.2887 1.2367 1.6725 
-3 0.49% 0.24% 3.67% 0.2020 0.8931 1.6206 0.3282 1.2297 1.9120 
-2 0.65% -0.49% 4.32% 0.1537 1.2305 0.8949 0.3547 1.2726 1.9969 
-1 0.81% 0.24% 5.13% 0.4527 1.7101 1.8964 0.4470 1.2450 2.5718 
0 1.33% 0.33% 6.45% 0.6112 2.3672 1.8495 0.5696 1.3511 3.0200 
1 1.06% 0.37% 7.51% 0.2231 1.0825 1.4767 0.6040 1.3093 3.3050 
2 0.42% 0.30% 7.93% 0.0613 0.9388 0.4678 0.6035 1.3426 3.2204 
3 -0.55% -0.62% 7.38% -0.2307 1.0835 -1.5251 0.5438 1.3177 2.9563 
4 0.61% -0.23% 7.99% 0.1222 1.5731 0.5566 0.5572 1.3470 2.9634 
5 -0.16% -0.01% 7.83% 0.0226 0.9448 0.1717 0.5508 1.3253 2.9776 
6 -0.76% -0.40% 7.08% -0.2630 0.7825 -2.4080 0.4899 1.2417 2.8265 
7 -0.22% -0.10% 6.85% -0.1573 0.9168 -1.2293 0.4514 1.2072 2.6784 
8 -0.73% -0.51% 6.12% -0.2786 0.8910 -2.2396 0.3918 1.2342 2.2740 
9 0.58% 0.24% 6.70% 0.1990 0.9256 1.5405 0.4215 1.2428 2.4299 
10 0.25% 0.08% 6.95% 0.0616 0.7764 0.5682 0.4257 1.2399 2.4599 
11 0.09% -0.47% 7.03% -0.0248 1.0593 -0.1675 0.4147 1.2052 2.4649 
12 -0.04% 0.26% 7.00% 0.0128 0.9433 0.0975 0.4106 1.2086 2.4336 
13 -0.28% -0.66% 6.71% -0.1326 1.0974 -0.8654 0.3817 1.2005 2.2781 
14 -0.22% -0.21% 6.50% -0.0301 0.8447 -0.2555 0.3712 1.1839 2.2459 
15 -0.61% -0.37% 5.89% -0.1644 0.7870 -1.4966 0.3386 1.1927 2.0336 
16 -0.97% -0.75% 4.92% -0.3627 0.9300 -2.7937 0.2743 1.1868 1.6560 
17 0.03% 0.03% 4.95% -0.1118 1.2853 -0.6229 0.2526 1.2107 1.4946 
18 -0.06% -0.16% 4.89% 0.0217 1.1944 0.1304 0.2528 1.1811 1.5334 
19 0.02% 0.54% 4.92% 0.0075 0.8903 0.0603 0.2508 1.1597 1.5494 
20 0.01% 0.15% 4.93% -0.0680 0.7308 -0.6667 0.2371 1.1570 1.4681 
21 -0.85% -0.62% 4.08% -0.3198 0.9088 -2.5206 0.1849 1.1778 1.1248 
22 -0.40% -0.07% 3.69% -0.1070 1.1533 -0.6645 0.1664 1.2345 0.9659 
23 -0.79% -0.17% 2.89% -0.2274 1.1030 -1.4767 0.1303 1.3028 0.7163 
24 0.64% 0.38% 3.53% 0.2840 0.9811 2.0738 0.1712 1.2537 0.9780 
25 -0.21% 0.07% 3.31% 0.0134 0.7484 0.1286 0.1713 1.1927 1.0287 
26 -0.13% -0.09% 3.19% -0.0575 1.1170 -0.3687 0.1610 1.1853 0.9733 
27 -0.03% 0.10% 3.16% -0.0378 1.3154 -0.2061 0.1539 1.1297 0.9759 
28 0.25% 0.08% 3.41% 0.0974 0.8376 0.8330 0.1662 1.1240 1.0595 
29 0.85% 0.21% 4.26% 0.3299 1.1413 2.0704 0.2112 1.1165 1.3552 
30 0.31% 0.13% 4.57% 0.0342 1.0594 0.2316 0.2139 1.0763 1.4238 
          
-1 to 1     3.20% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05569 0.7430 1.7696 3.0081 
 
 
  
  
7–163 
 
Table-A 7.15 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Confucian Acq; (MM, 22) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.41% 0.26% 0.41% 0.1220 0.7049 0.8496 0.1220 0.7049 0.8496 
-19 1.02% 0.16% 1.43% 0.3513 1.2186 1.4146 0.3347 0.9557 1.7184 
-18 -0.15% -0.04% 1.28% -0.1379 0.7066 -0.9579 0.1936 0.8106 1.1722 
-17 0.10% -0.09% 1.37% 0.0351 0.8478 0.2033 0.1853 0.9567 0.9502 
-16 0.53% 0.39% 1.90% 0.1220 1.0757 0.5566 0.2203 0.8866 1.2192 
-15 0.81% 0.15% 2.71% 0.2135 0.9958 1.0521 0.2882 0.9684 1.4606 
-14 0.67% 0.89% 3.38% 0.2826 0.9125 1.5196 0.3737 1.0829 1.6931 
-13 0.50% 0.12% 3.87% 0.1581 0.6295 1.2327 0.4055 1.0628 1.8719 
-12 0.63% 0.50% 4.50% 0.2202 0.8936 1.2093 0.4557 1.1473 1.9488 
-11 1.02% 0.82% 5.52% 0.4145 0.8333 2.4405 0.5634 1.1471 2.4098 
-10 -0.42% -0.65% 5.11% -0.1185 1.0065 -0.5778 0.5014 1.1132 2.2101 
-9 0.27% 0.37% 5.38% 0.1485 0.9312 0.7824 0.5229 1.0404 2.4662 
-8 0.20% 0.29% 5.58% 0.0554 0.8590 0.3166 0.5178 1.0076 2.5215 
-7 1.75% 1.38% 7.33% 0.6332 1.2367 2.5125 0.6682 1.0328 3.1745 
-6 0.94% 0.06% 8.26% 0.2255 0.9296 1.1902 0.7037 1.0405 3.3188 
-5 1.46% 0.23% 9.72% 0.5579 1.9960 1.3715 0.8209 1.0901 3.6949 
-4 0.14% -0.23% 9.86% 0.0304 0.8529 0.1750 0.8037 1.0871 3.6278 
-3 -0.79% -0.15% 9.07% -0.1616 1.0882 -0.7285 0.7430 1.0057 3.6252 
-2 -0.04% -0.80% 9.03% -0.0228 1.0195 -0.1096 0.7180 0.9941 3.5440 
-1 0.52% 0.27% 9.54% 0.2165 1.2895 0.8240 0.7482 1.0802 3.3987 
0 3.05% 1.11% 12.59% 1.0421 1.9171 2.6672 0.9576 1.0489 4.4797 
1 2.08% 2.85% 14.67% 0.6023 1.4144 2.0896 1.0640 1.0598 4.9260 
2 1.19% 0.48% 15.85% 0.3409 1.2453 1.3434 1.1117 1.1073 4.9263 
3 1.20% 0.65% 17.05% 0.2486 1.1425 1.0679 1.1390 1.1521 4.8512 
4 -0.25% -0.17% 16.80% -0.1507 0.9681 -0.7636 1.0859 1.1345 4.6966 
5 0.20% 0.21% 17.00% 0.1092 0.9280 0.5772 1.0862 1.1638 4.5796 
6 -0.71% -0.85% 16.30% -0.2327 1.0693 -1.0680 1.0211 1.2413 4.0366 
7 0.03% -0.49% 16.32% -0.1289 1.1959 -0.5288 0.9784 1.1804 4.0671 
8 -1.32% -1.55% 15.01% -0.4338 1.0789 -1.9731 0.8808 1.2326 3.5064 
9 1.35% 0.39% 16.36% 0.3345 1.0907 1.5046 0.9270 1.2195 3.7300 
10 0.85% 0.41% 17.21% 0.2147 0.9340 1.1276 0.9505 1.2126 3.8462 
11 0.16% -0.06% 17.37% -0.0996 1.2009 -0.4070 0.9179 1.2048 3.7385 
12 -0.01% -0.68% 17.36% -0.0642 0.7961 -0.3956 0.8927 1.2156 3.6035 
13 0.76% 0.51% 18.13% 0.1826 1.2641 0.7088 0.9108 1.2681 3.5244 
14 -0.18% -0.16% 17.95% -0.1100 0.8901 -0.6062 0.8791 1.2955 3.3299 
15 -0.45% -0.62% 17.50% -0.0921 0.9787 -0.4617 0.8515 1.3264 3.1501 
16 -0.58% -0.71% 16.92% -0.3400 1.2813 -1.3021 0.7840 1.3144 2.9268 
17 -1.36% -0.40% 15.56% -0.4177 0.8947 -2.2910 0.7059 1.3456 2.5739 
18 -0.61% -0.67% 14.95% -0.4451 2.2085 -0.9889 0.6255 1.4295 2.1470 
19 0.24% 0.21% 15.20% -0.0584 1.0566 -0.2714 0.6084 1.4427 2.0691 
20 0.36% -0.05% 15.56% 0.0971 0.9133 0.5215 0.6161 1.4260 2.1198 
21 -0.26% -0.25% 15.30% -0.1929 1.5339 -0.6171 0.5789 1.5010 1.8925 
22 0.14% 0.16% 15.44% 0.0545 0.8057 0.3317 0.5805 1.4522 1.9613 
23 -0.76% -0.54% 14.69% -0.3148 1.0251 -1.5070 0.5264 1.4914 1.7317 
24 0.05% 0.04% 14.73% -0.0030 0.9548 -0.0155 0.5200 1.4451 1.7658 
25 -0.59% -0.25% 14.14% -0.1875 0.6951 -1.3238 0.4867 1.4619 1.6336 
26 -0.49% -0.17% 13.65% -0.1106 0.6808 -0.7970 0.4654 1.4354 1.5909 
27 -0.84% -0.77% 12.81% -0.3011 0.7974 -1.8529 0.4170 1.4245 1.4365 
28 -0.26% 0.29% 12.55% -0.0985 0.8149 -0.5934 0.3987 1.4517 1.3475 
29 -0.32% -0.47% 12.23% -0.1265 0.8581 -0.7233 0.3768 1.5031 1.2300 
30 0.49% 0.31% 12.71% 0.1034 0.9922 0.5111 0.3875 1.5231 1.2485 
          
-1 to 1     5.64% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05351 1.0744 1.5634 3.3721 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–164 
 
Table-A 7.16 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Germanic Acq; (MM, 18) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.22% -0.06% -0.22% -0.0713 0.9308 -0.3408 -0.0713 0.9308 -0.3408 
-19 0.48% 0.70% 0.26% 0.2494 0.5946 1.8654 0.1259 0.6446 0.8689 
-18 0.86% -0.23% 1.12% 0.2027 1.0476 0.8607 0.2198 0.8512 1.1488 
-17 -1.13% -0.28% -0.01% -0.1853 1.3911 -0.5925 0.0977 1.2861 0.3380 
-16 -0.43% -0.30% -0.44% -0.0445 1.4208 -0.1394 0.0675 1.5658 0.1918 
-15 -0.26% -0.21% -0.70% -0.1165 1.0517 -0.4926 0.0141 1.3320 0.0470 
-14 1.45% 0.65% 0.74% 0.3496 1.2702 1.2245 0.1452 1.2040 0.5364 
-13 -0.89% -0.86% -0.15% -0.1709 1.9459 -0.3907 0.0754 1.4643 0.2290 
-12 -0.81% -0.51% -0.96% -0.2132 0.9928 -0.9552 0.0000 1.4885 0.0001 
-11 2.51% 0.93% 1.54% 0.8319 1.0489 3.5283 0.2631 1.3227 0.8848 
-10 0.16% 0.20% 1.70% 0.1456 0.8996 0.7201 0.2948 1.2688 1.0334 
-9 0.89% 0.14% 2.59% 0.2002 1.0196 0.8735 0.3400 1.2735 1.1877 
-8 -2.50% -1.21% 0.09% -0.4861 1.1611 -1.8624 0.1918 1.1866 0.7192 
-7 0.99% 0.20% 1.08% 0.3181 1.0018 1.4125 0.2699 1.1485 1.0453 
-6 0.54% 0.06% 1.62% 0.1270 1.1037 0.5118 0.2935 1.2051 1.0835 
-5 0.63% -0.33% 2.25% 0.1540 0.9920 0.6904 0.3227 1.1772 1.2194 
-4 1.37% 0.33% 3.63% 0.3668 1.4279 1.1428 0.4020 1.2668 1.4117 
-3 0.67% -0.04% 4.29% 0.4407 2.3679 0.8280 0.4946 1.3646 1.6123 
-2 1.08% 0.43% 5.37% 0.5158 1.2368 1.8553 0.5997 1.3881 1.9219 
-1 3.04% 1.40% 8.41% 1.1197 2.0765 2.3988 0.8349 1.4190 2.6173 
0 6.15% 3.39% 14.55% 2.5693 3.6617 3.1213 1.3755 1.5798 3.8732 
1 5.24% 3.77% 19.79% 1.5193 2.2045 3.0659 1.6678 1.7743 4.1814 
2 1.60% 0.45% 21.39% 0.4258 1.8495 1.0241 1.7199 1.9592 3.9052 
3 -0.98% -0.11% 20.41% -0.3097 1.0598 -1.2998 1.6205 1.9565 3.6845 
4 -0.51% 0.04% 19.89% -0.1137 0.6936 -0.7295 1.5650 1.9551 3.5609 
5 -1.23% -0.73% 18.67% -0.3930 0.8865 -1.9719 1.4575 1.9010 3.4106 
6 -0.10% -0.08% 18.57% 0.1047 1.2832 0.3631 1.4504 1.9003 3.3953 
7 -0.30% 0.34% 18.27% -0.0423 0.6250 -0.3012 1.4163 1.8617 3.3842 
8 0.53% -0.07% 18.80% 0.1634 0.6031 1.2048 1.4220 1.8512 3.4170 
9 0.42% 0.20% 19.22% 0.1120 0.5847 0.8524 1.4185 1.8126 3.4813 
10 -0.01% 0.32% 19.22% -0.0969 0.8126 -0.5305 1.3781 1.7462 3.5107 
11 -0.16% 0.45% 19.06% 0.0640 0.7726 0.3685 1.3677 1.7401 3.4963 
12 1.13% 0.24% 20.19% 0.1414 0.7905 0.7955 1.3714 1.6626 3.6693 
13 0.14% -0.09% 20.33% 0.1741 1.1050 0.7010 1.3810 1.5854 3.8748 
14 0.47% 0.20% 20.80% 0.1940 1.0426 0.8279 1.3939 1.5549 3.9877 
15 -0.37% -0.40% 20.43% 0.0228 0.9182 0.1104 1.3782 1.5440 3.9706 
16 0.10% -0.38% 20.53% -0.0482 0.9282 -0.2309 1.3515 1.5483 3.8830 
17 0.81% 0.21% 21.33% 0.0881 1.0387 0.3774 1.3479 1.5222 3.9391 
18 1.56% 1.21% 22.89% 0.6590 1.1407 2.5699 1.4360 1.5189 4.2059 
19 1.87% 0.86% 24.77% 0.5414 1.0328 2.3320 1.5036 1.4616 4.5761 
20 0.06% 0.22% 24.83% 0.0078 0.7186 0.0481 1.4863 1.4516 4.5549 
21 -0.13% -0.34% 24.70% 0.0157 1.0193 0.0686 1.4710 1.3961 4.6871 
22 -0.04% 0.35% 24.66% 0.1284 1.0168 0.5617 1.4733 1.3690 4.7874 
23 0.87% 0.14% 25.53% 0.2501 0.7270 1.5302 1.4942 1.3445 4.9438 
24 -0.01% 0.00% 25.52% 0.0105 0.8492 0.0549 1.4791 1.3620 4.8309 
25 0.11% 0.30% 25.63% 0.3150 1.6626 0.8428 1.5093 1.4228 4.7190 
26 -0.31% 0.22% 25.33% -0.0808 0.5674 -0.6339 1.4814 1.3977 4.7148 
27 0.17% 0.43% 25.49% 0.1761 1.0730 0.7302 1.4913 1.3908 4.7701 
28 2.11% 0.99% 27.61% 0.5719 0.7116 3.5750 1.5577 1.3515 5.1271 
29 0.01% -0.72% 27.62% 0.1905 1.5603 0.5432 1.5690 1.3183 5.2943 
30 -0.21% 0.21% 27.41% -0.0064 0.8872 -0.0319 1.5527 1.3553 5.0961 
          
-1 to 1     14.42% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.07124 3.0070 3.0073 4.4480 
 
 
 
  
  
7–165 
 
Table-A 7.17 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Nordic Acq; (MM, 11) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.89% -0.39% -0.89% -0.3122 0.6671 -1.4857 -0.3122 0.6671 -1.4857 
-19 2.07% 0.26% 1.18% 0.4095 1.1804 1.1014 0.0688 1.0275 0.2126 
-18 -2.71% -0.43% -1.53% -0.3914 1.2656 -0.9819 -0.1698 1.0022 -0.5379 
-17 1.01% -0.05% -0.52% 0.2398 1.7538 0.4342 -0.0271 0.6333 -0.1361 
-16 -0.40% 0.66% -0.91% 0.1984 1.3482 0.4672 0.0644 0.9328 0.2193 
-15 0.49% 0.15% -0.43% 0.1397 0.7987 0.5551 0.1158 1.0167 0.3617 
-14 1.43% 0.37% 1.00% 0.1600 0.9173 0.5539 0.1677 0.9980 0.5336 
-13 -0.50% -0.29% 0.50% -0.1520 0.7631 -0.6324 0.1032 0.8302 0.3945 
-12 2.69% 0.56% 3.19% 0.4181 1.0428 1.2728 0.2366 0.9404 0.7988 
-11 3.70% 1.18% 6.89% 0.5758 1.4311 1.2773 0.4066 0.9409 1.3718 
-10 2.44% 1.08% 9.33% 0.4806 1.4992 1.0177 0.5325 0.9721 1.7393 
-9 -0.61% 0.73% 8.73% -0.1949 0.8738 -0.7082 0.4536 0.9860 1.4606 
-8 -0.51% -0.18% 8.22% -0.0129 0.7173 -0.0571 0.4322 0.9030 1.5196 
-7 1.43% 0.46% 9.65% 0.2251 1.0714 0.6672 0.4767 0.8659 1.7477 
-6 -1.20% -0.24% 8.45% -0.2568 0.8896 -0.9167 0.3942 0.8706 1.4375 
-5 0.92% 0.94% 9.37% 0.4628 1.1915 1.2333 0.4974 0.7227 2.1850 
-4 0.43% -0.13% 9.80% 0.1543 1.0628 0.4610 0.5200 0.8207 2.0115 
-3 0.54% -0.15% 10.33% 0.3255 1.2362 0.8361 0.5820 0.9264 1.9948 
-2 1.34% 0.01% 11.67% 0.3935 0.8690 1.4375 0.6568 0.8911 2.3401 
-1 4.55% 3.31% 16.22% 1.2386 1.5531 2.5318 0.9171 0.9403 3.0966 
0 3.57% 5.11% 19.79% 1.1001 2.7404 1.2745 1.1351 0.7250 4.9708 
1 4.12% 0.91% 23.92% 1.1133 2.4118 1.4655 1.3463 0.9090 4.7023 
2 1.90% -0.10% 25.81% 0.6932 2.1966 1.0020 1.4613 1.1005 4.2158 
3 3.05% 0.90% 28.87% 1.0526 1.8320 1.8241 1.6454 1.3667 3.8222 
4 -0.46% -0.69% 28.41% -0.0855 1.1277 -0.2407 1.5950 1.3834 3.6605 
5 1.74% 0.95% 30.15% 0.4749 1.7295 0.8718 1.6572 1.2669 4.1530 
6 -1.83% -0.06% 28.32% 0.0346 1.5662 0.0702 1.6329 1.2157 4.2645 
7 0.98% 0.14% 29.29% 0.1265 0.8411 0.4776 1.6274 1.1812 4.3739 
8 0.29% -0.01% 29.59% 0.0097 0.7892 0.0392 1.6009 1.1449 4.4391 
9 2.41% 0.81% 32.00% 0.4080 0.8039 1.6113 1.6485 1.1059 4.7326 
10 -0.30% 0.70% 31.70% 0.1740 0.9403 0.5875 1.6529 1.1239 4.6693 
11 1.39% 0.95% 33.09% 0.2747 0.7199 1.2114 1.6754 1.1429 4.6541 
12 0.70% 0.04% 33.79% 0.1454 0.7489 0.6165 1.6752 1.2040 4.4172 
13 -0.55% 0.22% 33.24% 0.0343 0.7271 0.1498 1.6562 1.2553 4.1890 
14 -0.82% -0.62% 32.42% -0.2962 0.5668 -1.6592 1.5823 1.2088 4.1559 
15 0.60% 0.45% 33.02% 0.3179 0.6857 1.4718 1.6132 1.1816 4.3343 
16 -0.20% 0.37% 32.82% 0.1225 1.1627 0.3345 1.6114 1.1997 4.2642 
17 0.41% 0.05% 33.24% 0.0199 1.0068 0.0628 1.5933 1.2597 4.0155 
18 0.62% -0.02% 33.85% 0.1212 0.8638 0.4456 1.5921 1.2281 4.1160 
19 1.55% 0.63% 35.40% 0.2896 0.7236 1.2706 1.6179 1.2178 4.2178 
20 0.09% -0.13% 35.49% 0.0700 1.2226 0.1819 1.6090 1.1688 4.3706 
21 -1.26% -0.79% 34.23% -0.3108 0.7923 -1.2453 1.5417 1.1874 4.1222 
22 -1.22% -0.20% 33.02% -0.3698 0.5400 -2.1743 1.4673 1.1619 4.0094 
23 1.36% 0.59% 34.38% 0.4645 0.6071 2.4290 1.5206 1.1353 4.2523 
24 0.56% 0.44% 34.93% 0.0887 0.4265 0.6605 1.5168 1.1335 4.2486 
25 -0.86% -0.60% 34.07% -0.2091 0.6774 -0.9800 1.4694 1.1139 4.1880 
26 1.66% 1.34% 35.74% 0.3885 0.7041 1.7520 1.5103 1.0579 4.5325 
27 -0.67% 0.24% 35.06% 0.0526 0.7628 0.2191 1.5021 1.0941 4.3589 
28 1.14% -0.19% 36.20% 0.0681 2.1958 0.0984 1.4964 1.1015 4.3133 
29 -0.80% -0.87% 35.40% -0.4710 1.6771 -0.8916 1.4148 1.1696 3.8405 
30 0.16% -0.35% 35.57% 0.2319 1.2877 0.5718 1.4333 1.0976 4.1460 
          
-1 to 1     12.24% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.09353 1.9930 2.3488 2.6939 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–166 
 
Table-A 7.18 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Anglo Acq; (MM, 44) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.03% -0.01% 0.03% 0.0279 1.1598 0.1706 0.0279 1.1598 0.1706 
-19 0.38% 0.41% 0.42% 0.2271 1.0894 1.4799 0.1803 1.1993 1.0672 
-18 -0.08% -0.03% 0.34% -0.0450 1.1607 -0.2749 0.1213 1.2517 0.6877 
-17 -0.30% -0.01% 0.04% -0.0168 1.4239 -0.0838 0.0966 1.1758 0.5833 
-16 0.82% 0.09% 0.86% 0.2623 1.4320 1.3002 0.2037 1.2101 1.1950 
-15 0.55% 0.09% 1.41% 0.1140 1.2265 0.6600 0.2325 1.2005 1.3749 
-14 -0.18% -0.05% 1.22% 0.0375 1.3266 0.2005 0.2294 1.1939 1.3641 
-13 0.19% -0.11% 1.41% 0.0922 1.0420 0.6281 0.2472 1.2178 1.4410 
-12 1.05% 0.13% 2.46% 0.3443 1.2479 1.9585 0.3479 1.3576 1.8187 
-11 0.80% 0.64% 3.26% 0.2741 1.0551 1.8440 0.4167 1.3716 2.1564 
-10 0.90% 0.25% 4.17% 0.2491 1.3748 1.2859 0.4724 1.3664 2.4540 
-9 1.38% 0.02% 5.55% 0.6528 2.0818 2.2257 0.6407 1.4565 3.1225 
-8 0.80% 0.29% 6.35% 0.3354 1.4243 1.6715 0.7086 1.5665 3.2108 
-7 0.60% 0.10% 6.95% 0.1326 1.2622 0.7459 0.7183 1.6280 3.1317 
-6 0.06% -0.24% 7.01% 0.2436 2.0370 0.8490 0.7568 1.6201 3.3159 
-5 -1.42% -0.67% 5.59% -0.4128 1.5927 -1.8398 0.6296 1.6978 2.6322 
-4 0.09% -0.30% 5.68% 0.0485 1.5006 0.2295 0.6226 1.6182 2.7309 
-3 1.14% 0.65% 6.82% 0.4919 1.3630 2.5616 0.7210 1.6757 3.0539 
-2 0.51% -0.23% 7.33% 0.1820 1.3770 0.9381 0.7435 1.7750 2.9732 
-1 0.46% -0.06% 7.79% 0.3916 2.5520 1.0892 0.8122 1.7754 3.2473 
0 2.00% 0.50% 9.79% 0.7904 3.1000 1.8098 0.9651 1.8702 3.6631 
1 1.18% 0.22% 10.97% 0.2560 1.6289 1.1154 0.9975 1.7603 4.0224 
2 0.85% 0.47% 11.83% 0.3039 1.1416 1.8895 1.0389 1.7485 4.2178 
3 -1.51% -0.38% 10.31% -0.4055 2.4051 -1.1968 0.9343 1.8494 3.5860 
4 0.66% 0.15% 10.97% 0.2740 1.6020 1.2140 0.9702 1.7820 3.8647 
5 -0.20% 0.06% 10.77% -0.0739 1.1666 -0.4498 0.9369 1.7355 3.8319 
6 -0.60% -0.40% 10.17% -0.3344 0.9438 -2.5148 0.8550 1.6119 3.7653 
7 -0.66% -0.07% 9.52% -0.1531 1.6305 -0.6664 0.8107 1.6362 3.5169 
8 -0.44% -0.31% 9.07% -0.1878 0.7967 -1.6731 0.7617 1.5855 3.4102 
9 0.30% 0.22% 9.37% 0.1645 1.3973 0.8357 0.7789 1.6164 3.4206 
10 0.35% 0.18% 9.73% 0.1052 0.8690 0.8594 0.7852 1.5932 3.4983 
11 0.22% -0.49% 9.95% 0.0465 1.1513 0.2867 0.7810 1.5619 3.5494 
12 -1.36% -0.07% 8.59% -0.3954 2.9200 -0.9612 0.7003 1.8352 2.7085 
13 0.26% -0.65% 8.85% 0.0300 1.3193 0.1612 0.6950 1.7475 2.8232 
14 -0.34% -0.29% 8.51% -0.1238 1.1176 -0.7865 0.6641 1.7610 2.6769 
15 -0.15% -0.19% 8.36% -0.0284 1.1261 -0.1792 0.6501 1.6802 2.7463 
16 -0.79% -0.25% 7.58% -0.3402 1.3081 -1.8460 0.5853 1.7148 2.4228 
17 0.56% 0.10% 8.14% 0.1024 1.1573 0.6279 0.5942 1.7070 2.4707 
18 -0.21% -0.16% 7.93% -0.1588 1.0237 -1.1012 0.5611 1.7206 2.3146 
19 0.43% 0.59% 8.36% 0.2052 1.0255 1.4201 0.5864 1.7137 2.4291 
20 0.43% 0.53% 8.79% 0.1605 0.9485 1.2008 0.6043 1.7145 2.5019 
21 0.08% -0.04% 8.87% 0.0286 0.9009 0.2256 0.6015 1.6960 2.5174 
22 0.19% 0.29% 9.06% 0.1116 1.0222 0.7748 0.6115 1.6959 2.5593 
23 -0.14% 0.17% 8.92% 0.0938 1.0370 0.6419 0.6186 1.7102 2.5676 
24 0.59% 0.28% 9.51% 0.2900 1.0864 1.8950 0.6549 1.6721 2.7803 
25 0.22% 0.40% 9.74% 0.1513 0.8876 1.2098 0.6701 1.6196 2.9368 
26 -0.02% 0.03% 9.71% -0.0304 1.3207 -0.1633 0.6585 1.6217 2.8822 
27 0.09% 0.07% 9.80% -0.0667 1.3458 -0.3518 0.6420 1.6483 2.7646 
28 0.59% 0.26% 10.39% 0.1921 0.9364 1.4562 0.6628 1.6407 2.8675 
29 0.81% 0.23% 11.20% 0.3688 1.2806 2.0441 0.7083 1.6588 3.0309 
30 0.71% 0.16% 11.91% 0.1972 1.0856 1.2896 0.7290 1.6317 3.1711 
          
-1 to 1     3.65% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06285 0.8302 2.5686 2.2942 
 
 
 
  
  
7–167 
 
Table-A 7.19  Market Returns; Indian Targets; LE Acq; (MM, 8) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.01% -1.55% 0.01% -0.0679 1.5474 -0.1249 -0.0679 1.5474 -0.1249 
-19 -0.40% -1.27% -0.39% -0.0029 1.2615 -0.0066 -0.0501 1.5372 -0.0927 
-18 0.39% 1.58% 0.00% 0.3479 1.9625 0.5048 0.1600 1.3883 0.3281 
-17 1.06% -0.24% 1.06% 0.0879 1.2997 0.1925 0.1825 1.4469 0.3591 
-16 -0.98% -0.84% 0.08% -0.3082 0.7426 -1.1817 0.0254 1.0797 0.0669 
-15 1.53% 0.31% 1.61% 0.3131 0.9544 0.9340 0.1510 0.7904 0.5439 
-14 -0.55% -1.44% 1.06% -0.2181 0.9811 -0.6330 0.0573 0.7903 0.2066 
-13 -0.37% -0.37% 0.69% -0.0272 0.4832 -0.1601 0.0440 0.6823 0.1838 
-12 -2.56% -1.22% -1.86% -0.6947 1.0038 -1.9705 -0.1901 0.4841 -1.1177 
-11 -2.04% -0.42% -3.90% -0.5799 2.0289 -0.8138 -0.3637 0.9616 -1.0768 
-10 -1.73% 0.07% -5.63% -0.5836 1.9680 -0.8443 -0.5227 1.4286 -1.0417 
-9 1.77% 0.85% -3.86% 0.5322 1.5642 0.9687 -0.3468 1.0164 -0.9716 
-8 -0.68% -0.59% -4.54% 0.0301 1.4377 0.0597 -0.3249 1.0580 -0.8743 
-7 1.19% -0.59% -3.34% 0.2408 2.3706 0.2892 -0.2487 0.5290 -1.3384 
-6 -2.36% -0.80% -5.70% -0.4151 1.8455 -0.6404 -0.3474 0.5426 -1.8231 
-5 -3.95% -4.65% -9.65% -1.0851 1.4547 -2.1238 -0.6077 0.5377 -3.2174 
-4 2.20% 0.22% -7.46% 0.3767 1.6369 0.6552 -0.4982 0.5788 -2.4504 
-3 1.49% 0.99% -5.97% 0.0990 1.2812 0.2199 -0.4608 0.7257 -1.8078 
-2 0.54% 0.46% -5.43% 0.3062 1.6342 0.5335 -0.3783 0.6522 -1.6513 
-1 1.28% -0.06% -4.16% 0.3027 0.9195 0.9373 -0.3010 0.5968 -1.4359 
0 4.26% 4.05% 0.10% 1.3531 1.6286 2.3655 0.0015 0.7468 0.0058 
1 -1.10% -1.70% -1.00% -0.5819 1.9178 -0.8639 -0.1226 0.8945 -0.3901 
2 0.08% -0.04% -0.92% 0.0212 0.3896 0.1549 -0.1155 0.8392 -0.3917 
3 0.18% -0.97% -0.75% 0.0899 0.9097 0.2813 -0.0947 0.7411 -0.3637 
4 -0.22% -0.46% -0.96% 0.0037 0.6945 0.0152 -0.0920 0.7284 -0.3597 
5 0.22% -0.15% -0.74% 0.0650 0.5966 0.3100 -0.0775 0.6706 -0.3290 
6 0.77% 0.73% 0.03% 0.1791 1.0930 0.4664 -0.0416 0.6454 -0.1835 
7 0.78% 0.12% 0.82% 0.1044 0.8458 0.3514 -0.0211 0.6580 -0.0913 
8 1.83% 2.16% 2.64% 0.5245 0.9750 1.5318 0.0767 0.6361 0.3431 
9 -0.63% -0.80% 2.01% -0.2703 0.5499 -1.3997 0.0260 0.6106 0.1213 
10 0.02% -0.10% 2.03% -0.0509 0.8779 -0.1651 0.0165 0.6337 0.0739 
11 0.73% 0.48% 2.77% 0.3652 0.8019 1.2967 0.0808 0.5274 0.4359 
12 1.16% -0.02% 3.93% 0.3306 1.4166 0.6645 0.1371 0.6100 0.6398 
13 -0.69% -0.15% 3.24% -0.3120 1.0122 -0.8775 0.0815 0.6308 0.3681 
14 0.01% 0.22% 3.24% -0.0861 0.8437 -0.2904 0.0658 0.7378 0.2540 
15 -0.81% -0.09% 2.43% -0.4345 1.1917 -1.0382 -0.0075 0.8592 -0.0249 
16 -0.87% -0.86% 1.57% -0.4295 0.7712 -1.5855 -0.0780 0.9242 -0.2404 
17 -0.35% -0.37% 1.22% -0.3615 0.9923 -1.0373 -0.1356 0.9987 -0.3867 
18 1.44% 0.94% 2.67% 0.4923 1.1699 1.1981 -0.0551 0.8989 -0.1744 
19 0.89% 0.80% 3.55% 0.6255 1.8527 0.9613 0.0445 0.6306 0.2011 
20 0.28% 0.01% 3.83% 0.3559 1.8686 0.5422 0.0996 0.4393 0.6453 
21 0.42% 0.83% 4.24% 0.1833 0.5794 0.9005 0.1267 0.4379 0.8235 
22 -0.39% 0.50% 3.86% 0.3246 1.8027 0.5127 0.1747 0.4770 1.0425 
23 2.49% 2.28% 6.35% 0.6145 1.1633 1.5041 0.2653 0.4563 1.6555 
24 1.01% 0.61% 7.36% 0.1388 0.9477 0.4169 0.2830 0.4564 1.7659 
25 0.56% 0.21% 7.91% 0.2181 0.9073 0.6845 0.3121 0.4368 2.0345 
26 -1.20% -1.30% 6.71% -0.3724 0.7140 -1.4850 0.2545 0.5063 1.4309 
27 2.00% 3.01% 8.71% 0.5864 0.7780 2.1460 0.3364 0.4904 1.9534 
28 0.33% 0.35% 9.05% 0.0930 0.5022 0.5272 0.3463 0.4530 2.1761 
29 -0.10% -0.51% 8.95% -0.0246 0.5026 -0.1395 0.3393 0.4470 2.1611 
30 1.46% 0.85% 10.40% 0.4142 0.7667 1.5381 0.3940 0.3680 3.0479 
          
-1 to 1     4.43% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04336 0.6200 1.3215 1.3358 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–168 
 
Table-A 7.20 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Ohers Acq; (MM,3) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -3.69% -2.75% -3.69% -0.9190 0.8114 -1.9022 -0.9190 0.8114 -1.9022 
-19 -2.23% -0.24% -5.92% 0.0471 0.8705 0.0908 -0.6165 0.6922 -1.4960 
-18 -5.69% -6.14% -11.61% -0.8584 0.8233 -1.7512 -0.9990 1.0404 -1.6128 
-17 -5.67% -6.40% -17.28% -1.0791 0.5981 -3.0304 -1.4047 1.1376 -2.0739 
-16 -3.06% -0.67% -20.34% -0.2339 0.4726 -0.8313 -1.3610 1.0930 -2.0914 
-15 2.43% 0.82% -17.91% 0.7496 1.1737 1.0726 -0.9364 0.7007 -2.2446 
-14 2.70% 0.13% -15.21% 1.4005 3.1191 0.7541 -0.3376 1.0815 -0.5243 
-13 0.19% -0.05% -15.02% 0.4743 1.2283 0.6486 -0.1481 1.2341 -0.2016 
-12 -0.45% 0.96% -15.47% 0.5379 1.4160 0.6381 0.0397 1.5563 0.0428 
-11 -6.28% -5.25% -21.75% -1.2264 0.4896 -4.2066 -0.3502 1.3218 -0.4450 
-10 -0.41% 0.71% -22.16% -0.2171 0.6231 -0.5852 -0.3993 1.1584 -0.5790 
-9 5.74% 0.67% -16.42% 0.5259 0.6649 1.3285 -0.2305 0.9202 -0.4208 
-8 -5.96% 0.17% -22.38% -0.4367 0.8855 -0.8283 -0.3426 1.1291 -0.5096 
-7 2.22% -0.38% -20.16% -0.1827 1.1811 -0.2599 -0.3790 0.8610 -0.7393 
-6 0.33% -0.65% -19.84% -0.0793 0.2406 -0.5538 -0.3866 0.7746 -0.8382 
-5 0.42% 0.36% -19.41% 0.0937 0.1160 1.3561 -0.3509 0.7553 -0.7804 
-4 -1.49% -1.03% -20.91% -0.5762 0.9255 -1.0458 -0.4802 0.6571 -1.2273 
-3 -1.07% -0.18% -21.98% 0.0278 0.4443 0.1050 -0.4601 0.7432 -1.0398 
-2 0.39% 3.11% -21.59% -0.0417 1.7060 -0.0410 -0.4574 0.9673 -0.7942 
-1 6.81% 6.53% -14.78% 1.5359 0.9323 2.7668 -0.1024 1.1100 -0.1549 
0 6.91% 0.37% -7.87% 0.4347 1.1943 0.6113 -0.0051 0.8786 -0.0097 
1 10.78% 5.98% 2.92% 1.1278 1.3553 1.3976 0.2355 0.5763 0.6863 
2 0.53% 0.14% 3.45% -0.0271 0.2635 -0.1730 0.2247 0.5130 0.7355 
3 1.62% 1.71% 5.07% -0.1657 1.4054 -0.1981 0.1861 0.6972 0.4483 
4 2.95% 2.43% 8.01% 0.6453 1.0568 1.0256 0.3114 0.4989 1.0484 
5 2.02% 1.78% 10.04% 0.6890 0.9112 1.2700 0.4405 0.4447 1.6635 
6 12.59% 16.44% 22.63% 2.2397 2.5693 1.4641 0.8633 0.9108 1.5920 
7 1.36% 0.00% 23.99% 0.9919 2.2782 0.7312 1.0352 1.3135 1.3237 
8 -3.51% -0.20% 20.48% -0.2165 0.6144 -0.5919 0.9770 1.3721 1.1959 
9 -10.03% -5.91% 10.45% -1.0886 1.2790 -1.4296 0.7618 1.5804 0.8096 
10 -1.08% -0.62% 9.37% 0.5614 1.9624 0.4805 0.8502 1.9032 0.7503 
11 3.24% 3.20% 12.61% 0.4852 0.5127 1.5896 0.9226 1.9455 0.7965 
12 0.08% -0.46% 12.69% 0.1243 0.4114 0.5073 0.9302 1.9872 0.7861 
13 3.65% 4.35% 16.34% 0.7876 1.0307 1.2834 1.0515 2.1322 0.8282 
14 3.19% 0.10% 19.53% 0.2345 0.4756 0.8281 1.0760 2.0722 0.8721 
15 -2.17% -0.65% 17.37% -0.1113 0.4970 -0.3761 1.0424 2.1187 0.8263 
16 0.26% 0.41% 17.63% 0.5932 1.4376 0.6931 1.1257 2.3204 0.8148 
17 -2.05% -2.15% 15.58% -0.3551 0.2750 -2.1689 1.0532 2.2472 0.7871 
18 -3.55% -3.81% 12.03% -0.5633 0.5972 -1.5841 0.9494 2.1362 0.7464 
19 -0.46% -0.37% 11.57% -0.1249 0.4608 -0.4551 0.9177 2.0421 0.7548 
20 4.12% 2.10% 15.69% 1.2721 1.8171 1.1758 1.1051 1.9678 0.9432 
21 -2.16% -2.90% 13.54% -0.5052 2.2713 -0.3735 1.0139 1.6713 1.0189 
22 -0.77% 0.74% 12.77% -0.2421 0.8650 -0.4701 0.9652 1.7096 0.9482 
23 1.04% -0.40% 13.81% 0.3557 0.8043 0.7428 1.0078 1.6595 1.0200 
24 -1.86% -0.18% 11.94% -0.4951 0.9309 -0.8933 0.9227 1.6821 0.9213 
25 0.00% -0.95% 11.95% 0.1400 0.5868 0.4007 0.9332 1.7453 0.8981 
26 -4.53% -4.32% 7.41% -0.9912 0.7098 -2.3453 0.7787 1.7204 0.7602 
27 2.22% 2.33% 9.63% 0.7403 0.8864 1.4027 0.8774 1.7246 0.8544 
28 1.32% 0.64% 10.95% 0.3968 0.5437 1.2258 0.9251 1.7844 0.8707 
29 -3.73% -3.19% 7.22% -0.8885 1.2311 -1.2122 0.7901 1.6008 0.8290 
30 -1.65% 0.04% 5.57% -0.5022 0.8978 -0.9394 0.7120 1.4639 0.8169 
          
-1 to 1     24.51% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.1327 1.7889 0.9113 3.2970 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–169 
 
Table-A 7.21 Market Returns; Indian Targets; SA Acq (MM, 3) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.76% 0.75% -0.76% -0.1509 0.7925 -0.3541 -0.1509 0.7925 -0.3541 
-19 -0.17% 0.44% -0.94% 0.0051 1.0163 0.0093 -0.1031 0.8913 -0.2151 
-18 0.61% 0.51% -0.32% 0.2144 0.0418 9.5320 0.0396 0.7377 0.0998 
-17 0.83% 1.18% 0.51% 0.1876 1.1076 0.3148 0.1281 0.2700 0.8818 
-16 0.26% -0.01% 0.77% 0.1541 0.4179 0.6854 0.1835 0.3888 0.8772 
-15 2.50% 2.97% 3.27% 0.9749 1.0653 1.7012 0.5655 0.6758 1.5554 
-14 -3.16% -3.78% 0.11% -1.0823 0.2646 -7.6020 0.1145 0.7159 0.2973 
-13 2.96% 3.98% 3.07% 0.9129 0.8883 1.9104 0.4299 0.3556 2.2468 
-12 -0.99% 0.58% 2.09% -0.3627 1.2687 -0.5314 0.2844 0.6427 0.8225 
-11 -0.59% 0.37% 1.50% -0.1120 0.6978 -0.2985 0.2344 0.5891 0.7395 
-10 -0.54% -0.14% 0.96% -0.1534 0.2325 -1.2264 0.1772 0.5916 0.5568 
-9 1.98% 1.12% 2.95% 0.6351 0.5385 2.1924 0.3530 0.5819 1.1276 
-8 2.18% 1.87% 5.13% 0.7628 0.1682 8.4281 0.5507 0.5972 1.7140 
-7 -2.17% -1.15% 2.96% -0.6786 0.7716 -1.6350 0.3493 0.5504 1.1797 
-6 -1.28% -1.56% 1.68% -0.4234 0.1753 -4.4884 0.2281 0.5770 0.7350 
-5 1.42% 1.62% 3.10% 0.4685 0.3570 2.4389 0.3380 0.4798 1.3094 
-4 -2.12% -1.10% 0.98% -0.7765 0.8286 -1.7420 0.1396 0.5611 0.4624 
-3 -2.44% -3.74% -1.46% -0.9215 1.0758 -1.5923 -0.0815 0.3065 -0.4945 
-2 5.75% 6.58% 4.29% 2.2301 2.2406 1.8502 0.4322 0.8084 0.9940 
-1 -1.11% 0.11% 3.18% -0.2619 0.7796 -0.6244 0.3627 0.8721 0.7732 
0 -0.55% -1.15% 2.63% -0.0842 2.0059 -0.0781 0.3356 0.8320 0.7499 
1 1.15% 1.19% 3.78% 0.3650 0.5081 1.3354 0.4057 0.7587 0.9941 
2 -3.88% -3.27% -0.10% -1.1145 1.3567 -1.5270 0.1644 1.0248 0.2982 
3 4.53% 1.86% 4.44% 1.3761 1.5540 1.6460 0.4419 0.8013 1.0251 
4 5.45% 0.40% 9.89% 1.5202 2.9950 0.9435 0.7370 0.6387 2.1449 
5 -0.19% -0.51% 9.69% -0.1052 0.2734 -0.7155 0.7020 0.6379 2.0456 
6 -1.80% -2.13% 7.89% -0.6249 0.6542 -1.7757 0.5686 0.5127 2.0618 
7 2.96% 1.83% 10.85% 0.9468 0.8486 2.0742 0.7373 0.5941 2.3072 
8 0.47% -1.40% 11.33% -0.0547 1.4148 -0.0719 0.7143 0.6512 2.0392 
9 -0.44% 0.10% 10.88% -0.0570 0.6134 -0.1726 0.6919 0.6144 2.0934 
10 0.17% -1.10% 11.06% 0.0230 1.0535 0.0405 0.6848 0.4247 2.9975 
11 -4.25% -3.40% 6.81% -1.4271 0.7979 -3.3248 0.4217 0.2835 2.7648 
12 1.50% 2.05% 8.32% 0.5567 0.5681 1.8216 0.5122 0.3675 2.5910 
13 -3.56% -2.85% 4.75% -1.1689 1.1289 -1.9247 0.3041 0.2218 2.5494 
14 -1.29% -1.26% 3.46% -0.5049 0.5631 -1.6668 0.2144 0.2652 1.5028 
15 1.48% 1.57% 4.95% 0.4181 0.6386 1.2171 0.2811 0.2364 2.2103 
16 -4.30% -4.00% 0.65% -1.4725 0.9105 -3.0062 0.0352 0.3782 0.1730 
17 1.74% 3.24% 2.38% 0.4627 1.1724 0.7336 0.1098 0.2925 0.6978 
18 -1.43% -0.93% 0.95% -0.4673 0.3187 -2.7257 0.0335 0.2378 0.2623 
19 1.89% 1.48% 2.84% 0.6608 0.4287 2.8649 0.1376 0.1806 1.4166 
20 -1.60% -1.93% 1.24% -0.5871 0.2855 -3.8224 0.0442 0.1770 0.4644 
21 -3.62% -3.38% -2.38% -1.2897 0.2041 -11.7447 -0.1553 0.1931 -1.4956 
22 1.41% 1.63% -0.97% 0.5066 0.2688 3.5031 -0.0763 0.1966 -0.7211 
23 0.03% -1.66% -0.94% -0.1944 1.2561 -0.2876 -0.1047 0.3770 -0.5161 
24 2.39% 2.43% 1.46% 0.7977 0.2239 6.6214 0.0154 0.3996 0.0716 
25 -0.48% -0.57% 0.97% -0.0240 0.9144 -0.0487 0.0117 0.2914 0.0746 
26 -2.12% -4.18% -1.15% -0.5437 1.4787 -0.6835 -0.0677 0.2976 -0.4231 
27 0.03% -0.51% -1.12% 0.0457 0.8429 0.1007 -0.0604 0.1735 -0.6474 
28 -2.60% -2.99% -3.72% -0.9048 0.8458 -1.9887 -0.1891 0.0523 -6.7256 
29 3.14% 4.02% -0.57% 1.1195 0.9810 2.1214 -0.0289 0.1866 -0.2874 
30 -1.78% 0.70% -2.35% -0.4166 1.4597 -0.5306 -0.0869 0.1911 -0.8454 
          
-1 to 1     -0.51% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0627 0.0109 1.6481 0.0123 
 
 
 
  
  
7–170 
 
Table-A 7.22 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Confucian Acq (OLS, 24);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.20% 0.04% 0.20% 0.0309 0.6138 0.2622 0.0309 0.6138 0.2622 
-19 0.59% 0.00% 0.79% 0.1802 1.0235 0.9165 0.1493 0.8022 0.9687 
-18 -0.30% -0.05% 0.49% -0.1171 0.6541 -0.9319 0.0543 0.7231 0.3908 
-17 -0.03% -0.04% 0.47% -0.0156 0.7525 -0.1080 0.0392 0.8232 0.2479 
-16 0.19% 0.16% 0.65% 0.0198 0.9059 0.1136 0.0439 0.8220 0.2780 
-15 0.50% 0.11% 1.16% 0.1090 0.8507 0.6669 0.0846 0.9279 0.4745 
-14 0.43% 0.40% 1.59% 0.1705 0.7649 1.1604 0.1427 1.0075 0.7375 
-13 0.38% -0.03% 1.96% 0.1138 0.5963 0.9936 0.1738 0.9833 0.9199 
-12 0.34% 0.26% 2.30% 0.0805 0.7716 0.5427 0.1906 1.0435 0.9510 
-11 0.73% 0.74% 3.03% 0.2836 0.7798 1.8929 0.2705 1.0577 1.3314 
-10 -0.49% -0.64% 2.54% -0.1271 0.8647 -0.7649 0.2196 1.0287 1.1114 
-9 0.26% 0.44% 2.80% 0.1390 0.7711 0.9381 0.2504 0.9391 1.3879 
-8 0.03% 0.08% 2.83% 0.0251 0.7460 0.1751 0.2475 0.9040 1.4254 
-7 1.30% 0.77% 4.13% 0.4196 1.0896 2.0045 0.3507 0.9750 1.8721 
-6 0.86% 0.08% 4.99% 0.2208 0.8322 1.3813 0.3958 0.9871 2.0873 
-5 1.42% 0.35% 6.41% 0.5298 1.8067 1.5266 0.5157 1.0298 2.6067 
-4 -0.03% -0.12% 6.38% -0.0001 0.7820 -0.0008 0.5003 1.0354 2.5150 
-3 -0.87% -0.48% 5.51% -0.1736 0.9206 -0.9816 0.4453 0.9379 2.4713 
-2 -0.12% -0.16% 5.39% -0.0312 0.8452 -0.1924 0.4262 0.9325 2.3793 
-1 0.31% 0.15% 5.70% 0.1127 1.0217 0.5744 0.4406 0.9641 2.3790 
0 2.78% 0.97% 8.48% 0.8031 1.5079 2.7725 0.6053 0.9876 3.1901 
1 1.64% 1.80% 10.12% 0.3662 1.2331 1.5460 0.6694 1.0127 3.4409 
2 0.97% 0.17% 11.09% 0.2586 1.0493 1.2829 0.7086 1.0589 3.4837 
3 0.91% 0.62% 12.00% 0.1537 1.0294 0.7772 0.7251 1.1035 3.4205 
4 -0.28% -0.05% 11.72% -0.1068 0.8604 -0.6464 0.6891 1.1120 3.2257 
5 -0.10% -0.08% 11.62% 0.0698 1.1301 0.3213 0.6894 1.1522 3.1145 
6 -0.28% -0.76% 11.34% -0.0092 1.4422 -0.0334 0.6747 1.1909 2.9491 
7 -0.48% -1.58% 10.87% -0.3126 1.1689 -1.3923 0.6035 1.1531 2.7243 
8 -1.61% -1.68% 9.26% -0.5162 1.0364 -2.5928 0.4971 1.2039 2.1494 
9 0.83% 0.03% 10.09% 0.1775 1.0720 0.8618 0.5211 1.2282 2.2088 
10 0.39% -0.13% 10.47% 0.0527 0.8217 0.3341 0.5221 1.2355 2.2000 
11 0.17% 0.19% 10.65% -0.0184 1.0817 -0.0884 0.5107 1.2208 2.1775 
12 -0.32% -0.92% 10.33% -0.1125 0.7010 -0.8353 0.4833 1.2454 2.0201 
13 0.66% 0.45% 11.00% 0.1897 1.1317 0.8726 0.5087 1.3061 2.0274 
14 -0.42% -0.53% 10.58% -0.1439 0.7845 -0.9549 0.4770 1.3384 1.8553 
15 -0.77% -0.75% 9.80% -0.1814 0.8703 -1.0851 0.4401 1.3836 1.6559 
16 -0.66% -0.43% 9.14% -0.2799 1.0066 -1.4476 0.3881 1.3642 1.4810 
17 -1.38% -0.71% 7.76% -0.3718 0.7752 -2.4967 0.3227 1.3777 1.2191 
18 -0.67% -0.31% 7.10% -0.2987 1.5450 -1.0065 0.2707 1.3882 1.0149 
19 -0.06% -0.13% 7.03% -0.1549 0.9086 -0.8876 0.2428 1.3925 0.9075 
20 0.07% -0.09% 7.11% -0.0061 0.7538 -0.0421 0.2388 1.3685 0.9084 
21 -0.19% -0.32% 6.92% 0.0122 1.4962 0.0425 0.2379 1.3995 0.8847 
22 -0.19% 0.00% 6.73% -0.1542 0.9092 -0.8826 0.2116 1.3529 0.8140 
23 -0.63% -1.00% 6.10% -0.2339 1.0262 -1.1866 0.1739 1.3438 0.6735 
24 -0.34% -0.17% 5.77% -0.1367 0.8708 -0.8173 0.1516 1.3265 0.5948 
25 -0.50% -0.56% 5.27% -0.1472 0.8672 -0.8836 0.1282 1.3251 0.5036 
26 -0.57% -0.16% 4.70% -0.1222 0.5993 -1.0614 0.1090 1.3056 0.4346 
27 -1.00% -0.60% 3.70% -0.2976 0.6661 -2.3257 0.0649 1.2977 0.2604 
28 -0.38% -0.14% 3.32% -0.1055 0.6456 -0.8503 0.0492 1.3064 0.1959 
29 -0.63% -0.62% 2.70% -0.2006 0.8034 -1.2997 0.0203 1.3519 0.0782 
30 0.32% 0.19% 3.02% 0.0604 0.8623 0.3645 0.0286 1.3555 0.1097 
          
-1 to 1     4.73% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.05335 0.7402 1.3032 2.9566 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–171 
 
Table-A 7.23 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Germanic Acq (OLS, 18);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.49% -0.28% -0.49% -0.1366 0.8515 -0.7186 -0.1366 0.8515 -0.7186 
-19 0.23% 0.45% -0.26% 0.1465 0.5247 1.2503 0.0070 0.5826 0.0535 
-18 0.69% -0.26% 0.43% 0.1158 0.8724 0.5944 0.0725 0.7320 0.4437 
-17 -1.31% -0.35% -0.87% -0.2084 1.1543 -0.8087 -0.0414 1.0840 -0.1711 
-16 -0.72% -0.58% -1.59% -0.0875 1.2340 -0.3175 -0.0762 1.2987 -0.2627 
-15 -0.58% -0.22% -2.17% -0.1878 0.8544 -0.9846 -0.1462 1.1447 -0.5721 
-14 1.20% 0.41% -0.97% 0.2356 1.0665 0.9895 -0.0463 0.9935 -0.2087 
-13 -1.20% -1.25% -2.17% -0.2459 1.6108 -0.6837 -0.1302 1.1732 -0.4972 
-12 -1.05% -0.76% -3.22% -0.2305 0.9191 -1.1234 -0.1996 1.2125 -0.7375 
-11 2.17% 0.93% -1.05% 0.6215 0.8229 3.3834 0.0072 1.0913 0.0294 
-10 -0.06% 0.07% -1.11% 0.0718 0.7582 0.4243 0.0285 1.0684 0.1195 
-9 0.70% 0.08% -0.42% 0.1229 0.8892 0.6190 0.0628 1.0769 0.2610 
-8 -2.70% -1.26% -3.12% -0.4914 1.0478 -2.1008 -0.0760 1.0103 -0.3370 
-7 0.67% 0.07% -2.45% 0.2096 0.8888 1.0563 -0.0172 0.9828 -0.0785 
-6 0.29% 0.01% -2.15% 0.0762 0.9767 0.3495 0.0030 1.0270 0.0133 
-5 0.35% -0.38% -1.80% 0.0572 0.8592 0.2983 0.0172 0.9874 0.0782 
-4 1.19% 0.27% -0.61% 0.2600 1.2333 0.9442 0.0798 1.0624 0.3364 
-3 0.34% -0.67% -0.27% 0.2418 1.9843 0.5458 0.1345 1.1197 0.5381 
-2 0.79% 0.15% 0.52% 0.3698 1.1192 1.4798 0.2158 1.1422 0.8461 
-1 2.78% 1.22% 3.30% 0.9323 1.8535 2.2531 0.4188 1.1822 1.5867 
0 5.88% 3.40% 9.18% 2.1569 3.1824 3.0359 0.8794 1.3243 2.9743 
1 4.94% 3.18% 14.11% 1.2424 1.9384 2.8709 1.1240 1.4617 3.4445 
2 1.32% 0.15% 15.44% 0.2770 1.5958 0.7776 1.1571 1.6031 3.2331 
3 -1.14% -0.28% 14.30% -0.3472 0.9684 -1.6058 1.0618 1.5899 2.9915 
4 -0.68% -0.43% 13.62% -0.1510 0.6563 -1.0309 1.0102 1.5935 2.8396 
5 -1.47% -0.95% 12.14% -0.4253 0.8114 -2.3478 0.9072 1.5514 2.6192 
6 -0.30% -0.59% 11.84% 0.0544 1.1153 0.2187 0.9007 1.5433 2.6141 
7 -0.56% -0.14% 11.28% -0.1183 0.5609 -0.9447 0.8621 1.5095 2.5581 
8 0.29% -0.33% 11.57% 0.0706 0.5446 0.5807 0.8602 1.4971 2.5737 
9 0.14% -0.11% 11.71% 0.0143 0.5361 0.1197 0.8484 1.4660 2.5920 
10 -0.30% -0.30% 11.41% -0.1692 0.7735 -0.9800 0.8042 1.4131 2.5491 
11 -0.41% 0.23% 10.99% -0.0116 0.7380 -0.0705 0.7895 1.4089 2.5099 
12 0.80% -0.02% 11.80% 0.0549 0.7588 0.3242 0.7870 1.3379 2.6346 
13 -0.10% -0.34% 11.70% 0.1049 1.0566 0.4447 0.7933 1.2821 2.7715 
14 0.09% -0.18% 11.79% 0.0810 0.9840 0.3689 0.7956 1.2574 2.8340 
15 -0.67% -0.74% 11.12% -0.0629 0.8742 -0.3221 0.7740 1.2663 2.7378 
16 -0.12% -0.67% 11.00% -0.1173 0.8609 -0.6104 0.7442 1.2699 2.6249 
17 0.54% -0.13% 11.54% 0.0084 0.8639 0.0433 0.7357 1.2479 2.6406 
18 1.23% 1.04% 12.77% 0.4939 0.9853 2.2454 0.8053 1.2457 2.8954 
19 1.63% 0.50% 14.41% 0.4012 0.8987 1.9998 0.8586 1.1978 3.2108 
20 -0.18% -0.05% 14.23% -0.0664 0.6407 -0.4642 0.8377 1.1939 3.1427 
21 -0.43% -0.63% 13.80% -0.0745 0.9132 -0.3654 0.8161 1.1315 3.2309 
22 -0.29% 0.04% 13.51% 0.0340 0.8723 0.1746 0.8118 1.1015 3.3011 
23 0.54% 0.04% 14.05% 0.1339 0.6680 0.8977 0.8227 1.0831 3.4022 
24 -0.26% -0.28% 13.80% -0.0560 0.7757 -0.3235 0.8051 1.0967 3.2883 
25 -0.04% 0.17% 13.76% 0.2329 1.5089 0.6913 0.8307 1.1452 3.2489 
26 -0.58% -0.22% 13.18% -0.1447 0.5460 -1.1871 0.8007 1.1268 3.1828 
27 -0.11% 0.16% 13.08% 0.0897 0.9999 0.4019 0.8052 1.1268 3.2010 
28 1.88% 0.87% 14.96% 0.4193 0.6337 2.9635 0.8569 1.0838 3.5416 
29 -0.27% -1.18% 14.69% 0.0551 1.3432 0.1839 0.8561 1.0459 3.6662 
30 -0.40% 0.00% 14.28% -0.0702 0.8110 -0.3877 0.8378 1.0775 3.4827 
          
-1 to 1     13.60% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.07068 2.5009 2.6218 4.2727 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–172 
 
Table-A 7.24 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Nordic Acq (OLS, 11);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.93% -0.55% -0.93% -0.2906 0.6404 -1.4412 -0.2906 0.6404 -1.4412 
-19 1.91% 0.16% 0.98% 0.3418 1.0854 1.0002 0.0362 0.9106 0.1263 
-18 -2.82% -0.64% -1.84% -0.2867 0.9169 -0.9930 -0.1359 0.8037 -0.5371 
-17 0.91% -0.12% -0.93% 0.1159 1.4431 0.2551 -0.0598 0.5276 -0.3598 
-16 -0.54% 0.49% -1.46% 0.1411 1.1151 0.4019 0.0097 0.6990 0.0439 
-15 0.27% -0.16% -1.19% 0.1017 0.7181 0.4499 0.0503 0.7805 0.2048 
-14 1.34% 0.20% 0.14% 0.0675 0.7155 0.2994 0.0721 0.7712 0.2969 
-13 -0.58% -0.51% -0.44% -0.1652 0.7172 -0.7317 0.0090 0.6420 0.0447 
-12 2.50% 0.90% 2.07% 0.2741 0.7667 1.1353 0.0999 0.7041 0.4505 
-11 3.65% 1.14% 5.72% 0.4048 1.0846 1.1852 0.2227 0.6606 1.0709 
-10 2.33% 1.54% 8.05% 0.4448 1.3492 1.0472 0.3465 0.7197 1.5291 
-9 -0.73% 0.48% 7.32% -0.2258 0.7082 -1.0127 0.2666 0.6830 1.2396 
-8 -0.64% -0.10% 6.67% 0.0050 0.6704 0.0238 0.2575 0.6629 1.2337 
-7 1.24% 0.35% 7.91% 0.1624 0.9147 0.5640 0.2915 0.6271 1.4765 
-6 -1.29% -0.30% 6.62% -0.2640 0.7364 -1.1384 0.2135 0.6249 1.0851 
-5 0.85% 0.68% 7.47% 0.3884 1.0473 1.1779 0.3038 0.5055 1.9090 
-4 0.29% -0.20% 7.76% 0.1016 0.9604 0.3359 0.3194 0.6001 1.6904 
-3 0.36% -0.23% 8.12% 0.2422 1.0694 0.7193 0.3675 0.6888 1.6944 
-2 1.19% -0.05% 9.31% 0.3574 0.8000 1.4187 0.4397 0.6803 2.0527 
-1 4.40% 3.29% 13.71% 1.0351 1.2934 2.5418 0.6600 0.7071 2.9643 
0 3.35% 5.10% 17.06% 0.9652 2.2911 1.3380 0.8547 0.5701 4.7619 
1 4.10% 1.69% 21.16% 1.0125 2.1925 1.4668 1.0509 0.7282 4.5839 
2 1.65% -0.12% 22.80% 0.5992 2.0578 0.9248 1.1528 0.9524 3.8443 
3 2.88% 0.92% 25.68% 0.9481 1.6835 1.7886 1.3220 1.2295 3.4150 
4 -0.44% -0.77% 25.24% -0.0483 1.0723 -0.1431 1.2857 1.2721 3.2099 
5 1.58% 0.95% 26.82% 0.3660 1.5019 0.7740 1.3325 1.2137 3.4869 
6 -2.01% -0.33% 24.81% 0.0262 1.2177 0.0684 1.3126 1.1876 3.5104 
7 0.71% -0.01% 25.52% 0.0032 0.6835 0.0150 1.2896 1.1461 3.5735 
8 0.10% -0.06% 25.61% -0.0531 0.6781 -0.2486 1.2573 1.1321 3.5273 
9 2.35% 0.89% 27.96% 0.2870 0.6096 1.4953 1.2886 1.1224 3.6461 
10 -0.44% 0.70% 27.52% 0.1477 0.7875 0.5957 1.2941 1.1516 3.5693 
11 1.33% 0.94% 28.85% 0.2185 0.6158 1.1268 1.3124 1.1698 3.5632 
12 0.48% 0.03% 29.33% 0.1012 0.6525 0.4924 1.3099 1.2126 3.4309 
13 -0.61% 0.25% 28.72% 0.0312 0.6544 0.1514 1.2959 1.2709 3.2384 
14 -1.06% -1.01% 27.67% -0.3130 0.4984 -1.9945 1.2243 1.2283 3.1657 
15 0.45% 0.73% 28.11% 0.2452 0.5745 1.3553 1.2481 1.2074 3.2831 
16 -0.33% 0.58% 27.78% 0.0639 0.9778 0.2077 1.2416 1.2245 3.2204 
17 0.15% 0.11% 27.93% -0.0288 0.8741 -0.1045 1.2205 1.2860 3.0142 
18 0.53% 0.05% 28.46% 0.0822 0.7374 0.3540 1.2179 1.2401 3.1192 
19 1.44% 0.75% 29.90% 0.2160 0.6648 1.0320 1.2367 1.2464 3.1513 
20 -0.01% -0.28% 29.90% -0.0094 1.0194 -0.0294 1.2201 1.1950 3.2427 
21 -1.46% -1.00% 28.44% -0.2852 0.6894 -1.3139 1.1615 1.2238 3.0143 
22 -1.38% -0.25% 27.06% -0.3724 0.4989 -2.3710 1.0911 1.2149 2.8524 
23 1.31% 0.45% 28.37% 0.3921 0.5294 2.3520 1.1377 1.1819 3.0574 
24 0.37% 0.48% 28.74% 0.0151 0.3518 0.1360 1.1273 1.1785 3.0378 
25 -0.99% -0.80% 27.74% -0.2156 0.6259 -1.0940 1.0832 1.1791 2.9175 
26 1.54% 0.76% 29.28% 0.2434 0.5239 1.4757 1.1071 1.1307 3.1098 
27 -0.77% -0.13% 28.51% 0.0417 0.5620 0.2356 1.1015 1.1607 3.0140 
28 1.03% -0.25% 29.55% -0.0217 1.8445 -0.0374 1.0871 1.1716 2.9470 
29 -1.01% -0.98% 28.54% -0.4431 1.4190 -0.9918 1.0135 1.2212 2.6358 
30 0.00% -0.36% 28.55% 0.1609 1.0822 0.4721 1.0261 1.1389 2.8615 
          
1 to 1     11.85% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.09412 1.7395 2.0331 2.7174 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–173 
 
Table-A 7.25 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Anglo Acq (OLS, 46);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.19% -0.09% -0.19% -0.0538 0.9981 -0.3896 -0.0538 0.9981 -0.3896 
-19 0.30% 0.31% 0.11% 0.1498 0.9321 1.1613 0.0679 0.9622 0.5097 
-18 -0.22% -0.13% -0.11% -0.0837 0.9631 -0.6281 0.0071 0.9960 0.0514 
-17 -0.45% -0.14% -0.56% 0.0097 0.9600 0.0731 0.0110 0.8517 0.0933 
-16 0.60% 0.24% 0.03% 0.2135 1.1023 1.3990 0.1053 0.8658 0.8787 
-15 0.46% 0.06% 0.49% 0.1157 1.0664 0.7839 0.1434 0.8891 1.1648 
-14 -0.44% -0.08% 0.05% -0.0422 0.9737 -0.3130 0.1168 0.8645 0.9759 
-13 0.07% -0.24% 0.12% 0.0434 0.8964 0.3499 0.1246 0.9065 0.9930 
-12 0.87% -0.05% 1.00% 0.2628 1.0292 1.8444 0.2051 1.0438 1.4191 
-11 0.74% 0.62% 1.74% 0.2306 0.9489 1.7552 0.2675 1.0971 1.7610 
-10 0.57% -0.08% 2.31% 0.0512 0.9912 0.3728 0.2704 1.1080 1.7630 
-9 1.06% 0.01% 3.38% 0.4693 1.7070 1.9859 0.3944 1.1618 2.4521 
-8 0.64% 0.13% 4.02% 0.2553 1.1444 1.6112 0.4497 1.2437 2.6120 
-7 0.45% -0.05% 4.47% 0.0423 0.9586 0.3189 0.4447 1.3086 2.4545 
-6 0.07% -0.16% 4.53% 0.0843 1.3357 0.4557 0.4514 1.3322 2.4473 
-5 -1.57% -0.87% 2.96% -0.3266 1.2490 -1.8885 0.3554 1.3723 1.8706 
-4 -0.04% -0.52% 2.92% -0.0286 1.1698 -0.1765 0.3378 1.3192 1.8499 
-3 0.88% 0.31% 3.80% 0.3585 0.9449 2.7404 0.4128 1.3257 2.2494 
-2 0.32% -0.49% 4.11% 0.0903 1.0478 0.6225 0.4225 1.3821 2.2082 
-1 0.26% 0.08% 4.37% 0.3060 1.9486 1.1344 0.4803 1.3226 2.6229 
0 1.78% 0.37% 6.14% 0.6647 2.5104 1.9126 0.6137 1.3911 3.1868 
1 0.97% 0.18% 7.11% 0.1066 1.2639 0.6094 0.6224 1.3354 3.3664 
2 0.63% 0.35% 7.75% 0.1135 0.8628 0.9499 0.6323 1.3395 3.4098 
3 -1.89% -0.81% 5.85% -0.5671 2.0855 -1.9642 0.5033 1.4182 2.5632 
4 0.21% -0.10% 6.06% -0.0050 1.3991 -0.0260 0.4921 1.4244 2.4954 
5 -0.24% -0.04% 5.82% -0.0064 0.9389 -0.0495 0.4813 1.3860 2.5082 
6 -0.69% -0.40% 5.13% -0.2784 0.7926 -2.5372 0.4187 1.2911 2.3425 
7 -1.04% -0.26% 4.10% -0.3594 1.3556 -1.9148 0.3432 1.3382 1.8527 
8 -0.65% -0.51% 3.45% -0.2382 0.7835 -2.1956 0.2930 1.3317 1.5894 
9 0.19% 0.16% 3.64% 0.0874 1.0492 0.6019 0.3041 1.3348 1.6455 
10 0.24% 0.15% 3.88% 0.0683 0.7381 0.6684 0.3114 1.3265 1.6957 
11 0.00% -0.72% 3.88% -0.0673 0.9176 -0.5297 0.2946 1.2966 1.6412 
12 -1.57% -0.27% 2.31% -0.3922 2.4467 -1.1580 0.2218 1.4883 1.0765 
13 0.12% -0.66% 2.43% -0.0275 1.0656 -0.1865 0.2138 1.4125 1.0934 
14 -0.53% -0.78% 1.89% -0.0967 0.8921 -0.7829 0.1944 1.4187 0.9897 
15 -0.39% -0.43% 1.50% -0.0973 0.9285 -0.7566 0.1755 1.3598 0.9321 
16 -1.18% -0.75% 0.32% -0.4156 0.9887 -3.0365 0.1047 1.3956 0.5421 
17 0.11% 0.03% 0.43% -0.1089 1.2562 -0.6263 0.0857 1.4019 0.4415 
18 -0.11% -0.13% 0.32% 0.0073 1.2247 0.0428 0.0857 1.3967 0.4435 
19 0.20% 0.51% 0.52% 0.0948 0.8823 0.7765 0.0997 1.3963 0.5156 
20 0.21% 0.34% 0.73% 0.0363 0.7244 0.3620 0.1041 1.3913 0.5405 
21 -0.35% -0.30% 0.37% -0.1290 0.9635 -0.9668 0.0830 1.4086 0.4255 
22 -0.21% 0.09% 0.16% -0.0229 1.1340 -0.1458 0.0785 1.4547 0.3898 
23 -0.66% -0.07% -0.50% -0.1435 1.0674 -0.9710 0.0560 1.5186 0.2663 
24 0.52% 0.34% 0.02% 0.2714 0.9135 2.1462 0.0958 1.4778 0.4683 
25 0.10% 0.44% 0.12% 0.0879 0.7221 0.8790 0.1077 1.4248 0.5461 
26 -0.12% -0.09% 0.00% -0.0873 1.0908 -0.5784 0.0938 1.4037 0.4828 
27 -0.04% 0.06% -0.04% -0.0404 1.3052 -0.2235 0.0870 1.3563 0.4634 
28 0.38% 0.19% 0.34% 0.1432 0.7725 1.3395 0.1066 1.3516 0.5696 
29 0.77% 0.21% 1.11% 0.3053 1.0919 2.0196 0.1487 1.3346 0.8048 
30 0.52% 0.13% 1.63% 0.1139 0.9096 0.9046 0.1632 1.2889 0.9145 
          
-1 to 1     3.00% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06248 0.6220 2.0327 2.2103 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7–174 
 
Table-A 7.26 Market Returns; Indian Targets; LE Acq (OLS, 9);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.16% -0.07% -0.16% -0.1271 1.2226 -0.3076 -0.1271 1.2226 -0.3076 
-19 2.88% -0.97% 2.72% 0.3611 1.6434 0.6501 0.1655 1.5680 0.3122 
-18 0.41% 1.59% 3.13% 0.2987 1.4573 0.6064 0.3076 1.4057 0.6473 
-17 0.01% -0.88% 3.14% -0.1224 0.9430 -0.3839 0.2052 1.3484 0.4502 
-16 -2.96% -1.55% 0.18% -0.5280 0.7485 -2.0865 -0.0526 0.9393 -0.1656 
-15 2.62% -0.08% 2.80% 0.3832 0.9936 1.1409 0.1084 0.8282 0.3873 
-14 -3.76% -2.55% -0.96% -0.6345 1.2412 -1.5121 -0.1394 0.6343 -0.6501 
-13 -1.34% -0.99% -2.30% -0.1820 0.3952 -1.3622 -0.1947 0.5268 -1.0934 
-12 -2.63% -1.25% -4.94% -0.5721 0.7875 -2.1492 -0.3743 0.4753 -2.3296 
-11 -1.77% -0.04% -6.71% -0.4512 1.5981 -0.8352 -0.4978 0.8537 -1.7249 
-10 -0.41% 0.28% -7.11% -0.3146 1.7108 -0.5439 -0.5695 1.2641 -1.3326 
-9 1.27% 0.23% -5.85% 0.2977 1.2156 0.7245 -0.4593 0.9317 -1.4582 
-8 -0.96% -0.93% -6.81% -0.1167 1.0720 -0.3220 -0.4736 0.9950 -1.4080 
-7 0.72% -0.99% -6.09% 0.1518 1.8045 0.2489 -0.4158 0.5832 -2.1091 
-6 -5.18% -1.61% -11.28% -0.7306 1.6240 -1.3308 -0.5904 0.5009 -3.4866 
-5 -3.80% -3.92% -15.07% -0.8571 1.1276 -2.2484 -0.7859 0.4386 -5.2998 
-4 1.47% -0.15% -13.61% 0.0955 1.2160 0.2322 -0.7393 0.6070 -3.6030 
-3 0.83% -0.11% -12.77% -0.0589 1.0484 -0.1661 -0.7323 0.6930 -3.1258 
-2 -0.01% -0.03% -12.79% 0.1686 1.2940 0.3855 -0.6741 0.6282 -3.1742 
-1 0.75% -0.17% -12.04% 0.1266 0.6840 0.5475 -0.6287 0.5610 -3.3153 
0 3.42% 2.08% -8.62% 0.9232 1.3103 2.0841 -0.4121 0.6329 -1.9263 
1 -1.31% -0.55% -9.93% -0.5325 1.5213 -1.0354 -0.5162 0.7060 -2.1627 
2 -0.30% -0.29% -10.23% -0.0724 0.2915 -0.7351 -0.5199 0.6723 -2.2875 
3 3.72% -1.00% -6.51% 0.4369 1.6103 0.8026 -0.4198 0.7331 -1.6939 
4 0.44% -0.47% -6.07% -0.0119 0.7008 -0.0502 -0.4137 0.7765 -1.5760 
5 0.40% 0.26% -5.67% 0.0586 0.4248 0.4083 -0.3942 0.7377 -1.5807 
6 -0.20% 0.45% -5.87% -0.0496 0.9160 -0.1601 -0.3963 0.7033 -1.6671 
7 0.34% -0.06% -5.53% -0.0259 0.6527 -0.1174 -0.3941 0.6841 -1.7041 
8 0.16% 1.06% -5.37% 0.2243 0.9825 0.6752 -0.3456 0.5723 -1.7863 
9 -1.07% -1.30% -6.44% -0.3432 0.4791 -2.1188 -0.4024 0.5928 -2.0082 
10 -1.66% -0.96% -8.09% -0.2862 0.7341 -1.1532 -0.4473 0.5878 -2.2509 
11 0.90% 0.07% -7.19% 0.2475 0.6823 1.0732 -0.3965 0.5492 -2.1356 
12 2.03% 0.01% -5.16% 0.3033 1.1055 0.8117 -0.3376 0.6506 -1.5352 
13 -1.63% -2.47% -6.78% -0.3881 0.7884 -1.4561 -0.3992 0.6138 -1.9238 
14 -0.38% -0.12% -7.16% -0.1500 0.6376 -0.6957 -0.4188 0.6621 -1.8712 
15 -1.65% -0.51% -8.81% -0.4657 0.9243 -1.4904 -0.4906 0.7405 -1.9595 
16 -3.73% -1.52% -12.54% -0.7322 1.0442 -2.0743 -0.6043 0.7578 -2.3586 
17 -0.55% -0.55% -13.09% -0.3112 0.8444 -1.0901 -0.6467 0.8336 -2.2951 
18 4.72% 0.89% -8.37% 0.7670 1.5764 1.4392 -0.5156 0.8077 -1.8882 
19 -0.04% 0.33% -8.41% 0.4024 1.6492 0.7218 -0.4455 0.5716 -2.3053 
20 -0.05% -0.08% -8.46% 0.2058 1.6113 0.3778 -0.4078 0.4797 -2.5152 
21 0.68% 0.47% -7.78% 0.1721 0.5498 0.9259 -0.3764 0.4959 -2.2453 
22 -1.30% -0.73% -9.08% 0.1542 1.4388 0.3171 -0.3485 0.4771 -2.1605 
23 1.64% 0.47% -7.44% 0.3377 0.9050 1.1040 -0.2936 0.4774 -1.8191 
24 0.56% -0.01% -6.88% 0.0523 0.7567 0.2043 -0.2825 0.4851 -1.7227 
25 -0.47% -0.27% -7.35% -0.0090 0.7354 -0.0364 -0.2808 0.4995 -1.6627 
26 -1.36% -1.09% -8.71% -0.3234 0.5627 -1.7000 -0.3249 0.5581 -1.7223 
27 1.32% 1.92% -7.39% 0.3608 0.6335 1.6847 -0.2694 0.5298 -1.5046 
28 -0.83% -1.17% -8.22% -0.1262 0.4545 -0.8215 -0.2847 0.5028 -1.6750 
29 -0.49% -0.09% -8.71% -0.1059 0.3865 -0.8102 -0.2968 0.4890 -1.7957 
30 -0.42% 0.31% -9.13% 0.0317 0.8041 0.1167 -0.2895 0.4595 -1.8634 
          
-1 to 1     2.86% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.04321 0.2986 0.9892 0.8930 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–175 
 
Table-A 7.27 Market Returns; Indian Targets; Others Acq (OLS, 3);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -4.13% -3.44% -4.13% -0.6564 0.4595 -2.4068 -0.6564 0.4595 -2.4068 
-19 -2.69% -0.48% -6.82% -0.0176 0.6169 -0.0480 -0.4766 0.2893 -2.7755 
-18 -6.17% -5.99% -12.99% -0.5895 0.3477 -2.8560 -0.7295 0.4356 -2.8216 
-17 -6.26% -6.13% -19.25% -0.7646 0.1828 -7.0480 -1.0140 0.3761 -4.5417 
-16 -3.61% -1.22% -22.86% -0.2368 0.3302 -1.2083 -1.0129 0.4087 -4.1751 
-15 2.43% 0.15% -20.43% 0.3814 0.6784 0.9472 -0.7689 0.2979 -4.3479 
-14 2.41% -0.53% -18.03% 0.6140 1.7301 0.5979 -0.4798 0.7656 -1.0559 
-13 0.23% -0.15% -17.79% 0.3554 0.8843 0.6770 -0.3232 0.8151 -0.6680 
-12 -0.99% 1.56% -18.78% 0.3680 1.0829 0.5724 -0.1821 1.0530 -0.2913 
-11 -6.34% -5.97% -25.12% -0.8945 0.5192 -2.9026 -0.4556 0.8835 -0.8687 
-10 -0.25% 1.14% -25.36% -0.2186 0.6174 -0.5964 -0.5003 0.7803 -1.0801 
-9 5.83% 0.44% -19.53% 0.3689 0.5683 1.0934 -0.3725 0.5917 -1.0605 
-8 -5.82% -0.24% -25.35% -0.3601 0.5998 -1.0116 -0.4578 0.7306 -1.0555 
-7 2.35% -1.04% -23.00% -0.0496 0.7276 -0.1148 -0.4544 0.5096 -1.5020 
-6 -0.13% -1.33% -23.13% -0.1353 0.2531 -0.9004 -0.4739 0.4360 -1.8310 
-5 0.21% -0.17% -22.92% 0.0156 0.1659 0.1582 -0.4549 0.4429 -1.7306 
-4 -2.11% -1.59% -25.02% -0.3815 0.4212 -1.5259 -0.5339 0.3277 -2.7443 
-3 -1.24% -0.38% -26.26% -0.0179 0.2683 -0.1122 -0.5230 0.3541 -2.4887 
-2 0.39% 3.78% -25.87% 0.1011 1.0334 0.1649 -0.4859 0.3426 -2.3896 
-1 6.98% 6.95% -18.89% 1.0343 0.6469 2.6936 -0.2423 0.4750 -0.8594 
0 7.13% 0.55% -11.76% 0.2904 1.0257 0.4770 -0.1731 0.2471 -1.1803 
1 12.22% 5.58% 0.46% 0.7507 1.2100 1.0452 -0.0091 0.0380 -0.4022 
2 0.08% 0.16% 0.55% -0.0971 0.2843 -0.5754 -0.0291 0.0754 -0.6510 
3 0.82% 1.14% 1.37% -0.0645 0.7759 -0.1401 -0.0417 0.1908 -0.3681 
4 3.72% 5.23% 5.08% 0.3539 0.6217 0.9589 0.0299 0.1559 0.3235 
5 1.70% 1.09% 6.78% 0.3387 0.4961 1.1501 0.0958 0.1122 1.4385 
6 12.76% 15.80% 19.54% 1.7652 2.0194 1.4727 0.4337 0.2988 2.4452 
7 1.49% -0.08% 21.03% 0.7771 1.7098 0.7657 0.5728 0.5843 1.6515 
8 -4.18% -0.42% 16.85% -0.2435 0.4415 -0.9294 0.5176 0.6165 1.4143 
9 -9.89% -5.89% 6.96% -0.7251 0.8122 -1.5040 0.3765 0.7414 0.8555 
10 -1.29% -1.13% 5.67% 0.4268 1.4886 0.4830 0.4470 0.9942 0.7575 
11 3.06% 2.70% 8.73% 0.3431 0.3677 1.5716 0.5006 1.0271 0.8211 
12 0.55% 1.13% 9.28% 0.0960 0.2362 0.6851 0.5097 1.0489 0.8186 
13 3.39% 4.15% 12.67% 0.5776 0.7608 1.2791 0.6012 1.1628 0.8711 
14 2.11% -0.54% 14.78% 0.0714 0.3328 0.3613 0.6046 1.1178 0.9112 
15 -2.50% -1.18% 12.28% -0.1375 0.3056 -0.7582 0.5732 1.1473 0.8418 
16 0.70% 0.61% 12.98% 0.4761 1.0326 0.7768 0.6437 1.2974 0.8359 
17 -2.35% -2.77% 10.63% -0.3406 0.3078 -1.8646 0.5799 1.2307 0.7939 
18 -3.40% -4.47% 7.23% -0.4857 0.5781 -1.4154 0.4947 1.1272 0.7394 
19 -0.37% -0.15% 6.86% -0.1413 0.4620 -0.5152 0.4661 1.0432 0.7527 
20 4.07% 1.48% 10.93% 0.6826 0.9695 1.1861 0.5670 1.0049 0.9505 
21 -2.43% -3.35% 8.51% -0.6139 1.7458 -0.5925 0.4655 0.7681 1.0209 
22 -1.02% 0.03% 7.49% -0.1202 0.3882 -0.5217 0.4417 0.7849 0.9480 
23 -0.06% -1.10% 7.43% 0.0422 0.4783 0.1485 0.4430 0.7562 0.9870 
24 -2.21% -0.33% 5.21% -0.3196 0.4754 -1.1324 0.3904 0.7576 0.8683 
25 -0.16% -0.79% 5.06% 0.0703 0.3853 0.3074 0.3965 0.7985 0.8366 
26 -5.09% -4.71% -0.03% -0.7279 0.3877 -3.1634 0.2861 0.7574 0.6364 
27 2.35% 1.62% 2.32% 0.4143 0.4597 1.5185 0.3429 0.7634 0.7567 
28 1.57% 1.04% 3.89% 0.2902 0.3249 1.5047 0.3808 0.8015 0.8005 
29 -4.13% -3.28% -0.24% -0.7926 1.1118 -1.2011 0.2649 0.6454 0.6915 
30 -2.14% -0.19% -2.38% -0.4968 0.8493 -0.9856 0.1927 0.5287 0.6142 
          
-1 to 1     26.34% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.14082 1.1982 0.9264 2.1791 
 
  
  
7–176 
 
Table-A 7.28 Market Returns; Indian Targets; SA Acq (OLS, 3);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.79% 0.63% -0.79% -0.1997 0.8213 -0.4514 -0.1997 0.8213 -0.4514 
-19 -0.26% 0.42% -1.04% -0.0087 0.9031 -0.0179 -0.1474 0.8494 -0.3221 
-18 0.56% 0.48% -0.49% 0.1858 0.0773 4.4593 -0.0131 0.6980 -0.0348 
-17 0.73% 1.19% 0.24% 0.1385 1.0071 0.2552 0.0579 0.2274 0.4727 
-16 0.18% -0.19% 0.42% 0.1022 0.3801 0.4989 0.0975 0.3428 0.5279 
-15 2.40% 2.98% 2.82% 0.8841 0.9489 1.7294 0.4499 0.5941 1.4057 
-14 -3.25% -3.97% -0.44% -1.0522 0.2617 -7.4624 0.0189 0.6489 0.0539 
-13 2.97% 3.83% 2.53% 0.8951 0.8167 2.0343 0.3341 0.3354 1.8490 
-12 -1.07% 0.48% 1.46% -0.3173 1.1517 -0.5113 0.2092 0.6279 0.6185 
-11 -0.64% 0.50% 0.82% -0.1635 0.7134 -0.4254 0.1468 0.5722 0.4761 
-10 -0.65% -0.30% 0.17% -0.2014 0.2182 -1.7127 0.0792 0.5643 0.2606 
-9 1.91% 1.04% 2.08% 0.6104 0.6188 1.8308 0.2521 0.5699 0.8210 
-8 2.03% 1.61% 4.11% 0.6705 0.2328 5.3451 0.4281 0.5842 1.3603 
-7 -2.19% -1.02% 1.92% -0.6934 0.8132 -1.5825 0.2273 0.5223 0.8075 
-6 -1.33% -1.67% 0.59% -0.4198 0.1734 -4.4948 0.1111 0.5473 0.3769 
-5 1.26% 1.64% 1.85% 0.3783 0.3544 1.9811 0.2022 0.4414 0.8503 
-4 -2.23% -1.21% -0.38% -0.7259 0.7284 -1.8498 0.0201 0.5382 0.0693 
-3 -2.43% -3.78% -2.81% -0.8767 0.9241 -1.7610 -0.1871 0.3142 -1.1053 
-2 5.73% 6.60% 2.92% 2.0983 2.0286 1.9199 0.2993 0.7707 0.7208 
-1 -1.17% -0.06% 1.75% -0.3170 0.7821 -0.7524 0.2208 0.8165 0.5020 
0 -0.57% -1.02% 1.18% -0.1947 1.8745 -0.1928 0.1730 0.7682 0.4180 
1 1.16% 1.20% 2.34% 0.3488 0.3825 1.6924 0.2434 0.6966 0.6485 
2 -3.95% -3.42% -1.62% -1.1551 1.3860 -1.5469 -0.0028 0.9662 -0.0054 
3 4.39% 1.67% 2.77% 1.3535 1.7048 1.4736 0.2735 0.7403 0.6857 
4 5.29% 0.13% 8.06% 1.5775 3.1819 0.9202 0.5835 0.6770 1.5997 
5 -0.29% -0.67% 7.77% -0.1158 0.3024 -0.7109 0.5494 0.6867 1.4851 
6 -1.89% -2.22% 5.88% -0.6491 0.6191 -1.9459 0.4142 0.5599 1.3733 
7 2.97% 1.95% 8.84% 0.9545 0.9444 1.8760 0.5872 0.6809 1.6007 
8 0.46% -1.55% 9.30% 0.0360 1.3865 0.0481 0.5836 0.7912 1.3693 
9 -0.65% -0.07% 8.65% -0.1669 0.5472 -0.5661 0.5433 0.7308 1.3800 
10 0.05% -1.08% 8.69% -0.0526 0.9445 -0.1033 0.5251 0.5737 1.6989 
11 -4.42% -3.77% 4.28% -1.4602 0.8647 -3.1344 0.2587 0.4128 1.1633 
12 1.64% 2.13% 5.92% 0.5894 0.6341 1.7254 0.3573 0.4899 1.3540 
13 -3.74% -3.22% 2.18% -1.2367 1.1687 -1.9641 0.1399 0.2991 0.8686 
14 -1.29% -0.99% 0.89% -0.4308 0.5166 -1.5480 0.0651 0.3716 0.3252 
15 1.44% 1.43% 2.33% 0.4107 0.6335 1.2034 0.1326 0.3825 0.6437 
16 -4.42% -4.10% -2.09% -1.4024 0.7625 -3.4140 -0.0997 0.4849 -0.3817 
17 1.79% 3.16% -0.30% 0.4845 0.9522 0.9444 -0.0198 0.4340 -0.0847 
18 -1.49% -0.92% -1.79% -0.4796 0.3519 -2.5299 -0.0963 0.3742 -0.4779 
19 1.76% 1.50% -0.03% 0.5598 0.3618 2.8718 -0.0066 0.3283 -0.0374 
20 -1.67% -1.91% -1.69% -0.5785 0.2548 -4.2137 -0.0969 0.3100 -0.5801 
21 -3.84% -3.83% -5.53% -1.2963 0.2445 -9.8416 -0.2957 0.3030 -1.8116 
22 1.32% 1.61% -4.21% 0.4557 0.2755 3.0703 -0.2228 0.3233 -1.2792 
23 0.14% -1.78% -4.07% -0.0570 1.1893 -0.0890 -0.2288 0.4850 -0.8758 
24 2.45% 2.23% -1.62% 0.7942 0.2296 6.4190 -0.1079 0.5128 -0.3906 
25 -0.48% -0.70% -2.10% -0.0581 0.9228 -0.1169 -0.1153 0.4254 -0.5030 
26 -2.12% -4.33% -4.22% -0.5419 1.4287 -0.7040 -0.1931 0.4363 -0.8214 
27 0.18% 0.11% -4.03% 0.0671 0.7369 0.1691 -0.1814 0.3324 -1.0128 
28 -2.68% -3.08% -6.72% -0.9191 0.8139 -2.0959 -0.3108 0.2130 -2.7090 
29 2.99% 3.71% -3.73% 1.0302 0.9387 2.0370 -0.1620 0.3436 -0.8753 
30 -1.85% 0.70% -5.58% -0.5148 1.5013 -0.6365 -0.2325 0.2787 -1.5487 
          
-1 to 1     -0.58% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06172 -0.0941 1.5255 -0.1145 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–177 
 
Table-A 7.29 Market Returns; Indian Targets; NCW Acq (MM, 83);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.03% 0.21% -0.03% 0.0180 0.9710 0.1685 0.0180 0.9710 0.1685 
-19 0.76% 0.26% 0.73% 0.3263 1.0392 2.8489 0.2434 1.0434 2.1174 
-18 -0.21% -0.03% 0.52% 0.0008 1.1170 0.0068 0.1993 0.9957 1.8160 
-17 -0.50% -0.26% 0.02% -0.0823 1.4136 -0.5281 0.1314 1.1326 1.0531 
-16 0.08% -0.09% 0.10% 0.1124 1.2145 0.8397 0.1678 1.1939 1.2755 
-15 0.69% 0.15% 0.79% 0.1497 1.0022 1.3556 0.2143 1.0798 1.8011 
-14 0.57% -0.08% 1.36% 0.2026 1.2612 1.4578 0.2750 1.0678 2.3369 
-13 0.01% -0.10% 1.37% 0.0541 1.1684 0.4200 0.2763 1.1640 2.1544 
-12 0.45% 0.14% 1.82% 0.1404 1.2565 1.0142 0.3074 1.3199 2.1130 
-11 1.06% 0.76% 2.88% 0.3115 1.2882 2.1945 0.3901 1.3136 2.6948 
-10 0.32% 0.11% 3.20% 0.0367 1.3433 0.2479 0.3830 1.3363 2.6010 
-9 1.00% 0.42% 4.20% 0.3143 1.3862 2.0573 0.4574 1.2843 3.2320 
-8 -0.43% -0.17% 3.77% 0.0486 1.3018 0.3390 0.4530 1.3515 3.0413 
-7 1.11% 0.08% 4.89% 0.2618 1.3810 1.7199 0.5064 1.3318 3.4507 
-6 -0.72% -0.33% 4.17% -0.2004 1.1148 -1.6312 0.4375 1.3640 2.9108 
-5 -0.31% -0.18% 3.86% -0.0334 1.5548 -0.1950 0.4153 1.3601 2.7707 
-4 0.22% -0.16% 4.07% 0.0386 1.1907 0.2939 0.4122 1.3143 2.8462 
-3 0.29% 0.30% 4.36% 0.1862 1.4195 1.1901 0.4445 1.3407 3.0086 
-2 0.53% -0.09% 4.89% 0.1817 1.1298 1.4595 0.4743 1.3323 3.2307 
-1 1.93% 0.59% 6.83% 0.6381 1.6454 3.5194 0.6050 1.3643 4.0242 
0 3.58% 2.74% 10.41% 1.2259 2.5495 4.3635 0.8580 1.3705 5.6808 
1 2.93% 1.78% 13.34% 0.7822 1.7946 3.9553 1.0050 1.4456 6.3088 
2 0.87% 0.14% 14.21% 0.2647 1.4734 1.6301 1.0381 1.5098 6.2393 
3 0.60% 0.26% 14.81% 0.1502 1.2533 1.0873 1.0469 1.5370 6.1811 
4 0.43% -0.01% 15.24% 0.1439 1.3496 0.9677 1.0545 1.5076 6.3475 
5 0.33% 0.13% 15.57% 0.1256 1.0560 1.0794 1.0587 1.4833 6.4768 
6 0.07% 0.33% 15.64% 0.0375 1.2874 0.2642 1.0461 1.4665 6.4733 
7 0.20% -0.01% 15.84% 0.0105 0.9816 0.0973 1.0292 1.4305 6.5289 
8 -0.25% -0.18% 15.59% -0.0660 0.8648 -0.6925 0.9991 1.4287 6.3458 
9 0.39% 0.21% 15.98% 0.1015 0.9199 1.0016 1.0008 1.4176 6.4066 
10 0.16% 0.10% 16.15% 0.0873 0.9129 0.8678 1.0002 1.4009 6.4791 
11 0.25% 0.29% 16.40% 0.0318 1.0616 0.2718 0.9901 1.3960 6.4362 
12 0.46% -0.02% 16.85% 0.0631 0.9990 0.5733 0.9860 1.4053 6.3668 
13 0.40% 0.19% 17.25% 0.1577 1.1482 1.2464 0.9984 1.4095 6.4279 
14 0.03% 0.01% 17.28% -0.0174 0.9614 -0.1646 0.9811 1.4062 6.3314 
15 -0.49% -0.28% 16.79% -0.0803 0.9731 -0.7487 0.9540 1.4069 6.1532 
16 -0.37% -0.20% 16.43% -0.1746 1.1378 -1.3925 0.9123 1.4233 5.8165 
17 0.28% 0.09% 16.71% 0.0185 0.9557 0.1760 0.9032 1.4247 5.7531 
18 0.26% 0.06% 16.97% 0.0564 1.4117 0.3626 0.9006 1.4298 5.7159 
19 1.05% 0.72% 18.02% 0.3034 1.0426 2.6404 0.9372 1.3973 6.0866 
20 0.20% -0.07% 18.22% 0.0621 1.1216 0.5022 0.9354 1.3758 6.1702 
21 -0.33% -0.32% 17.88% -0.1344 1.1105 -1.0979 0.9035 1.3694 5.9874 
22 -0.15% 0.20% 17.73% 0.0625 1.0374 0.5464 0.9025 1.3405 6.1095 
23 0.44% 0.13% 18.18% 0.1351 0.9915 1.2361 0.9125 1.3541 6.1155 
24 0.03% 0.20% 18.21% 0.0000 0.8232 0.0000 0.9023 1.3366 6.1262 
25 -0.23% 0.05% 17.98% 0.0196 1.0114 0.1756 0.8953 1.3473 6.0304 
26 -0.37% -0.09% 17.61% -0.0785 1.0039 -0.7100 0.8743 1.3358 5.9395 
27 0.02% 0.04% 17.64% -0.0049 1.0904 -0.0404 0.8645 1.3373 5.8658 
28 0.71% 0.33% 18.35% 0.1526 1.0771 1.2860 0.8774 1.3410 5.9375 
29 -0.15% -0.38% 18.20% -0.0219 1.2190 -0.1629 0.8655 1.3279 5.9146 
30 0.30% 0.04% 18.50% 0.0770 0.9779 0.7145 0.8677 1.3230 5.9517 
          
-1 to 1     8.45% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06626 1.5278 2.1053 6.5854 
 
  
  
7–178 
 
Table-A 7.30 Market Returns; Indian Targets; CW Acq (MM, 16);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.54% -1.46% -0.54% -0.2853 1.3769 -0.7692 -0.2853 1.3769 -0.7692 
-19 -0.50% -0.21% -1.05% -0.2648 1.1167 -0.8803 -0.3890 1.1443 -1.2619 
-18 -0.61% -0.30% -1.66% -0.2917 1.3010 -0.8322 -0.4860 1.3617 -1.3249 
-17 -0.04% -0.10% -1.69% -0.0544 0.8305 -0.2432 -0.4481 1.1112 -1.4970 
-16 0.64% 0.31% -1.05% 0.2571 1.5204 0.6277 -0.2859 1.1465 -0.9255 
-15 0.20% -0.13% -0.86% 0.0866 1.2904 0.2491 -0.2256 1.2287 -0.6815 
-14 0.79% 0.78% -0.07% 0.2962 0.8435 1.3034 -0.0969 1.1832 -0.3040 
-13 0.69% -0.29% 0.62% 0.2487 1.1206 0.8239 -0.0027 0.9783 -0.0103 
-12 0.17% 0.21% 0.79% 0.0767 0.6291 0.4527 0.0230 0.8388 0.1019 
-11 0.75% 0.36% 1.53% 0.3316 0.8606 1.4301 0.1267 0.8541 0.5506 
-10 -0.26% 0.12% 1.27% 0.0199 0.9005 0.0819 0.1268 0.8291 0.5676 
-9 1.25% 0.14% 2.52% 0.5094 2.0432 0.9254 0.2684 1.0246 0.9724 
-8 0.64% 0.92% 3.17% 0.2452 0.8828 1.0311 0.3259 0.9606 1.2594 
-7 0.77% 0.10% 3.93% 0.2184 0.9509 0.8524 0.3724 1.0589 1.3054 
-6 1.28% -0.57% 5.21% 0.5406 1.8031 1.1130 0.4994 1.0480 1.7688 
-5 -0.18% 0.18% 5.03% -0.1509 0.8457 -0.6622 0.4458 1.0730 1.5421 
-4 1.26% 0.21% 6.29% 0.3076 1.6669 0.6850 0.5071 1.1379 1.6542 
-3 0.93% 0.09% 7.23% 0.3322 1.5296 0.8061 0.5711 1.1626 1.8234 
-2 1.64% 0.70% 8.87% 0.6820 1.9398 1.3051 0.7123 1.3672 1.9340 
-1 2.05% 0.88% 10.92% 1.2116 3.0300 1.4842 0.9652 1.4338 2.4988 
0 2.88% 1.74% 13.80% 1.7320 3.9780 1.6161 1.3199 1.9587 2.5013 
1 -0.07% -0.66% 13.73% -0.2011 1.3227 -0.5644 1.2467 1.8453 2.5077 
2 1.66% 0.59% 15.38% 0.6427 0.8803 2.7099 1.3533 1.9568 2.5671 
3 -0.39% -0.37% 14.99% -0.1965 0.7351 -0.9921 1.2847 1.8718 2.5477 
4 0.09% 0.09% 15.08% -0.0231 0.7983 -0.1075 1.2541 1.8608 2.5017 
5 -0.41% 0.59% 14.67% -0.1380 1.2851 -0.3986 1.2027 1.7294 2.5813 
6 -1.23% -0.59% 13.44% -0.5037 0.7603 -2.4592 1.0833 1.5944 2.5219 
7 0.17% -0.01% 13.61% 0.0506 0.9527 0.1972 1.0733 1.4981 2.6594 
8 -0.47% -0.52% 13.14% -0.2022 0.8893 -0.8438 1.0171 1.4266 2.6463 
9 1.30% 0.28% 14.44% 0.5665 1.4786 1.4221 1.1034 1.6010 2.5582 
10 0.75% 0.59% 15.18% 0.1856 1.0243 0.6726 1.1188 1.5881 2.6150 
11 0.45% -0.28% 15.63% 0.1154 1.0699 0.4003 1.1216 1.5238 2.7322 
12 0.54% 1.00% 16.17% 0.2473 1.1193 0.8202 1.1475 1.5035 2.8330 
13 -1.28% -0.93% 14.89% -0.5247 1.0497 -1.8552 1.0405 1.5127 2.5533 
14 0.03% -0.51% 14.92% -0.0491 0.7753 -0.2352 1.0173 1.4440 2.6150 
15 0.38% 0.40% 15.30% 0.1545 0.7693 0.7454 1.0288 1.4833 2.5745 
16 -0.67% -0.44% 14.63% -0.1776 0.5300 -1.2435 0.9856 1.4614 2.5033 
17 -0.54% -0.50% 14.09% -0.1049 1.2100 -0.3219 0.9555 1.5027 2.3602 
18 -0.43% -0.57% 13.67% -0.1740 0.9388 -0.6879 0.9153 1.4880 2.2834 
19 -0.51% -0.12% 13.15% -0.1922 1.0364 -0.6882 0.8734 1.4602 2.2204 
20 0.76% 0.76% 13.91% 0.3073 0.7026 1.6236 0.9107 1.4651 2.3074 
21 -0.78% -0.40% 13.13% -0.2680 0.9177 -1.0840 0.8584 1.4422 2.2094 
22 0.32% 0.47% 13.45% 0.1606 0.8110 0.7349 0.8729 1.4474 2.2385 
23 -0.58% -0.24% 12.87% -0.1673 0.8940 -0.6944 0.8377 1.4712 2.1136 
24 1.90% 0.74% 14.77% 0.7551 1.3615 2.0585 0.9409 1.3836 2.5242 
25 0.28% -0.16% 15.05% 0.1484 1.0197 0.5402 0.9525 1.2795 2.7633 
26 0.29% 0.31% 15.35% 0.0288 1.1485 0.0932 0.9465 1.3504 2.6017 
27 0.42% 0.52% 15.77% 0.2836 1.0980 0.9589 0.9775 1.3963 2.5987 
28 0.24% 0.14% 16.01% 0.1386 1.0849 0.4741 0.9873 1.4105 2.5983 
29 1.17% 1.14% 17.18% 0.5579 1.4141 1.4646 1.0563 1.5375 2.5502 
30 0.71% 0.84% 17.89% 0.3323 1.4206 0.8683 1.0924 1.5321 2.6466 
          
-1 to 1     4.86% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.07239 1.5833 3.2409 1.8134 
   
  
7–179 
 
Table-A 7.31 Market Returns; Indian Targets; NCW Acq (OLS, 88);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.24% -0.08% -0.24% -0.0696 0.8510 -0.7870 -0.0696 0.8510 -0.7870 
-19 0.88% 0.21% 0.64% 0.2582 0.9805 2.5350 0.1334 0.9120 1.4079 
-18 -0.34% -0.07% 0.30% -0.0197 0.8967 -0.2114 0.0975 0.8564 1.0964 
-17 -0.69% -0.73% -0.39% -0.0848 1.0422 -0.7833 0.0421 0.8898 0.4551 
-16 -0.36% -0.31% -0.75% 0.0164 1.0286 0.1538 0.0450 0.9183 0.4715 
-15 0.63% 0.09% -0.11% 0.1121 0.8825 1.2226 0.0868 0.8751 0.9550 
-14 0.00% -0.10% -0.11% 0.0122 1.0125 0.1164 0.0850 0.8490 0.9638 
-13 -0.20% -0.25% -0.32% 0.0021 0.9870 0.0206 0.0803 0.9233 0.8367 
-12 0.20% 0.01% -0.11% 0.0671 1.0366 0.6233 0.0981 1.0659 0.8854 
-11 0.90% 0.73% 0.78% 0.2319 1.0729 2.0808 0.1664 1.0872 1.4729 
-10 0.24% 0.04% 1.03% -0.0306 1.0658 -0.2768 0.1494 1.1199 1.2839 
-9 0.77% 0.23% 1.80% 0.2222 1.1476 1.8636 0.2072 1.0532 1.8932 
-8 -0.56% -0.28% 1.24% 0.0055 1.0739 0.0492 0.2006 1.1103 1.7386 
-7 0.82% 0.02% 2.05% 0.1467 1.1016 1.2823 0.2325 1.1016 2.0314 
-6 -1.02% -0.33% 1.03% -0.1757 1.0909 -1.5507 0.1792 1.1378 1.5162 
-5 -0.46% -0.38% 0.57% -0.0291 1.3424 -0.2089 0.1662 1.1239 1.4238 
-4 0.02% -0.18% 0.59% -0.0422 0.9865 -0.4120 0.1510 1.1046 1.3162 
-3 0.03% -0.01% 0.62% 0.0767 1.1631 0.6349 0.1649 1.1015 1.4407 
-2 0.32% -0.16% 0.94% 0.1097 0.9560 1.1040 0.1856 1.0926 1.6353 
-1 1.63% 0.34% 2.56% 0.4865 1.3226 3.5408 0.2897 1.1070 2.5190 
0 3.22% 1.82% 5.79% 0.9638 2.1030 4.4114 0.4931 1.1285 4.2055 
1 2.63% 1.64% 8.41% 0.5329 1.5037 3.4114 0.5953 1.1996 4.7769 
2 0.59% -0.07% 9.01% 0.1253 1.2396 0.9729 0.6084 1.2604 4.6460 
3 0.62% -0.01% 9.63% 0.0470 1.2922 0.3503 0.6052 1.2926 4.5065 
4 0.28% -0.16% 9.91% 0.0293 1.2794 0.2203 0.5988 1.3037 4.4210 
5 0.19% -0.06% 10.10% 0.0852 0.9861 0.8319 0.6039 1.2904 4.5044 
6 0.01% -0.06% 10.11% 0.0540 1.1905 0.4364 0.6030 1.2707 4.5675 
7 -0.23% -0.20% 9.88% -0.1699 0.9310 -1.7568 0.5600 1.2515 4.3072 
8 -0.69% -0.43% 9.19% -0.1942 0.8701 -2.1482 0.5142 1.2645 3.9141 
9 0.13% -0.04% 9.32% 0.0279 0.8057 0.3328 0.5107 1.2636 3.8899 
10 -0.24% -0.14% 9.08% -0.0021 0.7985 -0.0251 0.5020 1.2578 3.8414 
11 0.14% 0.04% 9.22% -0.0250 0.9260 -0.2600 0.4896 1.2461 3.7824 
12 0.30% -0.10% 9.52% 0.0072 0.8042 0.0859 0.4834 1.2497 3.7233 
13 0.18% 0.06% 9.70% 0.0775 1.0115 0.7377 0.4896 1.2576 3.7470 
14 -0.25% -0.25% 9.45% -0.0674 0.8321 -0.7800 0.4711 1.2503 3.6268 
15 -0.82% -0.55% 8.63% -0.1573 0.8408 -1.8005 0.4383 1.2701 3.3217 
16 -0.88% -0.47% 7.75% -0.2815 1.0264 -2.6400 0.3861 1.2923 2.8755 
17 -0.08% -0.12% 7.66% -0.1239 1.0447 -1.1412 0.3609 1.3181 2.6352 
18 0.58% 0.09% 8.24% 0.1342 1.3406 0.9636 0.3777 1.2970 2.8029 
19 0.70% 0.49% 8.94% 0.1782 0.9303 1.8438 0.4011 1.2694 3.0416 
20 -0.03% -0.13% 8.91% -0.0463 0.8901 -0.5010 0.3890 1.2437 3.0104 
21 -0.52% -0.40% 8.40% -0.1467 1.1203 -1.2609 0.3617 1.2510 2.7827 
22 -0.57% 0.01% 7.82% -0.0942 1.0702 -0.8469 0.3431 1.2526 2.6362 
23 0.06% -0.07% 7.88% 0.0032 1.0079 0.0301 0.3396 1.2883 2.5375 
24 -0.16% -0.09% 7.72% -0.0197 0.7632 -0.2483 0.3329 1.2679 2.5271 
25 -0.37% -0.23% 7.34% -0.0045 0.9484 -0.0457 0.3286 1.2568 2.5165 
26 -0.49% -0.13% 6.85% -0.1176 0.8360 -1.3544 0.3079 1.2332 2.4033 
27 -0.17% -0.05% 6.68% -0.0354 1.0518 -0.3237 0.2996 1.1992 2.4045 
28 0.44% 0.22% 7.12% 0.0722 0.9104 0.7631 0.3068 1.2030 2.4550 
29 -0.31% -0.48% 6.80% -0.0541 1.0808 -0.4821 0.2961 1.1797 2.4158 
30 -0.06% -0.19% 6.74% -0.0106 0.8719 -0.1167 0.2917 1.1583 2.4239 
          
-1 to 1     7.48% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.06528 1.1450 1.7921 6.1501 
  
  
7–180 
 
Table-A 7.32 Market Returns; Indian Targets; CW Acq (OLS, 16);VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.66% -1.42% -0.66% -0.2292 1.1553 -0.7395 -0.2292 1.1553 -0.7395 
-19 -0.61% -0.42% -1.26% -0.2286 0.9729 -0.8758 -0.3237 0.9533 -1.2657 
-18 -0.72% -0.39% -1.99% -0.2363 1.0806 -0.8152 -0.4007 1.1218 -1.3316 
-17 -0.21% -0.28% -2.20% -0.1180 0.7799 -0.5642 -0.4060 0.9413 -1.6080 
-16 0.48% 0.07% -1.72% 0.1790 1.2841 0.5198 -0.2831 1.0079 -1.0471 
-15 0.05% -0.25% -1.67% 0.0446 1.0886 0.1528 -0.2402 1.1096 -0.8071 
-14 0.59% 0.61% -1.08% 0.1842 0.7465 0.9197 -0.1528 1.1210 -0.5081 
-13 0.56% -0.18% -0.52% 0.1433 0.9893 0.5401 -0.0922 0.9771 -0.3519 
-12 0.03% -0.16% -0.49% 0.0046 0.5651 0.0306 -0.0854 0.8558 -0.3721 
-11 0.63% 0.44% 0.14% 0.2235 0.7287 1.1434 -0.0104 0.8728 -0.0443 
-10 -0.45% -0.16% -0.31% -0.0684 0.7770 -0.3284 -0.0305 0.8494 -0.1339 
-9 1.15% 0.02% 0.83% 0.3710 1.6905 0.8183 0.0779 1.0016 0.2899 
-8 0.55% 0.79% 1.38% 0.2057 0.7597 1.0094 0.1319 0.9669 0.5085 
-7 0.67% -0.16% 2.06% 0.1481 0.8301 0.6652 0.1667 1.0579 0.5874 
-6 1.19% -0.61% 3.25% 0.4060 1.3305 1.1377 0.2659 1.0178 0.9738 
-5 -0.37% -0.04% 2.88% -0.1443 0.7209 -0.7464 0.2213 1.0624 0.7767 
-4 1.07% -0.06% 3.96% 0.1892 1.3543 0.5207 0.2606 1.1262 0.8627 
-3 0.75% -0.05% 4.70% 0.1814 1.1492 0.5884 0.2960 1.0895 1.0129 
-2 1.50% 0.61% 6.20% 0.5268 1.6719 1.1748 0.4090 1.2258 1.2439 
-1 1.89% 0.62% 8.10% 0.8473 2.3732 1.3311 0.5881 1.1702 1.8737 
0 2.81% 1.62% 10.91% 1.4615 3.3996 1.6028 0.8928 1.5427 2.1577 
1 -0.26% -1.02% 10.65% -0.1698 1.2387 -0.5109 0.8361 1.4798 2.1066 
2 1.58% 0.45% 12.23% 0.5156 0.7395 2.5996 0.9253 1.5699 2.1974 
3 -0.57% -0.70% 11.66% -0.2164 0.7087 -1.1383 0.8616 1.5029 2.1374 
4 -0.03% -0.10% 11.63% -0.0049 0.6849 -0.0266 0.8432 1.5287 2.0565 
5 -0.51% 0.65% 11.12% -0.1258 1.0324 -0.4543 0.8022 1.4546 2.0560 
6 -1.45% -0.91% 9.67% -0.5110 0.6488 -2.9364 0.6888 1.3597 1.8887 
7 0.05% 0.02% 9.71% 0.0029 0.8124 0.0133 0.6770 1.2872 1.9608 
8 -0.55% -0.42% 9.16% -0.1704 0.7266 -0.8744 0.6336 1.2559 1.8808 
9 1.19% 0.35% 10.35% 0.4243 1.1283 1.4022 0.7004 1.3501 1.9341 
10 0.67% 0.63% 11.02% 0.0975 0.8921 0.4074 0.7065 1.3532 1.9465 
11 0.26% -0.47% 11.28% 0.0683 0.9541 0.2669 0.7074 1.3023 2.0254 
12 0.34% 0.73% 11.62% 0.1594 1.0099 0.5884 0.7244 1.2609 2.1419 
13 -1.48% -1.13% 10.14% -0.4800 0.9776 -1.8305 0.6313 1.2804 1.8384 
14 -0.15% -0.91% 9.99% -0.0866 0.6882 -0.4692 0.6076 1.2459 1.8182 
15 0.22% 0.24% 10.21% 0.0867 0.6431 0.5029 0.6136 1.2654 1.8078 
16 -0.86% -0.88% 9.35% -0.2401 0.5229 -1.7120 0.5658 1.2339 1.7094 
17 -0.66% -0.49% 8.69% -0.2007 0.9360 -0.7992 0.5257 1.2134 1.6153 
18 -0.60% -0.62% 8.09% -0.1945 0.8688 -0.8344 0.4878 1.2176 1.4936 
19 -0.65% -0.16% 7.44% -0.2430 0.9362 -0.9678 0.4432 1.2139 1.3613 
20 0.67% 0.43% 8.11% 0.2128 0.6192 1.2812 0.4710 1.2194 1.4401 
21 -1.00% -0.62% 7.11% -0.2899 0.7607 -1.4208 0.4206 1.1872 1.3209 
22 0.14% 0.26% 7.25% 0.0707 0.7416 0.3553 0.4265 1.2031 1.3216 
23 -0.78% -0.59% 6.47% -0.2551 0.7417 -1.2825 0.3832 1.1991 1.1913 
24 1.84% 0.73% 8.31% 0.6381 1.0910 2.1808 0.4740 1.1195 1.5786 
25 0.17% -0.19% 8.47% 0.0766 0.8263 0.3456 0.4801 1.0367 1.7267 
26 0.14% 0.26% 8.62% -0.0001 1.0102 -0.0005 0.4750 1.1060 1.6011 
27 0.29% 0.45% 8.91% 0.1833 0.9692 0.7052 0.4965 1.1427 1.6197 
28 0.06% 0.01% 8.97% 0.0272 0.8631 0.1177 0.4953 1.1228 1.6444 
29 0.99% 1.11% 9.96% 0.3879 1.1068 1.3067 0.5451 1.2177 1.6690 
30 0.64% 0.82% 10.60% 0.3052 1.1731 0.9699 0.5825 1.1935 1.8196 
          
-1 to 1     4.45% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.07284 1.2350 2.6468 1.7396 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7–181 
 
Table-A 7.33 Market Returns; Indian Acquirers; All Firms; (MM, 37); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.21% 0.03% 0.21% 0.0151 0.7734 0.1163 0.0151 0.7734 0.1163 
-19 -0.52% -0.62% -0.31% -0.2044 0.9122 -1.3321 -0.1338 0.9357 -0.8503 
-18 -0.06% -0.49% -0.36% -0.1182 1.1560 -0.6080 -0.1775 1.0538 -1.0015 
-17 0.55% 0.31% 0.19% 0.1854 0.7808 1.4115 -0.0611 0.9874 -0.3676 
-16 -0.21% -0.16% -0.02% -0.0328 0.8032 -0.2427 -0.0693 0.8702 -0.4733 
-15 0.65% 0.56% 0.63% 0.2494 1.0201 1.4534 0.0386 0.8294 0.2765 
-14 -0.70% -0.22% -0.07% -0.2608 1.5348 -1.0101 -0.0629 0.9745 -0.3834 
-13 -0.45% 0.05% -0.51% -0.2656 2.1561 -0.7322 -0.1527 1.4321 -0.6338 
-12 0.20% -0.16% -0.31% 0.1333 1.2851 0.6166 -0.0995 1.1240 -0.5264 
-11 0.01% -0.26% -0.30% 0.0232 1.1155 0.1239 -0.0871 1.1739 -0.4409 
-10 -0.45% -0.19% -0.74% -0.1174 1.0439 -0.6683 -0.1184 1.1620 -0.6058 
-9 0.58% 0.42% -0.16% 0.1609 1.0991 0.8704 -0.0669 1.1089 -0.3587 
-8 -0.22% 0.13% -0.38% -0.0468 0.7684 -0.3618 -0.0773 1.0883 -0.4220 
-7 0.12% 0.22% -0.26% 0.0342 1.4946 0.1359 -0.0653 1.2361 -0.3141 
-6 -0.50% -0.48% -0.76% -0.2704 0.9425 -1.7055 -0.1329 1.2964 -0.6095 
-5 0.22% 0.39% -0.54% 0.1005 0.8155 0.7328 -0.1036 1.2177 -0.5056 
-4 0.55% 0.28% 0.02% 0.2572 1.0335 1.4795 -0.0381 1.1520 -0.1965 
-3 0.23% -0.42% 0.25% 0.0170 0.9635 0.1052 -0.0330 1.0876 -0.1803 
-2 -0.39% -0.39% -0.14% -0.0692 1.0976 -0.3747 -0.0480 1.0527 -0.2710 
-1 0.63% 0.15% 0.49% 0.2061 1.3514 0.9064 -0.0007 1.0653 -0.0039 
0 1.34% 1.15% 1.83% 0.5363 1.2906 2.4703 0.1164 1.0363 0.6675 
1 -0.80% -0.57% 1.02% -0.3082 1.0772 -1.7009 0.0480 0.9940 0.2869 
2 -0.64% -0.41% 0.38% -0.3359 1.2602 -1.5844 -0.0231 0.9432 -0.1457 
3 -0.53% -0.41% -0.15% -0.2381 0.8971 -1.5774 -0.0712 0.9509 -0.4452 
4 0.13% -0.26% -0.02% 0.0547 1.0921 0.2979 -0.0588 0.9911 -0.3529 
5 -0.43% -0.45% -0.46% -0.1004 1.5398 -0.3876 -0.0774 1.0511 -0.4376 
6 -0.48% -0.23% -0.94% -0.1184 1.1197 -0.6285 -0.0987 1.0934 -0.5367 
7 0.08% -0.29% -0.86% 0.0218 1.2301 0.1052 -0.0928 1.0379 -0.5316 
8 0.09% -0.17% -0.78% -0.0450 1.1439 -0.2338 -0.0996 1.0439 -0.5670 
9 -0.77% -0.39% -1.55% -0.2880 1.0088 -1.6973 -0.1505 1.0835 -0.8256 
10 0.88% 0.78% -0.66% 0.3820 1.2204 1.8605 -0.0794 1.0219 -0.4621 
11 0.46% 0.25% -0.21% 0.1174 1.0335 0.6754 -0.0574 1.0331 -0.3304 
12 -0.22% -0.24% -0.43% -0.1385 1.1435 -0.7199 -0.0807 1.0753 -0.4459 
13 -0.10% -0.13% -0.53% -0.0226 1.0011 -0.1342 -0.0833 1.0597 -0.4675 
14 -0.72% -0.73% -1.24% -0.3142 0.9804 -1.9051 -0.1352 1.0717 -0.7502 
15 -0.57% 0.10% -1.81% -0.2734 1.9558 -0.8309 -0.1789 1.1142 -0.9546 
16 -0.43% -0.68% -2.24% -0.1726 1.3886 -0.7389 -0.2049 1.1299 -1.0777 
17 -0.61% -0.59% -2.85% -0.2115 0.9873 -1.2732 -0.2364 1.1374 -1.2358 
18 0.17% 0.20% -2.68% 0.1089 0.9977 0.6486 -0.2160 1.1187 -1.1476 
19 0.72% 0.18% -1.96% 0.2730 1.7607 0.9217 -0.1701 1.0341 -0.9778 
20 -0.85% -0.43% -2.80% -0.4019 2.0378 -1.1724 -0.2308 1.2105 -1.1333 
21 -0.07% -0.53% -2.87% 0.0144 1.3463 0.0636 -0.2258 1.1576 -1.1594 
22 0.42% 0.22% -2.45% 0.2233 1.1677 1.1368 -0.1891 1.0705 -1.0500 
23 0.35% -0.12% -2.10% 0.0579 1.3545 0.2543 -0.1782 1.0298 -1.0286 
24 -0.09% 0.20% -2.19% -0.0635 1.1707 -0.3222 -0.1857 1.0677 -1.0337 
25 -0.59% -0.20% -2.78% -0.2994 0.8913 -1.9967 -0.2278 1.0988 -1.2323 
26 0.86% 0.28% -1.92% 0.3826 1.3102 1.7360 -0.1695 1.0818 -0.9315 
27 -0.13% -0.39% -2.05% -0.0917 1.4287 -0.3814 -0.1810 1.1967 -0.8990 
28 -0.13% -0.11% -2.18% -0.0157 0.9556 -0.0975 -0.1814 1.2320 -0.8751 
29 0.05% -0.65% -2.13% 0.0756 1.5559 0.2887 -0.1688 1.2175 -0.8244 
30 -0.42% -0.59% -2.55% -0.1643 1.0907 -0.8955 -0.1902 1.2849 -0.8799 
          
-1 to 1     1.17% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0313 0.2507 1.1482 1.2978 
 
 
 
 
  
  
7–182 
 
Table-A 7.34 Market Returns; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 37); VWI 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% 0.02% 0.06% -0.0433 0.7190 -0.3587 -0.0433 0.7190 -0.3587 
-19 -0.70% -0.70% -0.64% -0.2588 0.7999 -1.9256 -0.2136 0.8322 -1.5278 
-18 -0.19% -0.63% -0.83% -0.1409 1.0332 -0.8116 -0.2558 0.9064 -1.6796 
-17 0.47% 0.24% -0.36% 0.1440 0.7187 1.1922 -0.1495 0.8626 -1.0317 
-16 -0.48% -0.62% -0.84% -0.1237 0.7550 -0.9748 -0.1890 0.7746 -1.4525 
-15 0.53% 0.45% -0.31% 0.1869 0.9031 1.2317 -0.0963 0.7201 -0.7957 
-14 -0.81% -0.23% -1.13% -0.2765 1.3166 -1.2501 -0.1936 0.8215 -1.4030 
-13 -0.55% -0.16% -1.68% -0.2531 1.8116 -0.8314 -0.2706 1.2021 -1.3399 
-12 0.07% -0.29% -1.60% 0.0597 1.0819 0.3283 -0.2352 0.9527 -1.4696 
-11 -0.11% -0.38% -1.72% -0.0245 0.9800 -0.1491 -0.2309 0.9897 -1.3888 
-10 -0.56% -0.43% -2.28% -0.1168 0.9141 -0.7607 -0.2554 0.9782 -1.5541 
-9 0.43% 0.18% -1.85% 0.0634 0.8924 0.4228 -0.2262 0.9199 -1.4638 
-8 -0.36% -0.04% -2.21% -0.0898 0.6573 -0.8131 -0.2423 0.9003 -1.6017 
-7 -0.14% -0.31% -2.35% -0.0846 1.2239 -0.4116 -0.2561 1.0260 -1.4855 
-6 -0.68% -0.68% -3.02% -0.3039 0.8048 -2.2479 -0.3259 1.0714 -1.8103 
-5 0.16% 0.36% -2.87% 0.0754 0.7343 0.6112 -0.2967 1.0131 -1.7430 
-4 0.37% 0.07% -2.49% 0.1690 0.9386 1.0717 -0.2468 0.9628 -1.5258 
-3 0.05% -0.78% -2.44% -0.0454 0.8773 -0.3080 -0.2506 0.9073 -1.6436 
-2 -0.50% -0.54% -2.94% -0.0951 0.9852 -0.5748 -0.2657 0.8618 -1.8351 
-1 0.56% 0.12% -2.39% 0.1472 1.1928 0.7344 -0.2261 0.8551 -1.5735 
0 1.24% 0.89% -1.15% 0.4431 1.1612 2.2713 -0.1239 0.8389 -0.8792 
1 -0.88% -0.74% -2.03% -0.3236 0.9497 -2.0281 -0.1901 0.8042 -1.4068 
2 -0.68% -0.68% -2.71% -0.3024 1.0185 -1.7670 -0.2489 0.7392 -2.0043 
3 -0.59% -0.31% -3.30% -0.2327 0.8152 -1.6989 -0.2912 0.7297 -2.3751 
4 -0.06% -0.27% -3.36% -0.0100 0.9497 -0.0624 -0.2873 0.7844 -2.1800 
5 -0.52% -0.60% -3.88% -0.1157 1.2435 -0.5538 -0.3044 0.8063 -2.2470 
6 -0.48% -0.29% -4.36% -0.0938 0.9263 -0.6030 -0.3168 0.8330 -2.2634 
7 -0.10% -0.22% -4.46% -0.0426 1.0733 -0.2361 -0.3191 0.8340 -2.2774 
8 -0.01% -0.10% -4.47% -0.1060 1.0309 -0.6122 -0.3333 0.8607 -2.3045 
9 -0.81% -0.69% -5.27% -0.2581 0.8468 -1.8141 -0.3748 0.8697 -2.5650 
10 0.70% 0.58% -4.57% 0.2332 1.0531 1.3181 -0.3268 0.8338 -2.3328 
11 0.31% 0.00% -4.26% 0.0391 0.8569 0.2713 -0.3147 0.8262 -2.2675 
12 -0.40% -0.24% -4.66% -0.1971 0.9977 -1.1760 -0.3443 0.8727 -2.3478 
13 -0.21% -0.10% -4.87% -0.0759 0.8345 -0.5414 -0.3522 0.8841 -2.3710 
14 -0.73% -1.10% -5.60% -0.2960 0.8757 -2.0121 -0.3971 0.9064 -2.6080 
15 -0.71% -0.24% -6.31% -0.2677 1.5492 -1.0286 -0.4362 0.8932 -2.9070 
16 -0.33% -0.75% -6.64% -0.1137 1.1959 -0.5659 -0.4490 0.8756 -3.0518 
17 -0.66% -0.52% -7.30% -0.2184 0.8536 -1.5228 -0.4785 0.8940 -3.1854 
18 -0.02% 0.09% -7.32% 0.0363 0.9162 0.2356 -0.4665 0.8973 -3.0941 
19 0.60% 0.04% -6.72% 0.1404 1.4508 0.5758 -0.4384 0.8828 -2.9558 
20 -1.02% -0.55% -7.74% -0.3652 1.7243 -1.2607 -0.4901 0.9946 -2.9328 
21 -0.26% -0.92% -8.00% -0.0502 1.1226 -0.2660 -0.4919 0.9660 -3.0311 
22 0.25% 0.00% -7.75% 0.1202 0.9646 0.7418 -0.4679 0.9040 -3.0805 
23 0.24% -0.27% -7.51% -0.0046 1.2210 -0.0223 -0.4632 0.8991 -3.0665 
24 -0.15% 0.21% -7.66% -0.0766 0.9634 -0.4729 -0.4694 0.9090 -3.0738 
25 -0.77% -0.31% -8.43% -0.3262 0.8076 -2.4040 -0.5124 0.9136 -3.3384 
26 0.63% 0.22% -7.80% 0.2365 1.1182 1.2589 -0.4724 0.9248 -3.0405 
27 -0.13% -0.64% -7.93% -0.0865 1.1852 -0.4347 -0.4800 1.0121 -2.8226 
28 -0.24% -0.15% -8.17% -0.0605 0.8223 -0.4381 -0.4837 1.0303 -2.7944 
29 -0.09% -0.59% -8.27% -0.0373 1.2748 -0.1740 -0.4841 0.9899 -2.9109 
30 -0.50% -0.90% -8.77% -0.1775 0.9446 -1.1185 -0.5042 1.0386 -2.8894 
          
-1 to 1     0.92% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03103 0.1540 1.0188 0.8996 
 
  
  
7–183 
 
Table-A 7.35 Fama-French Returns; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (MM, 32) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.05% -0.40% -0.05% -0.1264 0.8083 -0.8745 -0.1264 0.8083 -0.8745 
-19 -0.31% -0.57% -0.36% -0.1209 0.8513 -0.7945 -0.1749 0.9251 -1.0573 
-18 0.18% -0.22% -0.18% -0.0148 1.2643 -0.0656 -0.1514 1.0800 -0.7838 
-17 0.57% 0.43% 0.39% 0.2426 0.8765 1.5477 -0.0098 1.0237 -0.0536 
-16 0.02% 0.11% 0.41% 0.0572 0.8434 0.3794 0.0168 0.8985 0.1047 
-15 0.76% 0.37% 1.17% 0.3298 1.1076 1.6655 0.1500 0.9161 0.9158 
-14 -0.51% -0.26% 0.66% -0.2578 1.3485 -1.0691 0.0415 1.0701 0.2167 
-13 -0.73% 0.10% -0.07% -0.4244 2.0730 -1.1450 -0.1113 1.3784 -0.4515 
-12 0.37% -0.45% 0.29% 0.1433 1.2496 0.6414 -0.0571 1.0813 -0.2956 
-11 -0.06% -0.01% 0.23% 0.0409 1.1326 0.2021 -0.0413 1.0804 -0.2136 
-10 -0.70% -0.64% -0.47% -0.2802 0.9850 -1.5912 -0.1238 1.0303 -0.6723 
-9 0.70% 0.45% 0.22% 0.2517 1.1459 1.2286 -0.0459 1.0023 -0.2561 
-8 -0.28% 0.14% -0.06% -0.0582 0.9177 -0.3545 -0.0602 0.9517 -0.3540 
-7 0.26% -0.09% 0.20% 0.0807 1.5760 0.2862 -0.0365 1.1702 -0.1744 
-6 -0.45% -0.54% -0.25% -0.2643 0.9472 -1.5608 -0.1035 1.2454 -0.4648 
-5 -0.18% -0.06% -0.43% -0.0287 0.9138 -0.1758 -0.1074 1.1429 -0.5256 
-4 0.65% 0.06% 0.22% 0.2356 0.9305 1.4160 -0.0471 1.1105 -0.2370 
-3 0.44% 0.07% 0.66% 0.1057 1.0115 0.5844 -0.0208 1.1045 -0.1054 
-2 -0.59% -0.54% 0.07% -0.2275 1.0381 -1.2258 -0.0725 1.0607 -0.3821 
-1 0.51% 0.08% 0.58% 0.2157 1.4328 0.8418 -0.0224 1.0556 -0.1187 
0 1.37% 0.97% 1.95% 0.5739 1.3212 2.4295 0.1034 1.0337 0.5593 
1 -0.58% -1.08% 1.38% -0.2436 1.2043 -1.1315 0.0491 0.9878 0.2777 
2 -0.58% -0.10% 0.79% -0.2408 1.3208 -1.0195 -0.0022 0.9586 -0.0130 
3 -0.51% -0.61% 0.29% -0.2062 0.9029 -1.2773 -0.0443 0.9461 -0.2617 
4 0.18% -0.22% 0.47% -0.0127 1.0373 -0.0687 -0.0459 0.9912 -0.2591 
5 -0.49% -0.34% -0.02% -0.1593 1.5196 -0.5864 -0.0763 1.0028 -0.4254 
6 -0.86% -0.50% -0.88% -0.2896 1.1133 -1.4546 -0.1306 1.0097 -0.7233 
7 0.19% -0.09% -0.68% 0.0871 1.2922 0.3770 -0.1118 0.9771 -0.6397 
8 0.67% 0.21% -0.01% 0.1942 1.1691 0.9289 -0.0738 0.9949 -0.4147 
9 -0.75% -0.52% -0.76% -0.3317 1.0104 -1.8363 -0.1331 1.0062 -0.7398 
10 0.96% 0.66% 0.21% 0.3647 1.3019 1.5666 -0.0654 0.9531 -0.3839 
11 0.46% 0.01% 0.66% 0.1710 1.0107 0.9462 -0.0342 0.9727 -0.1965 
12 -0.07% -0.04% 0.59% -0.0608 1.1365 -0.2992 -0.0442 1.0167 -0.2433 
13 -0.07% -0.40% 0.52% -0.0389 1.0587 -0.2053 -0.0502 1.0014 -0.2806 
14 -0.48% -0.70% 0.05% -0.2623 0.9708 -1.5111 -0.0939 1.0036 -0.5230 
15 -0.52% -0.02% -0.48% -0.2221 1.9802 -0.6273 -0.1296 1.0356 -0.6997 
16 -0.46% -0.55% -0.94% -0.1894 1.2749 -0.8308 -0.1589 1.0723 -0.8290 
17 -0.46% -0.19% -1.40% -0.1818 0.9307 -1.0923 -0.1863 1.0295 -1.0122 
18 -0.19% 0.01% -1.59% -0.0125 0.9115 -0.0766 -0.1859 0.9950 -1.0450 
19 0.60% -0.21% -1.00% 0.2051 1.8403 0.6231 -0.1512 0.8880 -0.9520 
20 -1.09% -0.60% -2.08% -0.5311 2.1150 -1.4045 -0.2322 1.0685 -1.2156 
21 -0.10% -0.88% -2.18% -0.0163 1.3796 -0.0660 -0.2320 1.0393 -1.2483 
22 0.36% 0.15% -1.82% 0.1756 1.2695 0.7737 -0.2025 0.9156 -1.2368 
23 0.46% -0.34% -1.37% 0.1011 1.5016 0.3764 -0.1849 0.8834 -1.1707 
24 0.06% 0.26% -1.31% -0.0173 1.2542 -0.0771 -0.1854 0.9128 -1.1361 
25 -0.76% -0.52% -2.07% -0.3706 0.9205 -2.2516 -0.2381 0.9537 -1.3960 
26 1.04% 1.05% -1.03% 0.4751 1.4861 1.7880 -0.1662 0.9644 -0.9639 
27 -0.13% -0.24% -1.15% -0.0483 1.5411 -0.1751 -0.1714 1.0917 -0.8783 
28 -0.22% -0.24% -1.37% -0.0569 1.0224 -0.3111 -0.1778 1.1278 -0.8817 
29 0.01% -0.77% -1.36% 0.0657 1.5810 0.2325 -0.1667 1.1291 -0.8258 
30 -0.35% -0.57% -1.71% -0.1084 1.0632 -0.5701 -0.1802 1.2021 -0.8386 
          
-1 to 1     1.31% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03276 0.3152 1.2748 1.3829 
 
  
  
7–184 
 
Table-A 7.36 Fama-French Returns; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 32) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.21% -0.35% -0.21% -0.1700 0.7521 -1.2600 -0.1700 0.7521 -1.2600 
-19 -0.46% -0.61% -0.67% -0.1729 0.7684 -1.2545 -0.2425 0.8633 -1.5656 
-18 0.06% -0.13% -0.61% -0.0563 1.1496 -0.2728 -0.2304 0.9602 -1.3379 
-17 0.41% 0.14% -0.20% 0.1804 0.8280 1.2150 -0.1093 0.9344 -0.6524 
-16 -0.18% -0.09% -0.38% -0.0209 0.8028 -0.1450 -0.1071 0.8493 -0.7033 
-15 0.69% 0.34% 0.30% 0.2759 0.9986 1.5404 0.0148 0.8594 0.0962 
-14 -0.61% -0.58% -0.31% -0.2656 1.1541 -1.2828 -0.0866 0.9959 -0.4850 
-13 -0.94% -0.20% -1.24% -0.4302 1.6916 -1.4179 -0.2332 1.1952 -1.0876 
-12 0.12% -0.44% -1.12% 0.0287 1.0399 0.1537 -0.2103 0.9592 -1.2221 
-11 -0.10% 0.11% -1.22% 0.0221 1.0061 0.1224 -0.1925 0.9446 -1.1361 
-10 -0.90% -0.87% -2.12% -0.2951 0.9056 -1.8164 -0.2725 0.9040 -1.6804 
-9 0.59% 0.38% -1.54% 0.1492 0.9381 0.8869 -0.2178 0.8733 -1.3905 
-8 -0.41% -0.02% -1.95% -0.0851 0.7966 -0.5957 -0.2329 0.8242 -1.5752 
-7 -0.04% -0.23% -1.99% -0.0421 1.3065 -0.1797 -0.2357 1.0211 -1.2867 
-6 -0.69% -0.71% -2.68% -0.3225 0.8110 -2.2173 -0.3109 1.0822 -1.6019 
-5 -0.31% -0.17% -2.99% -0.0597 0.7962 -0.4181 -0.3160 1.0105 -1.7434 
-4 0.45% 0.01% -2.54% 0.1421 0.8188 0.9673 -0.2721 0.9878 -1.5357 
-3 0.33% -0.08% -2.21% 0.0623 0.9212 0.3769 -0.2498 0.9952 -1.3992 
-2 -0.66% -0.45% -2.87% -0.2298 0.9684 -1.3230 -0.2958 0.9441 -1.7469 
-1 0.42% 0.01% -2.45% 0.1500 1.2892 0.6487 -0.2548 0.9144 -1.5535 
0 1.23% 0.71% -1.22% 0.4636 1.1909 2.1701 -0.1475 0.9244 -0.8895 
1 -0.68% -1.23% -1.90% -0.2754 1.0750 -1.4280 -0.2028 0.8887 -1.2723 
2 -0.59% -0.51% -2.49% -0.2093 1.0781 -1.0821 -0.2420 0.8427 -1.6010 
3 -0.56% -0.49% -3.05% -0.2071 0.8456 -1.3656 -0.2792 0.8134 -1.9134 
4 -0.01% -0.17% -3.06% -0.0649 0.9244 -0.3911 -0.2865 0.8698 -1.8364 
5 -0.63% -0.63% -3.69% -0.1776 1.2367 -0.8004 -0.3158 0.8554 -2.0579 
6 -0.86% -0.56% -4.55% -0.2601 0.9485 -1.5287 -0.3599 0.8526 -2.3534 
7 -0.08% -0.22% -4.63% -0.0187 1.1048 -0.0942 -0.3570 0.8668 -2.2957 
8 0.51% 0.22% -4.12% 0.0849 1.0683 0.4432 -0.3350 0.8955 -2.0853 
9 -0.82% -0.61% -4.94% -0.3071 0.8368 -2.0463 -0.3854 0.8757 -2.4538 
10 0.81% 0.49% -4.13% 0.2242 1.1659 1.0720 -0.3389 0.8729 -2.1644 
11 0.33% -0.23% -3.80% 0.0935 0.8810 0.5915 -0.3170 0.8697 -2.0323 
12 -0.22% -0.17% -4.02% -0.1103 0.9924 -0.6196 -0.3314 0.9061 -2.0390 
13 -0.29% -0.47% -4.31% -0.1296 0.8793 -0.8215 -0.3487 0.9086 -2.1397 
14 -0.57% -0.93% -4.88% -0.2830 0.8515 -1.8532 -0.3915 0.9219 -2.3676 
15 -0.65% -0.32% -5.54% -0.2292 1.6017 -0.7977 -0.4242 0.8873 -2.6656 
16 -0.40% -0.54% -5.94% -0.1446 1.0974 -0.7348 -0.4423 0.8957 -2.7527 
17 -0.59% -0.67% -6.53% -0.2245 0.8759 -1.4289 -0.4728 0.8785 -3.0004 
18 -0.50% -0.63% -7.03% -0.1089 0.8578 -0.7081 -0.4842 0.8619 -3.1318 
19 0.45% -0.27% -6.58% 0.0857 1.5903 0.3006 -0.4645 0.8643 -2.9964 
20 -1.28% -0.77% -7.86% -0.4953 1.7769 -1.5539 -0.5362 0.9607 -3.1114 
21 -0.34% -1.26% -8.21% -0.1069 1.1740 -0.5078 -0.5462 0.9444 -3.2246 
22 0.08% 0.04% -8.12% 0.0348 1.0720 0.1811 -0.5345 0.8659 -3.4415 
23 0.38% -0.52% -7.74% 0.0435 1.3299 0.1823 -0.5219 0.8798 -3.3069 
24 -0.07% 0.38% -7.81% -0.0536 1.0567 -0.2830 -0.5240 0.8710 -3.3543 
25 -0.97% -0.94% -8.79% -0.4004 0.8121 -2.7488 -0.5773 0.8762 -3.6735 
26 0.73% 0.41% -8.06% 0.3002 1.3460 1.2432 -0.5274 0.9028 -3.2570 
27 -0.15% -0.28% -8.21% -0.0464 1.3309 -0.1943 -0.5286 0.9819 -3.0010 
28 -0.41% -0.34% -8.62% -0.1130 0.8849 -0.7119 -0.5393 0.9870 -3.0460 
29 -0.09% -0.73% -8.71% -0.0350 1.3282 -0.1468 -0.5388 0.9708 -3.0943 
30 -0.46% -0.86% -9.16% -0.1390 0.9622 -0.8056 -0.5530 1.0249 -3.0078 
          
-1 to 1     0.97% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.0323 0.1953 1.1503 0.9464 
 
 
  
  
7–185 
 
Table-A 7.37 Market Returns; Indian Acquirers; FF-firms; (MM, 32) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.07% -0.14% 0.07% -0.0844 0.7662 -0.6047 -0.0844 0.7662 -0.6047 
-19 -0.46% -0.60% -0.39% -0.2064 0.9672 -1.1719 -0.2056 0.9595 -1.1768 
-18 0.03% -0.44% -0.36% -0.0735 1.2251 -0.3296 -0.2103 1.1119 -1.0388 
-17 0.75% 0.49% 0.39% 0.2923 0.7693 2.0866 -0.0360 1.0465 -0.1889 
-16 -0.18% -0.27% 0.21% -0.0333 0.7939 -0.2300 -0.0471 0.9026 -0.2864 
-15 0.76% 0.63% 0.97% 0.3065 1.0678 1.5765 0.0822 0.8495 0.5312 
-14 -0.89% -0.42% 0.08% -0.3853 1.5896 -1.3311 -0.0695 1.0069 -0.3793 
-13 -0.72% -0.19% -0.64% -0.4406 2.2374 -1.0815 -0.2208 1.4879 -0.8151 
-12 0.37% -0.14% -0.27% 0.1789 1.3653 0.7196 -0.1486 1.1427 -0.7140 
-11 0.07% -0.37% -0.19% 0.0651 1.1831 0.3023 -0.1204 1.2013 -0.5502 
-10 -0.49% -0.20% -0.68% -0.1939 0.9222 -1.1545 -0.1732 1.1393 -0.8349 
-9 0.66% 0.52% -0.02% 0.2033 1.1535 0.9680 -0.1072 1.1098 -0.5302 
-8 -0.18% 0.19% -0.20% -0.0234 0.8171 -0.1573 -0.1094 1.1009 -0.5459 
-7 0.17% 0.11% -0.03% 0.0424 1.5991 0.1454 -0.0941 1.2782 -0.4045 
-6 -0.52% -0.35% -0.55% -0.2597 1.0034 -1.4213 -0.1580 1.3527 -0.6414 
-5 0.11% 0.36% -0.44% 0.0935 0.8291 0.6192 -0.1296 1.2680 -0.5613 
-4 0.64% 0.30% 0.20% 0.2464 0.9244 1.4641 -0.0660 1.2071 -0.3001 
-3 0.37% -0.42% 0.56% 0.0742 0.9688 0.4204 -0.0466 1.1501 -0.2227 
-2 -0.60% -0.70% -0.04% -0.2253 0.9782 -1.2646 -0.0971 1.0916 -0.4883 
-1 0.52% -0.03% 0.49% 0.2032 1.4280 0.7814 -0.0492 1.1203 -0.2411 
0 1.35% 1.08% 1.84% 0.5674 1.2971 2.4020 0.0758 1.0886 0.3825 
1 -0.72% -0.85% 1.12% -0.3002 1.1136 -1.4802 0.0101 1.0459 0.0529 
2 -0.76% -0.60% 0.36% -0.3523 1.3122 -1.4744 -0.0636 0.9954 -0.3509 
3 -0.53% -0.46% -0.17% -0.2259 0.9589 -1.2936 -0.1084 1.0040 -0.5927 
4 0.33% 0.10% 0.16% 0.0550 1.0233 0.2954 -0.0952 1.0234 -0.5107 
5 -0.53% -0.50% -0.38% -0.1680 1.6046 -0.5749 -0.1263 1.0797 -0.6422 
6 -0.75% -0.26% -1.13% -0.2507 1.0960 -1.2560 -0.1721 1.1169 -0.8464 
7 0.12% -0.16% -1.01% 0.0601 1.3131 0.2515 -0.1577 1.0640 -0.8138 
8 0.33% 0.40% -0.68% 0.0582 1.1958 0.2674 -0.1441 1.0786 -0.7338 
9 -0.75% -0.41% -1.43% -0.2904 1.0123 -1.5757 -0.1947 1.1086 -0.9646 
10 1.09% 0.82% -0.33% 0.4186 1.2327 1.8648 -0.1164 1.0309 -0.6200 
11 0.64% 0.45% 0.30% 0.2235 0.9823 1.2493 -0.0750 1.0638 -0.3874 
12 -0.30% -0.24% 0.01% -0.1475 1.1493 -0.7048 -0.0996 1.1121 -0.4917 
13 -0.08% -0.14% -0.07% -0.0267 1.0686 -0.1374 -0.1027 1.0969 -0.5141 
14 -0.74% -0.84% -0.81% -0.3378 1.0229 -1.8134 -0.1583 1.1107 -0.7827 
15 -0.40% 0.19% -1.21% -0.1743 1.9901 -0.4810 -0.1851 1.1636 -0.8738 
16 -0.58% -0.69% -1.79% -0.2179 1.4237 -0.8404 -0.2184 1.1896 -1.0084 
17 -0.62% -0.56% -2.41% -0.2371 1.0225 -1.2735 -0.2540 1.1883 -1.1739 
18 0.16% 0.00% -2.25% 0.1064 1.0736 0.5442 -0.2337 1.1685 -1.0984 
19 0.67% 0.12% -1.57% 0.2508 1.8709 0.7363 -0.1911 1.0727 -0.9784 
20 -1.08% -0.61% -2.65% -0.5327 2.1613 -1.3536 -0.2720 1.2637 -1.1818 
21 -0.04% -0.49% -2.69% 0.0170 1.3945 0.0669 -0.2661 1.2017 -1.2159 
22 0.51% 0.30% -2.17% 0.2301 1.2301 1.0273 -0.2279 1.1023 -1.1353 
23 0.34% -0.16% -1.84% 0.0355 1.4535 0.1341 -0.2199 1.0561 -1.1435 
24 -0.02% 0.23% -1.86% -0.0594 1.2348 -0.2641 -0.2263 1.1019 -1.1279 
25 -0.71% -0.53% -2.57% -0.3539 0.9452 -2.0560 -0.2760 1.1368 -1.3333 
26 0.92% 0.50% -1.65% 0.4365 1.3870 1.7281 -0.2094 1.1271 -1.0202 
27 -0.21% -0.45% -1.86% -0.1005 1.5194 -0.3631 -0.2217 1.2581 -0.9677 
28 0.01% 0.01% -1.85% 0.0304 0.9968 0.1675 -0.2151 1.2960 -0.9114 
29 -0.05% -0.83% -1.90% 0.0537 1.6473 0.1791 -0.2053 1.2855 -0.8771 
30 -0.35% -0.45% -2.26% -0.0966 1.1495 -0.4617 -0.2168 1.3640 -0.8730 
          
-1 to 1     1.15% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03181 0.2716 1.2139 1.2286 
 
 
  
  
7–186 
 
Table-A 7.38 Market Returns; Indian Acquirers; FF-firms; (OLS, 32) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 -0.10% -0.12% -0.10% -0.1349 0.7167 -1.0310 -0.1349 0.7167 -1.0310 
-19 -0.66% -0.76% -0.75% -0.2654 0.8477 -1.7147 -0.2831 0.8515 -1.8208 
-18 -0.11% -0.49% -0.86% -0.0993 1.0949 -0.4966 -0.2885 0.9572 -1.6505 
-17 0.66% 0.39% -0.20% 0.2411 0.7099 1.8598 -0.1293 0.9183 -0.7709 
-16 -0.47% -0.77% -0.67% -0.1213 0.7530 -0.8823 -0.1699 0.8085 -1.1507 
-15 0.64% 0.52% -0.02% 0.2403 0.9430 1.3953 -0.0570 0.7412 -0.4211 
-14 -1.03% -0.72% -1.05% -0.3897 1.3566 -1.5732 -0.2001 0.8490 -1.2904 
-13 -0.82% -0.31% -1.87% -0.4112 1.8696 -1.2045 -0.3325 1.2448 -1.4629 
-12 0.24% -0.34% -1.63% 0.1008 1.1470 0.4813 -0.2799 0.9655 -1.5877 
-11 -0.04% -0.35% -1.67% 0.0154 1.0348 0.0816 -0.2607 1.0082 -1.4160 
-10 -0.60% -0.50% -2.28% -0.1819 0.7949 -1.2530 -0.3034 0.9436 -1.7607 
-9 0.50% 0.25% -1.78% 0.0938 0.9306 0.5518 -0.2634 0.9017 -1.5997 
-8 -0.32% 0.01% -2.10% -0.0667 0.6975 -0.5239 -0.2716 0.8947 -1.6622 
-7 -0.10% -0.33% -2.20% -0.0854 1.3066 -0.3578 -0.2845 1.0470 -1.4881 
-6 -0.72% -0.67% -2.92% -0.2995 0.8514 -1.9264 -0.3522 1.1046 -1.7461 
-5 0.05% 0.33% -2.88% 0.0735 0.7423 0.5426 -0.3226 1.0396 -1.6995 
-4 0.45% 0.08% -2.43% 0.1504 0.8129 1.0132 -0.2765 0.9943 -1.5230 
-3 0.18% -0.80% -2.25% 0.0022 0.8814 0.0134 -0.2682 0.9476 -1.5500 
-2 -0.71% -0.75% -2.96% -0.2289 0.8912 -1.4067 -0.3136 0.8806 -1.9501 
-1 0.45% -0.02% -2.51% 0.1423 1.2558 0.6204 -0.2738 0.8878 -1.6890 
0 1.25% 0.89% -1.26% 0.4724 1.1559 2.2381 -0.1641 0.8692 -1.0342 
1 -0.79% -1.02% -2.05% -0.3122 0.9739 -1.7558 -0.2269 0.8360 -1.4866 
2 -0.78% -0.71% -2.83% -0.3028 1.0524 -1.5755 -0.2851 0.7748 -2.0150 
3 -0.58% -0.25% -3.41% -0.2175 0.8700 -1.3690 -0.3235 0.7649 -2.3160 
4 0.12% 0.05% -3.29% -0.0114 0.8782 -0.0709 -0.3192 0.8030 -2.1770 
5 -0.61% -0.65% -3.91% -0.1730 1.2794 -0.7407 -0.3469 0.8098 -2.3462 
6 -0.73% -0.59% -4.64% -0.2082 0.8872 -1.2852 -0.3805 0.8246 -2.5272 
7 -0.07% -0.21% -4.70% -0.0119 1.1434 -0.0571 -0.3759 0.8343 -2.4677 
8 0.22% 0.16% -4.48% -0.0209 1.0823 -0.1059 -0.3733 0.8723 -2.3435 
9 -0.78% -0.70% -5.26% -0.2546 0.8391 -1.6620 -0.4135 0.8676 -2.6100 
10 0.91% 0.70% -4.35% 0.2619 1.0649 1.3469 -0.3597 0.8238 -2.3913 
11 0.49% 0.25% -3.86% 0.1370 0.7977 0.9407 -0.3298 0.8321 -2.1709 
12 -0.49% -0.25% -4.35% -0.2092 0.9958 -1.1503 -0.3612 0.8802 -2.2473 
13 -0.19% -0.12% -4.54% -0.0847 0.8875 -0.5228 -0.3704 0.8954 -2.2653 
14 -0.72% -1.17% -5.26% -0.3124 0.9132 -1.8735 -0.4179 0.9191 -2.4899 
15 -0.55% -0.16% -5.81% -0.1887 1.5568 -0.6639 -0.4435 0.9059 -2.6809 
16 -0.45% -0.76% -6.26% -0.1358 1.2353 -0.6020 -0.4598 0.9006 -2.7959 
17 -0.67% -0.44% -6.94% -0.2407 0.8823 -1.4938 -0.4927 0.9100 -2.9652 
18 -0.05% 0.03% -6.99% 0.0284 0.9849 0.1578 -0.4818 0.9153 -2.8828 
19 0.53% 0.04% -6.46% 0.1114 1.5373 0.3967 -0.4581 0.8952 -2.8027 
20 -1.26% -0.74% -7.72% -0.4756 1.8278 -1.4251 -0.5268 1.0168 -2.8374 
21 -0.24% -0.96% -7.96% -0.0494 1.1595 -0.2335 -0.5281 0.9851 -2.9360 
22 0.32% 0.01% -7.63% 0.1172 1.0137 0.6332 -0.5041 0.9143 -3.0194 
23 0.22% -0.36% -7.41% -0.0274 1.3113 -0.1144 -0.5024 0.9096 -3.0252 
24 -0.07% 0.24% -7.49% -0.0653 1.0112 -0.3534 -0.5066 0.9258 -2.9965 
25 -0.91% -0.94% -8.40% -0.3796 0.8547 -2.4319 -0.5570 0.9310 -3.2763 
26 0.67% 0.23% -7.73% 0.2753 1.1871 1.2702 -0.5109 0.9533 -2.9347 
27 -0.21% -0.65% -7.94% -0.0975 1.2530 -0.4260 -0.5196 1.0516 -2.7059 
28 -0.11% -0.13% -8.05% -0.0235 0.8557 -0.1507 -0.5176 1.0682 -2.6536 
29 -0.21% -0.85% -8.26% -0.0633 1.3495 -0.2570 -0.5214 1.0305 -2.7708 
30 -0.44% -0.69% -8.70% -0.1211 0.9947 -0.6667 -0.5332 1.0890 -2.6814 
          
-1 to 1     0.91% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03149 0.1746 1.0775 0.8874 
  
  
7–187 
 
Table-A 7.39 SW-1 Returns; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 37) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% 0.13% 0.06% -0.0332 0.7301 -0.2737 -0.0332 0.7301 -0.2737 
-19 -0.66% -0.58% -0.60% -0.2459 0.7797 -1.8958 -0.1974 0.8174 -1.4517 
-18 -0.20% -0.65% -0.80% -0.1418 0.9998 -0.8529 -0.2430 0.8755 -1.6690 
-17 0.41% 0.09% -0.39% 0.1215 0.7298 1.0006 -0.1497 0.8375 -1.0750 
-16 -0.43% -0.48% -0.82% -0.1117 0.7563 -0.8880 -0.1839 0.7639 -1.4473 
-15 0.57% 0.37% -0.25% 0.1869 0.9079 1.2381 -0.0915 0.7189 -0.7656 
-14 -0.80% -0.41% -1.04% -0.2759 1.4000 -1.1850 -0.1890 0.8537 -1.3314 
-13 -0.57% -0.30% -1.61% -0.2642 1.8609 -0.8537 -0.2703 1.2738 -1.2756 
-12 0.15% -0.24% -1.47% 0.0823 1.1129 0.4449 -0.2273 0.9914 -1.3787 
-11 -0.25% -0.30% -1.71% -0.0701 1.0050 -0.4195 -0.2379 1.0377 -1.3782 
-10 -0.54% -0.08% -2.25% -0.1083 0.9051 -0.7196 -0.2595 1.0020 -1.5569 
-9 0.39% 0.18% -1.86% 0.0490 0.8944 0.3291 -0.2343 0.9433 -1.4932 
-8 -0.42% -0.15% -2.28% -0.1092 0.6894 -0.9527 -0.2554 0.9281 -1.6544 
-7 -0.09% -0.29% -2.37% -0.0838 1.2238 -0.4116 -0.2685 1.0554 -1.5295 
-6 -0.70% -0.74% -3.07% -0.3060 0.7725 -2.3816 -0.3384 1.1024 -1.8456 
-5 0.13% 0.47% -2.94% 0.0697 0.7324 0.5724 -0.3102 1.0390 -1.7951 
-4 0.44% 0.24% -2.50% 0.1907 0.9254 1.2390 -0.2547 0.9750 -1.5706 
-3 0.01% -0.67% -2.49% -0.0598 0.8804 -0.4084 -0.2616 0.9164 -1.7165 
-2 -0.56% -0.60% -3.05% -0.1105 0.9874 -0.6727 -0.2800 0.8768 -1.9200 
-1 0.42% 0.13% -2.63% 0.1000 1.1857 0.5072 -0.2505 0.8931 -1.6865 
0 1.31% 0.98% -1.32% 0.4653 1.1407 2.4522 -0.1430 0.8665 -0.9919 
1 -0.78% -0.71% -2.10% -0.2907 0.9392 -1.8609 -0.2017 0.8375 -1.4477 
2 -0.78% -0.68% -2.87% -0.3384 1.0381 -1.9600 -0.2678 0.7756 -2.0758 
3 -0.73% -0.84% -3.60% -0.2769 0.8135 -2.0468 -0.3187 0.7671 -2.4977 
4 -0.07% -0.24% -3.67% -0.0084 0.9563 -0.0531 -0.3139 0.8045 -2.3461 
5 -0.62% -0.73% -4.29% -0.1418 1.2686 -0.6720 -0.3356 0.8431 -2.3936 
6 -0.57% -0.30% -4.86% -0.1135 0.9670 -0.7054 -0.3512 0.8914 -2.3689 
7 0.01% -0.23% -4.86% -0.0120 1.0812 -0.0665 -0.3471 0.8765 -2.3811 
8 0.04% -0.08% -4.81% -0.0926 1.0185 -0.5467 -0.3583 0.9016 -2.3893 
9 -0.87% -0.72% -5.68% -0.2781 0.8651 -1.9326 -0.4030 0.9165 -2.6440 
10 0.67% 0.44% -5.01% 0.2288 1.0435 1.3182 -0.3554 0.8820 -2.4226 
11 0.25% -0.02% -4.76% 0.0150 0.8872 0.1014 -0.3471 0.8806 -2.3701 
12 -0.47% -0.18% -5.22% -0.2245 0.9849 -1.3705 -0.3809 0.9283 -2.4672 
13 -0.17% -0.18% -5.40% -0.0660 0.8574 -0.4631 -0.3866 0.9284 -2.5038 
14 -0.75% -0.71% -6.15% -0.2941 0.8318 -2.1262 -0.4308 0.9395 -2.7568 
15 -0.80% -0.35% -6.94% -0.2926 1.5585 -1.1288 -0.4735 0.9426 -3.0204 
16 -0.53% -0.79% -7.48% -0.1795 1.2238 -0.8818 -0.4966 0.9430 -3.1660 
17 -0.67% -0.51% -8.15% -0.2258 0.8301 -1.6352 -0.5266 0.9553 -3.3144 
18 0.09% 0.13% -8.06% 0.0743 0.9508 0.4697 -0.5079 0.9486 -3.2195 
19 0.64% 0.04% -7.42% 0.1524 1.4674 0.6246 -0.4774 0.9337 -3.0743 
20 -0.91% -0.54% -8.32% -0.3351 1.6676 -1.2082 -0.5239 1.0498 -3.0007 
21 -0.18% -0.96% -8.51% -0.0297 1.1300 -0.1582 -0.5222 1.0044 -3.1261 
22 0.30% 0.02% -8.21% 0.1426 0.9929 0.8638 -0.4944 0.9299 -3.1964 
23 0.21% -0.01% -8.00% -0.0141 1.2297 -0.0691 -0.4908 0.9256 -3.1884 
24 -0.16% 0.22% -8.17% -0.0787 1.0026 -0.4720 -0.4971 0.9370 -3.1895 
25 -0.79% -0.38% -8.96% -0.3379 0.8543 -2.3783 -0.5415 0.9482 -3.4334 
26 0.64% 0.21% -8.31% 0.2277 1.1101 1.2334 -0.5025 0.9474 -3.1886 
27 -0.14% -0.64% -8.45% -0.0818 1.1906 -0.4133 -0.5090 1.0351 -2.9567 
28 -0.32% -0.62% -8.77% -0.0846 0.8473 -0.6000 -0.5159 1.0584 -2.9304 
29 -0.12% -0.73% -8.89% -0.0440 1.3133 -0.2014 -0.5169 1.0189 -3.0502 
30 -0.50% -0.78% -9.39% -0.1774 0.9806 -1.0878 -0.5367 1.0692 -3.0177 
          
-1 to 1     0.95% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03027 0.1585 0.9997 0.9535 
  
  
7–188 
 
Table-A 7.40 SW-2 Returns; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 37) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.06% 0.34% 0.06% -0.0312 0.7177 -0.2620 -0.0312 0.7177 -0.2620 
-19 -0.65% -0.58% -0.59% -0.2445 0.7716 -1.9111 -0.1950 0.8019 -1.4662 
-18 -0.17% -0.66% -0.76% -0.1309 0.9990 -0.7900 -0.2347 0.8473 -1.6708 
-17 0.42% 0.20% -0.34% 0.1226 0.7416 0.9967 -0.1420 0.8158 -1.0497 
-16 -0.46% -0.37% -0.79% -0.1230 0.7838 -0.9461 -0.1820 0.7464 -1.4705 
-15 0.56% 0.39% -0.23% 0.1809 0.9252 1.1793 -0.0923 0.7151 -0.7782 
-14 -0.82% -0.57% -1.06% -0.2826 1.4725 -1.1573 -0.1922 0.8971 -1.2923 
-13 -0.65% -0.15% -1.71% -0.2842 1.8718 -0.9157 -0.2803 1.3424 -1.2593 
-12 0.17% -0.17% -1.54% 0.0897 1.1422 0.4737 -0.2344 1.0347 -1.3660 
-11 -0.23% -0.31% -1.77% -0.0622 1.0128 -0.3707 -0.2420 1.0769 -1.3553 
-10 -0.49% -0.41% -2.26% -0.0871 0.9156 -0.5740 -0.2570 1.0125 -1.5309 
-9 0.36% 0.22% -1.91% 0.0393 0.8727 0.2719 -0.2347 0.9506 -1.4891 
-8 -0.44% -0.11% -2.34% -0.1109 0.6943 -0.9632 -0.2563 0.9399 -1.6443 
-7 -0.16% -0.34% -2.50% -0.1053 1.2320 -0.5155 -0.2751 1.0826 -1.5325 
-6 -0.71% -0.65% -3.21% -0.3064 0.7708 -2.3976 -0.3449 1.1280 -1.8439 
-5 0.14% 0.53% -3.06% 0.0790 0.7464 0.6384 -0.3142 1.0477 -1.8085 
-4 0.43% 0.29% -2.64% 0.1857 0.9281 1.2069 -0.2598 0.9786 -1.6008 
-3 0.06% -0.59% -2.57% -0.0448 0.8841 -0.3056 -0.2630 0.9183 -1.7272 
-2 -0.51% -0.60% -3.08% -0.1036 0.9859 -0.6339 -0.2798 0.8881 -1.8998 
-1 0.46% 0.13% -2.62% 0.1111 1.1905 0.5629 -0.2478 0.9119 -1.6390 
0 1.32% 1.14% -1.31% 0.4691 1.1321 2.4987 -0.1395 0.8870 -0.9485 
1 -0.85% -0.90% -2.16% -0.3177 0.9377 -2.0433 -0.2040 0.8751 -1.4061 
2 -0.74% -0.58% -2.90% -0.3308 1.0360 -1.9257 -0.2685 0.8113 -1.9961 
3 -0.69% -0.59% -3.59% -0.2672 0.8059 -1.9996 -0.3174 0.7946 -2.4092 
4 -0.03% 0.17% -3.62% 0.0046 0.9718 0.0284 -0.3101 0.8153 -2.2937 
5 -0.59% -0.84% -4.21% -0.1300 1.2870 -0.6090 -0.3296 0.8462 -2.3487 
6 -0.56% -0.37% -4.77% -0.1087 0.9699 -0.6760 -0.3443 0.8931 -2.3249 
7 -0.02% -0.22% -4.79% -0.0205 1.0578 -0.1168 -0.3420 0.8772 -2.3511 
8 0.01% -0.09% -4.77% -0.1073 1.0281 -0.6293 -0.3560 0.9087 -2.3622 
9 -0.81% -0.57% -5.58% -0.2583 0.8451 -1.8433 -0.3972 0.9175 -2.6104 
10 0.67% 0.51% -4.92% 0.2218 1.0601 1.2615 -0.3509 0.8938 -2.3674 
11 0.31% -0.09% -4.61% 0.0279 0.8841 0.1901 -0.3404 0.8896 -2.3076 
12 -0.37% -0.17% -4.99% -0.1985 0.9682 -1.2363 -0.3698 0.9311 -2.3949 
13 -0.24% -0.18% -5.22% -0.0813 0.8649 -0.5672 -0.3782 0.9293 -2.4544 
14 -0.69% -0.72% -5.91% -0.2669 0.8148 -1.9754 -0.4179 0.9354 -2.6941 
15 -0.83% -0.38% -6.74% -0.3097 1.5454 -1.2084 -0.4637 0.9328 -2.9976 
16 -0.53% -0.72% -7.27% -0.1826 1.1871 -0.9274 -0.4874 0.9310 -3.1571 
17 -0.71% -0.53% -7.98% -0.2406 0.8401 -1.7270 -0.5200 0.9454 -3.3165 
18 0.02% 0.26% -7.96% 0.0535 0.9545 0.3382 -0.5047 0.9449 -3.2210 
19 0.62% 0.06% -7.34% 0.1434 1.4789 0.5846 -0.4757 0.9438 -3.0393 
20 -0.94% -0.53% -8.28% -0.3431 1.7058 -1.2129 -0.5234 1.0531 -2.9973 
21 -0.26% -1.06% -8.54% -0.0583 1.1329 -0.3102 -0.5261 1.0037 -3.1612 
22 0.28% 0.05% -8.26% 0.1383 1.0134 0.8230 -0.4989 0.9331 -3.2241 
23 0.17% 0.12% -8.09% -0.0226 1.2521 -0.1090 -0.4966 0.9340 -3.2063 
24 -0.18% 0.22% -8.27% -0.0810 0.9774 -0.4998 -0.5031 0.9374 -3.2366 
25 -0.78% -0.30% -9.05% -0.3388 0.8557 -2.3877 -0.5476 0.9651 -3.4216 
26 0.65% 0.23% -8.39% 0.2362 1.1003 1.2945 -0.5073 0.9597 -3.1874 
27 -0.17% -0.55% -8.56% -0.0912 1.1615 -0.4735 -0.5151 1.0383 -2.9918 
28 -0.26% -0.40% -8.82% -0.0640 0.8217 -0.4698 -0.5190 1.0564 -2.9625 
29 -0.18% -0.65% -8.99% -0.0567 1.3502 -0.2531 -0.5218 1.0092 -3.1180 
30 -0.52% -0.70% -9.51% -0.1851 0.9718 -1.1489 -0.5426 1.0605 -3.0852 
          
-1 to 1     0.93% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03003 0.1515 0.9861 0.9267 
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Table-A 7.41 SW-3; Indian Acquirers; All-firms; (OLS, 37) 
Days AAR Median CAAR SARa SD t-Stats SCARa SD t-Stats 
-20 0.09% 0.27% 0.09% -0.0298 0.7262 -0.2482 -0.0298 0.7262 -0.2482 
-19 -0.69% -0.47% -0.60% -0.2495 0.7713 -1.9535 -0.1976 0.8103 -1.4721 
-18 -0.10% -0.67% -0.70% -0.1019 0.9811 -0.6272 -0.2202 0.8266 -1.6081 
-17 0.46% 0.15% -0.24% 0.1328 0.7457 1.0752 -0.1243 0.8078 -0.9289 
-16 -0.42% -0.73% -0.66% -0.1146 0.7979 -0.8674 -0.1624 0.7537 -1.3012 
-15 0.62% 0.33% -0.04% 0.1981 0.9243 1.2944 -0.0674 0.7068 -0.5755 
-14 -0.75% -0.36% -0.79% -0.2661 1.4478 -1.1097 -0.1629 0.8720 -1.1283 
-13 -0.61% -0.10% -1.40% -0.2779 1.8727 -0.8959 -0.2507 1.3117 -1.1539 
-12 0.25% -0.17% -1.15% 0.1151 1.1329 0.6135 -0.1980 1.0185 -1.1736 
-11 -0.21% -0.23% -1.36% -0.0550 1.0194 -0.3257 -0.2052 1.0568 -1.1724 
-10 -0.48% -0.42% -1.84% -0.0925 0.8912 -0.6270 -0.2235 1.0013 -1.3480 
-9 0.35% 0.33% -1.49% 0.0336 0.8977 0.2258 -0.2043 0.9402 -1.3122 
-8 -0.41% 0.07% -1.90% -0.1047 0.7176 -0.8807 -0.2253 0.9345 -1.4560 
-7 -0.16% -0.44% -2.06% -0.1064 1.2410 -0.5178 -0.2456 1.0755 -1.3787 
-6 -0.70% -0.64% -2.76% -0.3043 0.7700 -2.3863 -0.3158 1.1215 -1.7004 
-5 0.15% 0.57% -2.61% 0.0799 0.7558 0.6384 -0.2858 1.0391 -1.6609 
-4 0.46% 0.22% -2.15% 0.1936 0.9157 1.2764 -0.2303 0.9682 -1.4365 
-3 0.10% -0.61% -2.05% -0.0323 0.8828 -0.2209 -0.2315 0.9094 -1.5369 
-2 -0.46% -0.48% -2.51% -0.0838 0.9879 -0.5124 -0.2445 0.8704 -1.6963 
-1 0.48% -0.08% -2.02% 0.1134 1.1549 0.5930 -0.2130 0.8871 -1.4497 
0 1.34% 0.99% -0.68% 0.4740 1.1392 2.5122 -0.1044 0.8702 -0.7245 
1 -0.80% -0.95% -1.49% -0.2979 0.9312 -1.9317 -0.1655 0.8543 -1.1699 
2 -0.70% -0.56% -2.18% -0.3110 1.0402 -1.8056 -0.2267 0.7866 -1.7406 
3 -0.67% -0.29% -2.85% -0.2647 0.8282 -1.9301 -0.2760 0.7684 -2.1689 
4 -0.02% 0.07% -2.88% 0.0077 0.9491 0.0491 -0.2689 0.7868 -2.0634 
5 -0.59% -0.88% -3.47% -0.1307 1.2792 -0.6172 -0.2893 0.8122 -2.1507 
6 -0.53% -0.32% -4.00% -0.1035 0.9441 -0.6622 -0.3038 0.8490 -2.1609 
7 -0.07% -0.18% -4.08% -0.0342 1.0387 -0.1988 -0.3048 0.8425 -2.1847 
8 -0.03% -0.16% -4.11% -0.1163 1.0180 -0.6899 -0.3211 0.8721 -2.2233 
9 -0.74% -0.73% -4.85% -0.2394 0.8290 -1.7436 -0.3594 0.8762 -2.4767 
10 0.74% 0.65% -4.11% 0.2462 1.0809 1.3751 -0.3094 0.8508 -2.1955 
11 0.38% -0.04% -3.73% 0.0520 0.8848 0.3552 -0.2953 0.8458 -2.1081 
12 -0.40% -0.20% -4.13% -0.2108 0.9576 -1.3292 -0.3275 0.8912 -2.2188 
13 -0.27% -0.21% -4.41% -0.0902 0.8645 -0.6300 -0.3381 0.9001 -2.2680 
14 -0.60% -0.54% -5.01% -0.2409 0.8596 -1.6921 -0.3739 0.9117 -2.4766 
15 -0.79% -0.29% -5.80% -0.2910 1.5231 -1.1537 -0.4172 0.8962 -2.8111 
16 -0.43% -0.72% -6.23% -0.1525 1.1792 -0.7809 -0.4366 0.8832 -2.9850 
17 -0.67% -0.54% -6.90% -0.2298 0.8366 -1.6582 -0.4681 0.8976 -3.1489 
18 -0.02% 0.03% -6.92% 0.0386 0.9357 0.2489 -0.4559 0.9025 -3.0500 
19 0.60% 0.15% -6.32% 0.1421 1.4646 0.5860 -0.4277 0.9042 -2.8562 
20 -0.99% -0.52% -7.31% -0.3634 1.7477 -1.2556 -0.4792 1.0090 -2.8677 
21 -0.31% -0.96% -7.62% -0.0738 1.1297 -0.3944 -0.4848 0.9627 -3.0411 
22 0.18% 0.03% -7.44% 0.1067 1.0154 0.6343 -0.4629 0.8932 -3.1292 
23 0.23% 0.04% -7.20% -0.0088 1.2706 -0.0417 -0.4589 0.9003 -3.0780 
24 -0.13% 0.21% -7.34% -0.0699 0.9770 -0.4317 -0.4642 0.9044 -3.0992 
25 -0.81% -0.37% -8.14% -0.3358 0.8639 -2.3469 -0.5087 0.9252 -3.3195 
26 0.62% 0.26% -7.52% 0.2271 1.0895 1.2588 -0.4701 0.9266 -3.0633 
27 -0.07% -0.44% -7.59% -0.0690 1.1319 -0.3683 -0.4751 1.0022 -2.8625 
28 -0.21% -0.13% -7.80% -0.0518 0.8218 -0.3804 -0.4777 1.0188 -2.8310 
29 -0.22% -0.72% -8.02% -0.0687 1.3315 -0.3115 -0.4826 0.9744 -2.9905 
30 -0.48% -0.73% -8.50% -0.1747 1.0032 -1.0513 -0.5023 1.0260 -2.9558 
          
-1 to 1     1.02% StdDev(AAR-0) 0.03034 0.1671 0.9803 1.0295 
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Cross-Sectional – Analysis - Targets 
 
Table-A 7.42 Multivariate Analysis – Larger CAAR Windows; OLS CAARs 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-20,+20]   [-15,+15]   [-10,+10]   [-5,+5]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0616  0.0599  0.0664 * 0.0376  -0.0122   
(1.0979) (1.2334) (1.7561) 
 
(1.1137) (-0.4933) 
 GJ 0.0518  0.0595  0.0672 * 0.0903 ** 0.0588 ***  
(0.8775) (1.1004) (1.7271) 
 
(2.5386) 
 
(2.9759) 
 
 CWA 0.0385  0.0817  0.0862  0.0601  0.0224   
(0.4960) (1.1964) (1.3624) (1.2726) (0.7856) 
 Pct50 0.0250  0.0169  -0.0209  -0.0120  -0.0180   
(0.4591) (0.3210) (-0.5336) (-0.3312) (-0.7193) 
 PctToe 0.0012  0.0010  0.0012  0.0012  0.0006   
(1.0470) (0.9689) (1.4648) (1.4864) (1.1329) 
 Conglomerate -0.0507  -0.0273  -0.0104  -0.0079  -0.0131   
(-0.8203) (-0.4879) (-0.2389) (-0.2180) (-0.5997) 
 Intercept -0.0012  -0.0089  -0.0217  -0.0146  0.0320   
(-0.0191) (-0.1478) (-0.4859) (-0.4363) (1.6026) 
  Observations 99   99   99   99   99   
 F-Statistics 0.8244  0.9086  2.0171  2.7405  2.0442  
 p-value 0.5539  0.4924  0.0712 * 0.0170 ** 0.0675 * 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0010   0.0026   0.0673   0.0785   0.0587   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Table-A 7.43 Multivariate Analysis – Larger CAAR Windows; MM CAARs 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
  [-20,+20]  [-15,+15]  [-10,+10]  [-5,+5]  [-1,+1]  
 Cash 0.0229  0.0338  0.0465  0.0271  -0.0140  
 
 
(0.3858) (0.6560) (1.1660) (0.7572) (-0.5212) 
 GJ 0.0804 
 0.0892  0.0790 * 0.0845 ** 0.0657 *** 
 
 
(1.2888) 
 
(1.5899) (1.9679) 
 
(2.3482) 
 
(3.0844) 
 
 CWA 0.0213 
 0.0692  0.0726  0.0530  0.0199  
 
 
(0.2741) 
 
(1.0210) (1.1580) (1.1029) (0.6848) 
 Pct50 0.0047 
 0.0147  -0.0284  -0.0299  -0.0134  
 
 
(0.0813) 
 
(0.2746) (-0.6925) (-0.8109) (-0.4953) 
 PctToe 0.0008 
 0.0006  0.0009  0.0012  0.0005  
 
 
(0.6785) 
 
(0.5598) (1.1281) (1.5524) (0.8327) 
 Conglomerate -0.0142 
 -0.0015  0.0035  0.0021  -0.0149  
 
 
(-0.2347) 
 
(-0.0274) (0.0786) (0.0576) (-0.6691) 
 Intercept 0.0959  0.0598  0.0328  0.0170  0.0410 * 
 
 
(1.4479) (0.9603) (0.7524) (0.5076) (1.8460) 
 
  Observations 94   94   94   94   94   
 F-Statistics 0.5021 
 0.6156  1.6980  2.5575  2.0466  
 p-value 0.8052 
 0.7173  0.1310  0.0250 ** 0.0679 * 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0282   -0.0200   0.0361   0.0738   0.0595   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.44 Multivariate Analysis – Cultural Variables; OLS CAARs Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0769 * 0.0581  0.0421  0.0152  -0.0113    
(1.8563) 
 
(1.5030) (1.2082) (0.4619) (-0.4640) 
 Germanic 0.1145 * 0.1568 ** 0.1447 ** 0.1282 ** 0.1053 ***  
(1.8769) 
 
(2.6063) 
 
(2.4138) 
 
(2.1842) 
 
(2.9948) 
 
 Nordic 0.1530 ** 0.1436 * 0.1575 ** 0.1443 * 0.0804   
(2.0317) 
 
(1.7322) 
 
(2.1135) 
 
(1.8961) 
 
(1.4341) 
 Confucian 0.0542  0.0840 ** 0.0509  0.0199  0.0105   
(1.1424) (2.0315) 
 
(1.4661) (0.6366) (0.5069) 
 LE -0.0310  0.0140  0.0379  0.0374  -0.0137   
(-0.6588) (0.2678) (0.5472) (0.7749) (-0.4942) 
 SA 0.0305  0.0320  0.0439  -0.0172  -0.0371   
(0.3375) (0.5105) (0.7014) (-0.4428) (-0.7122) 
 CWA 0.0699  0.0684  0.0471  0.0416  0.0099   
(1.1647) (1.3819) (1.0377) (0.9354) (0.3386) 
 Pct50 0.0058  -0.0229  0.0038  -0.0183  -0.0100   
(0.1344) (-0.5977) (0.1025) (-0.5553) (-0.4530) 
 PctToe 0.0739  0.1062  0.0839  0.0159  0.0435   
(0.8471) (1.2551) (1.0280) (0.2110) (0.8164) 
 Intercept -0.0282  -0.0385  -0.0173  0.0307  0.0388 **  
(-0.6565) (-1.0685) (-0.5835) (1.1215) (2.1037) 
 
  Observations 100   100   100   100   100   
 F-Statistics 
2.3679  2.5383 
 2.1973  1.3361  1.6379  
 p-value 0.0189 ** 0.0121 ** 0.0293 ** 0.2298  0.1164  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0843   0.1183   0.0922   0.0483   0.1173   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.45 Multivariate Analysis – Cultural Variables; MM CAARs Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-10,+10]   [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0589  0.0498  0.0318  0.0093  -0.0137   
(1.3456) (1.2096) (0.8616) (0.2664) (-0.5192) 
 Germanic 0.1226 * 0.1641 ** 0.1447 ** 0.1269 ** 0.1052 ***  
(1.9411) 
 
(2.5664) 
 
(2.3158) 
 
(2.1159) 
 
(2.9377) 
 
 Nordic 0.1499 ** 0.1412  0.1457 * 0.1375 * 0.0791   
(1.9891) 
 
(1.6340) (1.9591) 
 
(1.7786) 
 
(1.3699) 
 Confucian 0.0482  0.0777 * 0.0458  0.0153  0.0104   
(0.9947) (1.8358) 
 
(1.3000) (0.4695) (0.4722) 
 LE -0.0087  0.0156  -0.0018  0.0101  -0.0075   
(-0.1718) (0.3105) (-0.0445) (0.3189) (-0.2401) 
 SA 0.0028  0.0102  0.0307  -0.0309  -0.0449   
(0.0358) (0.1790) (0.5672) (-0.7020) (-0.8288) 
 CWA 0.0565  0.0617  0.0416  0.0351  0.0059   
(0.9657) (1.2426) (0.9147) (0.7888) (0.2001) 
 Pct50 -0.0079  -0.0343  -0.0181  -0.0299  -0.0092   
(-0.1790) (-0.8462) (-0.4967) (-0.8790) (-0.3760) 
 PctToe 0.0393  0.0854  0.0873  0.0128  0.0342   
(0.4402) (0.9835) (1.0914) (0.1693) (0.6161) 
 Intercept 0.0374  0.0047  0.0204  0.0575 * 0.0500 **  
(0.8315) (0.1227) (0.6652) (1.9590) 
 
(2.3744) 
 
  Observations 95   95   95   95   95   
 F-Statistics 1.5429  2.2981  2.1883  1.2391  1.4976  
 p-value 0.1462  0.0231 ** 0.0306 ** 0.2825  0.1620  
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0394   0.0979   0.1010   0.0503   0.1018   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.46 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 GJ 0.0591 ***           0.0591 ***   
  (3.0327) 
 
(3.0076) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0646 ***           0.0654 *** 
  (3.2469) 
 
(3.2619) 
 
 Cash     -0.0098        -0.0118  -0.0115  
  (-0.4358) (-0.4722) (-0.4842) 
 CWA       -0.0303      0.0203  0.0186  
  (-1.0520) (0.7058) (0.6462) 
 Pct50         0.0015    -0.0148  -0.0120  
  (0.0551) (-0.6169) (-0.5396) 
 PctToe           0.0654  0.0684  0.0660  
  (1.2365) (1.2805) (1.3005) 
 Intercept 0.0320 *** 0.0330 *** 0.0744 *** 0.0748 *** 0.0696 *** 0.0578 *** 0.0255  0.0263  
  (2.7878) 
 
(3.0958) 
 
(4.3697) 
 
(5.8843) 
 
(5.5667) 
 
(3.7144) 
 
(1.4689) (1.6065) 
  Observations 100   101   104   104   104   103   99   100   
 F-Statistics 9.1974  10.5425  0.1900  1.1067  0.0030  1.5290  2.4686  2.6491  
 p-value 0.0031 *** 0.0016 *** 0.6639  0.2953  0.9561  0.2191  0.0380 ** 0.0276 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0718   0.0892   -0.0080   -0.0009   -0.0098   0.0081   0.0657   0.0829   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 7.47 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-3,+3] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   
 GJ 0.0737 **           0.0853 ***   
  (2.5034) 
 
(2.7286) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0831 ***           0.0928 *** 
  (2.7640) 
 
(2.9811) 
 
 Cash     0.0191        0.0143  0.0162  
  (0.5869) (0.4251) (0.4982) 
 CWA       -0.0134      0.0532  0.0487  
  (-0.3217) (1.1697) (1.0919) 
 Pct50         -0.0057    -0.0261  -0.0204  
  (-0.1593) (-0.8023) (-0.6532) 
 PctToe           0.0727  0.0606  0.0554  
  (1.0203) (0.8524) (0.8162) 
 Intercept 0.0421 ** 0.0428 *** 0.0799 *** 0.0904 *** 0.0901 *** 0.0741 *** 0.0168  0.0186  
  (2.3765) 
 
(2.6579) 
 
(3.6367) 
 
(5.0296) 
 
(4.6470) 
 
(3.2846) 
 
(0.6752) (0.7972) 
  Observations 100   101   104   104   104   103   99   100   
 F-Statistics 6.2668  7.6399  0.3444  0.1035  0.0254  1.0411  2.2744  2.5008  
 p-value 0.0140 ** 0.0068 *** 0.5586  0.7483  0.8738  0.3100  0.0534 * 0.0358 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0474   0.0639   -0.0064   -0.0089   -0.0095   0.0012   0.0420   0.0552   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
  
7–194 
 
Table-A 7.48 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 GJ 0.0821 **           0.0905 **   
  (2.5836) 
 
(2.5541) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0978 ***           0.1051 *** 
  (3.0050) 
 
(3.0353) 
 
 Cash     0.0478        0.0379  0.0462  
  (1.3545) (1.1159) (1.3537) 
 CWA       -0.0120      0.0589  0.0537  
  (-0.2990) (1.2655) (1.1940) 
 Pct50         0.0115    -0.0101  0.0031  
  (0.2886) (-0.2904) (0.0868) 
 PctToe           0.1428 * 0.1246  0.1080  
  (1.9454) 
 
(1.6479) (1.4633) 
 Intercept 0.0352 * 0.0352 * 0.0677 *** 0.0907 *** 0.0852 *** 0.0602 ** -0.0184  -0.0208  
  (1.7477) 
 
(1.9483) 
 
(2.9294) 
 
(4.5678) 
 
(4.1896) 
 
(2.4861) 
 
(-0.6497) (-0.8001) 
  Observations 100   101   104   104   104   103   99   100   
 F-Statistics 6.6752  9.0303  1.8346  0.0894  0.0833  3.7844  3.3218  3.8514  
 p-value 0.0113 ** 0.0034 *** 0.1786  0.7655  0.7735  0.0545 * 0.0083 *** 0.0032 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0516   0.0760   0.0082   -0.0092   -0.0089   0.0267   0.0879   0.1063   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 7.49 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-7,+7] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   
 GJ 0.0819 **           0.0942 **    
(2.4092) 
 
(2.5484) 
 
 Blockhold   0.1098 ***           0.1228 ***  
(3.1806) 
 
(3.4236) 
 
 Cash     0.0595        0.0501  0.0624 *  
(1.5015) (1.3601) (1.6738) 
 
 CWA       -0.0031      0.0814  0.0811   
(-0.0728) (1.5746) (1.6360) 
 Pct50         -0.0060    -0.0401  -0.0221   
(-0.1278) (-1.1673) (-0.6044) 
 PctToe           0.1375 * 0.1348 * 0.1079   
(1.6809) 
 
(1.7541) 
 
(1.4295) 
 Intercept 0.0265  0.0214  0.0596 ** 0.0864 *** 0.0878 *** 0.0579 ** -0.0319  -0.0418   
(1.1801) (1.0617) (2.1573) 
 
(3.7820) 
 
(3.9100) 
 
(2.0528) 
 
(-0.9577) (-1.3583) 
  Observations 100   101   104   104   104   103   99   100   
 F-Statistics 5.8042  10.1163  2.2544  0.0053  0.0163  2.8255  3.7236  4.7688  
 p-value 0.0179 ** 0.0020 *** 0.1363  0.9421  0.8985  0.0959 * 0.0041 *** 0.0006 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0446   0.0850   0.0116   -0.0098   -0.0096   0.0162   0.1172   0.1459   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.50 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-10,+10] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 GJ 0.0522            0.0674 *   
  (1.4131) (1.7460) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0843 **           0.1004 *** 
  (2.2205) 
 
(2.6589) 
 
 Cash     0.0817 **       0.0668 * 0.0847 ** 
  (2.1078) 
 
(1.7555) 
 
(2.0942) 
 
 CWA       0.0258      0.0846  0.0854  
  (0.4930) (1.3587) (1.4148) 
 Pct50         0.0063    -0.0184  0.0048  
  (0.1484) (-0.4996) (0.1171) 
 PctToe           0.1332  0.1253  0.0889  
  (1.6345) (1.6196) (1.1194) 
 Intercept 0.0468 * 0.0395 * 0.0508 * 0.0830 *** 0.0850 *** 0.0590 ** -0.0268  -0.0416  
  (1.7977) 
 
(1.6820) 
 
(1.9722) 
 
(3.8530) 
 
(3.5705) 
 
(2.2132) 
 
(-0.6542) (-1.0880) 
  Observations 100   101   104   104   104   103   99   100   
 F-Statistics 1.9969  4.9305  4.4426  0.2430  0.0220  2.6715  2.4182  2.9715  
 p-value 0.1608  0.0287 ** 0.0375 ** 0.6231  0.8823  0.1053  0.0415 ** 0.0155 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0097   0.0384   0.0324   -0.0076   -0.0096   0.0159   0.0767   0.1002   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 7.51 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 GJ 0.0653 ***           0.0657 ***   
  (3.2016) 
 
(3.1125) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0705 ***           0.0714 *** 
  (3.3848) 
 
(3.3783) 
 
 Cash     -0.0143        -0.0135  -0.0140  
  (-0.6255) (-0.4986) (-0.5503) 
 CWA       -0.0359      0.0175  0.0149  
  (-1.2431) (0.5978) (0.5108) 
 Pct50         0.0015    -0.0100  -0.0073  
  (0.0545) (-0.3806) (-0.3086) 
 PctToe           0.0555  0.0544  0.0526  
  (1.0443) (0.9869) (1.0106) 
 Intercept 0.0380 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0852 *** 0.0845 *** 0.0782 *** 0.0681 *** 0.0337 * 0.0357 * 
  (3.1340) 
 
(3.5302) 
 
(4.9090) 
 
(6.5527) 
 
(5.9920) 
 
(4.3523) 
 
(1.6666) 
 
(1.9236) 
 
  Observations 95   96   99   99   99   98   94   95   
 F-Statistics 10.2501  11.4567  0.3913  1.5452  0.0030  1.0905  2.4785  2.6266  
 p-value 0.0019 *** 0.0010 *** 0.5331  0.2168  0.9567  0.2990  0.0378 ** 0.0291 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0849   0.1023   -0.0064   0.0031   -0.0103   0.0033   0.0663   0.0851   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  
  
7–196 
 
Table-A 7.52 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-3,+3] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   
 GJ 0.0746 **           0.0832 **   
  (2.4520) 
 
(2.5438) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0805 **           0.0868 *** 
  (2.5760) 
 
(2.6778) 
 
 Cash     0.0147        0.0093  0.0111  
  (0.4439) (0.2576) (0.3226) 
 CWA       -0.0204      0.0472  0.0401  
  (-0.4816) (1.0303) (0.8931) 
 Pct50         -0.0182    -0.0350  -0.0288  
  (-0.5161) (-1.0293) (-0.8940) 
 PctToe           0.0631  0.0541  0.0493  
  (0.8861) (0.7492) (0.7103) 
 Intercept 0.0580 *** 0.0606 *** 0.0973 *** 0.1073 *** 0.1097 *** 0.0914 *** 0.0406  0.0448 * 
  (3.1732) 
 
(3.6628) 
 
(4.3821) 
 
(5.8842) 
 
(5.4817) 
 
(4.0322) 
 
(1.4707) (1.7640) 
 
  Observations 95   96   99   99   99   98   94   95   
 F-Statistics 6.0122  6.6359  0.1971  0.2320  0.2664  0.7853  2.0247  2.0064  
 p-value 0.0161 ** 0.0116 ** 0.6581  0.6311  0.6070  0.3778  0.0829 * 0.0854 * 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0477   0.0581   -0.0083   -0.0082   -0.0076   -0.0016   0.0370   0.0426   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
 
Table-A 7.53 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 GJ 0.0804 **           0.0845 **    
(2.5341) 
 
(2.3616) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0905 ***           0.0935 ***  
(2.7669) 
 
(2.6644) 
 
 Cash     0.0405        0.0270  0.0363   
(1.1580) (0.7512) (1.0098) 
 CWA       -0.0195      0.0534  0.0443   
(-0.4813) (1.1365) (0.9744) 
 Pct50         -0.0104    -0.0304  -0.0154   
(-0.2709) (-0.8790) (-0.4389) 
 PctToe           0.1337 * 0.1237  0.1064   
(1.8643) 
 
(1.6326) (1.4215) 
 Intercept 0.0588 *** 0.0616 *** 0.0925 *** 0.1140 *** 0.1141 *** 0.0834 *** 0.0180  0.0183   
(2.9302) 
 
(3.4113) 
 
(4.1875) 
 
(5.8445) 
 
(5.5855) 
 
(3.5362) 
 
(0.6102) (0.6798) 
  Observations 95   96   99   99   99   98   94   95   
 F-Statistics 6.4217  7.6558  1.3409  0.2317  0.0734  3.4756  3.0221  3.0919  
 p-value 0.0129 ** 0.0068 *** 0.2497  0.6314  0.7870  0.0653 * 0.0145 ** 0.0128 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0522   0.0676   0.0037   -0.0085   -0.0095   0.0254   0.0843   0.0877   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.54 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-7,+7] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   
 GJ 0.0891 **           0.0998 **    
(2.5475) 
 
(2.5395) 
 
 Blockhold   0.1108 ***           0.1216 ***  
(3.0968) 
 
(3.1652) 
 
 Cash     0.0478        0.0401  0.0526   
(1.1900) (1.0258) (1.3358) 
 CWA       -0.0162      0.0752  0.0698   
(-0.3740) (1.4512) (1.4056) 
 Pct50         -0.0205    -0.0491  -0.0292   
(-0.4391) (-1.2923) (-0.7411) 
 PctToe           0.1123  0.1137  0.0877   
(1.3796) (1.4350) (1.1122) 
 Intercept 0.0556 ** 0.0541 *** 0.0963 *** 0.1206 *** 0.1245 *** 0.0944 *** 0.0086  0.0028   
(2.4648) 
 
(2.6819) 
 
(3.4250) 
 
(5.2171) 
 
(5.4394) 
 
(3.3220) 
 
(0.2447) (0.0884) 
  Observations 95   96   99   99   99   98   94   95   
 F-Statistics 6.4899  9.5900  1.4161  0.1399  0.1928  1.9032  3.3040  3.9464  
 p-value 0.0125 ** 0.0026 *** 0.2370  0.7092  0.6616  0.1709  0.0088 *** 0.0028 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0530   0.0853   0.0040   -0.0094   -0.0080   0.0081   0.1008   0.1189   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table-A 7.55 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-10,+10] - Indian Targets 
  CAAR 
Window: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
  [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   [-10,+10]   
 GJ 0.0654 *           0.0790 *   
  (1.7806) 
 
(1.9773) 
 
 Blockhold   0.0878 **           0.1017 ** 
  (2.3218) 
 
(2.5567) 
 
 Cash     0.0589        0.0464  0.0643  
  (1.5224) (1.1542) (1.5161) 
 CWA       0.0038      0.0732  0.0666  
  (0.0723) (1.1985) (1.1252) 
 Pct50         -0.0112    -0.0292  -0.0041  
  (-0.2735) (-0.7541) (-0.0967) 
 PctToe           0.0943  0.0904  0.0566  
  (1.1807) (1.1607) (0.6900) 
 Intercept 0.0875 *** 0.0857 *** 0.1065 *** 0.1327 *** 0.1368 *** 0.1126 *** 0.0345  0.0259  
  (3.3986) 
 
(3.7073) 
 
(4.1527) 
 
(6.2334) 
 
(5.7250) 
 
(4.2541) 
 
(0.8055) (0.6503) 
  Observations 95   96   99   99   99   98   94   95   
 F-Statistics 3.1704  5.3908  2.3176  0.0052  0.0748  1.3941  1.8425  2.1766  
 p-value 0.0782 * 0.0224 ** 0.1312  0.9426  0.7851  0.2406  0.1128  0.0637 * 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.0221   0.0451   0.0134   -0.0103   -0.0096   0.0038   0.0470   0.0621   
 
 t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Cross-Sectional – Analysis – Acquirers 
 
Table-A 7.56 Multivariate Analysis – Cultural Analysis; OLS CAARs Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0079  -0.0037  -0.0349 * -0.0084  -0.0219 *  
(-0.2441) (-0.1816) (-1.8257) 
 
(-0.5535) 
 
(-1.7191) 
 
 Anglo 0.0036  -0.0157  -0.0411  -0.0600 *** -0.0722 ***  
(0.0783) (-0.7871) (-1.6714) (-2.8529) 
 
(-4.5377) 
 
 ED -0.0093  -0.1607 * -0.3074 *** -0.4390 *** -0.5318 ***  
(-0.0446) (-2.0277) 
 
(-3.3360) 
 
(-5.3173) 
 
(-6.7100) 
 
 CWT -0.0183  0.0027  -0.0285  -0.0162  -0.0071   
(-0.5302) (0.1210) (-1.6371) (-1.1419) (-0.5415) 
 Pct50 0.0210  -0.0036  -0.0221  -0.0374  -0.0084   
(0.5111) (-0.1366) (-0.5828) (-1.3972) (-0.5869) 
 PctToe -0.0742  -0.0650  -0.0001  0.0626 ** 0.0274   
(-0.7519) (-1.6846) (-0.0033) (2.3499) 
 
(0.9559) 
 Conglomerate 0.0212  0.0583 ** 0.0213  -0.0051  0.0167   
(0.3845) (2.1311) 
 
(1.2345) (-0.3085) (1.4894) 
 Intercept -0.0196  0.0100  0.0664 * 0.0872 *** 0.0950 *** 
 
 
(-0.3535) (0.3577) (2.0378) 
 
(3.2473) 
 
(4.5239) 
 
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.3814  2.0523  4.1143  12.3522  9.3097  
 p-value 0.9051  0.0847 * 0.0034 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.2089   0.0219   0.1074   0.3365   0.5010   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Table-A 7.57 Multivariate Analysis – Cultural Analysis; MM CAARs Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
  [-7,+7]   [-5,+5]   [-3,+3]   [-1,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0055  -0.0038  -0.0349 * -0.0081  -0.0209  
  (-0.1557) (-0.1521) (-1.7173) 
 
(-0.5251) (-1.5779) 
 Anglo 0.0084  -0.0163  -0.0419 * -0.0586 ** -0.0695 *** 
  (0.1665) (-0.7284) (-1.7662) 
 
(-2.7561) 
 
(-4.1370) 
 
 ED -0.0187  -0.1762  -0.3179 *** -0.4378 *** -0.5251 *** 
  (-0.0815) (-1.4927) (-2.9535) 
 
(-5.2112) 
 
(-6.5599) 
 
 CWT -0.0174  0.0071  -0.0251  -0.0176  -0.0100  
  (-0.5098) (0.2754) (-1.4026) (-1.2102) (-0.7487) 
 Pct50 0.0279  0.0041  -0.0166  -0.0366  -0.0092  
  (0.6350) (0.1302) (-0.4154) (-1.3368) (-0.6046) 
 PctToe -0.0641  -0.0608  0.0048  0.0617 ** 0.0285  
  (-0.6965) (-1.0977) (0.0913) (2.2329) 
 
(1.0057) 
 Conglomerate 0.0368  0.0724 ** 0.0299  -0.0014  0.0188  
  (0.7502) (2.3850) 
 
(1.5075) (-0.0801) (1.5014) 
 Intercept -0.0080  0.0188  0.0721 ** 0.0897 *** 0.0962 *** 
   (-0.1276) 
 
(0.5681) 
 
(2.1908) 
 
(3.3197) 
 
(4.3634)  
  Observations 35   35   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.3637  1.5833  2.8376  12.5038  9.9678  
 p-value 0.9153  0.1830  0.0236 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.1976   0.0121   0.1226   0.3130   0.4634   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table-A 7.58 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [0,+1] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0073                  -0.0287 * -0.0221  -0.0219 *   
(-0.5359) (-1.9463) 
 
(-1.4482) (-1.7191) 
 
 ED   -0.2446 **               -0.4417 *** -0.4376 *** -0.5318 ***  
(-2.3761) 
 
(-3.4612) 
 
(-3.1183) 
 
(-6.7100) 
 
 Diffused     -0.0058                -0.0549 **    
(-0.2218) (-2.3368) 
 
 AS       -0.0072            -0.0601 **      
(-0.3067) (-2.7530) 
 
 Anglo         -0.0110              -0.0722 ***  
(-0.5453) (-4.5377) 
 
 CWT           0.0053        -0.0088  -0.0051  -0.0071   
(0.4013) (-0.5745) (-0.3271) (-0.5415) 
 Pct50             -0.0071      -0.0160  -0.0021  -0.0084   
(-0.2721) (-0.9313) (-0.1011) (-0.5869) 
 PctToe               0.0468    0.0206  0.0139  0.0274   
(1.0820) (0.6098) (0.4412) (0.9559) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0185  0.0088  0.0111  0.0167   
(1.4993) (0.7073) (0.9144) (1.4894) 
 Intercept 0.0066  0.0174 ** 0.0082  0.0091  0.0113  0.0018  0.0051  0.0017  0.0011  0.0915 *** 0.0822 ** 0.0950 ***  
(0.6127) (2.0489) 
 
(0.3206) (0.4003) (0.5918) (0.1706) (0.8488) (0.2212) (0.1346) (3.0212) 
 
(2.6800) 
 
(4.5239) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.2872  5.6459  0.0492  0.0941  0.2973  0.1611  0.0740  1.1708  2.2480  2.5223  2.0281  9.3097  
 p-value 0.5954  0.0231 ** 0.8258  0.7609  0.5890  0.6906  0.7871  0.2871  0.1428  0.0392 ** 0.0881 * 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0214   0.1790   -0.0254   -0.0233   -0.0145   -0.0251   -0.0238   0.0052   -0.0063   0.3458   0.3077   0.5010   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–200 
 
Table-A 7.59 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-1,+1] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0017                  -0.0171  -0.0081  -0.0084    
(0.1041) (-0.9817) (-0.4323) (-0.5535) 
 ED   -0.2622 ***               -0.3904 *** -0.3551 *** -0.4390 ***  
(-3.1042) 
 
(-3.9940) 
 
(-3.3260) 
 
(-5.3173) 
 
 Diffused     0.0031                -0.0438     
(0.1296) (-1.6793) 
 AS       -0.0019            -0.0593 **      
(-0.0858) (-2.1941) 
 
 Anglo         -0.0005              -0.0600 ***  
(-0.0255) (-2.8529) 
 
 CWT           -0.0055        -0.0190  -0.0144  -0.0162   
(-0.4189) (-1.2367) (-0.9334) (-1.1419) 
 Pct50             -0.0232      -0.0470  -0.0320  -0.0374   
(-0.8662) (-1.6559) (-0.9411) (-1.3972) 
 PctToe               0.0404    0.0543 * 0.0522 * 0.0626 **  
(1.1925) (1.9535) 
 
(1.8347) 
 
(2.3499) 
 
 Conglomerate                 -0.0032  -0.0122  -0.0098  -0.0051   
(-0.2169) (-0.7019) (-0.5802) (-0.3085) 
 Intercept 0.0085  0.0239 ** 0.0067  0.0106  0.0095  0.0111  0.0142 ** 0.0041  0.0096  0.0955 ** 0.0745 * 0.0872 ***  
(0.8431) (2.6157) 
 
(0.2946) (0.5141) (0.5428) (0.9610) (2.1369) 
 
(0.4830) (1.0836) (2.5488) 
 
(2.0434) 
 
(3.2473) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0108  9.6360  0.0168  0.0074  0.0006  0.1755  0.7504  1.4220  0.0471  4.7208  3.1003  12.3522  
 p-value 0.9177  0.0038 *** 0.8976  0.9321  0.9798  0.6778  0.3923  0.2416  0.8295  0.0015 *** 0.0156 ** 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0283   0.1779   -0.0278   -0.0283   -0.0285   -0.0253   0.0153   -0.0057   -0.0280   0.3007   0.2018   0.3365   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–201 
 
Table-A 7.60 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-3,+3] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   
 Cash -0.0154                  -0.0414 * -0.0360 * -0.0349 *  
(-0.8761) (-1.7663) 
 
(-1.7132) 
 
(-1.8257) 
 
 ED   -0.1510 ***               -0.2785 *** -0.2660 *** -0.3074 ***  
(-3.1169) 
 
(-3.6238) 
 
(-3.1658) 
 
(-3.3360) 
 
 Diffused     0.0015                -0.0353     
(0.0787) (-1.4946) 
 AS       0.0009            -0.0421       
(0.0484) (-1.4859) 
 Anglo         -0.0007              -0.0411   
(-0.0372) (-1.6714) 
 CWT           -0.0067        -0.0306  -0.0277  -0.0285   
(-0.4110) (-1.6350) (-1.5736) (-1.6371) 
 Pct50             -0.0278      -0.0291  -0.0190  -0.0221   
(-0.9362) (-0.7154) (-0.4877) (-0.5828) 
 PctToe               0.0167    -0.0063  -0.0095  -0.0001   
(0.3663) (-0.1372) (-0.2166) (-0.0033) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0254  0.0163  0.0180  0.0213   
(1.4782) (0.8490) (1.0214) (1.2345) 
 Intercept -0.0018  0.0005  -0.0092  -0.0087  -0.0076  -0.0057  -0.0020  -0.0078  -0.0115  0.0739 * 0.0637 * 0.0664 *  
(-0.1566) (0.0422) (-0.5675) (-0.6015) (-0.5631) (-0.4660) (-0.2682) (-0.9197) (-1.1728) (1.7783) 
 
(1.8483) 
 
(2.0378) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.7675  9.7149  0.0062  0.0023  0.0014  0.1689  0.8764  0.1342  2.1852  5.3778  5.7046  4.1143  
 p-value 0.3870  0.0036 *** 0.9378  0.9617  0.9705  0.6836  0.3556  0.7165  0.1483  0.0006 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0034 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0069   0.0257   -0.0284   -0.0285   -0.0285   -0.0247   0.0213   -0.0262   0.0001   0.0989   0.0674   0.1074   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–202 
 
Table-A 7.61 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-5,+5] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash 0.0016                  -0.0120  -0.0080  -0.0037   
(0.0905) (-0.5405) (-0.3833) (-0.1816) 
 ED   -0.1105 *               -0.2007 ** -0.1963 ** -0.1607 *  
(-1.9252) 
 
(-2.7058) 
 
(-2.6823) 
 
(-2.0277) 
 
 Diffused     -0.0015                -0.0306 *    
(-0.0934) (-1.7310) 
 
 AS       -0.0023            -0.0342 *      
(-0.1517) (-1.7230) 
 
 Anglo         0.0082              -0.0157   
(0.5335) (-0.7871) 
 CWT           0.0109        -0.0006  0.0016  0.0027   
(0.6091) (-0.0270) (0.0726) (0.1210) 
 Pct50             -0.0362 **     -0.0126  -0.0046  -0.0036   
(-2.2178) 
 
(-0.4792) (-0.1789) (-0.1366) 
 PctToe               -0.0490 *   -0.0725 * -0.0760 * -0.0650   
(-1.7799) 
 
(-1.7366) 
 
(-1.8942) 
 
(-1.6846) 
 Conglomerate                0.0559 ** 0.0554 ** 0.0567 ** 0.0583 **    
(2.0661) 
 
(2.1021) 
 
(2.1240) 
 
(2.1311) 
 
 Intercept -0.0092  -0.0023  -0.0074  -0.0068  -0.0143  -0.0124  -0.0007  -0.0043  -0.0161 * 0.0345  0.0284  0.0100   
(-0.7402) (-0.2012) (-0.6484) (-0.6696) (-1.5307) (-1.0528) (-0.0674) (-0.4179) (-1.8150) 
 
(1.0609) (0.9702) (0.3577) 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0082  3.7065  0.0087  0.0230  0.2847  0.3710  4.9188  3.1679  4.2686  3.1869  3.2049  2.0523  
 p-value 0.9284  0.0624 * 0.9261  0.8803  0.5970  0.5464  0.0332 ** 0.0843 * 0.0463 ** 0.0136 ** 0.0133 ** 0.0847 * 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0283   -0.0009   -0.0284   -0.0282   -0.0235   -0.0188   0.0519   -0.0025   0.1037   0.0646   0.0537   0.0219   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–203 
 
Table-A 7.62 Univariate Regression Analysis; OLS CAARs [-7,+7] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   
 Cash -0.0041                  -0.0064  -0.0076  -0.0079    
(-0.1446) (-0.1809) (-0.2311) (-0.2441) 
 ED   -0.0221                -0.0040  -0.0102  -0.0093   
(-0.2369) (-0.0230) (-0.0534) (-0.0446) 
 Diffused     0.0108                0.0040     
(0.3807) (0.0849) 
 AS       0.0087            0.0065       
(0.3242) (0.1377) 
 Anglo         0.0080              0.0036   
(0.3099) (0.0783) 
 CWT           -0.0269        -0.0177  -0.0183  -0.0183   
(-0.9663) (-0.5013) (-0.5215) (-0.5302) 
 Pct50             0.0194      0.0225  0.0208  0.0210   
(0.5655) (0.5221) (0.5077) (0.5111) 
 PctToe               -0.0533    -0.0728  -0.0730  -0.0742   
(-0.5334) (-0.7280) (-0.7204) (-0.7519) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0055  0.0218  0.0215  0.0212   
(0.1068) (0.3972) (0.3916) (0.3845) 
 Intercept -0.0208  -0.0212  -0.0309  -0.0291  -0.0281  -0.0130  -0.0267  -0.0221  -0.0232  -0.0236  -0.0204  -0.0196   
(-1.0880) (-1.1642) (-1.3670) (-1.4390) (-1.5730) (-0.7000) (-1.6598) (-1.4988) (-1.5912) (-0.3788) (-0.3362) (-0.3535) 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0209  0.0561  0.1449  0.1051  0.0960  0.9338  0.3197  0.2845  0.0114  0.3886  0.4001  0.3814  
 p-value 0.8859  0.8141  0.7058  0.7477  0.7585  0.3405  0.5754  0.5973  0.9155  0.9008  0.8938  0.9051  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0280   -0.0281   -0.0257   -0.0266   -0.0266   -0.0047   -0.0194   -0.0182   -0.0281   -0.2084   -0.2088   -0.2089   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–204 
 
Table-A 7.63 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [0,+1] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   [0,+1]   
 Cash -0.0040                  -0.0274 * -0.0210  -0.0209   
(-0.2777) (-1.7682) 
 
(-1.3351) (-1.5779) 
 ED   -0.2429 **               -0.4373 *** -0.4336 *** -0.5251 ***  
(-2.4855) 
 
(-3.5486) 
 
(-3.1989) 
 
(-6.5599) 
 
 Diffused     -0.0055                -0.0526 **    
(-0.2098) (-2.2068) 
 
 AS       -0.0070            -0.0575 **      
(-0.2965) (-2.5844) 
 
 Anglo         -0.0107              -0.0695 ***  
(-0.5219) (-4.1370) 
 
 CWT           0.0046        -0.0117  -0.0081  -0.0100   
(0.3400) (-0.7467) (-0.5126) (-0.7487) 
 Pct50             -0.0130      -0.0164  -0.0031  -0.0092   
(-0.4778) (-0.9350) (-0.1474) (-0.6046) 
 PctToe               0.0457    0.0221  0.0157  0.0285   
(1.0499) (0.6671) (0.5089) (1.0057) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0215  0.0111  0.0133  0.0188   
(1.5592) (0.8203) (1.0041) (1.5014) 
 Intercept 0.0070  0.0190 ** 0.0096  0.0106  0.0128  0.0037  0.0082  0.0048  0.0024  0.0924 *** 0.0836 ** 0.0962 ***  
(0.6165) (2.1185) 
 
(0.3816) (0.4726) (0.6702) (0.3422) (1.2916) (0.6030) (0.2850) (2.9693) 
 
(2.6591) 
 
(4.3634) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0771  6.1778  0.0440  0.0879  0.2724  0.1156  0.2283  1.1022  2.4312  2.5437  2.1109  9.9678  
 p-value 0.7829  0.0179 ** 0.8351  0.7686  0.6050  0.7359  0.6358  0.3014  0.1279  0.0379 ** 0.0769 * 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0266   0.1584   -0.0260   -0.0240   -0.0166   -0.0261   -0.0141   0.0027   -0.0012   0.3210   0.2874   0.4634   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–205 
 
Table-A 7.64 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-1,+1] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   
 Cash 0.0040                  -0.0161  -0.0075  -0.0081   
(0.2465) (-0.8854) (-0.3879) (-0.5251) 
 ED   -0.2585 ***               -0.3854 *** -0.3504 *** -0.4378 ***  
(-3.3586) 
 
(-4.0385) 
 
(-3.3677) 
 
(-5.2112) 
 
 Diffused     0.0036                -0.0409     
(0.1494) (-1.5562) 
 AS       -0.0016            -0.0561 **      
(-0.0736) (-2.0544) 
 
 Anglo         -0.0010              -0.0586 **  
(-0.0538) (-2.7561) 
 
 CWT           -0.0046        -0.0200  -0.0157  -0.0176   
(-0.3411) (-1.2667) (-0.9873) (-1.2102) 
 Pct50             -0.0286      -0.0453  -0.0311  -0.0366   
(-1.0668) (-1.5533) (-0.9083) (-1.3368) 
 PctToe               0.0401    0.0541 * 0.0524 * 0.0617 **  
(1.1409) (1.8775) 
 
(1.8276) 
 
(2.2329) 
 
 Conglomerate                 0.0015  -0.0083  -0.0060  -0.0014   
(0.0942) (-0.4424) (-0.3259) (-0.0801) 
 Intercept 0.0100  0.0262 *** 0.0089  0.0129  0.0124  0.0133  0.0179 ** 0.0080  0.0115  0.0957 ** 0.0752 * 0.0897 ***  
(0.9748) (2.7771) 
 
(0.3957) (0.6347) (0.7128) (1.1290) (2.5999) 
 
(0.9246) (1.2692) (2.5251) 
 
(2.0483) 
 
(3.3197) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0608  11.2804  0.0223  0.0054  0.0029  0.1163  1.1380  1.3017  0.0089  6.5102  4.2890  12.5038  
 p-value 0.8068  0.0019 *** 0.8821  0.9417  0.9574  0.7351  0.2934  0.2621  0.9255  0.0002 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0000 *** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0268   0.1625   -0.0276   -0.0284   -0.0285   -0.0263   0.0347   -0.0068   -0.0285   0.2675   0.1789   0.3130   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–206 
 
Table-A 7.65 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-3,+3] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   [-3,+3]   
 Cash -0.0150                  -0.0388  -0.0343  -0.0349 *  
(-0.7914) (-1.5394) (-1.5289) (-1.7173) 
 
 ED   -0.1397 **               -0.2647 *** -0.2528 *** -0.3179 ***  
(-2.4141) 
 
(-3.1183) 
 
(-2.7798) 
 
(-2.9535) 
 
 Diffused     0.0023                -0.0284     
(0.1143) (-1.2217) 
 AS       0.0014            -0.0345       
(0.0727) (-1.1981) 
 Anglo         -0.0039              -0.0419 *  
(-0.2098) (-1.7662) 
 
 CWT           -0.0006        -0.0261  -0.0237  -0.0251   
(-0.0348) (-1.3016) (-1.2577) (-1.4026) 
 Pct50             -0.0338      -0.0209  -0.0126  -0.0166   
(-0.9527) (-0.4700) (-0.3030) (-0.4154) 
 PctToe               0.0285    0.0009  -0.0015  0.0048   
(0.5867) (0.0177) (-0.0304) (0.0913) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0361  0.0253  0.0267  0.0299   
(1.6496) (1.2103) (1.3491) (1.5075) 
 Intercept 0.0044  0.0062  -0.0035  -0.0027  0.0011  -0.0015  0.0056  -0.0003  -0.0066  0.0697  0.0607  0.0721 **  
(0.3118) (0.4886) (-0.2135) (-0.1877) (0.0785) (-0.1060) (0.7349) (-0.0314) (-0.6107) (1.5802) (1.6825) (2.1908) 
 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.6263  5.8278  0.0131  0.0053  0.0440  0.0012  0.9077  0.3442  2.7213  3.4628  3.9029  2.8376  
 p-value 0.4341  0.0211 ** 0.9096  0.9424  0.8350  0.9724  0.3473  0.5614  0.1080  0.0089 *** 0.0046 *** 0.0236 ** 
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0123   0.0082   -0.0283   -0.0285   -0.0276   -0.0285   0.0298   -0.0190   0.0174   0.0768   0.0549   0.1226   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
7–207 
 
Table-A 7.66 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-5,+5] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   [-5,+5]   
 Cash -0.0003                  -0.0085  -0.0057  -0.0038   
(-0.0126) (-0.3024) (-0.2186) (-0.1521) 
 ED   -0.1061                -0.1836 * -0.1793 * -0.1762   
(-1.3701) (-1.7444) 
 
(-1.7499) 
 
(-1.4927) 
 Diffused     0.0023                -0.0205     
(0.1328) (-0.9773) 
 AS       0.0010            -0.0234       
(0.0559) (-0.9582) 
 Anglo         0.0065              -0.0163   
(0.3701) (-0.7284) 
 CWT           0.0168        0.0053  0.0068  0.0071   
(0.8238) (0.2033) (0.2654) (0.2754) 
 Pct50             -0.0381 *     -0.0010  0.0045  0.0041   
(-1.8203) 
 
(-0.0280) (0.1432) (0.1302) 
 PctToe               -0.0348    -0.0652  -0.0674  -0.0608   
(-1.2052) (-1.1361) (-1.1871) (-1.0977) 
 Conglomerate                0.0711 ** 0.0701 ** 0.0710 ** 0.0724 **    
(2.2382) 
 
(2.3670) 
 
(2.3744) 
 
(2.3850) 
 
 Intercept 0.0031  0.0089  0.0012  0.0022  -0.0016  -0.0030  0.0112  0.0076  -0.0066  0.0298  0.0251  0.0188   
(0.2068) (0.6489) (0.1021) (0.2221) (-0.1635) (-0.2078) (0.9116) (0.6326) (-0.6420) (0.7005) (0.6710) (0.5681) 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0002  1.8772  0.0176  0.0031  0.1370  0.6786  3.3136  1.4524  5.0095  1.8514  1.8205  1.5833  
 p-value 0.9900  0.1794  0.8951  0.9558  0.7135  0.4157  0.0773 * 0.2367  0.0317 ** 0.1179  0.1241  0.1830  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0286   -0.0103   -0.0283   -0.0285   -0.0263   -0.0118   0.0353   -0.0200   0.1245   0.0208   0.0164   0.0121   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
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Table-A 7.67 Univariate Regression Analysis; MM CAARs [-7,+7] - Indian Acquirers 
  CAAR 
Windows: 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   
  [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   [-7,+7]   
 Cash -0.0022                  0.0008  -0.0023  -0.0055   
(-0.0748) (0.0201) (-0.0665) (-0.1557) 
 ED   -0.0292                0.0189  0.0116  -0.0187   
(-0.2312) (0.1067) (0.0605) (-0.0815) 
 Diffused     0.0184                0.0202     
(0.6393) (0.4277) 
 AS       0.0157            0.0241       
(0.5750) (0.4971) 
 Anglo         0.0097              0.0084   
(0.3565) (0.1665) 
 CWT           -0.0229        -0.0149  -0.0165  -0.0174   
(-0.8614) (-0.4117) (-0.4629) (-0.5098) 
 Pct50             0.0139      0.0347  0.0289  0.0279   
(0.3920) (0.7304) (0.6576) (0.6350) 
 PctToe               -0.0377    -0.0584  -0.0565  -0.0641   
(-0.3878) (-0.6441) (-0.6075) (-0.6965) 
 Conglomerate                 0.0229  0.0387  0.0377  0.0368   
(0.4660) (0.7893) (0.7701) (0.7502) 
 Intercept -0.0040  -0.0032  -0.0192  -0.0167  -0.0116  0.0032  -0.0078  -0.0032  -0.0079  -0.0281  -0.0222  -0.0080   
(-0.2074) (-0.1728) (-0.8351) (-0.8092) (-0.5914) (0.1612) (-0.4862) (-0.2108) (-0.5321) (-0.4192) (-0.3506) (-0.1276) 
  Observations 37   37   37   37   37   37   37   35   37   35   35   35   
 F-Statistics 0.0056  0.0534  0.4088  0.3307  0.1271  0.7420  0.1536  0.1504  0.2172  0.4126  0.4242  0.3637  
 p-value 0.9408  0.8185  0.5268  0.5689  0.7236  0.3949  0.6974  0.7007  0.6441  0.8860  0.8786  0.9153  
  Adj. R-Squared -0.0284   -0.0278   -0.0205   -0.0222   -0.0258   -0.0117   -0.0239   -0.0245   -0.0199   -0.1891   -0.1920   -0.1976   
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01               
  
 
 
 
